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A dissertation entitled

INTERPRETING MAHĀYĀNA SYNCRETISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ŚĀNTARAKṢITA'S *THE ORNAMENT FOR THE MIDDLE WAY* IN INDIAN AND TIBETAN CONTEXTS

submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

James A. Blumenthal

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INTERPRETING MAHĀYĀNA SYNCRETISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ŚĀNTARAKSITA'S *THE ORNAMENT FOR THE MIDDLE WAY* IN INDIAN AND TIBETAN CONTEXTS

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

(Languages and Cultures of Asia: Religious Studies)

at the

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1999

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Over the course of the 1500 years immediately following the enlightenment of the historic Buddha, Śākyamuni (500 BCE), several distinct schools of Buddhist philosophical thought emerged on the subcontinent. This variance in schools was not only a response to the fact that the canon of Buddhist Sūtras, considered to be the words of Śākyamuni, portrayed the Buddhist presentation of truth in a variety of ways. The various Indian Buddhist schools also emerged over the centuries in response to one another and to the writings of the prolific Indian Buddhist pandits whose canonized texts represented the foundational standpoints of these schools. As the Buddhist tradition evolved in India and spread throughout Asia, these schools of thought were interpreted, represented and systematized in a variety of ways by the various inheritors of the tradition. One of the many unique qualities of the Tibetan tradition is the marked emphasis placed on this *śāstra* literature of these later Indian pandits. This study investigates one of the most important Indian Buddhist *śāstras*, Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament For The Middle Way* (Skt. *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, Tib. *dbU ma rgyan*) in both its Indian and Tibetan contexts.

The Bengali Buddhist pandit Śāntarakṣita (8th CE) and his major text *The Ornament For The Middle Way* hold a central place in the history and formation of Indian Buddhist philosophical doctrine and specifically in the evolution of Mahāyāna thought. His text held a similarly central yet distinct position in the history and development of Buddhism and Buddhist doctrine in Tibet. Considered as the foundational or root text of the sub-school of

Mādhyamika thought known in Tibet as Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, the text contains several key characteristics which signal its importance to Buddhists in both India and Tibet.

As the foundational text of the final major development in Indian Mādhyamika, Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament of The Middle Way* offers the first clear exposition of a system which integrates three of the most important developments in Indian Mahāyāna into one syncretic system. This occurs after more than a millennium of the evolution of Buddhist thought on the sub-continent. This bridging together of Yogācāra with Mādhyamika into one system while maintaining the superiority of the Mādhyamika system for the ultimate understanding of reality and simultaneously incorporating formal Buddhist logic offered a new Mahāyāna hermeneutic which at this point was needed in order to respond to the growth of the Yogācāra school which had been present in India since the fifth century. Mādhyamikans needed to respond to this Mahāyāna development and the hermeneutical framework Yogācārans employed based on the *Sūtra Unraveling The Thought* (Skt. *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*). Śāntarakṣita's response was found to be quite satisfactory by many leading Mādhyamikans at that time in India. Not only does Śāntarakṣita integrate Yogācāra and Mādhyamika thought with formalized Buddhist logic into one coherent system, but he also valorizes the importance of studying lower Buddhist schools as integral stepping stones on the ascent to the ultimately correct view of Mādhyamika. The influence of this position in Tibet via later Indian pandits such as Atiśa can still clearly be seen today in the monastic curriculum of the dGe-lugs pa[1] school among others.

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[1] There has been some debate in recent years over the name of the school of Tibetan Buddhism which is commonly known today both within the school and to the wider community as *dGe-lugs*. Some have argued that it should rightfully be referred to as *dGa'-ldan-pa* as the first followers of Tsong-kha-pa were called after the founding of his first monastery, *dGa'-ldan* in 1409. This argument is strengthened by the fact that the first appearance of the name, 'dGe-lugs' did not occur until the late 16th century. See L.W.J. van der Kuijp, "Mincellanea Apropos of the Philosophy of Mind in Tibet: Mind In Tibetan Buddhism," *Tibet Journal,* 10, no. 1 (1985), pp. 32-43. Others have argued that as a reopening of Atīśa's lineage it should be called The New Kadampa (*bKa'-gdams gSar*-ma) as it once was and is sometimes still referred to as today. dGe-lugs-pa's often refer to themselves as the New bKa'-gdams tradition, tracing their lineage back

In addition to a new and responsive Mādhyamika hermeneutic, we find in the first sixty-two verses of *The Ornament of The Middle Way*, a clear and perhaps the quintessential exposition of the famous 'neither one nor many' argument against the existence of any real or true nature in entities. This, along with the 'diamond slither' argument, is one of the classic Mādhyamika logical formulations aimed at establishing the emptiness (Skt. *śūnyatā*) of all phenomena. Making his way through the six classical non-Buddhist Indian philosophical systems and then through the lower Buddhist systems Śāntarakṣita puts them all up against the test of this argument in which he aims to demonstrate that the entities that these systems assert to be real in fact are not real at all or have no real nature because they have no single nor plural nature. If an entity has neither a singular nature nor a plural nature it is asserted that it must have no nature at all since these categories include all possibilities and are likewise mutually exclusive.

Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament of The Middle Way* also held a position of prominence in Tibetan Buddhist philosophical understanding during the period of the early dissemination of Buddhism into that country. This was in part because Śāntarakṣita himself was one of the key figures responsible for the transmission of Buddhism to Tibet. It was probably not until the tenth century when a second wave of Indian pandits including Atiśa (982-1054 CE) came to Tibet and the Buddhist canon was retranslated to include a broader selection of Indian *śātras*, that some of the privileging of Śāntarakṣita's position as the highest Buddhist philosophical explanation may have declined to some extent.

It has been commonplace for scholars to overlook the role of Śāntarakṣita's text in their analysis of the development of Tibetan Buddhist doctrine in favor of texts which hold a

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to Atiśa, Brom-ston pa and the bKa'-gdams school of the tenth and eleventh centuries. Tsong-kha-pa is said to have retrieved and reunified the three primary bKa'-gdams lineages which had previously been dispersed through three distinct lines tracing back to Brom-tston-pa, Atiśa's heart disciple and the founder of the school. While historical knowledge of the evolution of the name of the school is important, I will refer to the school in this study as 'dGe-lugs' given that this is the way the school which traces its lineage primarily back to Tsong-kha-pa most commonly refers to itself today.

more prominent position today in major (particularly dGe-lugs) monastic curriculums. Probably since the time of Atiśa and certainly since the time of Tsong-kha-pa (1357-1419 CE) the dominant philosophical discourse on Buddhist tenets in the Tibetan context has centered around the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika works of Chandrakīrti among others. The works of the great Indian pandits such as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Buddhapālita, Chandrakīrti, and Śāntideva are the primary ones investigated to penetrate the roots of Tibetan Mādhyamika and Dharmakīrti and Dignāga for it's famous marriage with logical analysis and valid cognition. For the purpose of illuminating contrasting Mādhyamika viewpoints and illuminating the Tibetan (usually dGe-lug) position by way of contrast and primarily for investigating the history of Indian Buddhist thought the works of several other important Buddhist thinkers have been studied. These include Mādhyamikans such as Bhāvaviveka and Jñānagarbha, Yogācārans such as Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla, as well as work on what Mahāyānists consider as the lower Buddhist schools through texts such as Vasubandhu's early encyclopedic work on Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣhika entitled *Abhidharmakośa.* But with few exceptions[2] has there been much investigation into Śāntarakṣita's system as outlined in *The Ornament For The Middle Way.* Likewise, there has been little scholarly investigation into the Mādhyamika works of his heart disciple Kamalaśīla who composed important commentaries on Śāntarakṣita's work as well as *śāstras* of his own including *The Illumination of the Middle Way* (Skt. *Mādhyamākāloka*, Tib. *dbU-ma snang-ba*) and *The Stages of Meditation* (Skt. *Bhāvanākrama,* Tib. *Gom-pa'i rim-pa*). This is of course quite puzzling given the authority of Śāntarakṣita's text as outlining the final major development in Indian Buddhist thought on the sub-continent and the fact that he and Kamalaśīla are considered to be the most authoritative voices of that development, the

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[2] See for example works specifically on *Mādhyamakālaṃkāra* such as (Ichigo) 1972, 1989; (Lipman) 1979, works on the history of Mādhyamika such as (Ruegg) 1980, 1981 and works on dGe-lug tenet system literature which addresses Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika such as (Hopkins) 1983; (Lopez) 1987; (Sopa and Hopkins) 1989; (Cabezon) 1992; (Newland), 1992; (Klein) 1994; and (Cozort) 1998.

school of thought commonly known as Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika[3]. It is all the more surprising given the central role Śāntarakṣita and his ideas have played in the development of Buddhism and Buddhist philosophical inquiry in Tibet.

The purpose of this dissertation is to generate an accurate understanding in both Indian and Tibetan contexts of Śāntarakṣita's views expressed in *The Ornament Of The Middle Way*. While earlier trends and influences on such thought can be traced back to Āryavimuktisena in the sixth century who composed an important commentary on *The Ornament For Clear Realization* (Skt. *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*) and is held to have been a student of Dignaga, Bhāvaviveka, and even Vasubandhu[4], it is in Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament Of The Middle Way* that we find the first clear exposition of a Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika position. Perhaps the most unique feature of this school of thought, as mentioned above, is its synthesis of the three major currents in the Indian Mahāyāna thought of its day. Writing at a time when the Buddhist logic of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti had been formalized and widely accepted as appropriate modes of philosophical analysis and when Yogācāra thought had gained wide currency, Mādhyamikans needed to respond. Śāntarakṣita did so in *The Ornament Of The Middle Way* by proposing a unique Mahāyāna syncretism which valorized the use of formal Buddhist logic including both

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[3] The use of the term 'Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika' (Tib. *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa*) which is frequently abbreviated to simply Yogācāra-Mādhyamika (Tib. *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma*) was not a term that Śāntarakṣita himself used to identify his particular exposition on Mādhyamika. In fact such a term designating a sub-school of Mādhyamika thought is found first in the early Tibetan doxographical literature on the subject. It is not at all clear that such divisions were so precisely designated in the Indian context and that *śāstra* composers such as Śāntarakṣita, Chandrakirti, Bhavaviveka, etc., though clearly in disagreement on important points, ever thought of themselves as other than simply Mādhyamikans. We do find evidence of a distinction between Sautrantika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans and Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans in the early Tibetan doxographical literature and between Prasangika-Mādhyamikans and Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans in the tenth century in writings of the Indian pandit, Atiśa, such as his *Special Instructions on Mādhyamika* (Skt. *Mādhyamikaopadesa*, Tib. *dbU ma'i man sngag*). This subject will be taken up again later in the third chapter of this study.

[4] David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Mādhyamika School of Philosophy in India*, (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), p. 87.

autonomous syllogisms and consequentialist arguments, and incorporated aspects of Yogācāra epistemology in its description of conventional truth while still maintaining a Mādhyamika standpoint for the final explanation of ultimate truth.

This study aims to understand and contextualize these developments from the hermeneutical perspectives of two distinct areas within the history of Buddhism. The first is of course Śāntarakṣita's own perspective. Here we are investigating the arguments made in *The Ornament of The Middle Way* and *The Auto-Commentary on The Ornament of the Middle Way* on their own terms and within the context and framework of 8th century India's fervent doctrinal discourse. From this perspective it is apparent that Śāntarakṣita, as the abbot of Vikramaśīla, one of the largest and most important monasteries in India at that time, offered what he considered to be a clear, well reasoned presentation of Buddhism's highest and most comprehensive philosophical position. This he based primarily on logical reasoning but founded of course on scriptural sources from which he quotes extensively in his *Auto-commentary* as a means of providing support for his arguments.

The hermeneutical stance of Śāntarakṣita, who aims to present a Mādhyamika position to be considered as the final, highest and most authoritative Buddhist philosophical position stands in contrast to the way his system is presented within the framework of the Buddhist philosophical analysis of the dGe-lugs school of Tibetan Buddhism. One of the primary factors in my decision to juxtapose Śāntarakṣita's own presentation with the dGe-lugs school's presentation of this philosophical system is the strong contrast apparent in the two perspectives. The study of such a contrast leads to significant insights into Buddhist philosophical developments in Tibet and insights into Śāntarakṣita's own views. By comparing Śāntarkṣita's own presentation of his views (and those of early Tibetan inheritors of the tradition) with the presentation of his views by a school which emerges after five centuries of Mādhyamika discourse in Tibet we also are able to extrapolate valuable insights into the process and content of Mādhyamika evolution in Tibet. The dGe-lugs school does

not consider Śāntarakṣita's views as representative of Buddhism's highest philosophical stance. In the dGe-lugs hierarchy of Buddhist views the sub-school of Mādhyamika which is said to find its foundational exposition in his *The Ornament of The Middle Way* is clearly a notch below the correct view, the Prasaṇgika-Mādhyamika. Extensive space in the dGe-lugs philosophical literature is given specifically to rejecting many of Śāntarakṣita's central assertions. A comparison of the two presentations offers a unique opportunity to then penetrate some of the core issues of the school which emerge as a result of the contrasting perspectives taken on these contentious issues. Therefore with Śāntarakṣita's text and the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school serving as a backdrop I intend also to deduce insights beyond the key issues of Śāntarakṣita's system, and into dGe-lugs hermeneutics and the politics of representation of philosophical matters within the dGe-lugs school.

I have developed a new model within this study for contextualizing the dGe-lugs commentarial literature on Śāntarakṣita's writings and the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school. Śāntarakṣita, as mentioned above, represents the views expressed in his text *The Ornament of The Middle Way* as an explanation of the correct understanding of Mādhyamika philosophy, the highest Buddhist philosophical position, and the ultimate expression of the nature of reality. The dGe-lugs school of Tibetan Buddhism disagrees. In discussing the dGe-lugs interpretive stance with regards to the Yogācāra-Svātatrika-Mādhyamika school and specifically Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament of The Middle Way,* I maintain that within the dGe-lugs pa school we find three distinct yet related pedagogical perspectives. The first such perspective is found in the two direct dGe-lugs pa commentaries on Śāntarakṣita's root text: rGyal-tshab's *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'* (Tib. *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*) and Tsong-kha-pa's *Notes On The Ornament For The Middle Way* (Tib. *dbU ma rgyan gyi zin bris*). Here the intention and purpose of the commentator is to represent, elucidate and explain as faithfully as possible the original meaning and intentions of the author of the root text upon which they are commenting. The

purpose is to mirror Śāntarakṣita's position in an explanatory style so as to render as faithfully as possible the intended meaning of the positions of one of the great Indian Mādhyamikans. These are explanatory texts illuminating a portion of the history of Indian Buddhist ideas. There is no criticism or refutation of Śāntarakṣita's positions nor hint or allusion to a higher position in these dGe-lugs representations. This is in spite of the fact that it is considered a penultimate philosophical view from the dGe-lugs pa perspective, being of course below the highest view, the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika (Tib. *dbu ma thal gyur*). These texts, read in conjunction with Śāntarakṣita's own root text are the sources which dGe-lugs pas turn to when attempting to get at Śāntarakṣita's own intended meaning.

The second category of pedagogical hermeneutics found within the dGe-lugs school is presented in a layer of textual commentaries once removed from commentaries on the original root text. These include not only tenet system texts such as lCang-skya's *Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets* (Tib. *Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bshag pa gsal bar bshad pa*), 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-ba's *Explanation of Tenets* (Tib. *Grub pa'i rnam bshad pa*) and dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po's *A Precious Garland Explaining Tenets* (Tib. *Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam bar bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba*) but also general dGe-lugs pa treatises on Mādhyamika and Mahāyāna philosophy such as Tsong-kha-pa's "Special Insight" (Tib. *lHag mthong*) chapter from *The Great (Exposition On) The Stages of the Path To Enlightenment* (Tib. *byang chub lam gyi rim pa chen mo*) and his *Essence of Eloquent Explanations: A Treatise Discerning The Interpretable and the Definitive* (Tib. *Drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par bhye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po*). Included as well would be his disciple mKhas-grub's *A Dose of Emptiness Opening The Eyes of the Fortunate Ones: A Treatise Powerfully Illuminating The Profound Emptiness* (Tib. *sTong thun chen mo Zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed*). In addition the monastic text books (Tib. *yig cha*) used as supplements and study material for understanding tenets would also be included in this category. The intention in

this genre of dGe-lugs commentarial literature is to lead the student on an ascent to the highest Buddhist philosophical position, in other words, Prasaṇgika-Mādhyamika according the dGe-lugs school. Though not all of these texts are specifically tenet system texts (Skt. *siddhānta*, Tib *grub mtha*) they do all function in that manner. Jose Cabezon insightfully points out that, "in the scholastic tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, especially in the literature of the dGe-lugs sect, the *siddhānta* schematization served as a de facto canonization of Buddhist philosophy that came to define what was philosophically normative."[5] Not only do they serve to canonize the philosophical schools to be investigated and to be included among the hierarchy of views, but these texts also serve as de facto canonical reference points for the proper understanding of these views which serve as stepping stones in the ascent to the correct view. The purpose of studying lower Buddhist schools in this context is to develop an understanding of them which serves as a part of the path to the correct view, the attainment of which is an absolutely indispensable aspect of the path to enlightenment and Buddhahood. In the dGe-lugs tradition, understanding of lower Buddhist schools ripens the mind for ascent to understanding progressively higher schools and ultimately to understanding the highest, Prasaṇgika-Mādhyamika. Therefore the philosophical investigation serves the soteriological purpose of aiding the student in identifying his/her precise misunderstanding of the nature of reality which binds him or her to saṃsāra, thus precluding any sort of liberation or Buddhahood. This genre of texts is specifically structured around this soteriological intent. It is important to remember also as a reference point for dGe-lugs pa hermeneutics that based on the inspiration of Atiśa and his seminal text, *A Lamp For The Path To Enlightenment* (Skt. *Bodhipathapradīpa*, Tib. *Byang chub lam sgron*) Tsong-kha-pa, the founder of the dGe-lugs school, saw the integration of all

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[5] Jose Ignacio Cabezon, "The Canonization of Philosophy and the Rhetoric of *Siddhānta* in Tibetan Buddhism," *Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota*, (San Francisco: Buddhist Books International, 1991), p. 8.

Buddhist schools into one larger Buddhist path as the correct interpretive framework for the Buddhist path as a whole. And it is interesting to note a similar though not identical tone in Śāntarakṣita's own thought which aims to integrate the three major developments of Indian Mahāyāna including aspects of Yogācāra epistemology, Mādhyamika ontology and formal Buddhist logic for reasoned analysis of reality. Śāntarakṣita also stresses the importance of studying the lower Buddhist schools since they are considered quite effective stepping stones on the ascent to the correct view.

The organization of Buddhist schools within this dGe-lugs genre of literature into four major schools (Vaibhāṣhika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika) with a small number of sub-schools is in fact a streamlined approach to the vast corpus of Buddhist philosophical schools in India. It is not considered necessary for example for students to know all the finer details differentiating the eighteen schools of thought which had been synthesized first by Vasubandhu as the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣhika school in his *Abhidharmakośa,* and then simply as the Vaibhāṣhika, the lowest of the four Buddhist schools in the tenet system literature.[6] Rather basic outlines of schools on specific topics such as the definitions of the schools, an exposition of their sub-schools, the etymology of the name of the school, and assertions regarding their views as to the basis, path and the fruits of the path are studied in a defined structure. Under this rubric a number of topics are investigated, usually with some reference back to the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika presentation. These might include the various school's positions on the two truths, or their assertions with regard to epistemological issues, persons, consciousness, subjects, and objects, etc. Within this fabricated framework which clearly finds its reference point in the Prasaṇgika-Mādhyamika view and presentation, the four major Buddhist philosophical schools and their

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[6] For an detailed discussion of Tibetan tenet system texts, see Jeffrey Hopkins, "The Tibetan Genre of Doxography: Structuring A Worldview," *Tibetan Literature: Studies In Genre,* eds. Jose Ignacio Cabezon and Roger R. Jackson. (Ithaca:Snow Lion Publications, 1996), pp. 170-186.

sub-schools are presented. This framework allows for the student to clearly distinguish the subtle differences between schools on specific topics in a quite systematic manner so as to engender a smooth and skillful ascent to the correct view. While misrepresentation of lower schools is certainly not the aim in these presentations, neither is the goal to necessarily precisely mirror individual Indian Buddhist pandit's presentation of a philosophical system. Rather the purpose is to lay out generalized frameworks of philosophical systems which are offered to present themselves as steps on the graduated ascent to the correct view, the Prasaṇgika-Mādhyamika, which is considered to be the only view of real significance since it is only by realization of this position that the practitioner has a chance at Buddhahood.

This is not meant to suggest that the presentation of lower schools here is inaccurate. The presentations of tenets in this genre can generally be described as reasonably accurate accounts of Indian schools, though not mirrors of specific Indian authors such as Śāntarakṣita one hundred percent of the time. Unstated positions on issues are on occasion extrapolated or taken from other authors who are associated with the school in order to fit into this particular framework of presentation or emphasize particular points of distinction even though the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika represented in these dGe-lugs texts is most often represented as the view of Śāntarakṣita. This genre of texts represents general systems of thought, based perhaps on the rough views of groupings of scholars associated with a school of thought, but they do not represent the specific views of any particular pandit. The texts within this second category I have outlined of dGe-lugs philosophical literature do however also serve as reference points for debating against opponents holding these views, an endeavor which could only be successful if there exists a proper understanding of the views of those schools in these texts thus reinforcing the assertion of their general accuracy. But specific points of various authors from one school often were streamlined into a harmonious position to fit neatly into the categorical framework of the texts within this genre. And perhaps this harmonizing or extrapolating of assertions not

explicitly stated by the authors, or taken from various assertions of distinct authors and streamlined into one monolithic view with the intention of making specific points more clear was executed at the expense of complete accuracy to the original portrayal of a particular figure's view or the Indian view in its own context. The purpose of this generalizing of views in the literature of this genre however is to assist in carrying the student to the correct view, that of the Prasaṇgika-Mādhyamika. Therefore in the case of *The Ornament For The Middle Way,* we find that Tsong-kha-pa and rGyal-tshab's direct commentaries on the root text go to great pains to simply mirror with clarifying explanation the precise views expressed by Śāntarakṣita. When dGe-lugs commentators represent the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika within this second genre of literature once removed from direct commentaries on the root text, the goal of representation has changed from mirroring the expressed root text views. They instead offer a close proximation which more effectively helps the student approach specific topics in a manner conducive to understanding and engendering ascent to Prasaṇgika-Mādhyamika.

The third pedagogical stance found within the dGe-lugs school is that form of interpretive representation found in oral commentaries. This is best divided into two different sub-categories corresponding to the first two categories of dGe-lugs philosophical commentarial literature described above. The first hermeneutical position in oral commentary is found in that dGe-lugs oral commentary which comments either directly on the India root sources, in this case Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament For The Middle Way* and *The Auto-Commentary On The Ornament For The Middle Way* or on the direct dGe-lugs pa commentaries on those root Indian sources which in this case include two texts, rGyal-tshab's *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'* and Tsong-kha-pa's *Notes On The Ornament For The Middle Way.* The oral commentator here seems to have two simultaneous agendas which evolve into a melding of the two previously discussed hermeneutical and pedagogical frameworks. First s/he aims to describe and elucidate the

intended meaning of the root Indian sources which in our case is Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament For The Middle Way* and its auto-commentary. At the same time, interwoven into this is an understanding and agenda deeply informed by the dGe-lugs school's own tenet system literature which has served as the primary intellectual basis for training in Indian Buddhist philosophical schools. As such, on pivotal issues there is a unique harmonizing of the first two dGe-lugs hermeneutical stances, where we find a sincere attempt to accurately explain Śāntarakṣita's stated positions while simultaneously adding interpretations and meanings informed by tenet system texts and pointing out directly similarities and differences between Śāntarakṣita's position and that of the Prasaṇgika-Mādhyamika.

The second sub-category within this third dGe-lugs pedagogical stance is comprised of the oral commentary on the second category of composed philosophical commentarial literature which is one generation removed from direct commentaries on the specific Indian sources. This include oral commentary on both tenet system texts such as dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po's *A Precious Garland Explaining Tenets* as well as oral commentary on texts such as the "Special Insight" chapter of Tsong-kha-pa's *The Great (Exposition On) The Stages of the Path To Enlightenment.* Here the oral commentary mirrors the dGe-lugs pa texts and their agenda to lead the disciple to the correct understanding of the nature of reality which is considered to be best formulated and expressed as the Prasaṇgika-Mādhyamika school of Buddhist thought. In this sense the oral commentary here in terms of a hermeneutical and pedagogical stance reflects that of the second category of dGe-lugs pa hermeneutics in this outline. It aims to provide, from a qualified source, an explanation of the correct interpretation of the material presented. Correct interpretation here refers to the most efficacious use of the materials for the purpose of leading the student ultimately to the correct view, the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika. And the tried and tested framework for successfully accomplishing this goal within the dGe-lugs school is generally within the framework and outline of tenet systems as presented in the genre of tenet system texts which

take their inspiration from the writings of Tsong-kha-pa and often from his closest disciples including rGyal-tshab, mKhas-grub and dGe-'dun grub, the first Dalai Lama.

Both categories of oral commentary include certain qualities which written commentaries lack. They encompass an opportunity for the student to interact with the living tradition of the text and its living meaning which in abstract ways is embodied in the intellect of the qualified commentator. Nuances of the text are brought to full vitality. The student is offered entrance into the text through the eyes of one who has mastered it. Within the lineage of the teacher, the student is lead to the correct meaning and interpretation according to that lineage which can vary in accordance with the categories explained above according to the text. Traditional modes of explanation and common analogies are inserted at appropriate times and terse textual verse is richly explained in order to draw out the meaning. An important component of oral commentary, particularly in a one on one setting with a student and lama, and less frequently in larger public commentaries, is the space for questions by the student. The teacher, acting as a repository of the meaning of the text, offers the student an opportunity to interact with the text in a sense as a living entity. This is considered to be a precious and rare opportunity to engage in the teachings with a qualified teacher and an essential component to the acquisition of the correct understanding of the text. In light of the terse style that so many Buddhist philosophical texts are composed, oral commentary becomes a necessity. Perhaps one of the reasons the texts were originally composed in such a terse style, in addition to facilitating memorization of at outline of arguments, was to necessitate this sort of student/teacher interaction. Any investigation of doctrinal issues within the Tibetan Buddhist cultural complex in which oral commentarial traditions are so central, necessitates an element of orality in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the issues through the eyes of the tradition.

It is the goal of this study to fill significant gaps in modern Buddhological scholarship in a number of areas and to offer what I hope are compelling new insights into

Buddhist traditions that will aid the scholarly navigation of Buddhist philosophical materials. The present study is the first of its kind to examine the text, the views and the arguments of Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament of The Middle Way* by means of contrasting Śāntarakṣita's own presentation with the dGe-lugs pa school's presentation of his views. Given the prominent place of Śāntarakṣita's text within the history of Indian Buddhist thought and the corresponding prominence of the dGe-lugs pa interpreters within the Tibetan Buddhist cultural complex, I feel the present study is long overdue. My methodological approach which understands the dGe-lugs interpreters from a new perspective outlined in the tri-fold presentation of dGe-lugs pa hermeneutics above, offers a framework for understanding dGe-lugs pa philosophical literature which I feel will greatly facilitate an accurate investigation into both dGe-lugs pa positions and those of Indian pandits such as Śāntarakṣita when examined in partial dependence on dGe-lugs commentarial works. Too often in modern Buddhological research, Indian Śāstras have been examined in sole dependence on dGe-lugs commentarial literature without close examination of the Indian texts themselves and without a proper framework for contextualizing the et dGe-lugs works.

In addition to the methodological considerations which are present throughout this work, I have divided chapters along sectional lines. After this introduction and the methodology chapter, this work outlines a history of Mādhyamika thought in both India and Tibet discussing important persons and texts in their historical context so as to best be able to situate Śāntarakṣita within the two contexts of this study. The fourth chapter involves an extensive narrative account of the text *The Ornament For The Middle Way* which offers analysis of each stanza and argument of the root text. Here the emphasis is placed on illuminating Śāntarakṣita's presentation of his view on his own terms and extensive use of his own *Auto-Commentary on The Ornament For The Middle Way* (Skt. *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, Tib. *dbU ma'i rgyan gyi rang 'grel pa*) including liberal quotations offered for the first time in English translation are incorporated here. rGyal-

tshab's outline of topics and commentary are also incorporated here to facilitate ease in understanding and to demonstrate how this genre of dGe-lugs commentarial literature actually functions. The fifth chapter deals primarily with dGe-lugs criticisms of Śāntarakṣita's and/or the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school's tenets. This is examined to not only illuminate aspects of the dGe-lugs process of inquiry, but also to draw the focus in on the pivotal Mādhyamika issues which become areas of contention for fellow Mādhyamikans due to the fact that these issues highlight some of the most critical positions in the Mādhyamika view. Finally, this study includes complete translations of Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament For The Middle Way* and rGyal-tshab's *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'*.

While some important work has certainly been done on the root text of Śāntarakṣita's work in the Indian context, no exhaustive study has heretofore been executed. This is in contrast to Śāstra works of parallel importance to the history of Buddhist ideas such as those of Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, Chandrakīrti, or Bhāvaviveka. Thus, the primary aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive entrance to the thought of Śāntarakṣita and his text *The Ornament For The Middle Way* both in its own Indian context and through the contrasting interpretive context of the dGe-lugs school of Tibetan Buddhism.

Chapter 2

Methodology

The aim of this study is three-fold. First I will investigate the structure, ideas, arguments and views of Śāntarakṣita as expressed in his two texts, *The Ornament of The Middle Way* and *The Auto-Commentary on The Ornament of The Middle Way*. At this point this study will examine the texts and arguments in light of their place within the history of Indian Buddhist ideas, and particularly with consideration that those texts represent the final major development in Indian Buddhist thought and an important synthesis of three of the major trends in Buddhist thought in India at that time. Included, as mentioned above, for the purpose of increasing accessability to canonical sources in Western languages in general and particularly as a primary resource for readers of this study is a complete translation of *The Ornament of The Middle Way*. In addition I have included translations of significant sections from his *Auto-Commentary on The Ornament of The Middle Way* commenting on nearly every root text verse within the chapter of this work entitled "Analysis of Texts and Arguments".

Secondly this study examines the treatment and representation of these texts and their attendant school of thought, the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, by the dGe-lugs school of Tibetan Buddhism, first through use of the two direct dGe-lugs commentaries on Śāntarakṣita's text. These include Tsong-kha-pa's *Note's On 'The Ornament of The Middle Way'* (Tib. *dbU ma rgyan gyi zin bris*) and a full translation of rGyal-tshab's *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'* (Tib. *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*). In addition this study examines secondary dGe-lugs materials such as tenet system texts

(Tib. *grub mtha*) and other major dGe-lugs works on Mahāyāna philosophy. Finally, this portion also gives consideration to the extensive oral commentary I received on relevant texts from esteemed representatives of the dGe-lugs tradition over a period of two years. This section of the study will not only examine the way in which Śāntarakṣita's ideas are interpreted and represented within the dGe-lugs school, but also will investigate some of the major critiques dGe-lugs pas level against Śāntarakṣita's understanding of Mādhyamika.

Finally, in the process of investigating the perspectives, interpretations, and representations of this particular Mādhyamika school by both Śāntarakṣita himself and by his dGe-lugs commentators, this study aim to draw out key issues concerning the politics of hermeneutics, representation and pedagogy as they pertain to this school in India and Tibet. For example I investigate the dGe-lugs attribution of views to Śāntarakṣita which he never explicitly asserted and probe the possible reasons for why dGe-lug pas choose to interpret and represent Śāntarakṣita in specific ways which appear to diverge from his own words in the second genre of their commentarial literature on his views comprised primarily of tenet system texts. In addition, by zeroing in on issues of contention between Śāntarakṣita and his dGe-lugs interpreters this study draws out some of the fundamental features of this Mādhyamika school and is thus better able to elucidate its meaning across Buddhist traditions. Therefore, through this further examination of key features, I aim to not only present a richer and fuller understanding of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school and the texts upon which the tenet system is based, but also to offer a new framework for reading and contextualizing dGe-lugs philosophical commentarial literature, at least as it pertains to Śāntarakṣita and discussions of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika sub-school of Mādhyamika. In a historical and textual study of this sort it is therefore imperative that some discussion be directed toward the primary sources utilized and the parameters within which this study will be carried out.

Sources and Contexts

Śāntarakṣita's text *The Ornament For The Middle Way* is of course one of the most important texts in the Mahāyāna śāstra literature. It represents a pivotal period in the development of Buddhist philosophical thought. Śāntarakṣita responds to and incorporates Yogācāra epistemology and formal Buddhist logic into the Mādhyamika presentation of truth, thus developing what comes to be the final major development in Indian Mādhyamika. Furthermore, as a central figure in early transmission of the tradition to Tibet, his text also represented the apex of Indian Mādhyamika śāstric literature in Tibet during the period of the early dissemination of Buddhism in that country. Later Tibetan schools which relied on the New Translations (Tib. *gSar-ma*) of the Indian canon, including the dGe-lugs school, later rejected Śāntarakṣita's positions as Buddhism's highest expression of philosophical truth, in favor of Chandrakīrti's interpretations of Nāgārjuna's thought. Śāntarakṣita's views are nonetheless still the object of extensive study in dGe-lugs pa philosophical and commentarial literature and they still occupy a major topic of study in the dGe-lugs curriculum. Examining Śāntarakṣita's views through the eyes of his dGe-lugs critics offers the modern scholar an opportunity to investigate the process of Tibetan or more specifically, dGe-lugs hermeneutics within the larger field of Buddhist hermeneutics. In addition through the process of conducting a study of one Mādhyamika system as it is criticized by a competing Mādhyamika system, one is inevitably are drawn to penetrate into the subtle issues of doctrine and doctrinal difference. These are often most revealing for getting at the heart of the principal issues of the systems. Opponents maintaining similar yet distinct views offer invaluable critical insights into the pivotal issues of competing philosophical doctrines. This

is a primary reason for my choosing to investigate the dGe-lugs school's examination of Śāntarakṣita's views.

In this comparative study of Śāntarakṣita's views and dGe-lugs pa representations of those views I have relied on several distinct layers of primary sources. The first layer is of course Śāntarakṣita's root text, *The Ornament For The Middle Way* (Skt. *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* , Tib. *dbU ma rgyan*) and his own auto-commentary *The Auto-Commentary On The Ornament For The Middle Way* (Skt. *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* , Tib. *dbU ma'i rgyan gyi rang 'grel*). These must be the basis for all further analysis as they are Śāntarakṣita's own words on the subjects presented and this is what is considered as the root text of the school of thought being studied, namely, the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika (Tib. *mal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rang grgyud pa*). The Sanskrit texts are no longer extant but I have worked with Tibetan translations which were executed in Tibet during Śāntarakṣita's stay there by Śīlendrabodhi and Ye-shes-de, two of Śāntarakṣita's direct disciples. This study brackets the works of Śāntarakṣita's disciple Kamalaśīla who also composed a commentary on *The Ornament of The Middle Way* as well as an important treatise of his own which is considered to be of central importance to the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school, *The Illumination of The Middle Way* (Skt. *Madhyamakāloka*, Tib. *dbU ma snang ba*). While they are texts of primary importance to these late developments in Indian Buddhist thought they have been bracketed here for two reasons. First, this study aims to specifically investigate the thought of Śāntarakṣita as he himself expressed it and contrast that presentation of a view with the presentation of his thought made by authoritative representatives of the dGe-lugs pa school. Secondly, while further research would be needed to verify this thesis, I would postulate that an extensive study would show that Kamalaśīla's views may not be a simple mirror of Śāntarakṣita's view, further illuminating the same, but rather that such a study would show that his views

may more appropriately be considered as the foundation of a distinct sub-school of Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika.

The second layer of source materials and the first layer within the approach of the dGe-lugs school consists of direct dGe-lugs commentaries on the root text composed by the most authoritative voices in the dGe-lugs tradition. While subtle doctrinal differences are maintained between monastic colleges within the dGe-lugs school, the two figures who are universally accepted as authoritative by all dGe-lugs pas are Tsong-kha-pa, the opener of the dGe-lugs pa teachings and rGyal-tshab his heart disciple. There are direct commentaries on Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament of The Middle Way* attributed to each of them. These include Tsong-kha-pa's *Notes On 'The Ornament For The Middle Way '* (*dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*) and rGyal-tshab's *Recalling 'The Ornament For The Middle Way '* (*dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*). The etymology of the word 'notes' (Tib. *zin bris*) in the title of Tsong-kha-pa's text comes from '*zin*', 'to grasp', and '*bris*', 'to write'. The connotation of this as explained to me in oral commentary was that this text was transcribed word for word by rGyal-tshab from the oral teachings he received on Śāntarakṣita's root text from Tsong-kha-pa, as if he grasped the words out of the air and wrote them onto paper. The other commentary, *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'* is a composition by rGyal-tshab himself. However, he states at the end of the text that it is based directly on the oral teachings of his guru, Tsong-kha-pa. He writes:

> Having composed this [commentary] on the well taught *The Ornament For The Middle Way* by the possessor of the Lord of Scholars, Śāntarakṣita, and likewise (based) on the speech of (my) lama (Je Tsong kha-pa), in order that it not be forgotten, I dedicate it to all transmigratory beings' mastery of the supreme system.[7]

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[7] rRGyal-tshab. *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang.* (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1976), p. 97.

Thus we find both of these texts in the Collected Works (Tib. *Sum bum*) of both Tsong-kha-pa and rGyal-tshab. These texts correspond with the first dGe-lugs hermeneutic as described in the introduction in which the intention of the dGe-lugs authors in composing the text is to mirror as closely as possible the intended meaning of the Indian author upon whose text they are commenting. It is clear that the importance of Śāntarakṣita's text to the dGe-lugs pa school, at least during the time of Tsong-kha-pa and rGyal-tshab was significant. While each of them composed direct commentaries on *The Ornament For The Middle Way,* they did not compose direct commentaries on many other primary Mādhyamika śāstras. In fact, other than these two commentaries on *The Ornament For The Middle Way,* the founding dGe-lugs authors only composed direct commentaries on the texts of Mādhyamika thinkers whom they regarded as authoritative representatives of Mādhyamika such as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Chandrakīrti, but not on other such important competing Mādhyamikans such as Bhāvaviveka or Jñānagarbha.

The third layer of textual sources utilized here includes the general treatises on Mādhyamika and Mahāyāna philosophy by dGe-lugs scholars which at times speak directly to Śāntarakṣita and at times address central issues more generally concerning his views as a leading exponent of Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, but always offer a definitive analysis of the Mādhyamika view from a dGe-lugs perspective. These texts represent the second layer of dGe-lugs pedagogical hermeneutics with regards to Śāntarakṣita's works as described in the introduction and are primarily the compositions of Tsong-kha-pa which include his classic treatises such as *Ocean of Reasoning* (Tib. *Rigs pa'i rgya tsho*) which is his major commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhayamakakāraikā*, the Special Insight (*lHag mthong*) chapter of *The Great Exposition on the Stages of the Path* (Tib. *Lam rim chen mo*), his commentary on Chandrakīrti's work entitled *Illumination of the Thought: Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) 'Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"'* (Tib. *dbU ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal*), and his *Essence of*

Good Explanations: Treatise Determining The Interpretable and The Definitive (Tib. *Drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po*).

The fourth layer of textual sources also is categorized within the second category of dGe-lugs pedagogical hermeneutics described above and consists of a genre of texts known in the dGe-lugs tradition as tenet system texts (Tib. *grub mtha* , Skt. *siddhānta*). '*Grub mtha*,' which can literally mean either "tenet" or refer to "tenet system texts". In this context the term refers to those texts by major dGe-lugs pa scholars whose works serve a fundamental place in the curriculum of young dGe-lugs pa student's approach to the various philosophical systems. The general format of the texts of this genre is to examine each of the major Indian philosophical systems, both non-Buddhist and Buddhist, in an ascending order so that as one moves from one school to the next they get closer and closer to the correct and highest view which for dGe-lugs pas is the Prasaṇgika-Mādhyamika. Each philosophical system is examined according to its position on specific topics. These are most simply divided into three: their ontological positions on the status of the basis of persons and the phenomenal world, the path, and the fruits of the path. Within this framework a number of important issues are addressed including assertions regarding conventional and ultimate truth, epistemological issues regarding subjects and objects, outlines of the path system, etc.

Tenet system texts have grown to play an enormously important role in dGe-lugs philosophical education and their presentation of philosophical views. Jose Cabezon argues in his article, "The Canonization of Philosophy and the Rhetoric of Siddhānta in Tibetan Buddhism," that, "the adoption of such a schema serves functionally to 'canonize' philosophy in much the same way as the collection of accepted scriptural texts creates a norm for what is textually canonical."[8] He goes on to argue that, " in the scholastic tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, especially in the literature of the dGe-lugs sect, the *siddhānta*

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[8] Cabezon (1991), p. 8.

schematization served as a de facto canonization of Buddhist philosophy that came to define what was philosophically normative... Put in another way, philosophical discourse (and particularly polemics) was based as much on the *siddhānta* classification scheme as it was on the physical canons, the collection of the 'Buddha's word' and the commentarial literature... In many instances the *siddhānta* schema that formed the doctrinal or philosophical canon came to supersede the physical canon as the standard by comparison with which new ideas or texts came to achieve legitimacy."[9] Cabezon insightfully describes the function of the tenet system texts as they operate in Tibet.

It is often the case that the presentation of a particular schools tenets in an authoritative tenet system text such lCang-skya's or dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po's will serve as the authoritative representation of that Indian school, even superseding penetrations into the original śāstra sources. This is the case with representations of Śāntarakṣita and the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika in many of these texts. But before ascribing fault or blame to the dGe-lugs authors it is imperative that one keep in mind their motivation and the purpose of the interpretive framework incorporated at this level of dGe-lugs discourse. The aim is not to create a systematized mirror of Indian Buddhist śāstra views of specific authors per se, but a rough outline of schools of thought based on specific categories of inquiry. The primary purpose of this is to lead to a ripening of the mindstream of the student ascending the ladder of philosophical views to the highest view, the Prasaṇgika-Mādhyamika, the realization of which is a necessity for the attainment of Buddhahood. The purpose is not to create a factual and historical account of Indian authors and their views. The presumption that this is the case has caused a great many modern Western scholars to make erroneous assumptions when they have attempted to obtain a factual historical account of the views of Indian authors by depending solely or primarily on this genre of

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[9] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

commentarial literature. Conversely, in more recent years it has caused scholars to wrongly assume that the dGe-lugs did not properly understand the perspectives of Indian śāstra authors. Both sides fail to understand what is happening within this genre of dGe-lugs literature. The purpose is to lead the student on a gradual ascent of increasingly subtle general Buddhist tenet systems culminating in the Prāsaṇgika-Mādhyamika which the dGe-lugs school considers as the highest and correct.

The final level of primary sources utilized in this study is that of oral commentary both on Śāntarakṣita's root text and commentary and on dGe-lugs pa works on Śāntarakṣita. These oral commentaries correspond to the two divisions of the third category outlined above into the three-fold division of dGe-lugs pa commentarial hermeneutics. I have intentionally kept the oral commentary on the tradition that I received from several of the most esteemed dGe-lugs pa scholars today as a separate category of textual source from those written sources because there are several unique qualities to orality and oral commentarial traditions which warrant it deserving and needing separate treatment.

Current Buddhological scholarship is significantly divided on the issue of the legitimacy of consulting eminent Tibetan scholars as a resource for investigating ancient Buddhist texts. Many strict philologists consider the perspectives of indigenous sources to be fraught with the biases of the devout and devoid of any critical analysis. They furthermore consider the Western scholars who make use of the sources to be like fruits which haven't fallen far from the tree. The motivations of scholars who see value in study with indigenous Tibetan scholars are various and these motivations need to be taken into account before a general assessment of the type of scholarship which emerges from *partial* dependence on the assistance of indigenous scholars. Certainly if a study begins and ends with the commentary and analysis of any scholar, indigenous or otherwise, without critical analysis and probing, that study will fall short in quality and utility. However, in order to attain a complete picture from which to begin analysis one must tap all the potential resources

of data before commencing with analysis of the materials and this must include traditional oral commentary.

The strict philological approach also presumes that all that is worth investigating is the original intention of text and its author perhaps with the aid of canonized commentaries. Consulting living representatives of a living tradition would only further obscure the true or original meaning of the text. There is an implied presumption that the living tradition has little of value worth investigating. The present work disputes this presumption. A tradition lives not only in the ancient texts upon which it is based and which maintain modern currency, but a tradition also lives in the minds of its adherents. In a religious tradition such as Tibetan Buddhism which places such central importance upon oral commentarial traditions, to disregard such orality in this sort of study would be negligent. Regardless of the proximity or lack there of, of a living tradition's particular interpretation of ancient religious texts to the modern scholar's perception of the intentions of the original author, the present work proceeds under a presumption of the living tradition's inherent value. The notion that well established living traditions, particularly those with rigorously preserved lineages of teaching stretching back centuries, have by virtue of their history and contemporary prominence, an importance and relevance for contemporary study has been a guiding principle of this study which in part aims toward an understanding of a living tradition. For those scholars investigating the way doctrine has evolved down to the present day and whose research involves attempting to understand living traditions (an endeavor with certainly as much scholarly worth as historical doctrinal investigation) the oral commentary of qualified traditional authorities is clearly essential.

Most Indian philosophical texts which are comprised in the Tibetan bsTan 'gyur, *The Translations of Śāstras,* were in fact written with the intention that they be accompanied by both written commentaries (Skt. *bhāsya* or *vṛtti,* Tib. *'grel ba*) and oral commentaries. The

root texts were most often composed as condensed outlines in verses (Skt. *kārika,* Tib *tshig le'ur byed pa*) of the points to be addressed in order to be utilized as mnemonic devices for the purpose of facilitating ease in memorization.[10] Auto-commentaries by the author, or other commentaries and sub-commentaries in addition to the oral commentaries were considered in India, and still today in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition are considered an indispensable component of proper understanding of the root texts.[11] Without oral commentary, the investigator of the text only has part of the picture. As a result the stereotypical European model philologist who aims at the intended meaning of the original author by penetrating analysis of only the author's original text and eschews any input from living traditions as mere sources of distortion denies him or herself an important component of successful scholarly inquiry.

Georges Dreyfus notes in his article, "Tibetan Monastic Education and the Role of Soteriology," that while Tibetan Buddhists are similar to their Indian predecessors in their dependence on the commentarial tradition beginning with the Indian *mūlaśāstras* and including the written and oral Indian and Tibetan commentaries on those, they differ from the approach of many of their counterparts in other parts of the Buddhist world. The Chinese, Japanese, and Theravāda traditions in this context rely more heavily on the actual Sūtra, the direct teachings of the Buddha, than on the Śāstra and commentarial traditions which are so heavily emphasized among the Tibetan Buddhist traditions.[12] Thus the above points made regarding the benefits of consulting oral traditions, particularly with regards to investigations into the Tibetan tradition, are all the more pertinent.

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[10] Georges Dreyfus, "Tibetan Scholasticism and the Role of Soteriology," *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies.* (Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer, 1997), pp. 41-42.

[11] For a detailed discussion of the role of oral commentary in the Tibetan tradion see Ann Klein, *The Path To The Middle: The Spoken Scholarship of Kensur Yeshey Tubden: Oral Mādhyamika Philosophy In Tibet.* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), pp.1-28.

[12] Dreyfus (1997), pp. 42-43.

Translation Methodology

Given that a significant portion of this study is the translation of relevant Indian and Tibetan Buddhist texts, some reflection on the methods for approaching such translations are in order here. Numerous methodological issues confront the scholar attempting the task of translating ancient religious and philosophical texts. These issues are compounded when, as is the case with Tibetan Buddhist texts, the translation problems are problems not only of the vast differences in linguistic structure between for example classical Tibetan and modern English, but also problems of translating across centuries, across cultures and across intellectual milieus. It is often a curious revelation for the young student of classical Tibetan to discover that their Tibetan friends do not understand the language of the Buddhist texts they are reading. The language of such texts is not only "Classical" in the sense of being old in much the same way Old English seems from a distant past and almost foreign to the average native English speaker, but it also incorporates a vocabulary and a manner of discussing topics which is quite different from the modern spoken usage of Tibetan language. But this is not to say that "Classical Tibetan" is an ancient relic. It is "modern" as well in the sense that its everyday use for the study and practice of the textually rooted aspects of Tibetan Buddhism has been and remains alive in the monasteries, nunneries, and among lay practitioners and scholars in Tibet and in exile up to the present day.

When we speak in a most general sense about Buddhist philosophy it may often seem remarkable how Buddhist systems of thought have been able to maintain relevance and currency as it has made its way across cultural borders and centuries. One may initially assume that its accessability must be immediately present in order to have dispersed itself so effectively. Yet we quickly find upon investigation that the world of Buddhist philosophical

discourse is often quite cryptic, its canonical texts terse, often to extreme degrees and consisting of a seemingly impenetrable web of allusions on first approach. Nevertheless, Buddhism has displayed enormous success in not only adapting itself to the various circumstances it has encountered but in communicating its canonical literature to the learned among its inheritors.

Early European scholars and their later American counterparts have made great strides toward deciphering the vast Buddhist canon of religious and philosophical literature and increasing its accessibility to those without access to Asian canonical languages. But the approaches of early Orientalist scholars were far from flawless. Issues regarding the translation across intellectual milieus were often methodologically ignored. Furthermore, the importance Buddhist literature speaking with a Buddhist voice in Western languages of translation were disregarded. There was little reflection on how one is to translate across intellectual milieus while simultaneously remaining faithful to the indigenous milieu and aiding in accessability to the intellectual milieu into which the tradition was being translated. There is little purpose in incessant dwelling on the methodological shortcomings of past scholars. Often history and circumstance dictate the parameters within which people work. However, reflection on where we come from with an eye to where we want to be makes an appropriate an fruitful use of history.

One problem of early translations of Buddhist texts was the tendency to translate with a biased or agenda laden language. For example many early Orientalists and missionaries used overtly Christian language in their translations of both texts and ideas and this led to serious misunderstanding of the information being translated. One primary example of this include Rhys David who put forth the assertion that Buddhists held to the notion of a soul. Doboom Tulku also points out that early Buddhologists such as Stcherbatsky infused the language of their own particular biases be they Kantian (in the case

of Stcherbatsky), Freudian, Jungian or other into their translation.[13] These are but a few of the numerous examples of translations which for an assortment of reasons disregard many important aspects of the indigenous intellectual milieu at the expense of faithful translations of those texts. By this I mean that what is lacking in the above is a faithfulness to the arenas in which they were indigenously created and function. Doboom Tulku argues that, "The goal for which we should all strive is of course translation which will speak with a genuine Buddhist voice, presented in a language and style comprehensible to the average educated reader."[14] We may add that a 'Buddhist voice' must certainly include to as great an extent as possible, a presentation of texts on their own terms without adding the interpretive biases or referential frameworks of the translator or of the culture of the receptive language of translation. Reflections on past problems and solutions to Buddhist translations may shed light on some of the possible answers to the methodological questions we must face.

The history of translations of Buddhist texts which reflect cultural biases or biases of the authors is a long one and does not begin in the West. When Buddhism was carried to China from India certain problems arose in the method and manner of translation which with the luxury of hindsight we may avoid if we so choose, unlike perhaps some of our European forerunners. Many Chinese translators of Buddhist texts and Indians pandits translating Sanskrit texts into Chinese used a system known as *Ko-i* or matching terms. The idea with the *Ko-i* system was that Sanskrit Buddhist terminology was matched with its closest corresponding Taoist or sometimes Confucian term in the Chinese and thus a new Buddhist language was not created. The advantage of this was that it made these new translations more widely accessible and understandable to the average Chinese already familiar with the terms and language. The disadvantage was that what in gained in breadth of reach it lost in

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[13] Doboom Tulku, *Buddhist Translations: Problems and Perspectives*, (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1995), p. 5.

[14] Ibid.

precision of translation and accuracy in transmission of doctrine. Buddhist translations were laden with Taoist terminology and tone. The readership brought to the texts the Taoist and Confucian intellectual milieus current in China at the time. This of course gave way to several important indigenous Chinese innovations, particularly with Ch'an (Jap. Zen), but it has been argued that this distanced Chinese Buddhism from its Indian roots.

In contrast, when Tibetans translated the Sanskrit canon, particularly during the time of the later spread of Buddhism to that country (10th-12th CE) and the accompanying New Translation (Tib. gSar-ma) of the canon, they employed very systematic controls over translation method. For example all translators used identical Tibetan words for translation from Sanskrit technical terms. Where there were no precise Tibetan equivalents, new words were created. Of course some Sanskrit terms have multiple meanings depending on the context in which they are used, and this was reflected in Tibetan translations by using distinct Tibetan terms at times depending on the specific context. Grammatical rules for movement from Sanskrit to Tibetan were systematized particularly in the second round of translating the Sanskrit canon. Of course this all did not occur one hundred percent of the time but it was the norm and standard by which translations were meant to be executed. The resulting New Translations were considered by many Tibetans to be of a superior level of accuracy and this set of New Translations became the functional canon of Sūtras and Indian Śāstras for a group of newly evolved schools of Tibetan Buddhism, the bKa'-rgyud, Sa-gya and bKa' gdam which evolved into the dGe-lugs.

This Tibetan method of translation has not gone without criticism by modern scholars however. Paul Griffiths referred to it as, "the most mechanical form of translationese the

world has yet seen."[15] Griffiths fails to acknowledge many of the distinct advantages resulting from such admittedly often awkward translations. First, we have a body of literature, the Tibetan Buddhist canon which maintains the only extant translations of much of the original Sanskrit canon and is often considered the most accurate, reliable and comprehensive Buddhist canon in existence today despite its supposed lack of linguistic grace. Elegance and grace of language perhaps have been sacrificed, but for a quality which the Buddhist tradition of Tibet felt to be more important than literary elegance, namely doctrinal accuracy. And it is not at all clear that the texts were elegantly written in the original Sanskrit. They were never considered to be works of literary beauty or excellence along the lines of the Koran which is considered to be not only Allah's word, but the apex of literary beauty in the Arabic language.

Griffiths has even more biting criticism of the English used in the translation of Buddhist texts[16] when he comments that, "Buddhist Hybrid English, [is] a bastardized form of the English language, so hag ridden by Sanskrit syntax that almost every sentence in constructed in the passive, every technical term is translated by a series of hyphenated polysyllables, and the ideal of writing clear, precise, and elegant English hardly even comes to the conscious awareness of the translator."[17] Certainly there is a need to call for attention to grace in style of translation into English. However, the criterion he suggests in his article for determining which Buddhist texts are worthy of English translation seems to contradict his own well thought out point when he observes " that the Buddhologist, as an academic, has a real duty to communicate, and the tendency in contemporary Western Buddhology to

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[15] Paul Griffiths, "Buddhist Hybrid English: Some Notes on Philology and Hermeneutics for Buddhologists," *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, (Vol. 4, No. 2, 1981), p. 17.

[16] Griffiths is particularly commenting on translation from Sanskrit but I think he would not disagree that his statement could by extention be applied to translations from Tibetan as well.

[17] Grifftiths (1981)., p. 24.

retreat behind an impenetrable shield of technical vocabulary comprehensible to only co-specialists, and make no effort to reach out colleagues in related fields, is to be very strongly deplored."[18] Griffiths argues that the purpose of the Buddhologist is to communicate and interpret the original meaning of the texts, to act as a sort of hermeneutician. When a translation will inevitably end up convoluted in the way he has described above it is often more appropriate for the scholar to execute a monograph about the meaning and history of the text rather than to execute a translation according to Griffiths. He argues, "translation is very frequently not the best way of performing the hermeneutical task, a fact rarely realized by practicing Buddhologists."[19] The criterion for deciding which texts deserve to be translated should be executed, "not as is usually done, from the viewpoint of content, but from the viewpoint of form, of literary and aesthetic merit."

Griffiths fails to acknowledge several points here. As previously stated, Buddhist texts were often not written with intentions toward literary elegance. The fact that it is difficult to translate them into English with elegance should not preclude the importance of their availability in English or other Western languages. If Tibetan scholars had adopted Griffiths model then even Buddhologists would not have access to the vast majority of originally Sanskrit canonical sources. We would be merely confined to the hermeneutical task executed by indigenous Tibetan commentators. We should not confine Westerners with an interest in penetrating Buddhist texts and meaning to the assessment of Western Buddhologists, however penetrating and insightful their analysis might be. Certainly many texts ought to be amended with the type of historiographical and hermeneutical analysis which Griffiths describes, but this does not render translations of unelegant texts a waste of time. This seems to be a crucial part of the sort of the reaching out to the wider academic

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[18] Ibid., p. 20.

[19] Ibid., p. 20.

community, to Western philosophy departments, anthropologists, folklorists, to art historians etc. which Griffiths hopes to see happen in the first place though his later suggestions seem to undermine. Why limit direct access to canonical sources on the basis of a texts literary merits and its viability for an elegant translation? The form and flavor of texts could be of as much interest as the actual content to other fields such as Comparative Literature. And it is possible that many Buddhist texts were written intentionally in a style which was difficult to penetrate in order to require the seeking of the oral commentary of a qualified teacher for access and real penetration into the meaning of the text. Translations representing these texts on their own terms in this manner is certainly suitable and potentially opens Buddhist Studies as a field to a much larger audience than it currently addresses.

This is all discussed by way of pointing out that a text like *The Ornament of The Middle Way* is probably one which Griffiths would argue is not linguistically graceful enough to warrant its translation into English. *The Ornament of The Middle Way* and *The Auto-Commentary on The Ornament of The Ornament of The Middle Way* are two extremely important Buddhist philosophical texts. While I certainly hope this study of them along with related dGe-lugs texts will illuminate their meaning and draw the reader in to ponder some of the compelling questions the texts raise, I think this study would be of decidedly less value to the reader without access to necessary canonical languages if there were no inclusion of a translation of the root text, however ungraceful it may or may not be. The reader now has the benefit of being able to refer to the actual text, albeit in translation, and this offers the reader an opportunity to determine for himself/herself whether my analysis of the text and its arguments and views stands up or not. The reader is not left to merely take my word for it so to speak. And the additional contribution of a translation of one of the two primary dGe-lugs pa commentaries offers an opportunity for the reader to do the same with respect to my analysis of dGe-lugs pa representations as well. Additionally it

gives the reader a sense of the literary styles involved both in the root text as well as the commentarial literature. In short, I think this would be a much weaker work without the inclusion of the translations and would have significantly less to offer the serious student of the history of Buddhist ideas and philosophical literature.

Let us return for a moment to the translation issues concerning the manner of translation of Buddhist texts into Chinese. Another problem with the way Buddhist texts went to China was the random nature with which they appeared. Texts did not come according to schools of thought or chronology of composition. For the most part Chinese pilgrims to India and Indian teachers brought texts to China which were of particular interest to them. In some cases they simply gathered whatever texts they could acquire and carried back as many as they could. As a result Buddhist texts arrived in China over a period of centuries in an utterly random order, making the discernment of Indian schools and a proper understanding of their evolution quite problematic. Western Buddhologists and translators face similar issues. The process of translating Buddhist texts into Western languages (primarily English, German and French) has also been a bit haphazard, depending mostly on the availability of texts and the whims or particular interests of those possessing the necessary skills to execute translations. The primary exception to this would be the translations conducted at Buddhist centers in the West under the specific instruction of the teacher with a view toward the immediate and long term needs of the student practitioners. Yet we have the distinct advantage of knowing historical chronologies of texts and authors and the hermeneutical hierarchies of the various Buddhist traditions which have gone before us. In other words, when comparing the random arrival of canonical texts to the West in Western languages and the situation in China nearly two thousand years ago, one of the primary differences is that we now have a breadth of secondary materials in Western languages with which we are able to contextualize translations of texts conceptually and

chronologically and thus can accurately organize the various schools and movements the texts represent.

In addition these secondary sources help both specialists and non-specialists to understand in general terms the history and development of Buddhism through various countries, cultures and time periods. This has also been a bit of mixed blessing because the dearth of secondary materials has also allowed for specialists to zero in on very specific topics for inquiry. This has in turn led to another situation which persisted in China, namely the translation of chapters or sections of canonical texts rather than the texts in their entirety. Western specialists often zero in on those sections which pertain specifically to the topic of their inquiry and ignore the rest. I would also argue that the nature of academia in the twentieth century contributes to this by pressuring scholars to "publish or perish." Capable scholars have no choice but to focus on smaller projects which they can crank out quickly in order to add to their curriculum vitae rather than to work on long term, larger and more inclusive and far reaching projects.

When Doboom Tulku talks about a goal of finding, "a genuine Buddhist voice" for our translations of Buddhist texts into Western languages he brings to light an important concept for the issue of translating Buddhist texts across cultures. But what is a "Buddhist voice"? Certainly a translator should try to avoid religious and philosophical biases of using overtly Christian or Kantian or Jungian language and technical terms in the translation of Buddhist texts as was discussed above. We do not want to make the same mistakes the Chinese did by utilizing the *Ko-i* system of matching terms with equivalent Taoist terms. Perhaps we can take a cue from the great Tibetan translators (Tib. *lo-rtsa-wa*) who are so revered in that tradition. They avoided some of the above mentioned pitfalls in a couple of ways. First (particularly among the later *gSar-ma* or New Translations) they came to an agreed upon vocabulary for translating specific technical terms from Sanskrit into Tibetan so that no matter who the translator was, the reader could be certain that a specific technical term

directly matched with a specific term from the source language. I think the quality and the universality of our translations would benefit greatly if there were an agreed upon set of equivalents for technical terms to which scholars adhered. This would be the first step in a move towards a Buddhist Hybrid English or German, not in the negative sense with which Griffiths uses the term, but in a way which could be functional and usable for many. Perhaps a scholarly conference on the subject would be a good first step toward coming to such an agreed upon vocabulary. However, as we all know, attaining universal scholarly agreement on anything is certainly a formidable task.

Tibetan translators also inaugurated many new technical terms into their religious vocabulary. Determining the form this would take in Western languages is difficult. For many technical terms we have already inaugurated Sanskrit loan words into English vocabulary for which there are no direct equivalents ("dharma", "karma," "tantra," etc.). Many such terms are relatively widely known among the general public who do not have specialized interests in their origins or technical meanings. But there is certainly a long ways to go before there is any complete and thorough Buddhist Hybrid English which is broadly functional and of use to the public, scholarly or otherwise.

I have attempted however to incorporate the ideas presented in this chapter in the execution of the present study. I have included a full translation of Śāntarakṣita's root text, the centerpiece of this study as well as a partial translation of his auto-commentary. Additionally I have included a full translation of rGyal-tshab's commentary on *The Ornament For The Middle Way* as a representational piece of a major aspect of the dGe-lugs presentation with regards to this text and philosophical system. It is my hope that the English translations offer what Doboom Tulku describes as a genuine "Buddhist voice". My aim in translation has been to allow the texts to speak for themselves. When decisions concerning stylistic grace arise versus doctrinal accuracy arise, my translations favor literal accuracy since accuracy is more important to the Buddhist tradition. I think that much of the

Buddhist voice and style can be maintained in this sort of translation, but this of course must be balanced. Literal translation can not be executed with total disregard for the English reader and this too has been taken into consideration. It is my hope that these translations offer the reader increased accessability to primary sources so that s/he can make his or her own evaluations and determinations on issues presented in the texts and in my analysis. And with availability of the translations the reader also may approach the texts as they see fit and not be confined to my analysis and understanding as Griffiths would have it. Additionally I have consulted eminent authoritative representatives of the dGe-lugs school in the reception of oral commentary on both Śāntarakṣita's root text in combination with his auto-commentary as well as on rGyal-tshab's own commentary, *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'*. These skillful teachers have been excellent representatives of their traditions and have helped me immensely in understanding their traditions and the interpretive frameworks by which they approach Śāntarakṣita on a variety of levels. It is my view that these methodological considerations result in a scholarly inquiry which effectively penetrates the core issues of investigation and present to the reader a work of substantially more utility than would be present if these considerations were ignored.

Chapter 3

A Brief History of Mādhyamika In India and Tibet

Indian Mādhyamika: An Overview of Texts and Authors

Modern scholars concur based on agreement within the Indian, Tibetan and Chinese sources that Nāgārjuna, the second century[20] Indian Buddhist pandit from modern day Andhra Pradesh was the founder and first exponent of the Mādhyamika school of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophical doctrine.[21] As the first exponent of the notion of the non-substantiality (Skt. *nihśvaghāvatā*) of all phenomena, Nāgārjuna can be regarded as the first Mahāyāna philosopher. One may even go so far as to say that all subsequent Mahāyāna philosophical thought is a footnote on Nāgārjuna. The question of influences on Nāgārjuna and the development and evolution of Mahāyāna, specifically Mādhyamika ideas inevitably leads one to investigate Mahāsaṃgha schools of that same region of south central Indian region. Chandrakīrti sites *Sūtras* from the *Mahāsaṃgha Tripitaka* in defense of certain Mādhyamika positions such as the denial of real origination and cessation. These appeared as extremely unconventional and contrary to the Buddha's teachings at that time in India. Despite these probable influences, Nāgārjuna is undeniably the father of Mādhyamika and Mahāyāna thought.

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[20] See Ruegg (1981), pp. 4-5 for a treatment of the ambiguity of the precise dating of Nāgārjuna.

[21] There has been some controversy over wether Rāhulabhadra was the teacher or disciple of Nāgārjuna or was the disciple of Nāgārjuna's disciple, Aryadeva. While some India sources suggest that he was the teacher of Nāgārjuna, Ruegg argues that more conclusive evidence from Chinese and Tibetan sources suggest that he was in fact a disciple of Nāgārjuna. See Ruegg (1981) pp. 4, 54-56.

Nāgārjuna's most important work, and the very foundational exposition of Mādhyamika thought is his *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā* which is composed in twenty seven chapters. This text is the unquestioned authoritative source for all subsequent Mādhyamikans. Nāgārjuna's logical works are variously categorized as being either five or six in number in different Tibetan traditions. The *Śūnyatāsaptati* and the *Vigrahavyāvartani* are commonly understood by later commentators such as Chandrakīrti as works to be engaged in conjunction with the *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā.* In addition to these his *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā, Ratnāvalī, and Vaidalyāsūtra* are included among this group. Nāgārjuna also composed two texts which serve as advisory texts on Buddhist practice for lay people which were written in the form of letters to an Indian king. These are *Ratnāvali* and *Suhṛllekha. Ratnāvali* is also sometimes considered among Nāgārjuna's logical works as mentioned above. Nāgārjuna's text, *Sūtrasamuccaya* , justifies his radical views with a collection of canonical quotations primarily from the Mahāyāna Sūtras. Finally, Nāgārjuna is traditionally credited with composing several tantric commentaries but there is considerable reason for doubting that the author of these tantric texts as well as some medical texts is the same historical Nāgārjuna who composed the above Mādhyamika treatises.[22]

Āryadeva, who is traditionally considered as Nāgārjuna's direct disciple is clearly the second most important Mādhyamika philosopher and the only source other than Nāgārjuna himself who is universally considered as authoritative by all subsequent Mādhyamikans. His most important work in the Indian and Tibetan traditions is the *Catuḥśataka.* This text takes the form of a dialogue or debate between Āryadeva and a variety of opponents. In the early chapters of the text, Āryadeva draws out the logical absurdity of all prevalent incorrect views and misconceptions about the nature of reality which bind beings to saṃsāric

[22] For an extensive treatment of this topic see Lindtner (1987).

existence. In the latter chapters of the text he deals more specifically with arguments concerning the emptiness of all phenomena.

It was perhaps not until the sixth century that Mādhyamika became the name of a the school following the thought of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva in opposition to the emerging Yogācāra school whose most famous proponents were Asaṅga (4th CE), Vasubandhu (4th CE), and Sthiramati (late 4th CE). During the period shortly after the emergence of the Yogācāra school, several important Mādhyamika commentators on Nāgārjuna's writings began to emerge and their conflicting interpretations of Nāgārjuna's thought led to eventual schisms within the Mādhyamika school. The first important commentator on Nāgārjuna during this period was Buddhapālita (470-540? CE). A contemporary of the Buddhist logician Dignāga (480-540 CE), Buddhapālita nevertheless resisted using many of the current innovations in Buddhist logic which were being formally systematized at the time. Specifically he did not use autonomous syllogisms (Skt. *svātantrānumāna*) to establish Mādhyamika positions in his commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā*. Buddhapālita rather uses a form of argument known as consequentialist (Skt. *prasaṇga*) which show the logically absurd outcomes of incorrect views without necessitating the formulation of positive assertions as counter-points. Buddhapālita closely follows Nāgārjuna's own process of discrediting opponents, but he does not explicitly discuss his methodology of solely using consequentialist arguments nor make any statements about the emerging use of autonomous syllogisms in Mahāyāna philosophical discourse therein.

Bhāvaviveka (500-570 CE) took an explicitly different stand with regard to methodological considerations concerning proper forms of logic to be used by Mādhyamikans. He had a distinctly more favorable attitude toward the logico-epistemological developments of Dignāga than Buddhapālita apparently did and was sharply critical of Buddhapālita on this point. Here began the famous marriage of Mādhyamika thought with formal Buddhist logic. In his famous commentary on Nāgārjuna's root text,

Lamp For (Nāgārjuna's) Wisdom (Skt. *Prajnāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, Tib. *dbU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma*) Bhāvaviveka argues that not only must Mādhyamikans use independent syllogisms to establish their positions, but is also explicitly critical of Buddhapālita for not doing so and only making use of consequentialist arguments. Critical issues regarding the two thinkers' views on the two truths also emerge in partial relation to the type of arguments utilized, and it is by way of the form of logic utilized (and for Bhāvaviveka and Śāntarakṣita on the basis of assertions regarding conventionality) by these Mādhyamika masters that subsequent corresponding delineations of schools were nominally designated. Bhāvaviveka's other major composition, *Blaze of Reasoning: A Commentary on "The Heart of the Middle Way"* (Skt. *Mādhyamakahṛdayakārikā*, Tib. *dbU ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba*), critically analyzed the major Indian schools of his day and was a precursor to the tenet system (Skt. *siddhānta*, Tib. *grub mtha*) style texts which later became so central to philosophical analysis in Tibet.

Chandrakīrti (600-650 CE),[23] who in some traditional accounts is considered to be a reincarnation of Buddhapālita, is by all accounts the great defender of Buddhapālita's exclusive use of consequentialist arguments. Since Buddhapālita merely incorporated this methodology without explanation or justification, Chandrakīrti who argues powerfully for the use of consequentialist arguments and against the use of autonomous syllogisms as being incompatible with Mādhyamika tenets, is considered as the founder of the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika school. His importance to later Mādhyamika developments in Tibet and particularly to the dGe-lugs pa school of Tibetan Buddhism cannot be overestimated. Chandrakīrti composed several important works which are central to both the history of Indian Mādhyamika and particularly to the dGe-lugs pa interpretation of Mādhyamika in Tibet. The first of the two most well known of these is *The Supplement To (Nāgārjuna's)*

[23] For a discussion of controverseys over the dating of Chandrakirti see Ruegg (1981) p. 71.

Treatise On The Middle Way (Skt. *Mādhyamikāvatāra*, Tib. *dbU ma la 'jug pa*) and its auto-commentary which reads more as an independent work on the bodhisattva grounds than as a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on The Middle Way.*[24] Herein we find Chandrakīrti's critique of Bhāvaviveka's stances concerning logic and epistemology as well as a refutation of the Yogācāra school. The second major work of Chandrakīrti's is his *Clear Words: A Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on The Middle Way* (Skt. *Mūlamādhyamakavṛittiprasannapadā*, Tib. *dbU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tschig gsal ba*) where we again find a detailed rejection of the use of autonomous syllogisms for holders of Mādhyamika tenets for either the purpose of putting forth a correct view or for rejecting the view of an opponent. His argument hinges on the notion that such autonomous syllogisms require their user to accept the existence of entities with which one reasons and to accept the presuppositions of one's opponents, thereby accepting some degree of inherent existence, a thoroughly unacceptable proposition for Mādhyamikans according to Chandrakīrti. In addition to his two major works, Chandrakīrti also composed commentaries on two of Nāgārjuna's other works including his *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) 'Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness'* (Skt. *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti*, Tib. *sTong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i 'grel pa*) and his *Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning'* (Skt. *Yuktiśaṣṭikāvṛtti*, Tib. *Rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel pa*) as well as his work on Āryadeva, *Commentary on (Āryadeva's) 'Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas'* (Skt. *Bodhisattvayogacharyāchatuhshatakaṭīkā*, Tib. *Byang chub sems pa'i mal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa*).

Śrīgupta (7th CE?) was a relatively minor figure in the history of Indian Mādhyamika but is important to this study for several reasons. Ruegg notes that Bu-ston's history of Buddhism in India considers Śrīgupta as a proponent of Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and thus

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[24] Paul Donnely, "A Tibetan Formulation of Mādhyamika Philosophy: A Study and Translation of Tsong-kha-pa's *Ocean of Reasoning*," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1997), p. 17.

one of Śāntarakṣita's predecessors in this respect. Tāranātha's *History of Buddhism In India* mentions that Śrīgupta was a contemporary of Dharmakīrti and was of such apparent high prominence that he was among the three pandits at the time which were worshipped by the king, Vimalacandra.[25] Tāranātha also notes that Śrīgupta was the teacher of Jñānagarbha who subsequently was Śāntarakṣita's teacher.[26] However it is noted in by Tāranātha and widely acknowledged in Tibetan Mādhyamika discourse that Jñānagarbha was a follower of the vein of Mādhyamika thought put forth by Bhāvaviveka which was later designated as Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. This is despite his teacher being a proponent of Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. Śrīgupta composed one treatise, the *Tattvāvatāravṛtti*, which contains among other elements, a version of the 'neither one nor many'[27] argument which later became the centerpiece of Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament of The Middle Way.*

As noted above, Jñānagarbha (early 8th CE) is described by Tāranātha as a disciple of Śrīgupta and the teacher of Śāntarakṣita. Hagiographic accounts note that he was the teacher of one thousand *upāsakas* and one thousand *upāsikas.* [28] This demonstrates, as an aside, that at least in early eighth century north India, there was some prevalence of committed lay practitioners. It is of interest to note that his teacher, Śrīgupta, and his disciple, Śāntarakṣita were both considered as major exponents of Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika while Jñānagarbha himself most commonly falls into the camp of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans.[29] Jñānagarbha's major work was *The*

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[25] Tāranātha, *Tārānatha's History of Buddhism in India*, trans. Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya, (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970), pp. 224-225.

[26] Ibid., p. 253.

[27] Ruegg (1981), p. 68.

[28] Tārānatha (1970), p. 253.

[29] Ruegg notes that there is some controversy over the classification of Jñānangarbha as a Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikan or a Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikan as Bu-ston classifies him as the latter.

Differentiation of the Two Truths (Skt. *Satyadvayavibhaṇgakarika*, Tib. *bDen pa gnyis mam par 'byed pa'i tshig le'ur byes pa*) and its auto-commentary (Skt. *vṛtti*).[30] Here Jñānagarbha outlines what he considers as the correct views concerning the two truths and directs specific arguments at late Yogācāra thinkers including Dharmapāla (530-561 CE), Sthiramati (510-570 CE) and Devendrabuddhi (630-690 CE). His discussions of the three natures and the place of Yogācāra as a step on the ladder ascending to the ultimately correct view makes his alignment with strict Yogācāra-Mādhyamikans like Śāntarakṣita vague.[31] Nevertheless, one can certainly see where Śāntarakṣita built upon the views of his teacher. Of course there was no delineation of two such distinct sub-schools of Mādhyamika until probably three centuries later in India and such divisions were much more prevalent in the Tibetan analysis of India Mahāyāna.

Śāntideva (early 8th CE) is one of the most revered Indian Buddhist saints within the Tibetan tradition and is commonly aligned with the school of thought associated with Chandrakīrti and known in Tibet as Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika. Where Chandrakīrti based his major work around the ten bodhisattva grounds, Śāntideva bases his major work, *Engaging In The Bodhisattva's Deeds* (Skt. *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Tib. *Byang chub sems pa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa*) around an explanation of the perfections (Skt. *pāramitā*) of a bodhisattva and the notion of generating the mind of enlightenment (Skt. *bodhicitta*) through the perfect union of wisdom and compassion. In the ninth and final chapter before the dedication Śāntideva outlines the correct view of the perfection of wisdom. Based on his erudite philosophical exposition in the ninth chapter, Atiśa and the later dGe-lugs school among others have

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Ichigo attempts to argue that Jñānagarbha is a Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikan but not so convincingly. For a thorough discussion of the issues surrounding this controversy see Ruegg (1981).

[30] Malcolm David Eckel has translated and conducted a study of this text in it's Indian context in his book *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on The Distinction Between The Two Truths: An Eighth Century Handbook of Mādhyamika Philosophy.* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987).

[31] For a treatment of issues regarding Jñānagarbha's alignment with specific views see Ruegg (1981), pp.68-71.

considered Śāntideva to be a representative of the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika. The other major work ascribed to Śāntideva, but which always takes second seat to *Engaging In A Bodhisattva's Deeds,* is his *Compendium of Instructions* (Skt. *Sikṣāsamuccayakārikā*, Tib. *bsLab pa kun las btus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa*). This text is very similar to Nāgārjuna's *Compendium of Sūtra (Quotations)* (Skt. *Sūtrasamuccaya*) in that it is largely a gathering of quotations from the Mahāyāna sūtras which comment on the first five perfections of a bodhisattva. Tradition has it that Śāntideva also composed a text called *Sūtrasamuccaya* but such a text is no longer extant. Nevertheless, the profound impact of Śāntideva's *Engaging In The Bodhisattva's Deeds* on both late Indian Buddhism and on the shape of Buddhist thought and practice to come in Tibet is hard to overestimate.

Śāntarakṣita (d. 788 CE), whose contributions to the history of Buddhist thought are the primary subject of this study, was born in north India in the early eighth century. While little is known of Śāntarakṣita's early life we do know that he was born to a royal Bengali family of the Vaṇga lineage. His age at ordination is unknown but Tāranātha's *History of Buddhism In India* tells us, as do *The Blue Annals* of his ordination lineage as descending from Nāgārjuna, Bhāvaviveka, Śrīgupta, and Jnānagarbha, and that through Śāntarakṣita this became the first ordination lineage in Tibet. The first ordained Tibetans included sBa-Rat-na, bla-chen-dGong-pa-rab-gsal, kLu-mes among others.[32] He studied in several of the major Indian Buddhist monasteries of his day before earning wide recognition as one of the most important Buddhist thinkers of his time and eventually becoming abbot of Vikramaśīla, one of the three largest and most prominent Buddhist monasteries in North India along with Nalanda and Odantapuri. Records of the later portions of his life are more clear from Tibetan histories because of his central importance to the dissemination of Buddhism in that country.

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[32] See Tārānatha (1970), p. 260, and George N. Roerich, trans. *The Blue Annals.* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas Publishers, 1976), p. 34.

In traditional histories Śāntarakṣita is said to have been brothers with the Tibetan king Khri-srong-lde-btsan (740-798 CE) and with Sal-nang in a previous life during which they made a pact to bring Buddhism to Tibet. Khri-srong-lde-btsan, who is considered to be an emanation of Mañjuśrī is said to have taken birth as the Tibetan king in order to complete these ends and in the said position sent Sal-nang to invite Śāntarakṣita who was then the abbot of Vikaramaśīla, to Lhasa.[33] Soon after Śāntarakṣita arrived in Tibet (763 CE) numerous natural disasters occurred and it was thought that the Bon deities were displeased. The King's ministers urged Khri-srong-lde-btsan to send Śāntarakṣita back to India. Before leaving, Śāntarakṣita urged the King to invite the great mahāsiddhi, Padmasaṃbhava who would be able to subdue the demons and clear the way for the Dharma to spread in Tibet. This he did and with a large offering of gold and a letter of request from Khri-srong-lde-btsan, Padmasaṃbhava accepted the invitation to come to Tibet. According to tradition he defeated the Bon deities by converting them to Buddhism and making them protector deities of the Buddhist teachings in Tibet. After this Padmasaṃbhava urged Khri-srong-lde-btsan to inivite Śāntarakṣita back to Tibet and upon his return in 775 CE they founded the first Tibetan Buddhist monastery at Samye which was completed and consecrated in the following two years. Śāntarakṣita stayed in Tibet and taught until his death in 788 CE.

Śāntarakṣita is credited with authoring several texts important to the history Indian and Buddhist philosophy the most famous of which, *The Ornament For The Middle Way* (Skt. *Madhyamkālaṃkāra*, Tib. *dbU ma'i rgyan gyi tshigs le'ur byed pa*) serves as the focus of this study and holds a place of vital importance to the history of Indian Mādhyamika. As the figure who is traditionally considered to be the founder of the syncretic tradition in late Indian Mādhyamika known as Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, his writings including particularly *The Ornament For The Middle Way* and its auto-commentary (Skt.

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[33] Roerich, George. Trans. *The Blue Annals.* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas Publishers, 1976.) pp. 38-39.

Madhyamkālaṃkāravṛtti, Tib. *dbU ma'i rgyan gyi rang grel*) have been an integral part of investigations into the permutations in Mādhyamika thought in India, Tibet and beyond.

The above text is important to the overall history of Indian Mahāyāna and in particular, Mādhyamika for several reasons. By the late eighth century the third turning of the wheel of the doctrine as represented by the full development of the Yogācāra school in India had occurred and Mādhyamikans needed to address the issues and views put for by their 'Mahāyāna competitors', the Yogācārans, in order to uphold their role as purveyors of the correct view. In addition formal Buddhist logic as outlined by Dignāga and refined by Dharmakīrti had become widely accepted as the foundation of Buddhist inferential inquiry. These developments in Buddhist thought needed serious consideration by Mādhyamikans if they were to maintain relevance. Yogācārans were already formulating a new hermeneutic based on *The Sūtra Unraveling The Thought* (Skt. *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, Tib. *dGongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo*) which considered the Mādhyamika view as in need of further interpretation and the Yogācāra view as the final presentation of the Buddha's highest explanation of philosophical truth. Śāntarakṣita answered this call upon Mādhyamikans in his seminal text *The Ornament For The Middle Way,* by proposing a syncretic system which still considered the Mādhyamika standpoint of Nāgārjuna as the authoritative explanation of *The Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras* (Skt. *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*, Tib. *Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i mdo*) and the highest Buddhist philosophical position. However, Śāntarakṣita also integrated Yogācāra thought into his presentation of Mādhyamika by offering a unique new presentation of conventional truth in his explanation of the two truths. Here he offered a description of conventional truth which in some respects resembled a precedence set by thinkers like Bhāvaviveka and Jñānagarbha, particularly in their delineations of real and unreal conventional truths. But he veered away from their ontological descriptions by incorporating large aspects of Yogācāra thought and its epistemological approach into his presentation of conventional truth. Where Bhāvaviveka

described conventional truths as external entities, Śāntarakṣita described conventional truths as being empty of a nature which is separate from the mind which perceives them. In a soteriological process, the practitioner thus ascends from a conventional understanding of phenomena as not having a nature separate from the mind perceiving it, as Yogācārans put forth, to the ultimate truth that the mind also has no real or true existence as Mādhyamikans assert. Ultimately, as Nāgārjuna maintains, no thing, person or phenomena, has any true nature at all. All of this is accompanied by an integration of formal Buddhist logic in the tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, which is presented as the appropriate method for inferentially investigating the nature of phenomena. Thus, Śāntarakṣita's innovations lie not only in his synthesis of these important trends in Buddhist thought in India at the time, but also in his transformation of an explanation of the two truths as being not only an ontological description of the status of entities but also as an integral part of a soteriological ascent to the correct view. These innovations contribute to an evaluation of Śāntarakṣita's thought as being the final major development in Buddhist philosophy on the Indian sub-continent.

Śāntarakṣita of course had predecessors in India who must have influenced his thought. Several Yogācārans wrote commentaries on the works of Nāgārjuna. Tibetan doxographers trace the origins of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika synthesis to Āryavimuktisena (6th CE) who was considered as a 'Yogācāra-Mādhyamikan'. He composed an important commentary on *The Ornament For Clear Realizations Sūtra* (Skt. *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, Tib. *mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan mdo*) and was said to be a student of Bhāvaviveka, Dignāga and Vasubandhu.[34] The Tibetan tradition generally considers the above sūtra as presenting the path system from the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika perspective and those Indian pandits who commented on it such as Āryavimuktisena and Śāntarakṣita's disciple, Haribhadra, as Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans.

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[34] Ruegg (1981), p. 87.

As mentioned above, Śrīgupta (7th CE) is also generally placed in the category of followers of this branch of Mādhyamika and offered a version of the 'neither one nor many' argument which closely parallels Śāntarakṣita's subsequent version in it's abridged syllogistic format. Śrīgupta's version reads as follows:

> In reality everything, both inside and out, is empty, because it is neither one nor many, like a reflection.[35]

By stressing internal and external phenomena in his rendition of the argument rather than stressing those phenomena asserted as real by Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools as Śāntarakṣita does, there is an apparent emphasis on an ultimate Mādhyamika analysis of a conventionally Yogācāra worldview. While Śāntarakṣita's later presentation of the 'neither one nor many' argument varied slightly, the orientation of Śrīgupta's thought toward an integration of the two Mahāyāna schools must have had a powerful impact on him. Though Śāntarakṣita turns the subject to the entities asserted to be real by lower Buddhist schools and non-Buddhist schools, his overarching ontology is very similar.

> Those entities put forth [as real] by our [Buddhist schools] and other [non-Buddhist] schools, because in reality they have neither singular nor plural nature, they have no nature at all, like a reflected image.[36]

Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita's teacher is generally associated with Bhāvaviveka and the school of thought commonly known in Tibet as Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. However, certain aspects of his discussion of conventional truth are closely related and must have impacted the development of Śāntrakṣita's thought. Eckel has gone so far as to argue that Śrīgupta, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Haribhadra probably all belonged to a "tradition

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[35] Trans. by Eckel (1987), p. 22.

[36] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 1a.

complex and flexible enough to incorporate and respond to sources as varied as the works of Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu and the Buddhist logicians."[37] It is not at all clear how these representatives of the two divisions of Svātantrika-Mādhyamika as understood by Tibetan doxographers viewed themselves at the time. It is clear though that the two divisions did represent two important distinctions as they were later understood in Tibet. And while Āryavimuktisena and Śrīgupta were most likely important influences on Śāntarakṣita, it is in *The Ornament For The Middle Way* and its auto-commentary that we find the first clear and thorough exposition of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika philosophical viewpoint.

In addition to *The Ornament For The Middle Way,* Śāntarakṣita also authored a commentary on Dharmakīrti's logical systems and an encyclopedic work on the prevailing Indian philosophical systems of his day called *Tattvasaṅgraha.* This text serves as a fine example of the Indian genre of philosophical survey literature (Skt. *siddhānta*) which was a precursor to the Tibetan genre of tenet system (Tib. *grub mtha*) literature, in that it outlines the basic presentation of views of current or important philosophical schools.

Among Śāntarakṣita's many disciples two of his most famous Indian disciples were Haribhadra and Kamalaśīla. Haribhadra wrote the most widely studied commentary on *The Ornament For Clear Realizations Sūtra* (Skt. *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, Tib. *mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan mdo*) the canonical reference point for the Mahāyāna path system, his *Illumination of 'The Ornament For Clear Realizations'* (Skt. *Abhismakālaṃkārāloka*, Tib. *mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi snang ba*), as well as two commentaries on *The Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras.* His commentary on *The Ornament For Clear Realizations Sūtra* like the sūtra itself is

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[37] Eckel (1987), p. 23.

considered to have been written from the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika perspective and he is thus considered to be a representative of that school.[38]

Similarly Kamalaśīla is also considered to be a representative of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school, though until a close and thorough study of his works is carried out, we can only speculate as to how closely his ideas match those of Śāntarakṣita. There is evidence which will be discussed in the next chapter which leads to the conclusion that on some subtle yet important matters, Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita may have differed slightly in their views. Nonetheless, next to Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla is the most important thinker representing this school. He not only wrote important commentaries on Śāntarakṣita's main works, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* and *Tattvasaṅgraha*, but also composed extremely important śāstra works of his own. The first of these is his *Illumination of the Middle Way* (Skt. *Madhyamakāloka*, Tib. *dbu ma snang ba*) which next to Śāntarakṣita's work is considered the primary doctrinal source of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school. In addition to addressing issues which concerned Śāntarakṣita in *The Ornament For The Middle Way,* (e.g. the two truths, epistemological issues, and proper forms of logic) Kamalaśīla also propounds the *ekayāna* theory of there being only one final vehicle into which all Buddhist schools eventually merge with on the path to Buddhahood, as well as issues concerning theories about Buddha nature (Skt. *tathāgatagarbha*). Furthermore, Kamalaśīla composed a three volume work entitled *Stages of Meditation* (Skt. *Bhāvnākrama*, Tib. *sGom pa'i rim pa*) dealing with the Mahāyāna path system. This text has become an integral one on the subject in Tibetan scholarship. Kamalaśīla will be discussed further in the following section on Tibet since he, like his teacher Śāntarakṣita, played a major role in the early dissemination of Buddhism to that country. Later Indian

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[38] Only mKhas-grub has argued that the *Abhisamayālaṃkārasūtra* was written from a Prāsaṇgika perspective and his view is *not* corroberated even by fellow representitives of the dGe-lugs school who have composed commentaries on the sutra such as Tsong-kha-pa himself, rRGyal-tshab or Se-ra-je-tsun-pa.

Mādhyamikans such as Atiśa who is also known as Ācārya Dīpaṅkaraśrījñāna will also be discussed in the section on Tibet below.

Tibetan Mādhyamika: A Brief Overview

Other than the legendary account of a Sanskrit Buddhist text (which nobody could read at the time) and accompanying relics which were said to have fallen from the sky to the roof of the palace of King lHa-tho-tho-ri (b. 173 CE), Buddhism made its first concrete appearance in Tibet during the reign of King Srong-btsan-sgam-po (618-650 CE). When the specific history of Mādhyamika in Tibet is documented however, its inception must be traced nearly a century later to the reign of the king Khri-srong-lde-btsan (740-798 CE). This is when canonical texts began to be translated into Tibetan on a large scale and leading Indian Buddhist pandits such as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla came to Tibet to teach. This began what is known in Tibetan history as the period of the "early dissemination" (Tib. *snga dar*) of Buddhism in Tibet and a collected translation of the Indian Buddhist canon which later came to be known as the Ancient Translations (Tib. *Nying-ma*). Many great Indian teachers came over a period of three centuries, but aside from perhaps the great tantric adept Padmasaṃbhava, none held more prominence than Śāntarakṣita. And as the major exponent on Sūtra and Buddhist philosophical doctrine, his place was unrivaled. In addition to his role as teacher of doctrine, Śāntarakṣita also founded the first Buddhist monastery in Tibet at Samye and ordained the first seven Tibetan Buddhist monks.

The only challenge to the views held by Śāntarakṣita, particularly on the importance of thorough philosophical investigation and a gradual approach to enlightenment came after his death from some leading Chinese Buddhist teachers. The disputes on the correct approach to Buddhism came to a head at the famous debate at Samye (sometimes called the Council of Lhasa) in 792 CE four years after the death of Śāntarakṣita. This debate was between Kamalaśīla, defending his teacher Śāntarakṣita and the Indian approach on the one hand and the Chinese Ch'an master Hva shang Mahāyāna on the other, representing the

sudden approach of the Chinese school. The loser was to leave Tibet and the winner to have their school of Buddhism be the state patronized religion. Surviving Tibetan accounts, in contrast with Chinese accounts, unanimously concur that Kamalaśīla was the victor and thus the Indian approach to Buddhism prevailed in Tibet. Aside from this posthumous Ch'an challenge, Śāntarakṣita's prominent role in the formation of Buddhism in Tibet naturally resulted in his philosophical positions being considered as the correct interpretation of Buddhism's highest exposition on the nature of reality. At this early point in Tibetan Buddhist history, as is still the case today, the works of Nāgārjuna and his disciple Āryadeva were considered to be the fundamental and authoritative texts on Mādhyamika, the correct view, while during 8th century Tibet, Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament For The Middle Way* (Skt. *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, Tib. *dbU ma rgyan tshig le'ur 'byed pa*) and Kamalaśīla's *Illumination of the Middle Way* (Skt. *Madhyamakāloka*, Tib. *dbU ma snang ba*) were considered as the premier commentaries on Nāgārajuna's thought in Tibet.

The centrality of Śāntarakṣita's Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika system during the early spread of Buddhism in Tibet (Tib. *snga dar*) is telling about more than just the early development of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. Its influence was also of principle importance to the Tibetan treatments of Mādhyamika thought, even given the decline in the prominence of its position in the hierarchy of views later in the history of Buddhism there. But from the eighth to tenth centuries the Yogācāra-Svātantrika perspective on Mādhyamika clearly had the widest currency in Tibet and in many respects went largely unchallenged until the re-translation of the Sanskrit Buddhist canon began in the late tenth century with the inclusion of many more Mādhyamika śāstras and the arrival of India pandits such as Atiśa who promoted Prasaṅgika Mādhyamika.

Several factors led to the decline of Śāntarakṣita's views among major Tibetan Buddhist schools over the centuries. A simple comparison the contents of the Nying-ma (Ancient Translations) of the Buddhist canon (8th-9th CE) to the gSar-ma (New Translation)

(11th-12th CE) finds important differences even between which particular Mādhyamika texts were translated during the two periods of canonical translation. The early period saw the translation of only five Mādhyamika texts which were, by the time of Atiśa beginning to be associated with the Prāsaṇgika sub-division of Mādhyamika. This is in contrast to the twelve Mādhyamika *śāstras* associated with one of the two divisions of Svātantrika-Mādhyamika in addition to the pan-Mādhyamika authoritative texts of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.[39] All three of the earliest indigenous Tibetan philosophical works including Ye-shes- sde's early 9th century doxographical work, *Distinguishing The Philosophical Views (lTa-ba khyad par)*, and dPal brtsegs's two texts, *Explanation of The Stages of The Views* (Tib. *lTa ba'i rim pa bshad pa*) and *Instructions on The Stages of The Views (lTa ba'i rim pa'i man ngag)* only two divisions of Mādhyamika are designated, the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika (Tib. *mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma*) and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika (Tib. *mal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma*) .[40]

Furthermore, it was not until the eleventh century, during the New Translation period that Chandrakīrti's *Mādhyamikāvatāra* with its defense of Buddhapālita's sole use of consequences and sharp criticism of Bhāvaviveka's support of the use of autonomous syllogisms was translated into Tibetan. This simple predominance of Mādhyamika materials supporting Śāntarakṣita's view or related Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika views available in Tibetan during the early period engendered their continued authoritative prominence during the first three centuries of Buddhism in Tibet. Paul Williams has deduced from this that a separate school known as Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika was probably not known in Tibet during the early period of translations. "It seems that Ye-shes-sde and, we can assume, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla did not know of a category called 'Prasaṅgika

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[39] Kennard Lipman, "A Study of Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Saskatchewan, 1979), pp. 2-3

[40] Ruegg (1980), p. 277.

Mādhyamika'. The continuum of Mādhyamika discourse was simply not divided in that way.'"[41] While a distinct school per se may not have been delineated at the time, Śāntarakṣita clearly knew of Mādhyamikans who exclusively used consequentialist arguments (in the tradition of Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti) since he devotes a significant portion of his own discussions on logic in *The Auto-Commentary On The Ornament of The Middle Way* to a refutation of precisely that methodology for those who hold Mādhyamika views.

Exclusive reliance on Tibetan commentarial materials by modern scholars without a proper understanding of the particular agenda at work often leads to erroneous assumptions or incomplete conclusions about Indian authors. The normal form this has taken in the past twenty years has been to rely exclusively on dGe-lugs pa tenet system literature to reconstruct the Indian schools they purport to outline. Williams himself even notes in relation to what he considers as the important consultation of the oral commentary of eminent Tibetan lamas as a primary source that while clearly much is to be learned from such lamas, that nonetheless, "a keynote in the study of Tibetan philosophy is caution."[42] This he feels is particularly important when relying on Tibetan sources for aid in the reconstruction of Indian Buddhist intellectual history. Yet here Williams seems to overlook his own insightful words of caution. Regardless of these issues however, it was primarily the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika perspectives of Bhāviviveka, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, among others, which were the focus of doctrinal inquiry in Tibet from the 8th to the 10th centuries.

However by the end of the re-translation project of the gSar-ma (New Translation canon), nearly all the major Indian commentarial works on Mādhyamika and related works such as the *Uttara Tantra* and the twenty-one commentaries on the *Abhisamayālaṃkārāsūtra*

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[41] Paul Williams, "Some Random Reflections on the Study of Tibetan Mādhyamika," *The Tibet Journal,* (Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring, 1989), p. 4.

[42] Ibid., p. 6.

had been translated into Tibetan. This included all of the works described above in the section on Indian Mādhyamika texts and authors. The only four works of note which were not translated into Tibetan or at least are no longer extant in Tibetan are the works of Devasharma, Gunamati, Gunaśri, and the Mādhyamika commentary of Sthiramati.

As described above the prominence of Śāntarakṣita's views and the Yogācāra-Svātantrika sub-school of Mādhyamika itself began to wane during the later dissemination (Tib. *phyi dar*) with the arrival of scholar/adepts such as Atiśa and the re-translation of the entire Sanskrit Buddhist canon including śāstras which are representative of the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika school. The New Translation canon included a more complete collection of the works of leading Indian proponents of Prasaṅgika such as Buddhapālita, Chandrakīrti and Śāntideva. Atiśa (982-1054 CE), whose heart disciple 'Brom-ston-pa, founded the bKa' gdam school in Tibet was perhaps the earliest voice in Tibet to clearly distinguish between the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school and the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika which he considered as the more profound and subtle view. In his text entitled *Special Instructions on Mādhyamika* (Skt. *Madhyamakopadeśa*, Tib. *dbU ma'i man sngag*) he draws a clear distinction between Prasaṅgika and Svātantrika Mādhyamikans and considers Prāsaṅgikas as representing the correct interpretation. Thu'u-bkvan, the eighteenth century dGe-lugs pa historian and doxographer even divides the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika into further sub-schools in his text *Mirror of the Good Explanations Showing the Sources and Assertions of All Systems of Tenets* (Tib. *Grub mtha' thams cad kyi khungs dand 'dod tshul ston pa legs bshad shel gyi me long*). The division is made by way of their alignment with regards to conventional truth with Yogācāra False Aspectarians or with Yogācāra True Aspectarians. Haribhadra, Jetari and Lavapa are considered proponents of the False Aspectarian perspective while Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Āryasena are considered as proponent of the division associated with True Aspectarians.

The evolving discourse on Mādhyamika thought in Tibet hit one of its critical apexes in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries with the major treatises of Tsong-kha-pa, the founder of the dGe-lugs pa school and those of his Sa-gya critics. This period witnessed a powerful shift toward the Prasaṅgika sub-school of Mādhyamika in Tibet as representing the high point in the hierarchy of views, despite discrepancies on the correct interpretation of Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika. Śāntarakṣita's influence was so powerful however that his positions still defined many of the parameters, the framework and the major issues for all subsequent Mādhyamikans in Tibet, even if they disagreed with some of the particularities of his views. Tsong-kha-pa however was now a thinker of such power and influence in Tibet that the course of Mādhyamika inquiry for some time after him entailed a series of either explanations of his views or criticisms of his views. Much like Śāntarakṣita five centuries earlier, Tsong-kha-pa largely defined the parameters of all subsequent Mādhyamika discourse in Tibet. Those scholars of any prominence who disagreed with his views had to clearly articulate and defend such arguments against Tsong-kha-pa's views in order to be taken seriously.

Among Tsong-kha-pa's voluminous works, his most important works on Mādhyamika and Mahāyāna thought in general include his commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamādhyamakākarikā* entitled *Ocean of Reasoning* (Tib. *Rigs pa'i gya mtsho*), his commentary on Chandrakīrti entitled *Illumination of the Thought: Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti's) 'Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'"* (Tib. *dbU ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal*), the Special Insight (Tib. *Hlag mthong*) chapter on Mādhyamika in his *Great Exposition on the Stages of the Path* (Tib. *Lam-rim chen-mo*) and his *Essence of Good Explanations: Treatise Determining The Interpretable and The Definitive* (Tib. *Drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po*). From this point until the flourishing of a non-sectarian movement at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries under the leadership of

Jamyang Kongtrul, who also revived the Emptiness of Other school (Tib. *gZhin sthong*) as well as the great Nying-ma scholar Mipam Rgya-tsho (Tib. *Mi-pham 'jam-dbyangs mam-rGyal rgya-mtsho*) who was an extremely learned scholar and prolific writer and who himself composed the detailed and extensive *Explanation of (Śāntarakṣita's) Ornament of The Middle Way* (Tib. *dbU ma rgyan gyi mam bshad*), the Prasaṅgika sub-school of Mādhyamika reigned largely unopposed as the supreme Buddhist philosophical view in Tibet. It's power was so great, and at least nominal acceptance so pervasive, that it appears that even those who did not hold what would traditionally be considered as Prasaṅgika views would nonetheless call their view 'Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika'.

Chapter 4

Analysis of Arguments and Texts

Introduction

This section of the study analyzes the arguments made by Śāntarakṣita in his text *The Ornament For The Middle Way* by drawing from and comparing three primary sources as well several auxiliary primary sources. The purpose is to provide a narrative account of the text and its arguments by juxtaposing Śāntarakṣita's own words, his commentary on his words and one of the two major dGe-lugs pa commentaries on his words as expressed in *The Ornament For The Middle Way.* The first primary source is of course Śāntarakṣita's root text itself, *The Ornament For The Middle Way* which, as mentioned above, is commonly regarded as the foundational text of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika sub-school of Mādhyamika thought. His arguments presented here will be analyzed in conjunction with his own *Auto-Commentary On The Ornament For The Middle Way.* I have quoted liberally from the auto-commentary for two reasons. First, the arguments in the auto-commentary go a long way toward clarifying Śāntarakṣita's positions on many issues. In fact he makes several important points in the auto-commentary that are not made in the more terse root text. Secondly, this text has yet to be translated into any Western language so my translations here also provide the reader with the first access to this text in English.

I have endeavored to explain Śāntarakṣita's views and arguments in primary dependence on his own words as presented in his two works on the subject of Mādhyamika. This presentation of arguments and views will be compared with the standard representation of them by the Ge-lug-pa school of Tibetan Buddhism as most clearly elucidated in rGyal-tshab's commentary on Śāntarakṣita's text, *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle*

Way' which is based on the oral instruction on Śāntarakṣita's text which rGyal-tshab received from his root lama and founder of the Ge-lug-pa school, Tsong-kha-pa. On occasion I have brought in other dGe-lugs material to highlight certain points, but the primary purpose here is to offer a narrative account of Śāntarakṣita's views and to compare Śāntarakṣita's presentation with the primary dGe-lugs attempt at the same project of mirroring his views in a narrative account. Most other dGe-lugs treatments of Śāntarakṣita such as is found in the tenet system literature have different agendas and those have been discussed in the introduction to this study and will be further investigated in chapter five.

In addition to using rGyal-tshab's text as a source for the Ge-lug understanding I have also relied in part on the oral commentary I have received from several eminent lamas.[43] Oral commentary was utilized for two primary reasons. The first was purely for assistance in penetrating some the nebulous and terse writing style and references in the texts and their arguments. The second and primary reason was to have the focus for the dGe-lugs side of this study be on the living dGe-lugs tradition and its living lineage of interpretation. With regard to this living tradition, I have relied on both lamas trained in Tibet before the exodus in the late 1950's and early 1960's and with lamas who have been trained in exile as the tradition often makes this distinction in its own moments of self reflection. In addition I have drawn in secondary philosophical literature from within the Ge-lug-pa tradition, a literature which is probably closer to the forefront of actual texts studied within the Ge-lug-pa lineage today. These include dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po's *Precious Garland of Tenets,* Kay-drub's *A Dose of Emptiness Opening The Eyes of The Fortunate: A Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying The Profound Emptiness,* lCang-skya *Presentation of Tenets,* and Tsong-kha-

[43] I received oral commentary on Śāntarakṣita's root text in conjunction with rGyal-tshab's commentary, *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'* from Geshe Jigme Dawa. Geshe Ngawang Samden reviewed my translation with me and answered several important questions for me in the process. Yangsi Rinpoche gave commentary on all of Śāntarakṣita's auto-commentary, *Mādhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti.* Geshe Lhundup Sopa gave commentary on the "Superior Insight" chapter of *The Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment* by Tsong-kha-pa.

pa's Special Insight chapter from his text *The Great Stages of the Path To Enlightenment.* Since I have included in the appendix of this study complete translations of rGyal-tshab's commentary *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'* and Śāntarakṣita's root text, *The Ornament For The Middle Way,* it was felt that for the purpose of penetrating the issues of comparative hermeneutic and comparative issues of representation, that large sections of Śāntarakṣita's auto-commentary be included in this chapter though a complete translation of this lengthy text is not included in this work.

rGyal-tshab's commentary on *The Ornament For The Middle Way* falls into a category of commentarial literature known as 'meaning commentary' in which he directly comments on each verse of the root text so as to draw forth and elucidate its intended meaning. rGyal-tshab here attempts to remain as close to the author's intentions as possible and we witness this for example in his use of autonomous syllogisms a move clearly made to follow the methodological preferences and form of argument used in the root text by its author, Śāntarakṣita. In addition rGyal-tshab refrains from any criticism of Śāntarakṣita's views even when Śāntarakṣita's it criticizing rGyal-tshab's own views such as on the topic of the appropriate form of logic. The only place where we find a clear imposition onto the text that is of rGyal-tshab's explicit creation, however accurate an account of the text it may be, is his topical outline. Here he describes the śāstra as having three main divisions or points it makes (along with numerous subdivisions and subtopics), first that entities do not ultimately exist, secondly that they do exist conventionally and finally the refutation of dissenting arguments. This organization of the subject matter and general outline of the text makes the material accessible by offering the reader a schematic framework for understanding the direction in which the author is proceeding, a framework which Śāntarakṣita himself does not offer to the reader.

The Text:

Title, Prostrations, and Introduction

The Tibetan version of the root text begins by giving both the Sanskrit and Tibetan names of the text. The Sanskrit name is given for several reasons. First it is considered auspicious to hear the Sanskrit name and to have that imprint (Tib. *pag cha*) planted in the disciple's mindstream. Secondly, Tibetan lamas often explain with a smile that the Sanskrit title demonstrates that the teaching and lineage come from India and are therefore older and more reliable. This was probably particularly the case during the first centuries of the transmission of Buddhism to Tibet; however in later times the voice of Tibetan authors such as Tsong-kha-pa carried as much authority as the earlier Indian pandits.

The root text then continues and rGyal-tshab's commentary similarly begins with prostrations or homage to Mañjuśri, the Buddha of perfect wisdom. The prostration to the Youthful Mañjuśri in the root text is actually a prayer of the translator's, Ye-shes-sde and Śīlendrabodhi, who translated the text from Sanskrit into Tibetan. It is traditional for the translator of Buddhist texts to offer homage or prostrations to the appropriate Buddhas in order to clear away the obstacles to completing the translation. This was a tradition which began in Tibet during the reign of Khri-srong-lde-btsan (740-798 CE). When the main topic of the text to be translated is wisdom or of the Abhidharma basket of the *Tripitaka* then the homage is offered to Mañjuśri. Translations of Sūtras begin with the translator's homage to the Buddha and the bodhisattvas and Vināya texts begin with homage to the All-Knowing One (Buddha) (Tib. *thams cad mkhen pa*). In his commentary rGyal-tshab likewise offers homage to Mañjuśri and also to his lama, Tsong-kha-pa, who he does not name specifically until the end of the text.

After prostrations to the Youthful Mañjuśri in the auto-commentary which is actually the prostration of the translator, then Śāntarakṣita himself offers homage. For Śāntarakṣita homage goes to all those who have had the direct realization of emptiness which takes place on the first bodhisattva ground (Skt. *bhumi* , Tib. *sa*)and who additionally possess the "superior aspiration" or bodhicitta which is defined conventionally as the altruistic aspiration to attain perfect enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings.

> I pay homage continuously to those who posses the pure and stable mind which has reached the [first bodhisattva] ground and see to the other shore which is like an ocean of the profound way of the dharma, to those unsurpassable residers who possess superior aspiration, who meditate in completion (on emptiness) and who take it to heart well.[44]

Śāntarakṣita proceeds from here to state the purpose of his composing this text.

> When one [directly] realizes that in reality there is no inherent existence, then all afflictive emotions (Skt. *kleśa*, Tib. *nyon mongs*) and stains of knowledge obstacles will be abandoned.[45]

It is often forgotten in Western analysis of Buddhist philosophical thought that philosophical learning is not separate from the soteriological goals of the path. Correct understanding of the nature of reality which is facilitated by such philosophical learning is an inseparable part of the Buddhist road to enlightenment. Śāntarakṣita explicitly relates the direct realization of the Mādhyamika philosophical position with the removal of obstacles to perfect Buddhahood outlined in Mahāyāna path system literature which is all based upon *The Ornament For Clear Realization* (Skt. *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*). Śāntarakṣita's heart disciple, Kamalaśīla in fact

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[44] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 19.

[45] Ibid., p. 19

wrote an extremely important three volume treatise on the Mahāyāna path system entitled *Stages of Meditation* (Skt. *Bhāvanākrama*, Tib. *bsGom pa'i rim pa*).

Śāntarakṣita continues the explanation of the purpose of composing the root text and auto-commentary as follows:

> Therefore always exert great effort toward realizing the lack of inherent existence (Tib. *rang bzhin med pa*) of all phenomena by [use of] reasoning and scriptures.
>
> Regarding that, since even those disciples following entirely by faith will not be completely satisfied by scriptures without inference derived from the power of cogent evidence, [I] will explain by way of logical reasoning."[46]

Logical analysis with specific evidence is described here by Śāntarakṣita as being an imperative part of a disciple's coming to the realization of the lack of inherent existence of all persons and phenomena, a realization which is necessary on the path to Buddhahood. By the eighth century the use of logical argumentation for the purpose of disposing of opponent's incorrect views and illuminating the correct view had become an integral part of Mahāyāna discourse in India. With regards to the use of logic and the appropriate form to be utilized, Śāntarkṣita follows his teacher Jñānagarbha who is in a lineage adhering to the position of Bhāvaviveka which holds that Mādhyamikans must use autonomous syllogisms (Skt. *svatantras*, Tib. *rang rgyud*) in order to communicate with opponents in debate and refute their views as well as to establish their own correct view, lest they fall into the extreme of nihilism. dGe-lugs pas such as Tsong-kha-pa and rGyal-tshab who have both written important commentaries on Śāntarakṣita's treatise, *The Ornament For The Middle Way*, would of course vehemently reject this position on logic. The rejection of the use of autonomous syllogisms as incompatible with Mādhyamika tenets is in fact a major topic in dGe-lugs pa philosophical education. rGyal-tshab nonetheless uses autonomous syllogisms

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[46] Ibid., pp. 19-20

in his commentary on Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament For The Middle Way* and refrains from criticism in order to most faithfully represent the positions and methodologies of Śāntarakṣita who is still considered as one of the great Mādhyamika pandits. rGyal-tshab is of course the most famous logician of the dGe-lugs school and this is clearly reflected in his writing style. Where Śāntarakṣita stylistically approaches arguments in a round about way both in his root text and especially in his auto-commentary on the root text, rGyal-tshab clearly outlines the direction his arguments will take and then quite systematically proceeds from one clearly presented syllogism to the next.

The 'Neither One Nor Many' Argument: Demonstrating That Entities Do Not Ultimately Exist (2.1)

Following the statement of the Tibetan and Sanskrit titles of the text along with the requisite prostrations comes the first śloka of the root text in which Śāntarakṣita lays out the concise syllogistic rendering of the 'neither one nor many' argument which will serve as the basis for first two thirds of *The Ornament For The Middle Way.* Therein he draws out the details of the argument by applying its reasoning to the assertions of all major competing Indian schools, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. This argument thus becomes part of a method for revealing his view by way of refuting actual competing views and hypothetical competing views. In this sense Śāntarakṣita draws on a similar vein of presentation as Nāgārjuna. The first śloka of Śāntarakṣita's root text states the syllogism as follows.

> (#1)These entities put forth [as real] by our [Buddhist schools] and other [non-Buddhist] schools, because in reality they have neither a singular nor plural nature, they have no nature [at all] like a reflected image[47]

The 'neither one nor many' argument is one of the five major logical arguments Buddhists employ as logical proofs for the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. According to oral commentary by Geshe 'Jigs-med zda-ba, the choice of which of these arguments to use depends on the scholar and that Śāntarakṣita found the 'neither one nor many' argument the most suitable for his Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika position. Prāsaṅgikas on the other hand prefer the 'diamond sliver' argument to prove the selflessness of persons and phenomena. While the nuances with which Śāntarakṣita utilizes the argument are unique, its appearance in *The Ornament For The Middle Way,* is not its first appearance.

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[47] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 1a.

The argument can be traced back to sūtra origins and is also found in various permeations in the writings of Śrīgupta and Jñanagarbha. Nāgārjuna uses the 'neither one nor many' argument as well and in fact utilizes all five of the great logical reasonings in his *Mūlamadhyamakakārika*, and so it is considered within the tradition that various Mādhyamika scholars will utilize them as they deem most appropriate.

The 'neither one nor many' argument is considered particularly useful for proving that entities do not ultimately or inherently exist. It is argued that if they did inherently exist then they should have either an inherently singular nature or an inherently plural nature. The 'neither one nor many' argument is therefore considered to be an expedient way for Mādhyamikans to show that entities or phenomena do not have an ultimate nature. The meaning of selflessness of phenomena which therefore derives from this argument is that since phenomena do not have or exist as unitary or singular natures nor do they exist in the nature of many that they therefore must not have any absolute nature at all. More attention in the argument is paid toward refutation of singular inherent existence, as will become apparent throughout this study of Śāntarakṣita's text, because refutation of the many derives naturally from the refutation of truly singular entities, since plurality must come from a aggregation of singular entities. Without a definable singularity there can be no plurality. The basic reasoning can be summed up in two syllogisms.

1. The subject, all internal and external phenomena do not have a singular inherent nature because they have parts.

The pervasion is established by the following syllogism.

2. The subject, all internal and external phenomena have parts because having parts and not having parts are mutually exclusive and being without parts is impossible for phenomena.

Śāntarakṣita goes on to demonstrate the fallacies involved with each attempt on the part of his Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents to establish singular, partless entities. Since all phenomena do not have a singular nature it is easy to establish from there that they do not have a manifold nature, because the nature of many depends on the aggregation of singular natures. Therefore phenomena are not truly established because they neither have the nature of being truly one or the nature of being truly many. It is worth noting here that though there are views held by Śāntarakṣita which dGe-lugs pas as holders of Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika views will disagree with, they consider Śāntarakṣita's use of the 'neither one nor many' argument in *The Ornament For The Middle Way* to be an appropriate and correct refutation of lower schools' views.

The Expanded 'Neither One Nor Many' Argument

rGyal-tshab begins his commentary with an overview of the major topics covered in Śāntarakṣita's text and a brief restatement of the fundamental syllogism of the 'niether one nor many' argument. I refer the reader at this point to the topical outline in the first Appendix of this study.

In reference to the outline, the first topic addressed by Śāntarakṣita is the refutation of permanent entities asserted by other schools (2.1.2.1.1.1.1.1). The main object of refutation here is the Universal Principle (Skt. *Prakṛiti*, Tib. *Tso bo*) put forth by the Sāṃkhya school, one of the six classical non-Buddhist Indian philosophical systems. The Universal Principle is said to be asserted as the permanent, absolute cause of all that exists though it, itself is causeless according to Śāntarakṣita and his dGe-lugs commentators. Śāntarakṣita briefly states his argument in the root text as follows.

> (#2) Since effects are produced (Tib. *nyer sbyor*) gradually [over time], permanent [causal] entities are not themselves singular. If each successive effect is distinct, then [the argument for] permanent, [causal] entities degenerates.[48]

The basis of the argument is that if the Universal Principle is the singular, permanent, unchanging, unobstructed cause of phenomena as Śāntarakṣita contends the Sāṃkhya school asserts, then all phenomenal effects should exist at all times and there should be no periodic arising and ceasing of objects because the cause of their being would always exist and not ever change. If the cause is always there it would be fallacious for the effects to only sometimes arise and fallacious for them not to persist. But we know from direct perception

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[48] Ibid.

that phenomena rise and cease periodically over time. rGyal-tshab thus explains that, "since such a fallacy comes, therefore the mere cause.....is not truly singular because it aids in the production of many successive fruits. Therefore having refuted the true, singular existence of the mere cause, the truly existent Fundamental Nature (Prakṛiti) is refuted."[49] rGyal-tshab elaborates by arguing that this Fundamental Nature must either have the ability to produce effects over time or not have that ability. If it does not then all effects must arise simultaneously, which clearly they do not. Since the Fundamental Nature must therefore have an assortment of abilities to produce successive effects at various moments in time, this clearly contradicts its true singularity and permanence.

Śāntarakṣita makes similar, yet distinct points in his auto-commentary. One of his primary arguments here rests on the unobstructed quality of the primary cause, Prakṛiti, when he writes,

> Since the fruits would be delayed if the cause were not complete, when causal efficacy is not obstructed, how would such a gradual arising of those [effects] be possible?[50]

In other words, if the cause (Prakṛiti) is truly singular and unobstructed as a causal agent which is absolute and permanent, then the periodic arising of effects would be impossible. And if the cause is permanent, singular and unobstructed, distinct effects could not arise because the cause is always the same and always present. His argument is similar to rGyal-tshab's but his emphasis is slightly different. Then Śāntarakṣita offers a peripheral argument which does not add further damage to the Sāṃkhya's system but does reinforce the acknowledgment of contradictions their system presents to the way we normally perceive

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[49] rRGyal-tshab. *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang, (Remembering 'The Ornament for the Middle Way')*, (Collected Works, Vol. 5) 1980, folio 579.

[50] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 21.

reality. He elaborates by explaining that if effects only depend on the primary cause and that the accompanying simultaneous conditions normally thought to be necessary requisites accompanying the primary cause for the effect to come to full fruition, actually are not necessary because all that is necessary is the Prakṛiti, Śāntarakṣita replies:

> ...then at that time the simultaneously produced conditions only abide by the power of force like [an animal with] a rope around its throat. The ceaseless continuum of effects would be unopposed.[51]

In other words the simultaneous conditions would play no part, contrary to our direct experience of causality and those conditions would only be like animals dragged around by a leash for the purpose of misleading. For example a seed may be the primary cause for a plant sprouting, but necessary conditions also include sunlight, water, etc. According to Śāntarakṣita's critique, since the Sāṃkhya system holds that the only requirement for the production of effects is the primary cause, Prakṛiti, all other simultaneous conditions are actually present for no purpose.

Finally Śāntarakṣita responds in his auto-commentary to the assertion that by definition, the ability of the Universal Principle, Prakṛiti, is the ability to produce periodic effects, a question rGyal-tshab addresses, but not as directly as Śāntarakṣita does here.

> Some would assert that this 'spontaneously produced cause' is a designation of an ability and that [ability] is asserted to be a gradual producer of effects. To them [I] offer this reply. How can this kind of mistake come? If you say that the nature of those producers of gradual effects (i.e. the intrinsically singular cause or Universal Principle) periodically [changes] from [producing] one effect to another, then you must give up the assertion of its permanence because the nature of each of the earlier and later effects is to arise and disintegrate.[52]

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[51] Ibid., p. 22.

[52] Ibid.

Śāntarakṣita logically compels his Sāṃkhya opponents here to abandon the notion of permanence with regard to its Universal Principle and by way of that s/he also must abandon its singularity because, if for no other reason than because it is related to different effects at different moments in time and therefore must have parts which are related to those aspects separately. This must be the case since it has already shown that they it can not have that causal relationship with all effects at all times.

The next topic to be addressed in root text is indicated by rGyal-tshab to be the rejection of the actual permanence held by our own Buddhist schools, which here refers to Vaibhāṣhikas and is designated in the outline as (2.1.2.1.1.1.1.2). The pertinent next verse in the root text reads as follows.

> (#3) Those uncompounded objects of knowledge known by the knowledge which arises in meditation and which are asserted by the system (of the Vaibhāṣhikas), even those (uncompounded objects) are not unitary since they are related to successive moments of wisdom.[53]

Śāntarakṣita illuminates this point in his auto-commentary by highlighting a contradiction similar to one which he criticizes the Sāṃkhya system for having, specifically that entities which are of a single nature must be permanent and that the entities which they want to assert as inherently singular, uncompounded objects, cannot be either permanent or singular given their relationship with an impermanent consciousness. Śāntarakṣita explains this point very clearly in his auto-commentary.

> Because there are objects and object possessors, if one says that since they (the objects) are related with impermanent consciousness (Tib. *rnam par shes pa rim ca*)

[53] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 1b.

> (the object possessors), they cannot be of a single nature since [a single nature] is unchanging.[54]

The crux of the argument is that if this wisdom of meditative equipoise of an *āryan* (one who has attained the path of seeing) as asserted by the Vaibhāṣhika school is permanent and unchanging then it cannot be related to various moments of consciousness because consciousness is impermanent and in a constant state of flux. If it were related to more than one different moment of consciousness then it cannot be singular since there must be a part which is related to moment A of consciousness and another part which is related to moment B of consciousness. Therefore even uncompounded phenomena such as the wisdom which arises from meditative equipoise cannot be permanent and singular as asserted by the Vaibhāṣhikas, but must be impermanent since it is related to various moments of consciousness. rGyal-tshab explains the argument in the form of an autonomous syllogism and adds to the reasoning which demonstrates the irrationality of the Vaibhāṣhika position, the idea that the normal flow of moments of time would be incongruous with the experience of moments of meditative equipoise if that wisdom were truly singular.

> The three non-compounded phenomena known by the meditative equipoise of an *āryan* which the Vaibhāṣhika system asserts to be truly singular, those three uncompounded phenomena, the subject are necessarily not truly singular because they are related as subject and object with various successive [moments of] wisdom obtained through meditation. The pervasion is established since the wisdom which is obtained from such meditative equipoise would be out of order and because the three uncompounded phenomena are necessarily momentary.[55]

Successive moments of consciousness would be known out of order according to rGyal-tshab because they would all be known at once according to oral commentary. In other

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[54] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 23.

[55] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 580.

words, what is known at a later time can also be known at an earlier time since that object known is said to be truly singular. Put yet another way, if consciousnesses at moments A, B, and C all have as their object the same wisdom and that wisdom is truly singular then since the truly singular wisdom cannot be related to different moments in time the wisdom known by those three moments of consciousness must all be known at once and could not be ordered according to successive moments. The fourth verse of the root text, *The Ornament For The Middle Way* and then Śāntarakṣita's own (indented) auto-commentary followed by the fifth verse of the root text clarifies what is presented here exactly as it is presented in the auto-commentary and outlines Śāntarakṣita's basic argument. It can also be seen by close examination that rGyal-tshab's rendering of the argument parallels Śāntarakṣita's while offering an expanding perspective to the same argument.

> (#4) If the nature of the object known by a previous consciousness continues to exist subsequently then even the previous cognition would still exist in the latter [and] in that way also, the latter would exist in the former.
>
> > If it is not like that then the nature of the uncompounded object known by the previous consciousness would still exist at a later time even though the previous consciousness would not exist (at that later time). Likewise the object known by the later consciousness would exist at the earlier time even though the later consciousness does not exist [at that earlier time]. Thus stated, [the Vaibhāṣhika position] degenerates. But if the later consciousness does not abide in the earlier time and the nature of the object known by the earlier consciousness does not abide in the later times, then if that is the case,
>
> (#5) Since the nature of the (latter) object does not arise in the earlier and (the earlier object) does not arise in later times, uncompounded phenomena like consciousness must be objects known to arise momentarily.[56]

Śāntarakṣita goes on to argue in his auto-commentary that since consciousness is impermanent and is destroyed moment by moment that so too should the nature of its objects

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[56] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 24.

to which it is related including those so-called uncompounded phenomena such as the wisdom arising from the meditative equipoise of an *āryan* be impermanent and destroyed moment to moment. It is important to keep in mind that this analysis is happening within the larger framework of the 'neither one nor many' argument which serves as the basis by which Śāntarakṣita aims to refute all competing views by first demonstrating that entities which both Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools assert to be of a single nature, in fact are not of a single nature. In his analysis of the single nature of uncompounded phenomena as asserted by Vaibhāṣhikas to which Śāntarakṣita is devoting a lengthy discussion, the next angle from which he approaches the argument is from the perspective of the cause of the arising and abiding of those uncompounded phenomena. The following quotation from the auto-commentary includes both the sixth and seventh verses from the root text along with Śāntarakṣita's own commentary on them which takes up this argument as follows.

> (#6) If the previous (uncompounded object) arises from the power of (the causes and conditions of the uncompounded object of) an earlier moment, then this would not [actually] be uncompounded, like minds and mental states.
>
> If you say that (objects) of later moments arise independently, that could not be the case.
>
> (#7)If you accept these momentary (objects) arise independently because there is not dependence on others, they must either exist permanently or not exist at all.
>
> Because they arise periodically, they will clearly be known as dependently co-arisen like that arising from minds and mental states.[57]

rGyal-tshab's argument follows Śāntarakṣita's line of reasoning in strict autonomous syllogistic form. He argues that the uncompounded phenomena which Vaibhāṣhikas want to assert to be singular must arise from their own power because if as Śāntarakṣita pointed out,

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[57] Ibid., 25.

they arise by the power of a previous uncompounded phenomena then they would not be independent and uncompounded by definition but must be dependent. However, if they arise from their own power he argues that they must either exist permanently, "because this is an entity which does not cease after the cause ceases (since it would not depend on causes or) it never exists because it is a phenomena which does not follow after a cause."[58] Entities which are said to not be dependent on causes must be either permanent according to Mādhyamika analysis or not exist at all because that which does not depend on causes for its arising will not cease to abide by virtue of the removal of a cause. There would be no logical explanation for the cessation of its abiding or for any change in its ontological status. Therefore since there would be no explanation for its change in ontological status, if it did not exist permanently, it would not exist at all.

Śāntarakṣita follows his application of the 'neither one nor many' argument refuting permanent entities asserted by Buddhist schools with the refutation of truly singular permanent persons (2.1.2.1.1.1. 2). There were several prevalent Indian schools holding the existence of permanent persons which Śāntarakṣita could have addressed here such as Vedantins whom he treats later under the topic of abandoning dissenting arguments. At this point however, the view he chose as his object of refutation is that held by the Vatsiputrians. Śāntarakṣita labels them as "outsiders" or non-Buddhists in his auto-commentary. There is some controversy as to whether they are a Buddhist school or not. Certainly they considered themselves a Buddhist school and more specifically as one of the eighteen sub-schools of Vaibhāṣika. However because they do hold a self of persons, the authenticity of their claims to being Buddhist has come into question by other Buddhists. In dGe-lugs analysis which determines the Buddhist or non-Buddhist quality of a school of thought by its adherence or

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[58] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 581.

lack there of to the four seals which signify a Buddhist theory,[59] Vatsiputrians are considered Buddhist. dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po explains the dGe-lugs pa response in his *Precious Garland of Tenets* in the following way, "There is no such fallacy [in categorizing them as Buddhist] because the self that they assert is a self-sufficient, substantially existent self whereas the selflessness of the four seals refers to the absence of a permanent, unitary, independent self."[60] Nonetheless, Śāntarakṣita's labeling them as "outsiders" therefore has a strong tone of condescension to it. The Vatsiputrian claim with regards to persons is according to rGyal-tshab's summation of their position that, "there are intrinsically singular persons which are inexpressibly [neither] permanent [nor] impermanent."[61] They accept inherently existing persons but assert that they are neither permanent nor impermanent and neither one nor different from the five aggregates. Śāntarakṣita asserts a syllogism in the root text to make his point in accordance with the 'neither one nor many' argument that those persons asserted to exist by Vatsuputrians actually have no nature since they have neither a singular nor plural nature due to their being neither momentary nor non-momentary. He asserts the syllogism in the root text, *The Ornament For The Middle Way* as follows. I have also included (indented) after the root text verse, Śāntarakṣita's own auto-commentary on this point

> (#9) It is clearly understood that a person has neither a singular nor plural nature since it is impossible to demonstrate [its] momentariness or non-momentariness (according to Vatsiputrians).

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[59] The four seals signify a theory as being Buddhist are, "1. All products are impermanent. 2. All contaminated things are miserable. 3. All phenomena are empty and selfless. 4. Nirvana is peace." Gyatso, Tenzin, The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, *The Dalai Lama At Harvard.* Trans. Jeffrey Hopkins, (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1988), p. 18.

[60] Sopa, Geshe Lhundup and J. Hopkins. *Cutting Through Appearances: Theory and Practice in Tibetan Buddhism.* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1989), p. 177.

[61] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang,* folio 581.

> Regarding this subject, the persons which are accepted by outsiders: the root of their argument demonstrating their lack of a singular or plural nature is easy to establish. If they were momentary then they would have a plural nature because another nature would arise in each moment (due to its relationship with distinct moments). If they were not momentary then they would have a singular nature because their single nature would be stable and permanent. Since they do not assert [either way] there is no difficulty in establishing their emptiness of a singular or plural nature.[62]

It is of interest to compare here the commentary Śāntarakṣita makes explaining his root text argument with the commentary of the dGe-lugs scholar, rGyal-tshab. rGyal-tshab is famous within his tradition as a master of logic and this mastery is evident throughout his commentary here *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'*. He uses the syllogistic form preferred by Śāntarakṣita to explain Śāntarakṣita's arguments, but we also see that he has inverted some of the points in order to create a syllogism which amplifies the clarity of the point Śāntarakṣita is attempting to make.

> The subject, persons, would not be truly singular because they are not expressed as permanent. [And] they would not be truly many because they are not expressed as impermanent. There is a pervasion because if an entity does not have a manifold nature it must be singular and if entities are of a manifold nature they must be many. In brief, they must not be truly singular because they are not expressible as impermanent or permanent.

rGyal-tshab's skill in creating clear, logical arguments is well demonstrated here. Not only does he argue the point Śāntarakṣita is making regarding the refutation of intrinsically singularly existing persons, but also argues that they must lack being the nature of many as well. In accordance with the 'neither one nor many' argument which fills the first two thirds of Śāntarakṣita's text, he therefore shows that based on Vatsiputrian's views, since there is no single nature and no plural nature of persons that there is no nature of persons at all.

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[62] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 27-28.

In the tenth verse of the root text Śāntarakṣita attacks two distinct positions. He uses the first two lines of the verse to refute first position , namely, singular pervasiveness (2.1.2.1.1.1) by formulating a question and the third and fourth lines to refute the second position, the existence singular, gross, non-pervasive entities (2.1.2.1.1.2). Thus in rGyal-tshab's commentary he also divided the verse along these lines as he elaborates on their meaning. Śāntarakṣita however offers the four lines as one cohesive verse in the root text.

> (#10) How can pervasive [entities such as space] be singular
> given that they are related with distinct directions?[63]
> Gross [non-pervasive entities] are also not singular
> since [some parts] of such entities can be visible [while other parts] are not visible.[64]

When Śāntarakṣita explains the first half of this stanza, the lines refuting singular pervasive entities such as space, in his auto-commentary, he argues that if singular pervasive entities such as space are related with other entities in distinct directions, then those entities with which it is relates like tress for example, must also by virtue of their relationship with space which is the nature of singularity also be of that singular nature since the single natured space can not be related with something having a different nature. Śāntarakṣita explains it as follows.

> (#11) What is the nature of that which is related with those singular entities such as space and so forth which are related to trees, etc. of different directions if they are also related with one another? Because they (trees) are related to that (relator)

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[63] Maintaining the integrity of poetic lines of verse when translated first from Sanskrit to Tibetan and then (with the Sanskrit original non-extant) from Tibetan to English is difficult if not impossible in many cases. I have therefore endeavored to translate the root text by remaining as close to the language, meaning and tone of the Tibetan as possible, but have not attempted to divide English verses of stanzas as the Sanskrit original was divided. I have nonetheless done so here to give the reader a feel for the verse and because two distinct points are made in the two halfs of the stanza. It is not often possible to divide the stanzas in such a clean manner.

[64] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 2b.

> which is itself singular, similarly these other (relatees such as trees) also are not distinct from that (singularity).

In his commentary rGyal-tshab again explains the root text verse by offering a clearly presented syllogism but also again by shifting the parts of the argument of Śāntarakṣita's auto-commentary explanation while maintaining the same meaning. The reason for Śāntarakṣita that singular pervasive entities such as space could not be singular according to Śāntarakṣita is because then entities of various directions such as trees would also have to be singular due to their relationship with singular space. His reason is that entities of a singular nature cannot be related with anything which is of a different nature, and clearly trees do not have a singular nature. Thus if trees for example, were related with singular pervasive space, then they must be of a single nature. rGyal-tshab draws out this point however by emphasizing that pervasive entities can't be singular because they are related with entities which are both related with pervasive space or time and also with other directions and therefore are simultaneously related with non-pervasive space which is of a singular nature and are themselves of a nature which is not singular.

> [Pervasive] time and space and the like, the subject, would not be truly singular because a tree, etc. which belongs to different directions like east and the like are simultaneously related with time.[65]

Śāntarakṣita proceeds to explain how gross, non-pervasive entities also are not of a singular nature. Here he is trying to show that if gross objects are merely the accumulation of singular partless particles, then if those building blocks are of a truly singular nature that the gross object should also be the same singular nature. If the particle which serve as the building blocks are of a single nature and relate to one another then they must all have the same nature and the gross objects also must have a single nature. He therefore argues that

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[65] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 582.

Vaibhāṣhikas want to make two incompatible assertions. The want to accept gross objects which are the accumulation of parts. Yet they must also accept that these gross objects are of singular nature since the parts are related and of a single nature and therefore should not have parts. It is illogical to accept a gross object composed of parts yet truly singular. While Vaibhāṣhikas probably would not come right out and claim that gross objects are truly singular, Śāntarakṣita argues that they can not avoid that claim if they accept that what goes into the formation of gross objects are truly singular partless particles. If they have a single nature the accumulation must combine to have that same singular nature or else the smallest partless singular building blocks would not be single or partless. Yet due to their acceptance of gross objects having the ability to possess conflicting qualities like having part of a pot visible to an eye consciousness while another part is not, there is a contradiction in its being truly singular yet possessing parts. He addresses this contradiction in the Vaibhāṣhika position in the following manner in his *Auto-Commentary On The Ornament For The Middle Way*:

> Even for the assertion of gross [entities] such as a body, etc., when you hold the abiding nature of incompatible [qualities such as] visibility and invisibility, mobility and immobility, the changability and unchangability of colors, liking and disliking, etc., if you assert that they must be [on] limbs (Tib. *yan lag*) and not [on] limb possessors (Tib. *yan lag can*) still, wouldn't these limbs be joined with the limb possessors? [If you say] they are not (joined), then if that is true, then [with respect to] these so-called [qualities such as] visibility and invisibility, etc. why shouldn't the object of eye consciousness [include] two [opposing qualities] in mutually distinct entities such as bodies and legs, etc.?
>
> If you say those are objects seen by the eye then it (the body) is either a possessor of other limbs or itself (without limbs). Otherwise there is no gross singularity. If it possesses the remaining limbs then it would see only phenomena as limb possessors [with] aspects and this is even more gross than that.[66]

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[66] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 29-30.

rGyal-tshab and his dGe-lugs oral commentators outline an organized approach to explaining the contradictions associated with the Mādhyamika rendition of the Vaibhāṣhika view. rGyal-tshab describes three contradictions with holding the Vaibhāṣhika view of saying that a gross object such as a pot is intrinsically single. The first contradiction has to do with a pot's having the qualities of being both unobstructed to the visual consciousness and obstructed to the visual consciousness. If it is intrinsically single, the dGe-lugs pas argue that it should be either all visible or be completely obstructed from visibility, but part of a singular entity could not be visible while another part is obstructed because the existence of parts would contradict its singularity. The second contradiction draws on a similar line of reasoning in that an intrinsically singular gross entity should not have distinct parts. Here rGyal-tshab emphasizes gross entities in which part is mobile while other parts are not. The example given in oral commentary was that of a tree with branches. If a tree is intrinsically single yet its branches can be moving while the trunk is stable, then a tree must have parts and therefore not be truly single. The final contradiction mentioned by rGyal-tshab and explained in oral commentary is the contradiction regarding color. If one takes a gross single object like a cloth and paints one side one color and another side a different color then we see a contradiction emerging with reference to the qualities the object possesses. A singular object should not have a multitude of qualities if it is truly singular.[67]

The next topic in the root text according to rGyal-tshab's commentary is the refutation of truly singular atomic particles which falls under the general heading of the refutation of permanent entities asserted by our schools in rGyal-tshab's outline (2.1.2.1.1.1.1.2). rGyal-tshab then mentions that the eleventh through thirteenth verses of the root text pertain to this argument. Śāntarakṣita quotes the eleventh and twelfth verses back to back in his auto-commentary, then comments and follows that with a quotation of the

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[67] Geshe Jigme Dawa (1998)

thirteenth root text verse but all three verses do pertain to this particular argument. The main target of Śāntarakṣita's argument here is a view held by both the Vaibhāṣhika and Sautrāntika Buddhist schools, that there exists minutest particles or atoms which are actually partless. There is no smaller essential building block for the physical world and it is these partless atoms which are of a single nature which combine to form gross objects according to those Buddhist schools considered as lower by Śāntarakṣita. The eleventh through thirteenth root text verses aim to disprove this position and read in the following manner.

> (#11) What is the nature of the central [atom] which faces singly towards [another] atom yet abides [with other atoms in various directions] either [around and] joining with it or around it [with space between them] or around it without space between?
>
> (#12) If it is asserted that [the central atom] also faces entirely toward another atom, then if that were the case how could land and water be expansive?
>
> (#13) If you accept [atoms with] sides which face other atoms [in different directions] then if that is the case, how could atoms be singular and partless?[68]

The argument put forth here questions basic assertions and assumptions of the two Hīnayāna[69] Buddhist schools examined here in order to refute the notion of the existence of partless atoms which they accept. The first of these three stanzas questions what the nature of an atom is which is related in one of three possible ways with atoms abiding in the ten directions around it. The second of these three verses from the root text questions how atoms of singular nature could combine to form gross objects. If they do in fact combine to do this then that first or central partless atom must have other inherently singular partless atoms surrounding it in one of the three possible ways as Śāntarakṣita states in the first verse in order to form gross objects. A contradiction arises because if other atoms abiding in the

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[68] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 2b.

[69] 'Hinayāna' is a pejorative term used by Mahāyaānists to refer to what they considered as inferior Buddhist schools. I do not use the term in this sense but only as a demarkation for a group of Buddhist schools as they were referred to by Śāntarakṣita and his dGe-lugs commentators.

ten surrounding direction combine with the central atom then the central atom must have side facing those atoms in ten distinct directions or some sort of relationship with those directions and therefore would not be truly singular due to its having parts related with different directions as Śāntarakṣita questions in the thirteenth verse of the root text. If it were truly singular and could only face and combine in one direction then gross object such as land and water or even earth mandalas as Śāntarakṣita writes in his auto-commentary could not be expansive. This of course runs contrary to our direct perception which knows all sorts of gross objects such as the ones mentioned. rGyal-tshab explains this point very briefly in syllogistic form.

> A particle which abides in the center of the ten directions, the subject, would not have different places [of abiding from] the particle to the east and in the nine other directions because the part of the subject facing to the east and the part of the subject facing to the other nine directions are one. If you accept this, then it would not be possible [for those] to develop into gross forms like earth because of accepting that [previous syllogism]. If you accept each of the [ten] faces, then that subject (the particle in the center of the ten directions) must not be singular and without parts because the subject would have ten different faces facing the [surrounding] particles in the ten directions.[70]

rGyal-tshab therefore offers two alternatives to those holders of partless atoms, both of which would be unacceptable. The first is that gross forms could not develop if their position were correct because atoms, being truly singular could not combine in the directions as would be necessary for gross form to take shape but could only combine in one place. If a single partless atom were to combine with atoms in a variety of directions then it would not be truly single and partless since it would be related with other atoms in a variety of directions. Therefore the only other alternative for Vaibhāṣhikas and Sautrāntikas according to rGyal-tshab is to accept that those tiny atoms which are said to be the building blocks of

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[70] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 582.

gross form are not truly partless or truly singular and that in fact there are no truly singular partless atoms.

Śāntarakṣita proceeds from here to further demonstrate the lack of a permanent, inherent nature in objects asserted as real by both lower Buddhist schools (2.1.2.1.1.1.1.1) and non-Buddhist schools (2.1.2.1.1.1.1.2). His auto-commentary (indented) following this verse from the root text additionally displays Śāntarakṣita's view on the soteriological value of Buddhist philosophical inquiry and logical inference. Not only do we have an abstract understanding of a philosophical system as a result of this inquiry but we will also develop an effortless knowledge of certain aspects of emptiness of inherent existence, a realization which is central to the attainment of Budddhahood in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

> (#14) Atoms have thus been established to have no inherent nature. Therefore it is evident that sight and substance and the like which are asserted [as real] by many of our own [Buddhist] schools and other [non-Buddhist] schools also have no inherent nature.
>
> > If we know that subtlest atoms do not (inherently) exist then the consciousness, etc. of eyes and form asserted as inherently existent (by our schools) and the substances and qualities, etc. asserted by the Vaiśeṣikas, etc. will be effortlessly known to be empty of inherent existence. One may ask if this (teaching of 12 āyatanas and 18 dhātus) is the teaching of the Conqueror (the Buddha) or not?[71]

Śāntarakṣita argues that as a result of understanding that atoms do not have a single, inherently existing nature that so too would the holders of such a view come to know that those grosser objects which the accumulation of those atoms supposedly form, also have no inherently existing nature. Much in the vain of *The Heart Sūtra* which similarly negates a host of Buddhist concepts, Śāntarakṣita refutes the true existence of the fundamental components of Buddhist *abhidharma* including the true existence of the five aggregates (Skt. *skandha* , Tib.*phung po*) the twelve sense spheres (Skt. *āyatana*, Tib. *skye mched*) and the

[71] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 34.

eighteen constituent elements (Skt. *dhātu*, Tib. *khams*). rGyal-tshab offers a basic syllogism as explanation of this verse which demonstrates that all of those objects of knowledge including the five aggregates, the eighteen constituent elements, etc. and the substances asserted by non-Buddhist schools all lack any truly existent nature because there are no truly existent particles.[72] rGyal-tshab proceeds to mention that the pervasion for the given syllogism is established in conjunction with the following fifteenth stanza of the root text, *The Ornament For The Middle Way*, the verse which also immediately follows Śāntarakṣita's hypothetical question (quoted above) of lower Buddhist schools about whether or not those abhidharma teachings are in fact the teachings of the Buddha .

> (#15) The nature of these [entities] is [said to be] comprised of those [atoms]. The qualities of these [entities], their own actions, and even their generalities (Skt. *sāmānya*, Tib. *spyi*) and particularities (Skt. *viśeṣa*, Tib. *khyad pa*), are said to be possessed of those [atoms] (and therefore do not inherently exist).[73]

Śāntarakṣita proceeds is his auto-commentary to give a very lucid explanation of his line of reasoning and the logical consequences which evolve out of holding the single, partless atoms as truly existent. His argument criticizes theVaibhāṣhika view that all such objects are made up entirely of partless atoms on the basis that if partless atoms do not exist then those grosser objects which they combine to form must also not truly exist.

> Our schools (Vaibhāṣhikas) assert that the ten types of constituent elements (Skt. *dhātu*, Tib. *khams*) of form possessors (i.e. the 5 senses and 5 sense objects) are made up of these subtlest atoms. These (ten constituent elements) would be unsuitable [to be posited as truly existent] if those (subtle atoms) do not [truly] exist. It is the same as saying that eye consciousness arises in dependence on form and an eye faculty (although those do not ultimately exist). If the five constituent consciousnesses (Tib. *rnam par shes pa'i khams lnga*) such as eye

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[72] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 583.

[73] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 3a.

> [consciousness] depend on those (form and an eye faculty) then if those did not exist then on what would their production rely. If the five constituent consciousnesses do not exist then the mental consciousness which is actually established by that immediate condition (of the existence of the five constituent consciousnesses) would naturally be incorrect. Likewise if the accumulation of the six consciousnesses is not established, then even a thorough explanation of the consciousness which is just beyond that would be illogical. And likewise, if the mind has no nature then simultaneous existents such as feeling, discrimination, intention, etc. these mental factors (Skt. *caitta*, Tib. *sems las byung ba*) also will be easily known as having no nature, and even [the same would be known with regard to] non-associated compositional factors (Tib. *ldan pa ma yin pa'i 'du byed rnams*). Since the heroic masters of logical thought have laid out bundles of explanations one hundred times there is no need for me to do an extra one....Therefore, since there are no [inherently] existent relationship possessors (i.e. base atoms) the accumulation of those also does not exist. Since it has already been shown and made clear that permanent entities such as space, time, directions, self and even subtle atoms have no inherent existence, by this manner of investigation, the form aggregate, the consciousness aggregate together with the concommitant factors (Tib. *mtshungs par ldan pa*) are also shown to have no inherent existence.[74]

The next topic in the root text is unique in some very important respects with regard not only to its meaning and implications for Śāntarakṣita's view but also is important in the context of the text itself. The topic (2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.1), self-cognizing cognition (Skt. *svasaṃvedana*, Tib. *rang rig*),[75] represent the only place in the first two thirds of the root text, the section where he is applying the 'neither one nor many' argument to all his opponents, where Śāntarakṣita actually makes an affirmative statement explaining his own view to the reader explicitly. All of the rest of this section is spent rejecting opposing views and only offering glimpses into Śāntarakṣita's own positions implicitly in the form of negative dialecticism. And Śāntarakṣita's own view is that he does hold self-cognizing cognition to be a correct, important and valid position. This is an important point upon

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[74] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 34-37.

[75] The Sanskrit term, '*svasaṃvedana*', or '*rang rig*' in the Tibetan has been translated in a number of different ways including "self-knowledge," 'self-awareness,' 'reflexive awareness,' 'the self-cognition of knowledge,' etc. I have chosen to follow the suggestion of Geshe Ngawang Samten which is probably closest with the final example offered here, and translate the term as 'self-cognizing cognition' in order to convey the full meaning of the term which shows a consciousness which is conscious of itself and its knowledge. Paul Williamas has suggested that the term may be used with slightly nuanced meanings by various authors and can be effectively translated in different ways depending on the context. See Williams, (1998).

which Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikans such as Tsong-kha-pa and the dGe-lugs school will later criticize Śāntarakṣita and the view he is considered as the central proponent of, namely the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. In rGyal-tshab's text commenting directly on *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* he offers no criticism however, but only attempts to faithfully elucidate Śāntarakṣita's position, thus supporting my three-fold pedagogical division of dGe-lugs commentaries on Śāntarakṣita and the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school.

Śāntarakṣita introduces the topic in the root text by giving a partial definition of the term but often also uses a synonym for self-cognizing cognition (Skt. *svasaṃvedana*, Tib. *rang rig*) such as self-knowledge (Tib. *bdag nyid shes pa*). In the section immediately following this root text verse in his own auto-commentary however he uses the technical term self-cognizing cognition several times. The sixteenth verse of the root text opens the topic in the following manner.

> (#16) Consciousness is produced in the opposite way from that which is of an inanimate nature. That which is the nature of not being inanimate is this self knowledge.[76]

Śāntarakṣita begins by simply defining it as that which is the opposite of being inanimate in the process of convincing Vaibhāṣhikas that they should hold the position of self-cognizing cognition. In other words, whatever is animate is reflexively conscious. In the following two verses Śāntarakṣita criticizes his hypothetical Vaibhāṣhika opponent who is supposedly convinced to accept self-cognizing cognition yet still holds to certain problematic Vaibhāṣhika epistemological views such as the ability to cognize the nature of external objects from which it is different, a critical mistaken assertion according to Śāntarakṣita. First however, Śāntarakṣita begins to explain self-cognizing cognition by

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[76] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 3a.

explaining that it is naturally clear. This is the case because all consciousnesses are defined as 'merely clear and mere cognition' (Tib. *gsal tsam dang rig tsam*) and self-cognizing cognition which has consciousness as its object and is of course consciousness itself must therefore be clear from both the side of the object as well as the subject. He then goes on to explain the fallacies involved with maintaining a consciousness which cognizes external objects. Śāntarakṣita's arguments here clearly show a debt to Yogācāra thinkers before him.

> Let me explain in short [to you Vaibhāṣhikas]. As for the manner of the two (apprehender and object) for the type of consciousness for which there are no aspects (self-cognizing cognition), [that type of consciousness] does not meet with the appearing object of the consciousness. Since it is only inclined toward the mere self [as its object] and mere consciousness therefore a nature which experiences an object which is different from consciousness is unsuitable. The established nature of self-cognizing cognition is naturally clear because it is opposite from the nature [cognizing external objects] since it does not know [external objects] such as chariots and the like.[77]

Śāntarakṣita is adding new information here to what he stated in the previous root text verse, not merely explaining the root text verse. rGyal-tshab on the other hand specifically comments on the root text verse in his *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'* and by putting the root text verse into syllogistic form and then explaining the pervasion. rGyal-tshab remarks that the following seventeenth verse of Śāntarakṣita's root text establishes the pervasion. rGyal-tshab's presentation is once again very precise, systematic and logical.

> [Regarding] the subject, consciousness, it should be [characterized as] self-cognizing because its production is unlike the nature of [the manner of production of] an inanimate object. There is a pervasion because apprehending consciousness (*'dzin rnam*) which is in the nature of being non-inanimate is the

[77] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 38.

> self-cognizing consciousness of that mind. In order to establish the pervasion the four [lines in the root text beginning with] "[If Vaibhaiṣikas," etc., pertain.[78]

When Śāntarakṣita establishes the pervasion in the seventeenth verse of the root text as rGyal-tshab explains, he does so by criticizing his hypothetical Vaibhāṣhika opponent whom he feels he has convinced to accept self-cognizing cognition yet still holds several mistaken Vaibhāṣhika views like that the nature of consciousness is unitary. So while Śāntarakṣita is using this as a forum for establishing the correct way of understanding self-cognizing cognition he is still remaining within the overarching 'neither one nor many' argument which is being applied to all his opponents throughout the first sixty one verses of the root text. This verse will also attempt to lead that hypothetical Vaibhāṣikan holding self-cognizing cognition into a dilemma regarding the ability to know the nature of objects from which it is distinct.

> (#17) [If Vaibhāṣhikas were to accept self-cognizing cognition], self-cognizing cognition would not actually [be asserted as] action and agent because it would be incorrect for consciousness which is of a single partless nature [to be understood as] three [knower, knowing, and known].[79]

We find a slight difference between the argument of this verse in the root text and the way rGyal-tshab explains it in his *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'*. The root text states the reason as being that there is no difference between consciousness and the three, knower, knowing and known while rGyal-tshab's commentary says there is no difference between consciousness' self-cognizing cognition and those three. It does not seem to effect the meaning or strength of the argument since Vaibhāṣhikas would have to

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[78] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folios 583-584.

[79] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 3a.

include self-cognizing cognition within the framework of a single, partless consciousness if they were to accept self-cognizing cognition, but it is nonetheless worth noting the slight variance in the two presentations. Before proceeding into the next root text verse, Śāntarakṣita leads the reader to it in the auto-commentary by arguing that because consciousness does not rely on anything outside itself to be illuminated, but has a nature which illuminates itself, "that nature which illuminates itself is called the self-cognizing cognition of consciousness."[80] The next verse in the root text follows precisely from this point and refers to it directly, once again reinforcing the argument made by Tsong-kha-pa in *Notes On 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'* (Tib. *dbU ma rgyan gyi zin bris*) that *The Ornament For The Middle Way* was composed in verse and prose as one text since verses refer to prose which is not related to other verses. If they were composed separately the root text verses would not refer to arguments made in the auto-commentary. The eighteenth verse which reads as follows therefore follows from this previous root text argument concerning the reasons consciousness is called self cognizing. In the second two lines Śāntarakṣita proceeds again to attack Vaibhāṣhika epistemology which maintains knowledge of objects external to the consciousness.

> (#18) Because of that, this [consciousness] is capable of self-consciousness since it is the nature of consciousness. How [though] could that cognize the nature of objects from which it is different?[81]

The first statement of this stanza draws from the auto-commentary argument in which Śāntarakṣita argues for self-cognizing consciousness on the grounds that it does not rely on

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[80] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 39-40.

[81] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 3a.

anything else to illuminate itself. rGyal-tshab organizes the argument into a syllogism. He writes:

> That subject, [consciousness] would be correctly posited as self cognizing because the subject is the nature of the apprehending consciousness [which is also the object].[82]

The language of rGyal-tshab's commentary is a little vague and could also be translated as "could be correctly posited as *having* self-cognizing consciousness."[83] The following two lines of the root text, ("How though could that cognize the nature of objects from which it is different?") along with the next verse directly attacks the Vaibhāṣika epistemological standpoint which holds that consciousness knows objects which are external to it. Such a view is incompatible with the correct manner of holding self-cognizing cognition according to Śāntarakṣita. Therefore fallacies exist for Śāntarakṣita's hypothetical Vaibhāṣhika opponent who holds self-cognizing cognition while maintaining the standard Vaibhāṣhika epistemology. Once again we begin to get insights into Śāntarakṣita's own positions as they indirectly emerge from his negative dialecticism. In his criticism of the Vaibhāṣhika explanation of knowing external objects, we come to see indirectly Śāntarakṣita's reasoning for utilizing a Yogācāra epistemological perspective on a conventional level which included putting forth self-cognizing cognition and the lack of objects with a nature different from the mind.. The root text verse reads as follows regarding the further rejection of a consciousness knowing external objects or more precisely, objects in which its nature does not exit.

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[82] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 584.

[83] The Tibetan which is being referred to here is "*rang rig 'thad par thal.*"

> (#19) [Since] its nature does not exist in external objects (Tib. *gzhin*), given that you assert objects of consciousness and consciousness are different, how could consciousness know objects other than consciousness?[84]

Śāntarakṣita follows this question in his auto-commentary with a multi-layered argument which he feels will compel his lower Buddhist opponents to accept that objects do not exist external to the consciousness which perceives them, for it would be impossible to know those objects directly if they are distinct entities. Śāntarakṣita does not explicitly state his position regarding the two truths here, as that will come towards the end of the text, but he begins to imply his position of provisionally accepting a Yogācāra framework at first before ultimately adopting the Mādhyamika perspective. We will discuss this critical position later when it is explicitly addressed in the root text, but it is interesting to observe Śāntarakṣita drawing out his own views here in the process of refuting the views of his opponents.

rGyal-tshab clearly explains the position in his commentary, *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'* when he comments in regards to the root text verse noted above:

> It would be incorrect [to posit] directly experienced external objects (Tib. *don dngos su myong*) because the object [and] the consciousness are different substances. That is the case because the nature of the object does not exist in the [perceiving] consciousness and the nature of the [perceiving] consciousness does not exist in the object. It would be incorrect [to posit] consciousness cognizing external objects in the same way as [the positing of] the correctness of self-cognizing consciousness because the object of consciousness (and the consciousness) are unrelated different substances.[85]

Śāntarakṣita adds one last point of criticism of the Vaibhāṣhika system as a way of segueing into the next topic refuting the three Sautrāntika epistemological standpoints. Here he adds

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[84] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 3a.

[85] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 584.

that since Vaibhāṣhikas assert that consciousness does not even possess aspects, it is therefore even a lower system of thought than the Sautrāntika systems who do assert that consciousness possesses aspects, albeit incorrectly.

> Moreover, it is taught from that [Vaibhāṣhika] perspective that consciousness has no aspects. Since there is absolutely no connection from this perspective with the position that consciousness possesses aspects, it is taught that this school is even much lower [than Sautrāntikas].[86]

Following this statement in his auto-commentary, Śāntarakṣita proceeds into his refutation of true singularity from the Sautrāntika perspective via a refutation of the Sautrāntika epistemological standpoint (2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.2). Here Śāntarakṣita divides Sautrāntikas into three distinct sub-schools along a line of division which more closely parallels the way Tibetans divide sub-schools of Yogācāra in tenet system (Skt. *siddhānta*, Tib. *grub mtha*) texts. Specifically the three divisions of Sautrāntikas are explained as the Non-Pluralists (Tib. *sNa tshogs gnyis med pa*) (2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.2.1), the Half-Eggists (Tib. *sGo nga phyed tshal ba*) (2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.2.2), and Proponents of an Equal Number of Aspects and Consciousness (Tib. *mam shes grangs mnyam pa*) (2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.2.3). It is rGyal-tshab who actually names these divisions of Sautrāntika in accordance with their parallel schools from within the Yogācāra framework. Śāntarakṣita simply puts forth the views one at a time and then rejects them, merely referring to each progressive school as 'other Sautrāntikans'. In oral commentary it was explained that these probably did not represent actual sub-schools of Sautrāntika since they are not described in the dGe-lugs pa tenet system texts, but rather were hypothetical views which Śāntarakṣita sets up to refute in order to once again help illuminate the correct view by means of negative dialecticism. In

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[86] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 42.

the first root text verse pertaining to Sautrāntikas, Śāntarakṣita proposes a general proposition applicable to all Sautrāntikas in order to begin to put forth their view so that the reader has a clear idea of what will be refuted.

> (#20) According to the (Sautrāntika) position the consciousness possesses aspects although in actuality the two (consciousness and aspects) are distinct. Since it is just like a mirror reflection, it can be suitably experienced as an imputation.[87]

Śāntarakṣita explains that Sautrāntikas argue that one does directly experience aspects of objects because the gross imputed object is like a mirror image of gathered aspects. He further elaborates in his own root text verse on the way of knowing external objects according to Sautrāntikas in the following manner in his auto-commentary.

> Consciousness knows objects which are mirror images in the nature of the known objects. Therefore they (Sautrāntikans) say that the resulting consciousness which experiences the mirror image also experiences the object.[88]

rGyal-tshab however explains this root text verse in a different manner, emphasizing the Sautrāntika assertion that they can validly know external objects according to their position because they assert aspects of objects unlike the Vaibhāṣhikas. As opposed to the Vaibhāṣhikas who hold the validity of knowing objects because objects do not have aspects, Sautrāntikas maintain that they do not fall into the fallacies of Vaibhāṣhikas explicitly because they do accept aspects of objects. rGyal-tshab seems to be basing his commentary more on what later evolved into the traditional dGe-lugs pa presentation of tenets than specifically on the words of Śāntarakṣita's root text in this case. Perhaps he felt it important

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[87] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 3a.

[88] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 42.

to add this aspect of Sautrāntika epistemology to the general presentation of Sautrāntika being put forth here, because it is very rare in his direct commentary *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'* for his explanation to diverge at all from Śāntarakṣita's line of presentation and argumentation. Although he does this, it does not in any way distort or modify Śāntarakṣita's points and thus does not contradict the three-fold model of dGe-lugs commentarial literature outlined in the introduction of this study. rGyal-tshab explains the Sautrāntika position in the following manner is his commentary:

> Even though objects and consciousness are of different substances according to Sautrāntikas, having analyzed objects, they hold the validity of the experience (of objects by the consciousness perceiving them) because they accept the aspects of objects.[89]

rGyal-tshab explains that the previous syllogism and the one that follows constitute a two verse analysis of the differences between the two lower Buddhist philosophical systems which postulate external objects. The previous syllogism demonstrates the validity of experiencing external objects according to the system of analysis put forth by the Sautrāntikas and then the following root text verse, the twenty-first, "demonstrates the incorrectness of analyzing according to the system of the Vaibhāṣhikas"[90] The rejection of the three sub-divisions of the Sautrāntika position follows the rejection of the Vaibhāṣhika position over the course of several verses. The root text rendition of the rejection of the Vaibhāṣhika explanation of the valid cognition of external objects is explained as follows in the twenty-first verse of the root text.

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[89] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 584.

[90] Ibid.

> (#21) For those who do not assert a consciousness which reflects aspects of objects, for them there can not even be externally cognized aspects.[91]

Śāntarakṣita expands on this argument in his auto-commentary by explaining that because Vaibhāṣhikas do not accept that aspects of objects are known, that the knowledge of gross objects must in their view actually extend further than the total knowledge of its parts or aspects, which contradicts itself. From there he argues along Sautrāntika lines that since they do not accept the relationship between objects, mirror like reflections and the imputations of consciousness as Sautrāntikas do that it is wholly illogical to posit externally cognized objects at all.

> Since [aspects] are the nature of being uncognized, entities which are objects of cognition must go further than [aspects]. Since they also do not accept the causal relations of mirror reflections, imputations also do not exist. If that is the case, consciousness itself possessed with (i.e. cognizing) aspects would be unsuitable and moreover it would not be that way.[92]

rGyal-tshab does not add much in his commentary beyond restating that the Vaibhāṣhika epistemological explanation is incorrect because they do not accept aspects. He then proceeds into the refutation of the three sub-divisions of Sautrāntika which he names as Non-Pluralists, Half-Eggists and Proponents of an Equal Number of Consciousnesses and Aspects with each giving a slightly more subtle (yet still incorrect in Śāntarakṣita's opinion) explanation than the previous one. Due to this ascending level of subtlety in the order of presentation, Śāntarakṣita begins with the rejection of the lowest, the Sautrāntika Non-Pluralists in the twenty-second verse of the root text.

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[91] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 3a-3b.

[92] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 43.

> (#22) Since [aspects] are not different from the single consciousness (as Sautrāntika Non-Pluralists assert) there would not be a multiplicity of aspects. Therefore one would not be able to establish the knowledge of objects by the power of that [mere appearance].[93]

Śāntarakṣita argues that because aspects are manifold and the consciousness which is asserted by the Sautrāntika Non-Pluralists is truly singular, that consciousness would be incapable of knowing objects because the cause of a consciousness knowing various objects, the manifold aspects of those objects, could not be established by a singular consciousness. A truly singular consciousness cannot be related to a multiplicity of aspects because that would undermine its claim to being truly singular. It is interesting to note the way rGyal-tshab explains this because though his argument is similar his emphasis is subtly different. His emphasis is not on convincing the Non-Pluralists that according to their view they could not know external objects, but rather on logically forcing them to accept objects as one substance with the consciousness. This line of argument is close to a Yogācāra epistemology and the sort of framework Śāntarakṣita wants to incorporate provisionally.

> When the appearance of many aspects [such as] blue, yellow, white, and red arise to a single consciousness, these aspects would not be of distinct substance, because they are not different from the one partless consciousness. If you accept this, then it would be improper to accept the establishment that the object is substantially different from the [consciousness which apprehends the appearance of the object] because those aspects are not of different substance.[94]

Śāntarakṣita continues his argument against Sautrāntika Non-Pluralist in the next verse of the root text where he implores his opponents that it is logically impossible for a singular consciousness to be one with or even related as perceiver and perceived with a

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[93] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 3b.

[94] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 585.

multiplicity of aspects and challenges his opponents to explain how this would be possible if it is in fact the case. Śāntarakṣita's auto-commentary (indented) on the twenty-third verse of the root text explains that either there is a contradiction in the manner of abiding of aspects and consciousness since one is single and the other is manifold, or else they must be completely distinct and unrelated and therefore the consciousness would not perceive aspects or the objects which are established on the basis of knowing aspects.

> (#23) Since [consciousness] is not separate from aspects, consciousness cannot be unitary. If that were not the case then how can you explain the two (aspects and consciousness) as unitary?
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> > If the consciousness is a body which is not different from the many aspects the [consciousness] would be plural like the particularities of those aspects. Regarding a consciousness which is of only a single nature, if there are many aspects then at that time since the subject (consciousness) would be abiding in a manner contradicting (the many aspects), if the two, consciousness and aspects were not distinct there would be a contradiction.[95]

According to Śāntarakṣita and the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school he is the chief representative of, the object and the object possessor or perceiver are conventionally of the same nature. A blue object and an eye consciousness perceiving blue rise together because they both rise in dependence on previous latent potentialities (Skt. *vāsana*, Tib. *bag chags*) and this explains how objects can be validly cognized. According to Sautrāntikas they are distinct entities working in a cause and effect relationship. But if a multiplicity of aspects is a cause for a truly singular consciousness then the effect must not be related to the cause which is illogical. So for Śāntarakṣita there are two major logical fallacies in the Sautrāntika position as stated thus far. It is illogical for consciousness to be truly singular given that it is related to a multiplicity of aspects and it is illogical for that single

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[95] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 44.

consciousness to directly perceive external objects from which it would be distinct. For Śāntarakṣita objects are not of a different nature from the consciousness perceiving them and nothing is truly singular. rGyal-tshab argues along the same line of reasoning as Śāntarakṣita here before proceeding on to the rejection of the Sautrāntika Half-Eggists whose position is stated by Śāntarakṣita (though not by name) in the twenty-forth verse of the root text. It is stated with a tone emphasizing that these Sautrāntikas feel they do not have the faults of those lower Sautrāntikas Śāntarakṣita just refuted because their position is slightly different in that they argue that aspects do not all arise simultaneously, but rather in a rapid succession. They therefore avoid the fault of one consciousness perceiving many aspects by claiming that it is actually an extremely rapid succession of consciousnesses, each perceiving one aspect and deceiving the person into thinking they are all being perceived at once.

> (#24) [Colors such as] white and the like arise in succession to the consciousness yet because of arising quickly foolish people think they arise simultaneously.[96]

rGyal-tshab explains this root text verse to be a mere assertion of the view of the Sautrāntika Half-Eggist. The following topic addressed in the twenty-fifth root text verse is the rejection of the assertion which is divided into two sub-topics, the rejection of the assertions and the rejection of the examples. Before the rejection however, rGyal-tshab also clearly restates the position of the Half-Eggists which will be rejected shortly.

> First, regarding the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "[Colors," etc., he (the Half-Eggist) claims, "We do not have those faults because when numerous aspects such as blue, yellow, etc., appear to one consciousness (*shes pa*), even though the aspects such as white etc. [actually] appear successively to the consciousness because of the rapidity of the process it mistakenly seems to have appeared simultaneously. For example, even though [circle of] a burning end of a

[96] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 3b

> stick [forms] gradually it is said to be known mistakenly [as a circle appearing] at once.[97]

Śāntarakṣita's auto-commentary elaboration (indented) on this statement of the Half-Eggist position given in the preceding root text verse, along with the examples they give according to Śāntarakṣita to support their position segues in his auto-commentary directly into the critique beginning with the twenty-fifth root text verse which is embedded in Śāntarakṣita's auto-commentary.

> [For example like an arrow] piercing a hundred petals from a blue lotus flower, because it happens so quickly, although entities [are pierced] gradually (those Sautrāntika Half-Eggists) strugglingly say that people think it happens simultaneously. [Or] for example like seeing the wheel [of light made by quickly circling] the burning end of a torch, they say that one sees [a wheel of light appearing at one moment] as a result of the rapid circling [of the torch]. If that is the case then....
>
> (#25) Why when the mind which hears the sound of such words as "*latā*"[98] [and "*tālah*"] arise very quickly does it not hear them as arising simultaneously?[99]

Śāntarakṣita's argument attacks the Sautrāntika Half-Eggists by questioning the examples they give to justify the meaning of their explanation and by offering counter-examples which in theory should support the Sautrāntika Half-Eggist position but in actuality work to its detriment. The Half-Eggist examples explain how aspects appear one at a time in rapid succession to a consciousness and not simultaneously as the Non-Pluralists assert so that when a consciousness perceives many aspects such as the many colors of a painting it does not actually perceive them all at once, but rather one at a time in rapid succession, so rapid in fact that the consciousness does not even realize they are not rising

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[97] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 586.

[98] The Sanskrit word 'latā' is translated into Tibetan as "lcug ma" and into English as "creeping plant"

[99] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 45.

simultaneously. This way the Half-Eggists avoid the faults of the Non-Pluralists who assert that a truly single consciousness knows a multiplicity of aspects simultaneously, a logically untenable assertion. Śāntarakṣita counters that the Half-Eggist position also has fallacies of its own which are difficult to overcome. The common example or metaphor which the Half-Eggists give to defend their position is that the rapid cognitive succession parallels the example of a burning torch, which when twirled very rapidly in a circle gives the appearance of a wheel of fire in the dark night. Actually though it is not a wheel of fire and only appears that way due to the rapid succession of images of flame appearing to the consciousness in a circular pattern. And this same mistake is made with regard to aspects of all objects like the various colors of a painting which appear to be cognized all at once but in actuality are cognized in rapid succession according to the Half-Eggists. Śāntarakṣita's counter-argument directs attention to sense faculties other than the eye consciousness, and specifically to the ear consciousness. He questions why aspects arising to the ear consciousness would not seem to arise simultaneously in the same way that aspects appearing to the eye consciousness do, such as the many colors of a painting. Why do colors appear instantaneously though not in actuality while sounds do not? The twenty-fifth verse of the root text gives a specific counter example using two Sanskrit words, "latā" and "tālah" in which the sounds are the same but the syllables are reversed to emphasize his point that if they were completely heard as if they arose simultaneously like the wheel of fire, then confusion would arise as to which word was heard and it would be impossible to differentiate them. Since this is not the case, Śāntarakṣita feels his point is made clear by direct perception. He comments in *The Auto-Commentary on The Ornament For The Middle Way* in the following manner:

> Since the mind whose objects are single letters such as 'latā' and 'tālah', and 'sara' and 'rasa' and the like which arise very quickly and since the mind [also] arises very quickly, wouldn't the mind know [all the aspects] at one time like [the

> colors of] one painting, etc.? Results which are like causes should not be of a different type because then [the causes] would not be causes.[100]

Regarding the final point about causes, his argument is that if many gradually appearing aspects result in a single consciousness, then the manifold and changing quality of the cause would not be reflected in a truly singular effect. It would be difficult to maintain that the causes are actually causes since their effects, the consciousness, would be of a different nature since the cause would be manifold and the result, singular. Śāntarakṣita proceeds to add further weight to his rejection of the Sautrāntika Half-Eggists by refuting their position even from the perspective of the conceptual mind which may be argued to make such mistakes out of ignorance. But even such a conceptual mind could not cognize in the way Half-Eggists assert because like aspects which rise and disintegrate moment by moment, so too does the conceptual consciousness perceiving them. If the consciousness itself does not abide, it could not hold a succession of aspects arising over time and could not hold them to exist simultaneously. Śāntarakṣita adds in his auto-commentary (indented) that if separate consciousnesses within an individual such as the eye consciousness and the ear consciousness cognize separately without being mixed then there would be no reason that their objects could not be know simultaneously.

> (#26) Even for the conceptual mind alone they (the aspects) will not be known in succession. Since they do not remain for a long time, all minds are similar in the rapidity with which they arise.
>
> > If consciousness of different types such as eye consciousness, etc. arise at the same time as mental consciousness and analyze without interruption and without being mixed, and also arise clearly and quickly, why then can they (their objects) not be known simultaneously? On the other hand, saying it is because they arise so quickly is not a suitable answer. Also from the perspective of the other's system, they will say that for the minds which

[100] Ibid., pp. 45-46.

> disintegrate very quickly nothing will remain for very long, (even the continuum of the mind).
>
> (#27) Therefore all objects are not apprehended gradually but are rather like the manifold aspects which appear to be apprehended simultaneously.[101]

Śāntarakṣita is arguing here that if there is just one eye consciousness which perceives many different aspects, then it cannot be explained on the basis of the quickness of appearance to the consciousness, because though they accept that aspects arise gradually, the consciousness also rises gradually. One consciousness engages aspects gradually, one at a time. rGyal-tshab explains the inappropriateness of asserting in this way as also being because just like the aspects, consciousness also is momentary and does not abide. Therefore it could not hold previous images of aspects in any way which would conclude a simultaneous appearance. The following argument which also targets the Sautrāntika Half-Eggists does so on the basis of investigating the issue of memory.

> (#28) Even with regards to [the example of] a burning torch, (Sautrāntika Half-Eggists assert) [that torch] gives rise to the mistaken instantaneous appearance of a wheel [of fire] (from memories of distinct perceptions of the torch, yet the circle of fire cannot be generated from memory) because it appears very clearly.[102]

The argument maintains that the Half-Eggists are making contradictory assertions. They claim that the eye consciousness sees the wheel of fire clearly and that it joins the sequential appearances by memory. That is how it appears as a wheel or how the gradual perception of many colors appear as a painting. At the same time as stating that this perception of the wheel of fire appears clearly they maintain that the distinct appearances are joined by memories. Śāntarakṣita's point is that unlike mental consciousness which has the

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[101] Ibid., p. 46.

[102] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 3b.

ability to remember and thus to join memories, the five sense consciousnesses including the eye consciousness does not have the ability to remember or join memories. If the perception is clear is must be made by the eye consciousness, but if formed by the joining together of memories then it must be an act of the mental consciousness which would by virtue of its formation by memory, not be clear. Memories by definition are not clear because they are not direct non-conceptual sense consciousnesses. Śāntarakṣita explains this in his auto-commentary.

> [Although] having seen, [the eye consciousness still] does not [have the ability to] join gaps [between past perceptions]. In general is it a contradiction for clear appearances to be joined together? Yes, it is a contradiction.[103]

rGyal-tshab highlights the same contradiction in his syllogistic commentary by pointing out that the conceptual mental consciousness is that consciousness which can join earlier and later consciousnesses and that is not clear. Nevertheless, Half-Eggists claim earlier and later moments are joined and are perceived clearly, in spite of the fact that such an action is considered to be the sole domain of the non-conceptual sense consciousnesses. Śāntarakṣita states this very clearly in the twenty-ninth verse of the root text.

> (#29) This joining of intermediate gaps is done by the memory [of the mental consciousness], not by the seeing [of an eye consciousness] because that [eye consciousness] cannot grasp past objects.[104]

The argument therefore is that if the perceptions of the eye consciousness are clear and they are a series of gradual perceptions and not all perceived simultaneously then

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[103] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 47.

[104] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 3b-4a.

examples like the wheel of fire clearly appearing as a wheel as a result of its rapidity would be incorrect as the Sautrāntrikas assert it. This would be the case because it would be a result of memory which is a product of the mental consciousness alone and thus not a clear direct perception such as of any of the five sense consciousnesses. The mistake of an eye consciousness and the mistake of a mental consciousness are two totally different types of mistakes. An eye consciousness can make a mistake by seeing something which is not there like a hallucination, but a mistake of a mental consciousness is a conceptual thought. Mental consciousness with its memory can join conceptual thoughts but an eye consciousness can not do that because an eye consciousness is only conscious of the present. Since an eye consciousness cannot apprehend past objects it cannot join them either so it could not create the perception of the wheel of fire as the Sautrāntika Half-Eggists would assert according to Śāntarakṣita. In the thirtieth verse Śāntarakṣita reiterates his point.

> (#30) Since the object of that [memory] has passed, it is not clear. Therefore the appearance of the wheel is of a type which is not clear.[105]

Śāntarakṣita adds in the immediately following section of the root text for emphasis on this point that, "Even for entities residing directly in front [of the sense consciousness] the memory could not conceptualize very clearly."[106] rGyal-tshab defends this point made in the root text quite logically with an explicit syllogistic structure. He argues to the Sautrāntika Half-Eggist opponents who do not accept the arguments made above.

> If one replies, "No pervasion," there would be a pervasion to that (syllogism) because if it is a mind which joins the earlier and the later, there must be memory.

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[105] Ibid., folio 4a.

[106] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 48.

> The subject, non-conceptual consciousness would not join the former and later because it would not hold onto past objects. The subject, a mind which joins the former and later, [to such a mind] there must be a clearly appearing object because it apprehends past objects. The subject, a mind which misapprehends the burning end of a stick as a circle would not be a mind which joins former and later because if it is, the object would not clearly appear to it, but the object does appear clearly.[107]

Having sufficiently refuted this system of the Sautrāntika Half-Eggists, Śāntarakṣita moves on in the ascending order of subtlety regarding hypothetical Sautrāntika sub-schools to the Sautrāntika Proponents of an Equal Number of Consciousnesses and Aspects. Śāntarakṣita goes on to describe their solution to the problems with the lower Sautrāntika assertions of a single consciousness perceiving manifold aspects. He explains that the Proponents of an Equal Number of Consciousness and Aspects propose that there will arise as many types of a common consciousness at one time as there are aspects in the object and thereby they avoid the various faults arising from positing one consciousness perceiving many aspects and the faults of the Half-Eggists. When they claim that as many types of a common consciousness will arise, 'common' (Tib. *mthun*) refers to the six types of consciousness so that within that division two eye consiousnesses are of a common type but an eye consciousness and an ear consciousness are of uncommon (Tib. *mi mthun*) type. Śāntarakṣita explains the position succinctly in his root text and then proceeds to launch into an immediate critique in the following verse.

> (#31) If one agrees with (those Sautrāntika Proponents of an Equal Number of Consciousnesses and Aspects) then one would understand that when someone sees the base (Tib. *gzhi*) of a painting then as many minds will arise simultaneously as there are aspects in that painting.
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> (#32) If that is the case then even when consciousness knows one type of aspect such as the color white, etc., since there is a distinct beginning, middle and end to that there will be a variety of observed (aspects within the one aspect).[108]

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[107] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 586-587.

[108] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 4a.

This sub-school of Sautrāntika aims to avoid the problems of other Sautrāntikans by asserting that numerous consciousnesses, one for every aspect, arise simultaneously thus solving the problems associated with asserting one consciousness perceiving many aspects. Śāntarakṣita's critique here draws on a similar line of reasoning to that which he employs against those who hold partless atoms. His argument zeros in on the question of how one holding this view will precisely define a single aspect for which a single consciousness abides. Since this presentation implies a necessary reduction of aspects to a singularity because there is a one to one relationship between aspects and consciousnesses, and they must therefore be definable so as to assert precisely what is 'one' in this one to one relationship. Aspects could not be manifold in such a circumstance because then they would require more than one consciousness. And if they wish to describe aspects as singular then a similar critical examination will come down regarding the sides of the aspect, the directions it faces, its relation with other aspects and its relation with moments of time such as its beginning, middle and end, much like the critique leveled against the Vaibhāṣhikas holding partless atoms. Śāntarakṣita explains this in his auto-commentary in the following manner.

> As with the many aspects such as blue, white, and the like which you accept as single; those also have many aspects with the nature of parts like this side and that side. And with respect to those (aspects of aspects) the nature of those also is known to be manifold. If you would say that you assert many [consciousnesses] (for a single manifold aspect), well then, what is the single [consciousness]? In order to explain this [consciousness would ultimately have to be] apprehending objects, atoms without limbs. Even those who possess very subtle wisdom would not be able to finely distinguish with certainty the subtle limbs of those objects. This sort of view (with such subtle acumen) is said to be inexperiencable.[109]

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[109] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 48.

Śāntarakṣita argues that to hold the view that maintains an equal number of consciousnesses and aspects one must ultimately be able to define and limit what precisely is an aspect so that there may be a one to one relationship between consciousnesses and aspects. In order to do this, aspects must finally be reducible to true singularity, otherwise they would require more consciousnesses. And since nothing is reducible to true singularity the position degenerates. In other words Śāntarakṣita's argument here aims at refuting this view by demonstrating how one cannot actually find a distinct, singular aspect for which there is a single consciousness because every aspect can always be broken down into smaller parts and thus require an endless number of consciousnesses ad inifinitum. Otherwise the consciousness of a single aspect would not actually be singular because the aspects themselves would have parts. rGyal-tshab explains this point in terse syllogistic form.

> The subject, a consciousness perceiving only the aspect of white must be perceiving many aspects because that white would have many different [aspects such as] north, south, etc. If you accept this then it would be impossible for a consciousness to hold only one aspect.[110]

Śāntarakṣita reiterates his position on this point in his next root text verse and its accompanying explanation from the *Auto-commentary On The Ornament For the Middle Way.*

> (#33) I honestly do not feel there has ever appeared any cognition of an [aspect] such as white, etc. which is singular and like the nature of an atom [as you assert them].
>
> > I very sincerely have never seen an atom which is empty of all parts. Without having seen that [partless atom] you still accept it which seems self-deceiving. If the cause for accepting their existence by intelligent people is a

[110] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang,* folio 587.

> visual [valid cognition] then since [such a valid cognition] does not exist, [single, partless atoms] are unacceptable.[111]

Śāntarakṣita bases this argument on the Sautrāntika assertion that though partless particles appear they cannot be individually perceived except as aggregations which form gross objects. The argument pushes further the absurdity of accepting an equal number of consiousnesses and aspects by pressing again on the irrationality of finding any aspect or particle which is truly singular as would be necessary for the view to hold true. rGyal-tshab reiterates the same point by also explaining that though partless particles appear they cannot be perceived according to the Sautrāntika view and so there seems to be no reason to accept that they actually exist. Mādhyamikans like Śāntarakṣita hold that even according to the Sautrāntikas' own assertion that there can be no inherently existing partless one because if there were it would be perceivable by valid cognition and partless ones are not perceivable by valid cognition according to Sautrāntikas. If they do not exist then for what would there be a single consciousness?

The following root text verse completes the argument against the Sautrāntikas by making clear that what holds for the five sense consciousnesses also holds for the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness because the mental consciousness is established in conjunction with the five sense consciousnesses. The five sense consciousnesses do not have single partless entities as their objects, but rather gross objects which are the accumulated aggregation of particles and in that same way, the mental consciousness does not have a single partless entity as its objects, but rather cognition and mental states as its object.

rGyal-tshab then explains that having thus finished the refutation of the Sautrāntikas, Śāntarakṣita then proceeds to refute the systems of non-Buddhists in the coming verses of

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[111] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 50-51.

The Ornament For The Middle Way. The first of the non-Buddhist schools to be addressed are the systems of the Particularists (Skt. *Vaiśeṣika*, Tib. *Bye brag pa*) and the Logicians (Skt. *Naiyāyika*, Tib. *Rigs pa can*). The following root text verse offers a summation of Śāntarakṣita's argument against these two classical Indian schools.

> (#35) Even according to the scriptures of outsiders (such as the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas) it would be illogical to hold the appearance [of gross objects] as singular since substances and the like are known to possess qualities (Skt. *guna*, Tib. *yon tan*).[112]

Buddhist rejections of non-Buddhist schools tend to be concise both among Indian Buddhist pandits and among their Tibetan counterparts. One might expect more detailed explanations of views and then corresponding rejections from Śāntarakṣita being that one of his major works, *Tattvasaṇgraha* , was an encyclopedic account of all the major India philosophical traditions and was a real *siddhānta* predecessor to the tenet system texts (Tib. *grub mtha*) which became so central to philosophical study and learning in Tibet. But nonetheless, Śāntarakṣita is brief in his dealings with non-Buddhists in *The Ornament For The Middle Way* with the exception of his reasonably detailed treatment and rejection of the Sāṃkhya system. Śāntarakṣita does not specifically name his opponent in the thirty-fifth verse of the root text but in the auto-commentary indicates the schools by mentioning the names of famous proponents of the systems to be addressed and thereby lets the reader know that the views refuted here are those of the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyaikas. The dGe-lugs school does not consider the differences between the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas to differ significantly enough as to warrant separate treatment. dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po explains this point in his *Precious Garland of Tenets.*

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[112] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 4a.

> The Vaiśeṣikas (Particularists) and the Naiyāyikas (Logicians) are followers of the sage Kanāda and the Brāhmana Akśipāda respectively. Although these two schools differ a little in the features of some of their assertions, their general tenets do not differ.[113]

And Śāntarakṣita's treatment of *Vaiśeṣikas* and *Naiyāyikas* seems to be no exception to this treatment of the two schools together. Nor is his treatment here any exception to the pattern of brevity with which both Indian and Tibetan doxographers offer to non-Buddhist schools. rGyal-tshab also summarizes the point with two succinct syllogisms which indicate how according to these systems it would by incorrect to maintain the existence of a consciousness which apprehends only one object as would be necessary for a consciousness to be truly singular. This will be the main object of negation with regards to the following non-Buddhist tenet holders to be addressed as well.

> Even according to the non-Buddhist system [of the Particularists] a consciousness apprehending only one object would be impossible because all minds exist with the appearance of many aspects....According to the system of the Particularists and the Logicians (a mind which apprehends only one object) would be impossible because substances and the like which have parts must be apprehended with the qualification of qualities, actions, collections (*'du ba*), and particularities, etc.[114]

rGyal-tshab echoes Śāntarakṣita's argument here, but Śāntarakṣita also adds that not only is a mind apprehending only one object impossible according to these non-Buddhist systems because they hold that objects must be apprehended with their qualities, but he also notes that moreover numerous objects (each with numerous aspects) may appear to one consciousness.

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[113] Trans. by Geshe Lhundup Sopa and J. Hopkins, in *Cutting Through Appearances: Theory and Practice in Tibetan Buddhism*. (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1989). pp. 155-156.

[114] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folios 587-588.

Not only are many aspects of one object apprehended by the consciousness, but many objects with their many aspects are apprehended by the consciousness.

Śāntarakṣita proceeds in the next verse to demonstrate the lack of a mind apprehending only a single object according to the positions of two other non-Buddhists, the Jains and the Mīmāṃsakas. Śāntarakṣita is once again treating two non-Buddhist schools with one sweeping syllogism and a brief explanation in his auto-commentary.

> (#36) (According to the views of the Jains and the Mīmāṃsakas) all entities are (plural) like the nature of a gem (emitting colorful) rays. It would be irrational for the mind which apprehends those (entities) to appear in the nature of singularity.[115]

rGyal-tshab explains in syllogistic format that the argument demonstrated here is quite simply that since entities are considered to be truly manifold like the rays of a gem, and given that a consciousness apprehends an entire object, including its manifold aspects, simultaneously, that the consciousness itself cannot be of a truly single nature by virtue of its relationship with manifold objects.

Śāntarakṣita identifies his opponent in the thirty seventh verse as, "the followers of the views of Suraguru"[116] who was a famous proponent of the Lokāyata system. His argument in the following root text verse maintains that a consciousness apprehending a singular object would be impossible according to their system also because the Lokāyatas maintain that all subtle and gross level objects, all sense faculties and sense objects are compounds of the four elements. As compound objects they cannot be singular so a consciousness which apprehends them also cannot be singular by virtue of its relationship

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[115] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folios 4a-4b.

[116] Masamichi Ichigo, Ed. *Mādhyamikaalamakaara of Śāntarakṣita.* (Kyoto: Kyoto Sangyo University, 1985.), p. 106. Ichigo identifies *lHa'i bla ma* as Suraguru or Suraacaaryaa who is associated with the Lokāyata school in this critical edition.

with those manifold compound objects. Śāntarakṣita explains as follows in the root text and following auto-commentary on the root text verse.

> (#37) Even for those who accept the (Lokāyata) system which establishes all sense faculties and objects as compounds of (the four elements such as) earth and the like, (cognition) is still incompatible with a singular (manner of) engaging entities.[117]
>
> > Since the cause of establishing (an object) as compounded is a manifold compound, it is illogical for a consciousness apprehending compounded phenomena to engage compatibly with singularity.[118]

rGyal-tshab argues along the same line of reasoning pointing out that since the objects of the consciousness are comprised of a combination of the four primary elements that it is of course illogical for the consciousness perceiving that object to perceive a single entity or to perceive such an entity as single. Thus it is logically untenable as well for that consciousness to be truly single given its relationship with manifold objects. rGyal-tshab comments on the root text verse in the following manner.

> Even according to the system of the Lokāyatas (Hedonists), the previous predicate (a consciousness perceiving only one object is impossible) because they accept that all forms, etc. such as objects and organs such as the eye organ, etc. are in the nature of a collection of the four elements.[119]

Śāntarakṣita then proceeds to demonstrate the logical untennability of maintaining a consciousness perceiving a single object according to the assertions put forth in the Sāṃkhya system. Here his argument targets the Sāṃkhya assertion that the five mere existences which comprise all objects of consciousness are all in the nature of the three qualities (Skt. *guna*,

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[117] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 4b.

[118] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 54.

[119] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 588.

Tib. *yon tan*). Given this position concerning objects it is untenable to posit a consciousness perceiving a single object since all objects are marked with these three qualities to greater or lesser degrees. Śāntarakṣita explains this very clearly in the thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth verses of *The Ornament For The Middle Way.*

> (#38) Even according to the position (of the Sāṃkhyas) (the five mere existences) such as sound, etc. are (only the nature of the three qualities such as) courage, and the like.[120] It is illogical to cognize the appearance of a singular object because objects appear as the nature of the three (qualities).
>
> (#39) Regarding the triple aspect nature of entities, if [consciousness] which is of single aspect nature appears without corresponding compatibility to that [object], how could it be asserted to grasp that object?[121]

rGyal-tshab echoes this argument in his *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'.*

> Even [adherents of] the system of the Enumerators (Sāṃkhya) would have to accept that (a consciousness perceiving a single object is impossible) because of accepting that the five mere existences (*de tsam lnga*), form, sound, etc. appear to the mind as objects which are the nature of the three qualities (Skt. *gunas*, Tib. *yon tan*): particles (Skt *rajas*, Tib. *rdul*), darkness (Skt. *tamas*, Tib. *mun*) and courage (Skt. *sattva*, Tib. *snying stobs*).[122]

Śāntarakṣita follows this line of argumentation from the root text by addressing a potential response on the part of Sāṃkhya adherents. He supposes that the Sāṃkhya reply would argue that since only one of the three qualities of any particular object really dominates and that only that dominating quality will be perceived so therefore a single object of a

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[120] Courage is the first of the three qualities (Skt. *guna*, Tib. *yon tan*) all five mere existences are comprised of. The other two are qualities are atoms or particles (Skt. *paramāṇu*, Tib. *rdul phran*), and darkness (Skt. *tumas*, Tib. *mun pa*).

[121] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 4b.

[122] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 588

consciousness is still a tenable assertion for holders of Sāṃkhya tenets. Śāntarakṣita answers such an argument by countering that if two of the three qualities of an object are not perceived then one could not even establish direct experience of such an object. rGyal-tshab maintains the same line of reasoning against the potential Sāṃkhya response in his commentary on the two root text verses addressing Sāṃkhyas by also stating that "the reality of the object" would not be apprehended if two of the three qualities of that object were not perceived.

The final non-Buddhist school to be addressed is the Vedānta school which at this time in Indian history probably refers to Śaṅkara who was an important opponent to Buddhists during Śāntarakṣita's time. As an Indian school positing a form of non-duality (Skt. *advaita*, Tib. *gnyis med pa*), and also as active critics of Buddhist thought while remaining the closest to Buddhism doctrinally among non-Buddhist Indian schools, it was a position which Śāntarakṣita needed to take quite seriously. He nonetheless is a bit flippant with his treatment, remarking in his auto-commentary about the ease with which their position is rejected and how unbelievable it is that someone could actually accept such views. Śāntarakṣita's argument attacks the Vedānta position that the universe is ultimately non-dual and that that non-dual universe is not separate from the singular, unchanging consciousness to which manifold aspects appear. Śāntarakṣita explains this in the fortieth verse of his root text and accompanying explanation in his *Auto-Commentary On The Ornament For The Middle Way*.

> (#40) Even though external objects do not exist, the suitability of maintaining (as Vedantins do) a permanent, (singular) consciousness to which arises either simultaneously or successively various appearances [of aspects] is extremely difficult [to accept].
>
> Even with regards to the position of those asserting in that way, [a singular consciousness cognizing] various [aspects] is still easy [to refute].

> A conscious to which appears simultaneously many aspects such as blue and yellow etc.,because it is not different from the many aspects [it cognizes] would itself similarly be the nature of many. Even [if they appeared] gradually, [the consciousness cognizing] the appearance of form and sound, etc. would be plural due to the two, reasoning and examples and would go no further than that. Otherwise, given the two (reasoning and examples) how could you say [consciousness cognizing form and sound] at one time [without] the same previously [explained] faults [arising]? If you wish to assert the cognizining of a single aspect then because the consciousness is not different from that (object), the consciousness would be like that [object's] own nature or both earlier and later aspects among those aspects you wish to assert would still be known because both also abide.[123]

rGyal-tshab is quite brief in his summation of the argument into a simple syllogism and this is indicative of dGe-lugs treatment of non-Buddhist schools in general. When I questioned one eminent dGe-lugs scholar on certain aspects of the Vedānta position with regard to rGyal-tshab's comments I was told that in general they do not study the non-Buddhist schools in much detail because there is no real need to do so. They are only studied roughly in order to reject their views. These schools are used as examples to illustrate how to refute certain views and to illuminate specific points. It refines the correct view and prepares the student to defeat opponents holding incorrect views. But there is no soteriological purpose in extensively studying these systems as there is with the lower Buddhist systems. Philosophical inquiry never seems to lose sight of its soteriological purpose in Buddhist analysis in general and within the dGe-lugs pa school in particular.

Śāntarakṣita swiftly moves from his critique of various non-Buddhist positions holding a singular consciousness which cognizes manifold aspects to a critique of corresponding Buddhist positions of what he considers to be lower Buddhist schools. Here he begins with an investigation of Sautrāntika assertions regarding their holding the notion of a single consciousness cognizing any of the three unconditioned phenomena such as space.

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[123] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 56-57.

Śāntarakṣita outlines his argument in the root text verse and accompanying explanation from his *Auto-Commentary* as follows:

> (#41) Even for the cognition of (the three unconditioned phenomena such as) space, etc., because of the appearance of many conceptual images of letters for the appearance of the mere name, many [aspects] clearly appear.[124]
>
> > (According to Sautrāntikas,) with the exception of reflections of conceptual thoughts which are related to the name, there is nothing in the [gross] or mere subtle nature of partlessness known to that [consciousness].[125]

Śāntarakṣita argues that even when a consciousness cognizes unconditioned objects like space it still has as its object the sound generality of the mere name which is comprised of conceptual images of individual letters and so due to the compounded nature of its name, if nothing else, it is still not singular and therefore the consciousness cognizing it is not singular either. rGyal-tshab states this point quite clearly in his commentary on Śāntarakṣita's root text verse.

> The subject, a mind apprehending non-compounded phenomena would exist with the aspects of various objects because many generalities, [such as] sound generalities of letters appear to it.[126]

Śāntarakṣita presses further against the Sautrāntikas in the next two root text verses by pointing out the logical errors which emerge as a consequence of their maintaining that there can be some consciousness to which non-manifold objects such as uncompounded space appear. The line of argumentation states that even those phenomena which

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[124] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 4b.

[125] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 57-58.

[126] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 589.

Sautrāntikas consider to be uncompounded have parts such as the generalities of the sounds of letters in the indetifying words and since the parts are not separate from the object, to say that the object is not manifold contradicts its aspects or to say that the aspects do not exist would be to deny the existence of the object since an object is not distinct from its aspects. Śāntarakṣita is arguing that if there is a consciousness cognizing one single object, logical harm would ensue for both the consciousness and the object. He explains this in the following manner in the following root text verses and auto-commentary:

> (#42) Even if there are some conciousnesses of appearances which are not manifold, still, it is not suitable to establish the existence of these in reality because you will see that it is logically incompatible with the characteristics.[127]
>
> (#43) Therefore it is established from all (perspectives), that the consciousness to which appears manifold aspects, as with differing aspects [themselves] cannot logically be of a single nature.
>
> > In conclusion, I will say this again here [with the following example]. Fingers are not other than a fist. What is not other does not exist [independently]. Like those which are not established, knuckles, and the like do not exist. Therefore a mere fist also does not exist. Therefore, by [this example of] finger and a fist, all entities are shown to not exist. There are no subtle entities which are not included among the accumulated. Therefore how does one analyze a mind which is a knower of one object. How is a gathering of mental states the single object of a mind?[128]

The example in the auto-commentary using the analogy of the fingers and the fist illustrates the logical fallacies of attempting to separate aspects from the objects themselves with regard to epistemological issues concerning a single consciousness cognizing them. This follows Śāntarakṣita's earlier refutation of non-compounded phenomena of lower Buddhist schools from an ontological perspective.

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[127] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 4b.

[128] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 58-59.

Śāntarakṣita proceeds from here to address Yogācārans over the course of the next several root text verses and accompanying explanation. rGyal-tshab formulates a list of the topics from Śāntarakṣita's multi-layered critique which examines several sub-schools of Yogācāra. The following exerpt from the major outline in Appendix #1 may assist the reader in following the progression of Śāntarakṣita's arguments.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.2 Refutation of Vijñaptivādins (True Aspectarians).

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.2.1. Expressing their view.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2. Examining the truth and mistakes.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3. Refuting their views.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1 True Aspectarians (Skt. *satyākāravādin*, Tib. *mam bden pa*).

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1.1 Half-Eggist (Tib. *sgo nga phyed tshal pa*).

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1.1.1 Positing the absurdum.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1.1.2 Pointing out the mistakes in their view.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1.1.3 Expressing the mistakes in what they accept.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1.2 Proponents Of An Equal Number of Subjects and Objects (Tib. *gzung 'dzin grangs mnyam pa*).

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1.3 Non-Pluralists (Tib. *sna tshogs gnyis med pa*)

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.2 False Aspectarians (Skt. *alīkākāravādin*, Tib. *mam brdzun pa*)

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.2.1 Putting forth their assertions

2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2 Refuting them.

2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.1 The absurdum that the experience of aspects by consciousness is incorrect.

2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.2 The absurdum of the incorrectness of experiencing aspects at all.

2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.3 The absurdum showing the incorrectness of direct experience.

2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.4 The absurdum of the incorrectness of experience having examined the aspect.

2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.5 The absurdum of the incorrectness of the relationship between aspects and consciousness.

2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.6 The absurdum of the incorrectness of being occasionally arisin.

2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.7 The absurdum of being a mere subjective aspect.

2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.8 The absurdum of being a dependent entity.

Śāntarakṣita begins his treatment of Yogācārans by treating the first topic which rGyal-tshab outlines based on his text, namely, expressing their view (2.1.2.1.1.1.2.2.1). After introducing the Mind Only (Skt. *Cittamatra*, Tib. *sems tsam*) and briefly mentioning some problems with it, Śāntarakṣita uses the first person of a Yogācāran expressing their view in the forty fourth root text verse and accompanying auto-commentary. In this way, acting as a Yogācāran, Śāntarakṣita explains their view by way of a Yogācāra criticism of Sautrāntikas in which the logical problem of Sautrāntikas is identified as there being a separation of the object of experience from the characteristics of the experiencer and their lack of understanding about the functioning of latent potentialities.

> According to those of pure (Tib. *kar-po*)wisdom mind who rely on the system of our own Mind Only (Skt. *cittamatra*, Tib. *sems tsam*) school, the consciousness arises in dependence on latent potentialities (Skt. *vāsana*, Tib. *bag chags*) with which it is in congruence. It is said that immediately after disintegration (Tib. *'jig pa*) there are no aspects of experiencers or experiencing of objects and this brings some qualms with regard to their system.

(#44) Aspects are manifest due to the ripening of latent potentialities of (the same) beginningless (personal) continuum, yet they appear as a result of a mistake like the nature of an illusion.

> The assertions made by (Sautrāntikas,) the followers of the view in which there are held to be (partless) atoms which [accumulate to form] sources of perception (Skt. *āyatanas*, Tib. *skye mched*) such as form, etc., substances and qualities, etc. and supreme (Tib. *mchog*)(true existents) and non-supreme (Tib. *mchog ma yin*) (non-true existents)[129] are incorrect.
>
> Because the object of experience (Tib. *tshor bar bya ba*) is separate from the characteristics of the experiencer (Tib. *tshor ba po*), therefore it is only like a city of ghosts, a flaming circle [appearing due to the rapid twirling of a] burning torch, an emanation, a dream, an illusion, or a [reflection of] the moon in water.
>
> As for the object, even these aspects appearing to the consciousness which you assert as truly existing, appear [to the consciousness] by the power of completely ripened latent potentialities arisen since beinningless saṃsāra and [established as a result of] exaggerated grasping at entities.[130]

Śāntarakṣita explains the Yogācāra view by means of their criticism of Sautrāntikas which contends that a knower must by definition not be separate from the object known or it would be no different from the cognizing of an apparition. Yogācārans deny a total separation of knower and known. rGyal-tshab summarizes Śāntarakṣita's expression of the Yogācāran viewpoint in much the same manner, though in a far more abbreviated fashion than Śāntarakṣita does in his *Auto-commentary.*

The first half of the next verse and corresponding commentary begins by praising aspects of the Yogācāran view which possesses many common attributes with Śāntarakṣita's Mādhyamika standpoint, both as cohorts in Mahāyāna Buddhism and particularly for Śāntarakṣita, as an integral part of his explanation of conventional truth which comes a bit later in the text. I have chosen in this section on Yogācāra to include particularly extensive quotations from Śāntarakṣita's *Auto-Commentary on The Ornament of The Middle Way* both because as I stated at the beginning of this chapter, the text has never been translated

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[129] It is unclear exactly what Śāntarakṣita is referring to when he says '*mchog dang mchog ma yin*' but it does not affect the meaning of the statement that the views held by the Sautrantikas are incorrect. Yangsi Rinpoche was also not sure what Śāntarakṣita was referring to but thought he may be referring to ultimate and conventional truths.

into a Western language and so these quotes offer a first glimpse into Śāntarakṣita's own line of presentation and argument, but also particularly here because Śāntarakṣita himself goes into extensive detail with regard to Yogācārans and his treatment of their position is so central to his own unique Yogācāra-Mādhyamika synthesis which will become more clear later in the text.

> (#45) Their view (i.e. the Yogācāra view) is virtuous, but are the entities (consciousness) [accepted by] Yogācārans [truly] existent in reality or are they something contentedly accepted only when they are unanalyzed.
>
> > This (Yogācāra) system known by reasoning (Tib. *tshad ma*) and very clear scriptures is also an antidote to the endless, negative, exaggerated grasping of object possessors because this extremely sincere view rejects gross and subtle [partless] atoms and with the reasoning previously explained shows the contradictions [with regards to the Sautrāntika position] on experiencing and the characteristics of the experiencer. The meaning of this will be made very clear. This system is also a possessor of scriptural quotations [to back up its arguments].
> >
> > The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* says, "Since infused by the beginningless mind, even though aspects of objects appear like a mirror reflection, the mind still does not see objects exactly as they are. Persons, causes, the aggregates, conditions, atoms, Prakṛiti (Universal Principles) (Tib. *gtso bo dbang phyug byed pa*) all those are mere designations from the mind. Objects do not exist, [except as] the nature of the mind. Seeing external objects is mistaken. If analyzed with logic, [substantially distinct] objects and apprehenders [of objects] will be refuted."
> >
> > By relying on this system (Yogācāra) scholars clear away erroneous divisive concepts such as 'I' and 'mine' and 'object' and 'apprehender [of objects]'. However there is still a small issue which needs to be investigated with regard to this (Yogācāra) system.[131]

Śāntarakṣita praises Yogācārans as he comments on the first part of the root text verse for their skill in explaining away many of the faults of the lower Buddhist schools both with scriptural quotations like the one cited from the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* and with logical

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[130] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 59-60.

[131] Ibid., pp. 60-61.

reasoning. While there is no doubt that Śāntarakṣita is sincere in his praise here, dGe-lugs oral commentators have added too that this may be a skillful way of drawing in Yogācārans to read further as Śāntarakṣita questions some of the faults which also exist in their system. Yogācārans were probably seen by Śāntarakṣita as his most likely converts to the correct view, his own, since there are so many parallels in their systems of thought and they are already Mahāyānists.

Śāntarakṣita begins to address some of the problems with Yogācāra thought in general here as well before focusing in on the particular tenets of the various sub-divisions of Yogācāra. According to Mādhyamika analysis Yogācārans hold that consciousness is truly existing. When objects are not analyzed they too are seen as single and truly existent, but that when they are analyzed they are known to be the nature of the mind or consciousness. rGyal-tshab's commentary on this root text verse in the form of a question leads specifically into the examination of the divisions of Yogācāra into True Aspectarians (2.1.2.1.1.1.2.2.3.1) and their subdivisions and False Aspectarians (2.1.2.1.1.1.2.2.3.2) by questioning not the truth or falsity of aspects but the truth or falsity of consciousness itself.

> Although that view is good and virtuous since it dispels many of the bad adherences of the Sautrāntika and lower schools, however is that non-dual consciousness [and its object] which is pleasant and singular when unexamined, true or is it false?[132]

Within rGyal-tshab's general outline of topics on the examination of Yogācāra tenets the first topic is the examination of the True Aspectarians which is divided into three sub-schools, the first of which is the Half-Eggist (2.1.2.1.1.1.2.2.3.1.1) and the first sub-topic within this examination is the positing of the absurdum (2.1.2.1.1.1.2.2.3.1.1.1). The absurdum deals with the problems arising for Half-Eggist True Aspectarian Yogācārans who hold multiple aspects to be truly existent and a single consciousness to be truly existent while

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[132] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 589.

maintaining some sort of ultimate non-duality of the two despite the contradictions in their mode of existing. Śāntarakṣita will argue that Yogācārans holding aspects to be true must conclude that consciousness and aspects are separate and that it is logically untenable for them to be of a single nature. If they are of one nature the if there are many aspects, the nature of the consciousness must be many. Conversely, if the nature of the consciousness is single then the many true aspects must be of a single nature due to their relationship with a single consciousness. Both conclusions being illogical, the only alternative is to argue that they are separate (i.e. non non-dual) which contradicts the entire Yogācāra framework. He explains this quite clearly in the forty sixth root text verse and accompanying auto-commentary.

> (#46) Since there are contradictions if truly existing (Tib. *yang dag*) consciousness is manifold or if it is a unity, [consciousness and objects] are undoubtedly separate entities.
>
> > Since if [consciousness] is not different from truly existent aspects, then like the nature of the aspects, consciousness would be truly many. Or even if these aspects are not different from a singular consciousness, the proposition that their nature is single like the nature of that consciousness would be difficult to defend (Tib. *bzlog par dka'o*). Since the mutual exclusivity is all that remains, ultimately aspects and consciousness must be different. Such assertions [of Yogācārans] are logical fallacies.[133]

Since consciousness is held to be single and truly existent and aspects of objects are clearly manifold, there is an incompatibility problem for the Yogācāra Half-Eggists who want to claim that such a single consciousness is of the same nature in a non-dual relationship with the many aspects of its objects. rGyal-tshab clearly sums up this argument with similar reasoning and by succinctly outlining the contradictions which arise with either

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[133] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 62.

of the two alternatives of maintaining a singular consciousness or a manifold consciousness with regard to its non-duality with truly existing aspects.

> [If there exists a truly existing consciousness which is non-dual with the objects it perceives], that consciousness would have to be [the nature of] many, because it is truly one with many aspects. [Or] the aspects would be truly singular because they are truly substantially one with the (truly singular) consciousness. If you say, "There is no pervasion." then those two would be separate substances because the aspects are truly many and the consciousness is [truly] singular.[134]

According to the previously stated outline based on rGyal-tshab's summation of topics regarding Yogācārans, Śāntarakṣita moves on from here to pointing out the mistakes in their view (2.1.2.1.1.1.2.2.3.1.1.2) in the forty-seventh verse of the root text. Here he provides examples of absurd consequences (Skt. *prasaṅga*, Tib. *thal gyur*) which directly follow from the position the Half-Eggists are trying to maintain. It is worth noting that Śāntarakṣita does make use of consequentialist arguments for the purposes of rejecting incorrect views. Despite his extensive use of autonomous syllogisms (Skt. *svatantra-prayoga*, Tib. *rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba*) and the emphasis placed on this usage particularly by Tibetan commentators, consequetialist arguments are quite prominent throughout Śāntarakṣita's *Auto-Commentary On The Ornament of The Middle Way.* Śāntarakṣita addresses this topic by offering an absurdum which is commonly used in Mādhyamika rejections of both Yogācārans as in this case and in the rejection of Sautrāntikans. The argument centers in on the position that both aspects and consciousness are truly existent and have a non-dual relationship despite the fact that the aspects of a cognizing consciousness could be numerous according to the Yogācāra Half-Eggists whereas the consciousness is singular. He thus gives examples to demonstrate the absurdity of maintaining a non-dual relationship between a truly singular consciousness and truly manifold aspects. The example

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[134] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folios 589-590.

mentioned in the root text verse concerns the aspects of an object of which part is moving and part is at rest. If a tree for example were in a non-dual relationship with a singular consciousness it would necessarily be single, yet a consciousness can perceive its branch as moving while its trunk is at rest. That being the case the tree must have parts and if they are knowable simultaneously by the consciousness, the consciousness must not be singular. In other words, all the aspects of an object in a non-dual relationship with a single consciousness must be single or the consciousness itself is not single. Thus if one aspect of a tree is moving the entire tree must be moving and if one aspect of a painting is yellow it all must be yellow.

> (#47) If aspects are not different from (the singular consciousness) then it will be very difficult to respond to the following consequence that with regards to moving and rest and the like, by the movement of one, all would move.[135]

> Yet their teaching says that they are not different, that they are of that [single] nature. If that is the case then if one aspect is engaged in the action of moving, etc. or if one is the nature of yellow, etc. then all remaining aspects will also be like that. If that is not the case then they must definitely be of manifold nature.[136]

rGyal-tshab and Śāntarakṣita explain this verse in an almost identical manner. This again demonstrates the tri-fold hermeneutical paradigm present in dGe-lugs commentarial literature on Śāntarakṣita in which the representational purpose of commentaries commenting directly upon the Indian source texts is to illuminate and mirror the intended meaning of the root Indian sources as closely as possible. This point however is most clear on issues upon which rGyal-tshab refrains from criticizing Śāntarakṣita on issues with which he disagrees with Śāntarakṣita such as self-cognizing cognition or which the more general dGe-lugs

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[135] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 5a.

[136] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 63.

presentation of Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika differs from the precise presentation Śāntarakṣita offers such as is the case with the issue of conventional truth which will be discussed in detail later in this study. Nonetheless, rGyal-tshab attempts to mirror Śāntarakṣita on this point:

> When we see the movement of one object, all would move, and when one is yellow, all would be yellow because aspects are one.[137]

Śāntarakṣita proceeds from here to reject a hypothetical Sautrāntika opponent, a Sautrāntika Half-Eggist for whom there is no evidence of such an actual school of thought in India. It is rather constructed on the basis of a melding of prevalent views in order to illuminate a larger point for Śāntarakṣita. He claims that such hypothetical Sautrāntikas who hold external objects would be unable to avoid the same faults as those Yogācārans who do not hold external objects. This is one of a continuing series of consequentialist arguments geared towards rejecting true singular existence.

> (#48) Even according to the system of those maintaining external objects, if aspects are not separate (from each other) then they would all also certainly become single phenomena and not other than that.[138]

Here Śāntarakṣita is arguing that even if objects are external to the consciousness and do not fall into the fallacy of having the same nature as a singular consciousness as the Yogācārans do, that still they hold that aspects truly exist. Since they hold aspects to truly exist, if those aspects are not separate from each other, then since they are also truly single, they must all be one because the truly single aspects would be related to each other. If one

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[137] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 590.

[138] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 5a.

were yellow, all would have to be yellow. The fallacy is similar to the fallacy relating to a single consciousness with regards to the Yogācāran perspective. When Ichigo translates the related section of the root text verse as "If (knowledge and its image) are inseparable"[139] I think he missed the point of the argument that Śāntarakṣita is saying that even if the role of a single consciousness is not an issue as it is for Yogācārans, because Sautrāntikans hold objects and their aspects to be external, still there is a problem with maintaining truly existent aspects.

Having thus completed the discussion of the Yogācāra Half-Eggist, Śāntarakṣita proceeds to the next topic, (2.1.2.1.1.1.2.2.3.1.2) the rejection of the Proponents Of An Equal Number of Subjects and Objects (Tib. *gzung 'dzin grangs mnyam pa*). Here Śāntarakṣita maintains that the argument refuting such a position would in fact be quite similar to the argument criticizing the true existence of single, partless atoms. The root text verse makes this point before Śāntarakṣita elaborates in his auto-commentary.

> (#49) If you accept an equal number of consciousnesses as aspects, then it would be difficult to overcome the same type of analysis as is made regarding atoms.[140]

> If like the nature of subtle atoms which abide [around a central atom] without intervals there also arise many corresponding consciousnesses, then like the earlier analysis of subtle atoms, it would be difficult to overcome that criticism with regard to consciousness.
>
> As with that reason, if we were to [hypothetically] say that the consciousness is asserted to be like the atom in the center surrounded by [other] atoms, then what is the nature of that [consciousness] which is in front of one [aspect] and also in front of another?[141]

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[139] Masamichi Ichigo, "Śāntarakṣita's Mādhyamikalamkara," *Studies in The Literature of the Gretat Vehicle,* eds. Luis O. Gomez and Jonathan A. Silk. (Ann Arbor: Collegiate Institue for the Study of Buddhist Literature and Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, The Universtiy of Michigan, 1989), p. 207.

[140] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 5a.

[141] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 63.

As Śāntarakṣita states, the line of argumentation here takes a parallel line of reasoning with the argument against partless atoms. If a consciousness is conscious of only one aspect and is truly singular then the question would arise as to what its relationship is with the bordering aspect. If there is a relationship with the aspect next to the aspect it is conscious of then it is not truly single. Or if it is truly single then the other aspect must not be another aspect at all but be of the exact same nature.

Śāntarakṣita proceeds in the commentary to demonstrate the Sautrāntika Proponents of an Equal Number of Consciousnesses and Aspects position along side the Yogācārans in order to further clarify how the same criticism will apply to both schools. Whether one says as Sautrāntikans do that single atoms without intervals between them are mistakenly perceived as gross objects or if one says as Yogācārans do that aspects such as colors exist without intervals and we mistakenly see them as for example a painting, there is no difference in the faults of reasoning according to Śāntarakṣita. Whether the aspect is one nature with a single atom or one nature with a single consciousness, there is not a substantive difference in the reasoning for Śāntarakṣita. He explains in the following manner in his auto-commentary:

> When [consciousness] apprehends many atoms of a single type without intervals between them it is mistakenly apprehends them as one gross bundle[142] or on the other hand the nature which experiences many [aspects] without intervals between them such as knowing blue, etc. and considers them to be one, what is the difference? Some (Sautrāntikas) accept the appearance of blue, etc. without intervals as the nature of subtle atoms. Others [such as Yogācārans] say [everything] is the nature of cognition and go no further than those similar faults (of Sautrāntikans). They (Non-Pluralists) accept that the nature of the manifold [is known] only by single

[142] This is the Sautrantika Proponents of Equal Number of Consciousnesses and Aspects proposition; the next is that of Yogācāra Proponents of an Equal Number of Consiousnesses and Aspects

> consciousness like the [manifold] rays emanating from a gem. I will assert some doubt on their system.[143]

Śāntarakṣita then launches into the critique of the next subdivision of Yogācārans, the Non-Pluralists (2.1.2.1.1.1.2.2.3.1.3) in the fiftieth and fifty-first stanzas of the root text in which he compares these faults of Buddhist schools with those of non-Buddhists such as Jains. In his *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'*, rGyal-tshab comments on the following two root text verses together in the process of explaining Śāntarakṣita's critique.

> (#50) If one [consciousness experiences] manifold [aspects] wouldn't that be like the system of the Sky Clad (Digambaras), etc.? Manifold objects are not the nature of singularity just as manifold precious [gems] and the like [are not the nature of singularity].
>
> (#51) If manifold [objects appear to a consciousness of a] single nature, how could they appear in the nature of many and how could parts such as being obstructed and non-obstructed, etc. be distinguished?[144]

rGyal-tshab's explanation begins by restating the Non-Pluralist position and then comparing it not only to the Jain Digambaras as Śāntarakṣita does, but also to the Vedāntists. He explains that it would be logically untenable for numerous aspects together to be the nature of a single consciousness because if numerous aspects appear to a single consciousness either the consciousness is not truly singular or these different aspects could not actually be distinguishable since they would be of a single nature.

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[143] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 66.

[144] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folios 5a-5b.

> If one asserts various aspects are truly in the nature of a singular conscioune (as the Non-Pluralists assert) [it would be] like the system of the Vedāntists and the Digambaras. If that truly singular consciousness to which appears various objects is asserted, then there is a pervasion since if various aspects appear [to it, it] would not be truly singular, like a heap of jewels. There is also the appearance of various aspects to the consciousness. If you accept the singularity of aspects, then it would be impossible for there to appear many different aspects such as 'visible' and 'invisible', etc. and aspects of various sorts such as blue and yellow, etc. because the various aspects are truly singular.[145]

rGyal-tshab echoes Śāntarakṣita's argument by pointing out that if the Non-Pluralists wish to maintain that aspects are truly singular and the consciousness perceiving them is truly singular then all the aspects perceived by must have the same nature as the consciousness and thus all the many aspects of an object must have the same nature. Thus, for example one cannot be the nature of blue while another has the nature of yellow because that would require a perceiving consciousness with a manifold not single nature. Therefore such a position entails internal contradictions.

Having completed his refutation of the three branches of True Aspectarian Yogācārans, Śāntarakṣita continues with his rejection of the False Aspectarian Yogācārans (Skt. *Alīkākāravāda-yogācārin*, Tib. *nal 'byor spyod pa'i rnam brdzun pa*) (2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3). This topic is divided by rGyal-tshab into two sub-topics: (2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.1) putting forth their assertions and (2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2) refuting them. In the following verse from *The Ornament of The Middle Way,* Śāntarakṣita explains the False Aspectarians assertions.

> (#52) (According to the Yogācāra False Aspectarians) the aspects in the nature of that (object) do not exist. In reality aspects do not exist but appear by virtue of a mistake committed by the consciousness.[146]

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[145] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folios 590-591.

[146] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 5b.

rGyal-tshab sums up the their view as explained here by saying that the False Aspectarians claim they do not have the faults ascribed to the True Aspectarians because rather than holding aspects to be truly existent and singular, the False Aspectarians hold that aspects merely appear without actually existing in reality. In the words of Śāntarakṣita's auto-commentary they claim that, "consciousness is ultimately clear like a crystal,"[147] and that, "aspects appear due to the ripening of mistaken imprints since beginningless time."[148] Śāntarakṣita then proceeds into the first of a series of eight absurdums used to demonstrate the faults in the view of the False Aspectarians.

> (#53) If [aspects] do not exist how can consciousness clearly experience those [objects]? There is no consciousness which is distinct from the entities of those [aspects which appear to it].[149]

This first absurdum (2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.1) used to demonstrate the fallacies in the False Aspectarians does so by claiming that the experience of objects by the consciousness would be incorrect given their views. A consciousness must by definition exist with an object. Despite the fact that consciousness perceives entities with aspects, the False Aspectarians maintain that there are no real aspects and so the perception of aspects and the objects they appear to be inseparable from must necessarily be deluded since consciousness does not actually perceive the object with aspects. As a result there is no clear experience of the objects of consciousness.

The second absurdum, the incorrectness of experiencing aspects at all (2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.2), argues is a similar vein as the first absurdum. Consciousness could

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[147] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 68.

[148] Ibid., p. 69.

[149] Ibid., p. 69.

not correctly perceive aspects because there is no entity with aspects. Śāntarakṣita argues that just as there is no real white experienced in non-white, there can be no real experience of aspects when there are no aspects.

Śāntarakṣita then proceeds to the third absurdum which rGyal-tshab labels as "[the absurdum showing] the incorrectness of direct experience." (2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.3)[150] Here Śāntarakṣita, arguing on the basis of direct experience and demonstrates the ensuing fallacies if one were to maintain the False Aspectarian view. Because they maintain direct knowledge of objects is possible and since objects are considered to be of the same nature as consciousness, the False Aspectarians' position with regards to aspects must in fact be faulty. This is the case because aspects do not actually exist in their view and so they must not be of the same substance as the consciousness which is a prerequisite for direct knowledge of them. Therefore rather than direct experience False Aspectarians are left with illusions and the absurdum demonstrating the incorrectness of direct experience because despite the fact that they claim aspects do not exist they would also claim that they are know directly. If aspects are mere illusions, direct perception of them, of something which does not actually exist would be absurd, particularly given that Yogācārans maintain direct perception based on the fact that consciousness and objects are of the same nature. Śāntarakṣita expresses this in the following manner in the root text.

> (#55) With regards to aspects, 'knowledge' is not the correct term [for explaining] direct [perception] because this type of direct [perception] is completely separate from the nature of knowledge, like flowers in the sky, etc.[151]

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[150] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 591.

[151] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 5b.

rGyal-tshab attempts to clarify this argument by organizing it into a clearly stated syllogism.

> The subject, aspects would be incorrect to experience directly because it is not of the substance of consciousness, like flowers of the sky.[152]

The fourth absurdum used to refute the Yogācāra False Aspectarians is the "absurdum demonstrating the incorrectness of experience having examined the aspect,"[153] (2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.4). Here the absurdum is meant to demonstrate that because aspects are false and do not actually exist it is absurd to maintain that they would have causal efficacy which is necessary for them "to produce itself as an aspect perceived by consciousness."[154] Śāntarakṣita explains this absurdum in the following manner in *The Ornament of The Middle Way.*

> (#56) [The subject, consciousness,] is incapable of experiencing [aspects] even when examining them because non-existent [aspects] have no [causal] ability like the horn of a horse. The ability of non-existent [aspects] to [cause the] generation of an appearing consciousness is unsuitable.[155]

As he does throughout the commentary on the 'neither one nor many' argument section of *The Ornament of The Middle Way*, rGyal-tshab remains extremely close to the Śāntarakṣita in his rendering of the arguments.

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[152] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 591.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Ibid.

[155] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 5b.

> The subject, consciousness, would be incorrect in its experience of the aspect having examined it because the aspect does not have the ability to produce itself as an aspect possessed by consciousness for example like an impotent horse.[156]
>
> There is a pervasion because if they do not exist in reality it would not have the ability to produce the consciousness to which it appears.[157]

The fifth absurdum used to demonstrate the incorrectness the Yogācāra False Aspectarians deals with the relationship between aspects and the consciousness (2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.5). In Dharmakīrti's *Pramānavārttika* , the major treatise followed by Śāntarakṣita and his Tibetan successors for a correct formulation of Buddhist logic, he explains that there are only two possible relationships: causal relationships and relationships of identity. Aspects and consciousness cannot have either of these two types of relationships according to the way they are defined by the False Aspectarians yet they are supposedly related according to this system nonetheless. They cannot have a causal relationship because since aspects do actually exist they can not, by definition, have any causal efficacy. And aspects and consciousness can not have a relationship of identity because according to False Aspectarians consciousness has a real nature while aspects do not. They cannot have a relationship of identity because they do not have the same nature. Śāntarakṣita explains this in some detail in the following root text verse and accompanying auto-commentary.

> (#57) What is the relationship of those [aspects] which are definitely experienced with the consciousness? It is not the nature of that [consciousness] and does not arise from it.
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> > Although aspects are not the nature of consciousness they will have the faults of existing like consciousness or [consciousness] will have the faults of non-existence like aspects. The nature of non-existence also does not arise from consciousness. Because there is no nature which generates aspects, if

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[156] The root text says '*rta ru*' (horse horn) whereas rRGyal-tshab's commentary uses the tradional example of an impotent horse as an example of something without causal efficiency. This would make more sense in this instance. Perhaps there was a mistake in this rescension of the root text. Ichigo's critical edition also says, '*rta ru.*'

[157] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 592.

> it arises from consciousness then since one would also be earlier and [the other later there would be the fault of not knowing them simultaneously [because aspects would arise after the consciousness which produced them].[158]

rGyal-tshab calls the next absurdum (2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.6), "the absurdum of the incorrectness of being occasionally arisin."[159] Here Śāntarakṣita questions False Aspectarians on the basis of the occasional or periodic arising of aspects. Since aspects are not real they should not have a cause for their arising. And if they do not depend on causes it does not make sense that they would arise only occasionally. Normally in Buddhist thought, if something has no cause it is argued that is must either permanently exist or permanently not exist, but aspects in this case rise and disintegrate without causes and in a timely manner corresponding with objects. Śāntarakṣita powerfully argues this point against his Yogācāra opponents in the fifty-eighth verse of the root text and its accompanying auto-commentary.

> (#58) If there were no cause [for aspects] how is it they arise only on occasion? If they are possessed with a cause, how could some not be [produced] by dependent nature?
>
> > Because aspects do not exist there is no cause. If there is no cause there should be no periodic arising because there is no reliance [on causes for arising]. Such faults will arise [due to holding this view]. If you accept that [aspects] possess causes, then according to that you must immediately accept [aspects] as existent.
> >
> > If there is no cause then there would be no arising [of objects] from other powers (Skt. *paratantra*, Tib. *gzhan dbang*). How would you answer to this? Arising by the power of others (Skt. *paratantra*) is nothing other than dependent origination (Skt. *pratītyasamutpāda*, Tib. *rten cing*

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[158] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 70-71.

[159] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 592.

> *'brel bar 'byung*). Existence from the nature of arising from conditions also is not other than [dependent origination].[160]

The fifty-ninth verse deals with what rGyal-tshab calls, "the absurdum of being a mere subjective aspect (Skt.. *grāhaka-ākāra*, Tib. *'dzin rnam*)." (2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.7) Here the absurdum as outlined in Śāntarakṣita's root text maintains that if aspects do not exist and yet objects are perceived with aspects, then since there could not exist a consciousness with aspects (being that they do not exist) consciousness could not experience objects either because objects are never experience without aspects and thus it would merely be self-consciousness. Śāntarakṣita explains this in the following stanza of the root text.

> (#59) If aspects do not exist then consciousness [with aspects] also [would not exist] by virtue of the non-existence of aspects. Consciousness then, like a clear crystal, would not experience [objects].[161]

The eighth and final absurdum used to refute the Yogācāra False Aspectarians is referred to by rGyal-tshab as, "the absurdum of being a dependent entity," (2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.8). Here Śāntarakṣita demonstrates that even if the perception or consciousness of aspects is erroneous, it still must arise in dependence on others even if that which it depends on is an illusion. Yogācārans must concede that this would fall into the category among the three natures (Skt. *trisvābhava*, Tib. *ngo bo nyid gsum*) of the nature which is dependent on the power of others (Skt. *paratantrasvabhava*, Tib. *gzhin gi dbang gi ngo bo*). This point is illustrated very clearly by Śāntarakṣita in the sixtieth root text verse.

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[160] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 71-72.

[161] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 6a.

> (#60) If they say this [eye consciousness which sees a mirage] is an erroneous (Tib. *khrul*) consciousness, then why does [this system] rely on errors? Even if it arises by the [power of delusion] still then [consciousness of a mirage is] dependent on the power of others (Skt. *paratantra*, Tib. *gzhin gi dbang*).[162]

rGyal-tshab also echoes this point as he comments on Śāntarakṣita's sixtieth verse, by showing how even if in reality there are no aspects that since they are perceived they still must be dependently arisin. And dependent phenomena are functional entities.

> If one says that although in reality there are no aspects, that aspects appear due to illusions, then the subject, aspects would be other dependent (Tib. *gzhan dbang*) because it depends on illusion since it is arisin from the force of delusion.[163]

This refutation of the False Aspectarian Yogācārans concludes the first major section of the text. Śāntarakṣita has exhaustively examined the entities put forth as real by all competing Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools and demonstrated with valid inference that none of them have a real singular nature, thus proving that the reason has the property of the subject (Tib. *phyogs chos*) (2.1.2.1) with regards to singular natures. In each individual case he already established the two pervasions. This completes the first part of the 'neither one nor many' argument which demonstrates that entities do not ultimately exist as a single nature (2.1). From here Śāntarakṣita must prove that entities do not have true manifold existence in order to complete the argument stated at the beginning of the text and ultimately show that they have no nature at all.

> (#1) Those entities put forth [as real] by our [Buddhist schools] and other [non-Buddhist] schools, because in reality they have neither singular nor plural nature, they have no nature at all, like a reflected image.[164]

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[162] Ibid.

[163] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 592.

Śāntarakṣita has established that the first part of the reason, the lack of a single nature, is of the property of the subject, the entities put forth as real by Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools, but he still needs to establish that the second part of the reason, the lack of a plural nature is of the property of that subject as well. This task is taken up in only two verses in the root text but Śāntarakṣita explains their meaning extensively in his auto-commentary. The first root text verse to address the issue of entities possessing a nature which is truly many is the sixty first.

> (#61) When analyzing any entity, [we find] there are none which are truly single. For those for whom there is nothing which is truly single, there must also be nothing which is manifold.[165]

Śāntarakṣita argues here that on the basis of establishing that there are no entities of a truly singular nature, one must also accept that there are no entities which could be validly established as having the nature of many since a manifold nature would depend on the accumulation of singular natures. If there are no singular natures, as Śāntarakṣita went to great lengths to establish by individually addressing the relevant positions of all possible doctrinal opponents of his day, then there cannot be the accumulation of singular natures which is the necessary condition of an entity with a nature which is truly many. Śāntarakṣita explains this quite clearly in his *Auto-Commentary on The Ornament of The Middle Way.*

> Those followers of Buddhist and non-Buddhist views accepting permanence and impermanence, pervasiveness and singularity, atoms, gross objects and consciousness, etc., when each of these entities is distinctly analyzed as to its singularity, there is no amount of perseverance which can endure the heavy burden

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[164] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 1b.

[165] Ibid., folio 6a.

> of such [critical] analysis at that time. Since there are no [entities] which can be correctly [described as] being of a single nature, accepting a plural nature must also be incorrect because plurality is characterized by the accumulation of singularities. If there is nothing which is single there must also be nothing which is the [accumulation of singularities]. If there is no tree there also will be no forest, etc. Therefore, when we analyze any phenomena and there is nothing [found] which is single, "For those for whom nothing exists as a singular nature nothing exists in a manifold nature either."[166]

Śāntarakṣita strengthens his point when commenting on this by adding supportive quotations from Sūtras including most prominently from the *Lankāvatārasūtra*. By this means of quotation his argument is defended by both logic and scriptures, an important quality of a thorough Buddhist argument. He sums up this point by writing,

> Therefore if we were to examine with the wisdom of logic and scriptures, all entities which upon detailed analysis [break down] into one hundred parts are logically established to be separated from either a singular or manifold nature.[167]

While Śāntarakṣita explains this all extensively over the course of several pages in his auto-commentary, rGyal-tshab sums up the entire point in one extremely succinct and terse syllogism while refraining from any elaborate explanation.

> The subject, entities, would not be established as being [of a nature which is] truly many because there are no truly singular [natures].[168]

Based on this refutation of any truly manifold nature, the criterion of the subject having the quality of the reason (Tib. *phyogs chos*) with regards to either a single or manifold nature is considered to be proven.

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[166] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 70-71.

[167] Ibid., p. 77.

[168] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 592.

Śāntarakṣita then goes on afterward to give some explanation of the example, that entities have no nature like a mirror image. After this he also extols the value of studying the lower philosophical systems. Looking back on the extensive argument, Śāntarakṣita writes that, " having investigated all those systems, it would be incorrect to completely discard them."[169] Here is Śāntarakṣita's statement which is echoed both theoretically and in practice within the dGe-lugs pa school. There is a functional and practical purpose to the study of lower Buddhist schools which is soteriological in nature according to Śāntarakṣita despite their errors. The study of the lower systems progressively ripens the disciple's mind for ascent to understanding the highest view which is a necessary requisite for the attainment of Buddhahood. Of course Śāntarakṣita and the dGe-lugs scholars would differ as to what the highest view is, but their insistence on studying and understanding the lower Buddhist philosophical systems remains the same. Within the dGe-lugs tradition this is but a part of the larger inclusiveness of Tsong-kha-pa's vision where all the Buddha's teachings are incorporated into an internally coherent system.

The following verse in the root text addresses what rGyal-tshab describes in his initial outline of topics for this text as the establishment of the pervasion (Tib. *khyab pa sgrub pa*) (2.1.2.2). The pervasion here refers to establishing the pervasion of the initial syllogism, the stating of the 'neither one nor many' argument in the very first verse of the root text. This establishment of the pervasion of the argument is accomplished according to Śāntarakṣita and rGyal-tshab in the sixty-second verse and the accompanying commentaries.

> (#62) An entity which has aspects and which does not have either a single or plural [nature] does not make sense since the two alternatives are mutually exclusive (and inclusive of all possible alternatives).

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[169] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p.77.

> Since a single natureand a plural nature are characterized as being inclusive of all alternative, any other [potential] alternative is cleared away.[170]

Śāntarakṣita establishes the pervasion of the 'neither one nor many' argument by stating, after refuting a true singular nature and a true plural nature, that if an entity has neither of those two types of nature that it necessarily must not have any nature at all since those two alternatives are mutually exclusive and include all possible alternatives for the way a truly existent nature could exist. rGyal-tshab mirrors Śāntarakṣita's reasoning here as he comments on this verse and the establishment of the pervasion, both because his aim here is to do so and because Prāsaṅgikas would consider the 'neither one nor many' argument to be a valid refutation of true existence as well. rGyal-tshab explains the pervasion of the argument in the following manner.

> If the true existence of one and the true existence of many is not established, then there must be no true existence because there are no entities not belonging [either] to the class of one or many. That is so because [the categories of] one and many are a direct result of relying on the consequences of [all inclusiveness and] mutual exclusivity.[171]

With the establishment of the pervasion Śāntarakṣita completes the largest argument of the text, the neither one nor many argument, which comprises sixty-two of the ninety-seven root text stanzas and represents the most well known exposition of the argument within the Tibetan Buddhist canon.

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[170] Ibid., pp.81-82.

[171] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 593.

Demonstrating That Entities Do Exist Conventionally (2.2)

Having completed the 'neither one nor many' argument which establishes that entities do not ultimately exist because they do not have an ultimately or truly existent single nature nor a truly existent plural nature, Śāntarakṣita moves on to discuss the way entities do exist in a topic which rGyal-tshab describes as "demonstrating that entities do exist conventionally."(2.2)[172] rGyal-tshab divides this topic of Śāntarakṣita into three sub-topics: identifying the characteristics of entities (2.2.1), identifying the characteristics of conventional existence (2.2.2), the refutation of the ultimate existence of the cause of the illusion (2.2.3).[173]

The first of the three sub-topics under the larger heading of establishing entities as existing conventionally aims to probe the characteristics of entities. Here Śāntarakṣita begins with the explicit statement that entities only exist conventionally. He then ponders what can be done for those who absolutely accept entities as ultimately existing.

> (#63) Therefore all entities are characterized only by conventionality. If one accepts them as ultimate what can I do for them?[174]

Śāntarakṣita explains in his auto-commentary through both reasoning and quotations from scriptures that while entities do not ultimately exist they, it is not the case that they do not exist at all for that view would entail falling into the extreme of nihilism or absolute non-existence. In this process of explanation he first attacks the ignorance which clings to

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[172] Ibid.

[173] Ibid.

[174] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 6a.

ultimate existence as a result of holding incorrect philosophical views. It is to these people that he questions in the root text as to what he can do for them if they insist on holding such views. Śāntarakṣita then attacks innate (Skt. *sahaja*, Tib. *lhan skyes*) ignorance which clings to ultimate existence but without a basis in constructed wrong views. He does this with extensive quotations from sūtras where the Buddha states repeatedly that phenomena do not exist in reality. For example Śāntarakṣita quotes *The Skillful Elephant Sūtra* as stating the following.

> *The Skillful Elephant Sūtra* says, "Śariputra was wondering, what do you think about this question which he asked the Buddha, 'Is there [consciousness] knowing the nature of any phenomena? Or is there not?' The Bhāgavan replied, 'This searching for the nature of phenomena is searching for the nature of an illusion.' The Bhāgavan said, 'That (illusion) does not exist and that (a nature of phenomena) does not exist.' If someone asks what the reason is for this, the Bhāgavan taught that the reason is, 'All phenomena are the nature of an illusion.' Anything that is like an illusion does not exist. Likewise, regarding the searching for the nature of phenomena, the searching [itself] does not exist. If one asks for an explanation, the explanation is that there are no phenomena whatsoever which exist in reality." This and so forth was how it was explained.[175]

rGyal-tshab simply offers this syllogism. "The subject, these entities must exist falsely because their basis is established and the establishment of true existence is [already] refuted."[176] Śāntarakṣita's quotation from *The Skillful Elephant Sūtra* is followed with a question from a hypothetical opponent about the nature of conventionally existent entities. If their real existence is so strongly negated there can easily arise questions as to whether Mādhyamikans such as Śāntarakṣita deny the complete existence of anything at all. This hypothetical question lead Śāntarakṣita into the next sub-topic concerning the nature of

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[175] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 87-88.

[176] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 593.

conventional existence, identifying the characteristics of conventional existence (2.2.2) and the sixty-forth stanza in the root text.

> Well then, if this is the nature of conventional [phenomena], are there no existent entities? If there exists no entities, then if one says that seeing [them] and [their] functionality would be contradicted, [I must reply that] those (conventional phenomena) are not explained to be like that.
>
> (#64) Those phenomena which are only agreeable when not put to the test of (ultimate) analysis, those phenomena which are generated and disintegrate, and those which have the ability to function are known to be of a conventional nature.[177]

In the sixty-forth root text stanza and accompanying auto-commentary Śāntarakṣita establishes three criterion for what he calls a conventional truth: 1) that they are seen or known by the mind, 2) that they have the ability to function in the way that they appear, and 3) that they are unable withstand ultimate analysis. He later adds in his auto-commentary that they are impermanent as well. Śāntarakṣita then distinguishes between real conventional truths and false conventional truths. Real conventional truths meet all three of those criterion. On the basis of the second criterion, the ability to function in the way that they appear, Śāntarakṣita distinguishes false conventional truths from real ones because false conventional truths are unable to function in the way that they appear. Examples of false conventional truths would be hallucinations and a magicians illusions and the like. For example water is considered as a real conventional truth, but a mirage is a false conventional truth because it is not able to function in the way that it appears, as water. Śāntarakṣita explains these criterion for conventional truth in his auto-commentary.

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[177] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 88.

> 'Conventional' is not a nature which is merely the designation of a sound. Because they cannot withstand (ultimate) analysis dependently arisin entities which function and are seen, they are [called] real conventionalities.[178]

Śāntarakṣita further explains that conventional truths are not merely the names or labels but that the words are referents to entities. He quotes the Buddha in his auto-commentary to stress this point.

> The Protector also said, " For example, we wish to call 'a chariot' those [entities] which are the accumulation of the parts [of a chariot]. Likewise, the [accumulation of] aggregates have become the cause conventionally for what we call 'a sentient being'."[179]

When rGyal-tshab comments on this point his syllogism, the argument, and its reason take a slightly different shape yet the essential components remain the same. Śāntarakṣita lists criterion and describe the reason for their being called real conventional entities as their inability to withstand ultimate analysis. For rGyal-tshab the inability to withstand ultimate analysis is listed as one of the criterion while the reason for their being called real conventional entities is their ability to be found by conventional valid cognition. Śāntarakṣita uses this language later in discussions of conventional truth in his auto-commentary, but not here.

> The subject, the three [criterion for real conventional entities: objects which] cannot endure the examination of ultimate analysis, which are produced and cease, and objects which are able to function, are conventional truths because these are findable objects by the conventional valid cognition (*tha snyad pa'i tshad ma*).[180]

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[178] Ibid., pp.88-89.

[179] Ibid., pp. 90-91.

[180] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 593.

rGyal-tshab makes note that from here Śāntarakṣita proceeds into the third sub-topic under the larger topic of demonstrating that entities do exist conventionally (2.2). The third sub-topic which is addressed in the sixty-fifth and sixty-sixth stanzas from the root text is the refutation of the ultimate existence of the cause of the illusion (2.2.3) While his aim here is to refute the notion that causes ultimately exist, Śāntarakṣita is not rejecting efficaciousness of causes altogether. Because true existence has been refuted, truly existent causes are also refuted, but that does not mean there are absolutely no causal relationships whatsoever. In the root text stanzas on this Śāntarakṣita argues precisely this point that though causes do not ultimately exist because they cannot withstand ultimate analysis, they do exist conventionally.

> (#65) Although they are agreeable only when not analyzed (by ultimate analysis), since it depends on the earlier causal self, the subsequent fruit arises in correspondence with that.
>
> (#66) Therefore if there is no conventional cause, that is said to be incorrect and is no good. If its substantial cause (Skt. *upādāna*, Tib. *nyer len*) is said to be real then that must be explained.[181]

Śāntarakṣita goes on to give further explanation of the way in which causes exist conventionally in *The Auto-Commentary on The Ornament of The Middle Way* by repeating explanations he had already given about the way real conventionalities exist, reiterating that conventionalities are not merely the sounds of imputed labels, but that they correspond with entities which serve as the basis of emptiness and simply cannot withstand ultimate analysis which searches for true existence.

> That has already been explained. Entities which are able to function yet cannot forebear (ultimate) analysis are called real conventionalities. It is said that beings, etc. are not merely the sound [of the labels which designate them]. If those [beings,

[181] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folios 6a-6b.

etc.] arise in dependence on their own cause which is unable to withstand examination by [ultimate] analysis in this expressed way, how could there be no cause [at all]? If analyzed with wisdom and gnosis, intelligent ones will assert the existent nature of the cause [which is emptiness]. The suchness of chariots also does not go beyond that [ultimate nature].[182]

[182] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 91-92.

The Refutation of Dissenting Arguments (2.3)

At this point Śāntarakṣita moves on to the third point within the second topic of the text, the refutation of dissenting arguments of other schools (2.3). rGyal-tshab lists these seven topics as, "(2.3.1) abandoning the contradictions with direct perception, (2.3.2) abandoning the contradictions with scripture, (2.3.3) expressing the ultimate truth, (2.3.4) abandoning (dissenting) arguments regarding that (ultimate truth), (2.3.5) putting forth the nature of conventional truth, (2.3.6) showing the way the nature of the Mahāyāna is more glorious than the others, and (2.3.7) [showing how] if one knows this system, [s/he knows] the cause of the generation of compassion and faith."[183] There are two stanzas in the root text which address the first topic of abandoning contradictions with direct perception.

> (#67) As for the inherent nature of all entities, we have cleared away such claims of others following the path of reasoning. Therefore there is nothing to be disputed [in our position].
>
> (#68) If they are earnest those [holders of lower school views] will not be able to argue from any angle against those who assert neither existence nor non-existence nor both existence and non-existence.[184]

Śāntarakṣita argues that by means of logic he has refuted all other tenet systems maintaining inherent existence and that if they are honest they could not maintain even that such a rejection of inherent existence contradicts direct perception. When put to the test of ultimate analysis, even by a non-Āryan it is apparent that no entities can withstand such analysis and still be considered as inherently existent.

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[183] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 594.

[184] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 6b.

It is of significant interest to note here as in many other instances in both Śāntarakṣita's root text and commentary that he uses language said according to dGe-lugs doxographers never to be used by Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans to describe emptiness or ultimate truth. dGe-lugs pas beginning with Tsong-kha-pa in his writings on Mādhyamika such as the Superior Insight chapter of *The Great Exposition on the Stages of the Path To Enlightenment* and down through all the major dGe-lugs tenet system texts on to the oral commentators today, all clearly explain while stressing the point's importance that Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans will say entities do not truly exist (Tib. *den par med*) or do not ultimately exist (Tib. *don dam par med*) but that they will not say that they do not inherently exist (Tib. *rang bzhin med*) or have inherent existence. Here is just one example in the in the sixty-seventh verse of Śāntarakṣita discussing emptiness or ultimate truth in terms of a lack of inherent existence. Similarly there are numerous occasions when he simply that entities do not exist, instead of qualifying such a statement with 'ultimately' or 'truly'. When I questioned oral commentators from the dGe-lugs pa lineage about this point it was suggested that the purpose of those dGe-lugs pa commentaries, particularly in tenet system texts was not necessarily a word for word commentary, but a commentary on the meaning of the views. These are presented is such a way as to best facilitate ascent to the highest view, the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika. I have discussed these points in the sections on the two truths and dGe-lugs pa hermeneutics in the following chapter, but I only raise them here to point out an example.

Returning to the arguments at hand, rGyal-tshab gives a very clear explanation of Śāntarakṣita's point regarding potential conflicts with direct perception concerning his view when he comments.

> If one says, " If there are no entities which are established as truly existent, that contradicts direct perception." I respond that, by refuting true existence, there are no faults of contradiction with direct perception because although entities bearing

> the investigation by the knowledge of final examination are refuted, objects found by the conventional valid cognition (*tha snyad pa'i tshad mas*) are not refuted. There would be no faults of contradictions, etc. with direct perception with that explanation (above) because we do not accept the true existence of the four extremes of existence, non-existence, both or neither.[185]

The sixty-ninth verse addresses what rGyal-tshab describes as the abandonment of the contradictions with scriptures. Here Śāntarakṣita quotes extensively from a number of Sūtras in his auto-commentary, not only to abandon contradictions in general with scriptures, but in particular with regards to one point which in Śāntarakṣita's presentation, lower Buddhist schools may consider to be contradicting the Buddha's words; this is the non-production of all phenomena. It is argued here by Śāntarakṣita that if phenomena do not truly exist then they cannot be truly produced for there cannot be any true cause of their being. I will first quote rGyal-tshab's clear and brief summation of the point before presenting Śāntarakṣita's auto-commentary and his Sūtra citations used to back up his point.

> There is a reason for stating in the scriptures that all phenomena are not produced and do not cease. It is because there are no entities which are truly established.[186]

Śāntarakṣita begins by linking the argument against the true production and true cessation of entities to the 'neither one nor many' argument by questioning how entities could be truly produced, persist, or cease if they all lack a truly singular or truly plural nature. If there is no true cause of production and no true fruit, there cannot be true production. The argument against true production also can be traced back to Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamikakārikā* and his four-fold negation of causation.

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[185] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 594.

[186] Ibid.

> Nothing ever arises anywhere from itself, from somewhere else, from both, or from no cause at all.[187]

Śāntarakṣita follows his own root text stanza in his auto-commentary with a series of quotations from various Sūtras to support his view and to demonstrate that his view which clearly is defensible with logic is likewise supported by scriptures.

> (# 69) Therefore in reality there are not any established entities. Due to that the Tathāgatas taught the non-production of all phenomena.
>
> > In reality it would be incorrect [to postulate] that even gross or subtle entities are thoroughly established because this manner of teaching demonstrates that [entities] lack the nature of one or many.
> > Therefore by what are they actually produced? And how do they prelimanarily exist? And how are they impermanent?
> > How also would other such phenomenal entities exist?
> >
> > Like that, it says in *The Ocean of Intelligent Teachings Sūtra* as follows, "There is not even the slightest nature in dependently arisin phenomena. Since they have no nature those do not arise [in any of the four ways]."
> >
> > *The Skillful Elephant Sūtra* says, "If there are not any phenomena which are produced, it is only the childish ones who claim arising for those phenomena which are not arisin."
> >
> > *The Base of the Arising of the Jewel Sūtra* says, "There is no inherent existence for any [entity]. Since there is no inherent existence how can there be conditions of another's [production]? And since there is no inherent existence how can they be produced by another? This reason was taught by the Sugata."
> >
> > Therefore, *The Meeting of the Father and Son Sūtra* says, " It is taught that by engaging in dependent origination one is also engaging in dharmadhātu (ultimate truth). The Bhāgavan said regarding that, that ignorance does not exist by the nature of ignorance itself. If one responds by asking 'Why?' to that, it is because ignorance is separate from inherent existence. Also for any phenomena which does not inherently exist, entities do not exist. For those for whom entities do not exist, there are no

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[187] Trans. by Malcolm David Eckel in *Jnanagarbha's Commentary On The Distinction Between The Two Truths: An Eighth Century Handbook on Mādhyamika Philosophy.* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), p. 22.

thoroughly established existents. Without thoroughly established existents, there is no production. Without production there is no cessation. That which is not produced and does not cease will not imputedly be called past and it will not imputedly be called present or future. For anything which does not exist in the three times, a name does not exist, characteristics [of it] do not exist, a signifier (Tib. *mtshan ma*) does not exist, and it imputedly does not exist. They do not exist in any other [way] but merely by name, by mere sign, mere designation, as mere convention, mere assertion, and as mere imputation. Except for the purpose of guiding sentient beings [the Buddha did not teach conventional existence], but that ignorance itself ultimately does not exist. Any phenomena which ultimately does not exist also does not exist imputedly, does not exist by way of designation, and does not exist as something expressible. The Bhāgavan said that from this so-called mere name on up to the mere imputation of those, that also in reality they do not exist." This sort of teaching arose extensively. Since that is the case, when the [second] wheel of the dharma turned it was taught by the Protector that from the earliest times all phenomena were peacefully free [of inherent existence], not produced, and the nature of nirvana.

These verses explain it eloquently. They demonstrate completely that all phenomena in the three times are naturally equal [with regards to their lack of inherent existence]. Because the past and future are separate from inherent existence, that (nature) is peacefully released from inherent existence. Even at the time of arising (the present) there is no production because it is separate from inherent existence. Even in the past, nirvana is beyond the nature of inherent existence because it is separate from inherent existence.[188]

The Meeting of the Father and the Son Sūtra says, "All of these phenomena are equal by way of their being equal in the three times. Even in the past all phenomena were separate from inherent existence. Also in the future and the present all phenomena are separate from inherent existence."

That Sūtra (*The Meeting of the Father and the Son Sūtra*) also says, " It is clearly [demonstrated] that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence. Any phenomena which do not inherently exist did not exist in the past, will not exist in the future, and do not exist at the time of arising. If someone asks, "Why?", [we would respond that] one would not imputingly say that [phenomena] which do not inherently exist [only do not inherently exist] in the past and like that one would not imputingly say that they [only

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[188] It is noteworthy that Śāntarakṣita continually uses "inherent existence" as the referrent term. In the Special Insight chapter of *The Great Exposition On The Stages of the Path To Enlightenment*, Tsong-kha-pa says that Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans such as Śāntarakṣita do not use this sort of language to describe emptiness because they consider entities to "inherently exist," conventionally. This highlights the point that those dGe-lugs texts in the second category of the three-fold division of dGe-lugs commentaries, that category which comprises tenet system texts and general treatises on Mahāyāna philosophy, do not necessarily attempt to offer a rigorous mirror like representation of Indian authors in their presentations for the reasons discussed above.

> do not inherently exist] in the future or only at the time of arising. Even non-production and the like have been classified as conventional realities." [189]

Śāntarakṣita thus presents extensive support from sūtras for his position that there is no inherent production. These Mahāyāna sūtras were likely the same sources Nāgārjuna drew from when he refuted real causation in his work. Several important points are made here with these quotations. Śāntarakṣita clearly wants to emphasize that he does not merely talk about the past or future when speaking of a lack of inherent existence of production but also of the present, of the 'time of arising'. This eliminates any potential ambiguity about the lack of inherent existence necessitating a relationship to a specific time other than the present because the lack of inherent existence is the same in all of the three times. Much of the argument against real production which bases itself on the lack of inherent existence in any phenomena centers on the notion that if there is no inherently existing phenomena there can be no inherently existing cause. Without an inherently existing cause there can be no true production.

According to rGyal-tshab's outline of topics the following topic, 'the refutation of the ultimate existence of the cause of the illusion' (2.2.3) is handled by Śāntarakṣita over the course of the next three stanzas in his root text. Śāntarakṣita begins in the seventieth stanza and accompanying commentary by explaining that with regards to ultimate truth that all verbal fabrications are ultimately eliminated, but that such elaborations are necessary conventionally for ascent to that ultimate view.

> (#70) Because they are harmonious with ultimate truths (Tib. *dam pa'i don*)[190] some call this [non-production] ultimate truth, but in reality they (i.e. ultimate truths) are free from all accumulations of elaborations (Skt. *prapanca*, Tib. *spros pa*).

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[189] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 95-99.

[190] Literally, "the object of the holy ones'(Tib.*dam pa'i don*), refers here to an object realized as an emptiness by the wisdom of an āryan in meditative equipose. In other words an object of the holy ones is an ultimate truth.

> With regards to the ultimate, entities and non-entities, production and non-production, emptiness and non-emptiness, etc. are all free from the net of elaborations. Because non-production, etc. is harmonious with the engaging in that (wisdom of the meditative equipoise of an āryan) we label them as (elaborations of) the ultimate (truth). Without the stairs of actual conventionalities it would be unsuitable for a master to go to the top of the house of reality (ultimate truth). Why then is it taught directly that that is not ultimate [truth]?[191]

According to oral commentary[192] I received this conversation also revolves a division of ultimate truth into two categories, the ultimate truth of the object and the ultimate truth of the object possessor. The ultimate truth of the object is also further divided into the real or actual ultimate truth of the object and the mere designation of the ultimate truth of the object. Thus Śāntarakṣita is aiming at the actual ultimate truth of the object which is beyond any elaboration while noting the necessity of conventional designations in ascent to that. This point is elaborated upon and the pervasion of the argument is established in the next two root text verses.

> (#71) Because of the lack of (ultimate) production, non-production, etc. does not exist. Because of the refutation of that (production, etc.), the sound of the words of that do not exist.
>
> (#72) There is no good in applying [words] of negation to a non-existent object. Even if one relies on conceptual thought it would be conventional, not ultimate.[193]

rGyal-tshab clarifies this point in the following manner in his commentary on Śāntarakṣita's root text verses.

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[191] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 99-100.

[192] Geshe Jigme Dawa (1998).

[193] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 6b.

> There is a pervasion because if there is no true production then in meditative equipoise (Tib. *mnyam gshyag*) according to the view of the (wisdom realizing emptiness of a noble one) there would not be application of the words which refute it. That is so because there would be no application of negating words (Tib. *dgag sgra*) without a base of negation. If they (Yogācārins) say that there is application of negating words to conceptually designated ones then that subject would not be established as ultimately real but would be conventional because it would be a negation negating the object of refutation designated by conceptual thought.[194]

Śāntarakṣita also further explains in his auto-commentary by quoting from the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, one of his major canonical sources.

> *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* says, "On the basis of existence, non-existence [is established]. Also on the basis of non-existence, existence [is established]. Therefore do not think of [entities] as not existing [at all] and do not consider them as existent in and of themselves (Tib. *yod pa nyid*). For anything which is not produced there is no cessation. So regarding the solitary seeing of worldly things, there is no [extreme of] existence and no [extreme of] non-existence."[195]

Śāntarakṣita then proceeds to move into what rGyal-tshab describes as the fourth topic, that of abandoning of the dissenting arguments regarding ultimate truth (2.3.4) which itself has four sub-topics. The first of these is to abandon the absurdum that people of low intellectual capabilities will know emptiness through direct perception (2.3.4.1) which according to rGyal-tshab is addressed in the seventy-third stanza of the root text. The argument questions why everybody would not directly intuit the ultimate nature of entities when they perceive entities by direct perception.

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[194] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folios 594-595.

[195] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 102-103.

> (#73) Well then,[if someone were to say that] since they know those [entities], even non-masters should directly intuit the [ultimate] nature of them. Why shouldn't they know [the ultimate nature of] entities in this way? [196]

The argument continues:

> If they [directly] know entities, then not knowing the nature of those would be incorrect. If we see a ground without a jar, then likewise we know the nature of the ground as without a jar.[197]

Śāntarakṣita responds that the difference between the perception of those of low intellect who are unenlightened and the perception of enlightened ones is that in addition to valid cognition of gross objects, those of low intellect also impute inherent existence onto the objects they perceive, thus imputing extremes onto objects which do not abide in either of the two extremes.

> There is no purity in the view of ordinary individuals with regards to entities since such inferior people also [impute] unreal assertions [such as inherent existence] on aspects of entities and the like which lack [inherent] existence. If those who assert unreal assertions to be real know that they all are actually separate from the [two] extremes, why don't they say that they understand that?
>
> (#74) They do not. Because of the power of false imputations of real existence onto entities by the burdened continuums of all sentient beings from beginningless time, [emptiness] is not known directly by any animate life form.
>
> Those beings who have been stirred by the poison of strong attachment to entities generated in saṃsāra from beginningless time, since they merely know directly they are unable to fully understand aspects.[198]

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[196] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 6b-7a.

[197] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 105.

[198] Ibid.

rGyal-tshab explains the argument (2.3.4.1.2) in a similar manner while stressing the persistence of the delusion in the mind of being since beginningless saṃsāra.

> Even though it is so that there are no true existent entities, there is a reason why shepherds, etc. do not cognize emptiness by direct perception. It is because from beginningless time, [their] mental continuum is deluded by being bound to the illusion which exaggerates things as truly [existent].[199]

This leads Śāntarakṣita directly into answering the question as to who does know ultimate truth if it is not known merely by ordinary people with direct perception of entities (2.3.4.2). The answer he offers is two-fold. First it is known by those inferring emptiness through logical reasoning and secondly it is known by powerful yogis through direct perception. Śāntarakṣita explains this point in the following root text stanza and accompanying auto-commentary.

> (#75) Those [who realize emptiness are] those who know it inferentially with the logical proofs which make [the lack of real existence] known and that cut unreal assertions, as well as those powerful yogis who know it clearly by direct perception. (106.13)
>
> > They do not obtain the mere clearing up of false assertions with regards to entities [merely] by hearing (Tib. *thos*) teachings. Accumulated phenomena will certainly be examined without elaboration [by the wisdom which] thoroughly differentiates phenomena which arise from thinking. If we do not examine all inner and outer entities with the wisdom which is separate from the stains of conceptual thought and which arises from the that considers the nature of all phenomena as equal [with regard to their emptiness], we will be content and not [see] their essence (i.e. emptiness) as do the powerful yogis.[200]

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[199] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folios 594-595.

[200] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 106-107.

rGyal-tshab elaborates on this point by echoing the general categories Śāntarakṣita describes of beings who know emptiness, but he does so also by making explicit reference to where in the Mahāyāna Buddhist path system these specific being may be abiding in at the time of realization, thus qualifying also the type of realization those beings are having at the time.

> Even though foolish people (Tib. *blun po*) do not cognize [emptiness], there are persons who cognize emptiness. Those bodhisattvas on the path of preparation (*sbyor lam*) or on the path of accumulation (Tib. *tshog lam*) [cognize emptiness conceptually] by relying on correct reasoning (Tib. *gtan tshigs*). Bodhisattvas abiding on the (ten) grounds realize [emptiness] directly by [relying on] direct yogic cognition.[201]

At this point Śāntarakṣita segues in his auto-commentary and then in the root text to a defense of the use of autonomous syllogisms (Skt. *svatantra-prayoga*, Tib. *rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba*) under the topic which rGyal-tshab describes as refuting the absurdum that there would be no established speech (2.3.4.3) It is worthy of notice that rGyal-tshab aims strictly to explain Śāntarakṣita's positions here with regards to logic despite the fact that Śāntarakṣita offers challenges to what will later become central arguments that dGe-lugs-pas hold regarding logic, the use of consequences (Skt. *prasaṅga*, Tib. *thal gyur*) and inappropriateness of using autonomous syllogisms for holders of Mādhyamika tenets. This restraint in asserting his own view in this direct commentary on Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament For The Middle Way* reinforces the framework outlined in this study for engaging in dGe-lugs commentarial works since rGyal-tshab has as his sole aim here, to explain as accurately as possible the intended meaning which Śāntarakṣita himself puts forth.

Śāntarakṣita begins the discussion with two critiques of his own views regarding logic. The first challenge as explained by Śāntarakṣita begins by an opponent of his questioning how he could establish valid arguments given his acceptance of the lack of

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[201] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folios 595-596.

inherent existence of all phenomena since then even the components of the argument would not truly exist.

> If you accept that all entities have no inherent existence, then because the property of the subject criterion, etc.[202] is not established, is it not that the designational object to be inferred and the inferential cognition would not be established? Due to that, how could the proponent delineate [any thesis]? If no reason is asserted which establishes all phenomena as lacking inherent existence, then at that time, since there is no reason established for the lack of [inherent] existence, the meaning of your assertions is not established. [203]

This first criticism comes from opponents Śāntarakṣita considers to be from lower Buddhist schools.

The second criticism which he describes in his auto-commentary (quoted below) is given from the perspective of a Prasaṅgika opponent. While there is no evidence of a split in Mādhyamika schools in India at this time along the lines of logic, clearly it was a contested issue in Śāntarakṣita's mind and he was probably familiar with the critiques of Chandrakīrti or his followers of the use of autonomous syllogisms. Śāntarakṣita begins to explain the challenge posed by who we would now categorize as Consequentialists in the following manner in his *Auto-Commentary on The Ornament For The Middle Way.*

> If [a reason] is asserted [which establishes all phenomena as lacking inherent existence], then there is an [inherently] existent reason. If that is the case then the meaning of your assertions would not be established since the lack of inherent existence of all phenomena would not be established [since you must admit that the reason is inherently existent].[204]

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[202] This refers to the three criterion (Skt. *trairūpya*, Tib. *tshul gsum*) for a valid autonymous syllogism. The three are 1) that the mark is of the property of the subject (Skt. *pakṣadharmatā*, Tib. *phyogs chos*), (2) the forward pervasion (Skt. *anvayavyāpti*, Tib. *rjes khyab*), and (3) the counter pervasion (Skt. *vyatirekavyāṗti*, Tib. *ldog khyab*).

[203] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 108.

[204] Ibid.

Śāntarakṣita is posed with two challenges. On the one hand it is argued that his syllogisms are meaningless since he must consider its parts to lack true existence. On the other hand if he holds them to be valid then he must maintain the inherent existence of the parts of the argument, which would undermine the purpose of logically establishing the lack of inherent existence. Śāntarakṣita responds to these challenges in the following three stanzas of *The Ornament For The Middle Way*. The primary problem facing Śāntarakṣita is how to assert a subject of a syllogism which is common to both himself as a Mādhyamikan who holds no inherent existence with those opponents from lower schools who do maintain real entities. A common subject is a prerequisite for a valid autonomous syllogism of the type he wants to utilize. Yet when the subject of a syllogism is for example, a book, that would mean something entirely different to a Mādhyamikan than it would to an adherent of some other philosophical system. The critique is therefore that the proponent and opponent would be talking past each other, never really discussing the same subject. Discussion of these arguments can be found in detail in the following chapter of this study but suffice it to say here that Śāntarakṣita responds by arguing that a common subject can be established since there are validly established entities known by all beings.

> (#76) Having discarded [preferred views] based on particular established speech concerning how subjects [exist], there are entities which are well known by everyone from masters to women to children.
>
> (#77) These entities which are established and will be established are thoroughly engaged as such. If that were not the case, how would you respond to the argument that the base (of the logical mark) is not established?
>
> (#78) Because we have not rejected entities with regards to their possessing the taste (Skt. *rasa*, Tib. *ngang*) of appearances, we are unshaken with regard to the establishment of the subject and the thesis.[205]

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[205] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 7a.

He continues to address the Prasaṅgika criticism by reinforcing his position that common components of an argument and the criterion for its establishment are valid because those objects of the sense consciousnesses he maintains are the objects of the sound referents of the words which make up the syllogism despite the fact that they ultimately lack true existence. Moreover Śāntarakṣita argues, he never rejected 'entities with regards to their possessing the taste of appearances'. He is attempting here to establish a common subject which is 1) known by all, 2) not generated by tenets, and 3) is the mere sound of the reason and other component parts.

> Some say, inferential valid cognition and the designational objects to be inferred must be given up completely [since they depend on] different subjects generated by incompatible tenets.
>
> Consciousness of ears, nose, etc. of everyone from masters to women to children [are a referent] for engaging [in autonomous syllogisms] by relying on subjects which are the sound of the three criterion (Tib. *phyogs sgra la sogs pa*) which possess the taste of appearances.[206]

It becomes a little vague at this point as to what exactly Śāntarakṣita means by 'the taste of appearances' and he seems to fall into precisely the problem he acknowledges being criticized of by Prāsaṅgikas, namely that he would end up maintaining the user of autonomous syllogisms will have to assert entities as inherently existing or existing by way of their own characteristics. This is one argument on which the dGe-lugs school later criticizes Mādhyamika users of autonomous syllogisms. But Śāntarakṣita quickly turns the table around on the Consequentialists in his *Auto-Commentary on The Ornament For The Middle Way*. He questions how they would be able to establish any knowledge at all given

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[206] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 109.

their position on this point. He proceeds to explain then how it is only through this form of logic that one can correctly understand the canonical philosophical commentaries or *śāstras.*

> If that is not the case (i.e. if there is no common subject) there will be no establishment of the base of the reason for all [arguments] you assert to be established such as [the argument demonstrating that by] the existence of smoke there is fire and [the arguments about] impermanence, etc. because established subjects are not established as the nature of the qualities of part possessors and space [as Vaiśeṣikas assert].
>
> If that is the case one could not even establish the examples of the subject which possess both (the predicate and the reason). If others even accept that which is to be established and that which is designationally established in that way, then if that is the case why is this well known argument needed? This is only discussing the faults of others' systems and not looking at our own system. I also do not clearly know [the ultimate nature of] entities which possess the taste of appearances to consciousnesses such as eye consciousness, etc. Since there does not even appear an essence like the trunk of a banana tree when we analyze them with wisdom and gnosis, we do not ultimately accept them. Due to that, since we have not rejected the meaning of the appearance [even by the valid cognition which infers its emptiness] and since we engage in the designationally established[207] and the established object without strong grasping at those there is also no [logical] harm at all in saying all phenomena are not inherently existing?
>
> As it says, " As long as we do not rely on polluted grasping, designations will be thoroughly established. If one becomes a master in designations, they will not be obscured in their understanding of the meaning of the *śāstras.*"[208] [209]

Śāntarakṣita then makes one more stab at his Prasaṅgika critics before concluding this topic by calling them nihilists who must hold the extreme of non-existence and as a result, uproot the very virtues of the Dharma.

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[207] This refers to the three criterion (Skt. *trairūpya*, Tib. *tshul gsum*) for establishing an autonymous syllogism as valid.

[208] Śāntarakṣita here refers to the conceptual doctrinal categories employed to generate an inferential understanding of Buddhist views as represented in the Śāstras.

[209] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 110.

> In the view of those subjugators who have animosity toward the system of those postulating meaningful [arguments], the view that all phenomena lack any inherent existence is like the view of complete non-existence from the crown to the body.[210]

The next topic addressed according to rGyal-tshab's outline is the absurdum that there would be no karma and effects (2.3.4.4), a common criticism levied against Mādhyamikans due to their rejection of real production and real cessation. The first among the three sub-topics of this subjects is to demonstrate the absurdity of asserting the invalidity of previous and later lives (2.3.4.4.1) which according to rGyal-tshab is addressed in the seventy-ninth stanza of the root text.

> (#79) The seeds of a [previous] similar type which [stimulate] knowledge of entities and entitylessness, etc. in the continuums [of beings] from beginningless existence are objects of inferential [knowledge].[211]

The argument which seems a bit vague and tenuous at first glance is based on the notion that one can know inferentially that the seeds of consciousness are of a similar type in the continuums of beings over many lifetimes and therefore one can infer previous and later lives according to rGyal-tshab's understanding of Śāntarakṣita. rGyal-tshab makes this point more clear in his commentary.

> The subject, the conception[212] of entities and entitylessness by a newborn baby is preceded by its similar former type because it is consciousness. In the same way, one becomes accustomed to objects of desire.[213]

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[210] Ibid.

[211] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 7a.

[212] "Conception" (Tib. *rtogs pa*) here refers to that part of consciousness which mixes sound and meaning.

[213] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 596.

The argument is made more clear here by rGyal-tshab on behalf of Śāntarakṣita. He argues that in the same way that one becomes accustomed to objects of desire in one lifetime based on the seeds of a previous similar type, so too do infants become accustomed to entities, etc. right upon birth on the basis of having been accustomed to entities in previous lives.

In Śāntarakṣita's auto-commentary stanzas seventy-nine through eighty-two are presented successively without any intervening commentary. rGyal-tshab separates the seventy-ninth verse then asserts that verses eighty and eighty-one establish the pervasion (2.3.4.4.1.2) of the argument just presented in the previous stanza.

> (#80) Regarding this, because these (notions of entities and entitylessness) [ultimately] do not exist, they do no arise by the power of [external] entities. The nature of entities themselves is thoroughly rejected in an extensive manner.
>
> (#81) Because they arise gradually they are not sudden. Because there is no permanent arising there is nothing which is permanent. Because they themselves are likewise accustomed to that, entities arise from their own kind (Tib. *rang gi rigs*).[214]

Śāntarakṣita offers a detailed explanation of his argument here. He argues that these imputed notions such as entities and entitylessness which even exist in newborn babies do not arise as a result of external entities which is verified by the fact that such entities have already be logically rejected in this text. Likewise they are not sudden and are not permanent since there is nothing which is permanent. Since the consciousnesses of even new-born infants are already accustomed to common modes of consciousness such as perceiving entities and entitylessness, they must arise from a previous instance of a similar type of consciousness, and thus one of a previous life. rGyal-tshab explains this point in a similar manner

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[214] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folios 7a-7b.

> That subject (consciousness) would not be able to arise by the power of a partless object because there are no partless objects and because the true existence of entities has already been refuted. It would not be causeless because it occurs in succession. Its nature would not be permanent because it is not permanently arising. Thus a previous consciousness [precedes it] because it is consciousness.[215]

Śāntarakṣita also summarizes the point very succinctly in the following section of his auto-commentary.

> Because of conceptualizing about entities, etc., at their first arising in this life, it is inferred that they are produced from imprints with which we have become accustomed and which are similar [to those known by consciousnesses of the same continuum in previous lives].[216]

Śāntarakṣita thus concludes as a result of this that he has demonstrated that the two extremes of eternalism and absolute non-existence or nihilism (Tib. *chad pa*) are perfectly avoided in this text (2.3.4.4.1.3) and thus in the Mādhyamika system contrary to the accusations asserted by his critics from other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. He explains this in the following stanza from *The Ornament For The Middle Way* and his own accompanying auto-commentary.

> (#82) Therefore the views of [the two extremes of] eternalism and absolute non-existence (Tib. *chad pa*) remain far away from this text. [Entities arise,] change and decay like a seed, sprout and plant.
>
> > Ultimately there is no occasion for eternalism or absolute non-existence. Since both of those two views rely on entities, if entities exist, in what way do they exist? By relying on conventional truth, when a previous moment is gone, since another moment arises, entities must be

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[215] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folios 596-597.

[216] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p.113.

> beginningless. Since that is like the assertions of outsiders (i.e. non-Buddhists), that really must not be the case.[217]

rGyal-tshab sums up this point in an interesting and succinct manner.

> The system of Mādhyamika does not have the faults of permanence or nihilism (Tib. *rtags chad*). [There is no fault of] permanence because after the cause is negated (Tib. *ldog*), the subsequent effect is negated (Tib. *dog*)[218] and there is no fault of nihilism because fruits arise[219] from causes like sprouts arise from seeds.[220]

Śāntarakṣita defends his position additionally with a quotation from scriptures in relation to the question as to how one does not fall into the extreme of nihilism while claiming that even bodhisattva training and practices do not exist. The response is that Mādhyamikans do not fall into the extreme of nihilism due to the conventional acceptance of causes and results.

> *The Cloud of Jewels Sūtra* (Skt. *Ratnameghasūtra*, Tib. *dKon mchog sprin gyi mdo*) says, "If one says bodhisattvas are masters in Mahāyāna, then regarding the training and all the practices of bodhisattvas, training does not [ultimately] exist; the path of training does not [ultimately] exist; and those who train do not [ultimately] exist. Due to [the conventional existence of] causes, conditions and bases that does not constitute a view of [the extreme of] absolute non-existence."

Following this, Śāntarakṣita goes on to argue in the eighty-third stanza of *The Ornament For The Middle Way* that liberation from cyclic existence is actually possible (2.3.4.4.1.4). This is explained in the context of demonstrating how "liberation is easier [if

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[217] Ibid., p. 114.

[218] Geshe Ngawang Samten suggested that the commentary erroneously reversed *ldog* and *log* in this sentence. His assumption is based on the way this argument is presented in other Mādhyamika commentaries such as *dbU-ma sgong pa rab sal*, etc.

[219] The text actually has "*mi 'byung*" (do not arise) but Geshe Jigme Dawa suggested that this is probably a mistake in printing given the context. If it were not a mistake, the text would have to say that "true effects do no arise from true causes" but this does not really make sense in the context of the argument.

[220] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 597.

one understands the meaning of] this text."[221] 'Understanding the meaning of this text' means to understand the lack of inherent existence of all persons and phenomena. This argument also implies certain assumptions for Śāntarakṣita regarding the path system, specifically that Hīnayāna arhats do not obtain liberation from saṃsāra. I will first present the root text stanza then explain.

> (#83) Masters who know the selflessness of phenomena, having become accustomed to the lack of inherent existence, they abandon from the root the afflictions and obstacles which arise from perverted views.[222]

When Śāntarakṣita speaks of 'masters who know selflessness of phenomena' he speaks very specifically about Mahāyāna āryans as opposed to Hīnayāna Arhats who only know the selflessness of persons, but not phenomena according to Śāntarakṣita. It is only those Mahāyānists who abandon the afflictions and obstacles which arise from wrong views. Hīnayāna Arhats do not because they are unable to abandon the active grasping at inherent existence implied by their views and therefore they do not obtain Buddhahood. This is a serious point of contention for Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikans and Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans not to mention those holding what are pejoratively called Hiinayāna views. I refer the reader to chapter five of this study for a detailed treatment of the issues involved. Regardless of the subtle implied points made by Śāntarakṣita about lower Buddhist schools, the point here is that liberation for cyclic existence is possible. rGyal-tshab, in keeping with the three-fold framework discussed in the introduction to this study, does not criticize Śāntarakṣita on this point but only comments by way of explanation to illuminate Śāntarakṣita's point, nothing more.

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[221] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p.116.

[222] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 7b.

> Ārya Bodhisattvas, the subject, abandon afflictions which arise from the cause of grasping true [existence] without (much) effort because they are familiarized with emptiness that is already seen.[223]

According to rGyal-tshab's outline of topics, the next topic is the absurdum of positing the invalidity of afflictive emotions (Skt. *kleśas*, Tib. *nyon mongs*) (2.3.4.4.2). Offshoots of this argument can be found in Japanese Buddhism as well in the writings of the thirteenth century master Dōgen, who like Śāntarakṣita was quite critical of this understanding. In the Japanese context it was used more by corrupt monks validate laziness and an assortment of other activities by claiming that it was all Buddha nature (Skt. *tathāgatagarbha*). In the Indian context, according to Śāntarakṣita it stems from a misunderstanding of Mādhyamika and the functioning of the two truths in that system. He offers entrance into the topic by first asserting that all beings are the specific results of their own previous karma.

> The mark of persons is exactly corresponding with the agreeable and non-agreeable results which arise from the ripening of virtuous and non-virtuous karma. From that cause this type of being arises. From that result is produced the mind possessing the mode [of the corresponding karmic cause].[224]

Śāntarakṣita affirms not only afflictive emotions but also positive ones resulting from virtuous karma, so the scope is a little larger that rGyal-tshab's topical name suggests but the meaning of the point is the same; karma functions on a conventional level. rGyal-tshab separates the dealings with afflictive emotions on this topic with issues regarding the accumulations of merit which immediately follows.

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[223] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 597.

[224] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p.118.

> (#84) Since entities which are causes and results are not negated conventionally there is no confusion about what is purified and what is defiled.

rGyal-tshab is once again succinct and to the point in his commentary as he ties in the issues of karma and afflictive emotions with the whole of the cycles of saṃsāra and cyclic existence.

> The refutation the true existence of extremely afflictive emotions (Skt. *saṃkleśas*, Tib. *kun nyon*) does not cause faults of distortion nor deterioration in (the system of) saṃsāra and liberation because causes and results are accepted conventionally.[225]

Now the following yet related topic according to rGyal-tshab's outline is the absurdum of positing the invalidity of the accumulations of merit (2.3.4.4.3) and is addressed in the eighty-fifth through ninetieth stanzas of Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament For The Middle Way*. Śāntarakṣita himself begins the topic with three stanzas from his root text before beginning to explain in his auto-commentary.

> (#85) Since this teaching of causes and results is established, accumulations [of wisdom and merit] without stains is a suitable position according to this text.
>
> (#86) Pure effects arise from pure causes like the pure limbs, etc. which arise from the ethics of correct view.
>
> (#87) Likewise, impure effects arise from impure causes like sexual misconduct, etc. arises by the power of wrong views.
>
> > All effects are under the influence of causes. As a result of corresponding [with each other] pure and impure [causes], result in pure and impure [effects]. For example, ripened fruits from the karma of both good and bad deeds do come forth, even if just a little. It is said like that. From the correct view, the limbs of discipline and morality, etc. (i.e. the ten virtues) are drawn out and like that from wrong views, the limbs of desire and sexual misconduct, etc. (i.e. the ten non-virtues).[226]

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[225] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 597.

[226] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp.121-122.

The cornerstone for maintaining the validity of the accumulations of merit is the fact that Śāntarakṣita maintains the conventional validity of cause and result, of karma and its effects. Rather than the position that all entities are empty of inherent existence being a problem on this issue, it is precisely because Mādhyamikans hold that entities lack inherent existence that they are under the influence of causes and conditions. If entities had inherent existence and were thus permanent then they could not spawn causal reactions nor arise as a result of causes since they would permanently exist without causes. But because phenomena are empty and impermanent, "all effects are under the influence of causes". rGyal-tshab similarly stresses the centrality of the conventional establishment of cause and effect in this system, yet additionally ties the view of emptiness to virtuous morality.

> According to this system stainless accumulations are possible[227] because having refuted true cause and effect, they are established conventionally. The subject, the merits which rise from the intention of the (wisdom realizing) emptiness (Tib. *stong nyid kyi lta bas kun*) rise as thoroughly pure results because the cause is thoroughly pure like the morality (Skt. śīla, Tib. *tshul khrims*) which abandons taking life, etc. rises from the intention of the correct worldly view. The subject, the merits which rise from the intentions of grasping true [existence] would have the opposite predicate and reason like [for example] sexual desire arisen from the strength of the wrong view.[228]

Śāntarakṣita proceeds from here to establish the argument by explaining the logical connection between the correct view of emptiness and right moral action. The link is argued to be that if one does not correctly see all phenomena as lacking true existence then ultimately

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[227] The text erroneously says, "*mi rung*" (unsuitable) instead of, "*rung,*" (suitable). This is clearly a typographical error from the context of the argument. However Geshe Ngawang Samden suggested that if it is omitted this would not be an absudum, but rather a straight syllogism like the previous four "absurdums" which are really just syllogisms. To accord with the others this is how I have treated it, as a reasoning although rRGyal-tsap calls them absurdums. I have just put this in line with the other three "absurdums" which rRGyal-tsap presents as reasonings.

[228] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 597.

valid cognition is harmed and strong grasping becomes prevalent, thus serving as the basis for all sorts of inappropriate actions with regards to morality. Śāntarakṣita explains this in the next verse and accompanying auto-commentary.

> If someone were to ask how this is established, I will demonstrate.
>
> (#88) Seeing entities as [truly] existent is like consciousness of a mirage. Since there is harm to valid cognition, it is known as mistaken.
>
> > Since in reality it is incorrect that any entity would be of either a single or plural nature, (ultimate) existence[229] is harmed by valid cognition as has previously been explained. The characteristics of the action of knowing and the knower as well as the object itself are also harmed by valid cognition as has previously been explained. If by way of views it is said that [entities] are actually existent and there is strong grasping then because the existence of all entities and the giver, etc. are harmed by valid cognition, that is a mistake like knowing a mirage as water.[230]

Śāntarakṣita proceeds from here to explain how even virtuous activity such as the six perfections are of little benefit when executed from the basis of strongly grasping at ultimate existence. While there will be some benefit, the highest goal of attaining perfect enlightenment is certainly not possible.

> (#89) Because of that [arising from strongly grasping at ultimate existence], accomplishing the [six] perfections will be of little power like [accomplishments] arising from wrong views [which cling to] 'I' and 'mine'.
>
> > When inner and outer heretics (Skt. *tirthika*, Tib. *mu stegs*) conscientiously practice charity and morality (Skt. *śīla*, Tib. *tshul khrims*), etc. (i.e. the six perfections) as arising from self-grasping views, the limbs of unsurpassable, complete, perfect enlightenment will not be achieved. (124.4) Like a small power, those who hold [true] existence also have little

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[229] Here is another of the many examples where Śāntarakṣita does not feel compelled to qualify 'exitence' with 'ultimately' in contrast with the way Tsong-kha-pa describes the paraeters of the use of language for Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans such as Śāntarakṣita in the Special Insight chapter of *Lam rim chen mo*.

[230] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p.123.

> power because there is no distinction between that and arising from a mistaken view.[231]

rGyal-tshab reiterates this point with very little variance, but finally draws it then back to the harm done by valid cognition in the mind of one still grasping at true existence.

> With regards to the subject, the generosity which does not rise from the intention of the (wisdom realizing) emptiness, its fruits will be of little power because the cause of giving arises from a perverted view like the fruits which arise from grasping at the 'I' and 'mine'. That is so because truly established phenomena are harmed by valid cognition like grasping at a mirage as water.[232]

In contrast with the relative little worth to be found in the performance of the six perfections and other acts of virtue when they are still grounded in the erroneous view which clings to 'I' and 'mine', there is said to be enormous benefit from engaging in those activities while maintaining the correct view, that entities have no true existence.

> (#90) There is a great fruit arising from not seeing entities as [ultimately] existent because they arise from an increasing cause like a sprout [arising from] a powerful seed, etc.[233]

Śāntarakṣita clarifies his description of the correct view and supports in with sūtra quotations following this verse.

> *The Compendium of Perfect Doctrine Sūtra* (Skt. *Dharmasaṃgītisūtra*, Tib. *Chos yang dag par sdud pa'i mdo*) says, "All phenomena which are not seen as [ultimately] existent are not engaged by consciousness."

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[231] Ibid., 124.

[232] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folios 597-598.

[233] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 8a.

> Also from that [Sūtra], "Not seeing all [as ultimately existent] is seeing perfectly."[234]

Based on this correct view Śāntarakṣita comments on the root text verse.

> Because it is not correct that objects of knowledge exist, in reality objects of knowledge are not seen. Because increasing causes are not mistaken they are like the view of the selflessness of persons.
>
> Generosity and the like which arise from those [increasing causes] are able to accomplish well very extensive fruits because they are lead by causes which possess great power like sprouts which arise from fresh seeds.[235]

rGyal-tshab reiterates the point in clean syllogistic format.

> The subject, generosity which rises from the intention of the (wisdom realizing) emptiness, produces thoroughly pure effects because of arising from thoroughly pure causes of development like the rising of a sprout of a fresh corn seed.[236]

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[234] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p.125.

[235] Ibid., pp. 124-125

[236] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 598.

Yogācāra-Mādhyamika Synthesis

Having now abandoned all the stated absurdities which are commonly brought to Mādhyamikans, Śāntarakṣita proceeds into the next topic which rGyal-tshab describes as his putting forth the nature of conventional truth. In order to lead into this discussion of conventional truth which for Śāntarakṣita inevitably leads to issues of epistemology he notes by way of introduction that he has already covered the subject of self-cognizing cognition (Skt. *svasaṃvedana*, Tib. *rang rig*). He additionally notes that he brings up the topic of conventional truth because of the many questions raised in debate by adherents of lower systems.

> I have already demonstrated that self-cognizing cognition is classified as conventional truth because it cannot bear an examination of singular or plural nature. Therefore because I have already made [this argument] I will not make it again.
>
> Because all those debaters from lower [schools] wish to argue with the thesis about causal and resultant entities [asserted] by [Mādhyamikans,] I will analyze those conventional entities.[237]

Śāntarakṣita begins the discussion in the ninety-first root text verse by claiming boldly that like the Mind Only (Skt. *cittamatra*, Tib. *sems tsam pa*) school holds ultimately, that he conventionally maintains that entities and cause and result are merely the nature of consciousness. Thus like the Mind Only school he maintains self-cognizning cognition ultimately, he maintains self-cognizing cognition on the conventional level as an integral part of his epistemological standpoint. This verse is one of the pivotal verses in the entire text as it establishes his link with the Mind-Only school, elaborating to some extent on how this system understands conventional truth and key issues such as karma and its effect, specifically as being of the nature of the mind.

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[237] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p.127.

> (#91) That which is cause and result is merely consciousness only. Whatever is established by itself is consciousness.[238]

Śāntarakṣita's auto-commentary first follows this with a short discussion of how knowledge of external objects is untenable as he argued earlier in the text in relation to the Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas. If objects were separate from the consciousness then it is argued they could not be validly cognized. rGyal-tshab succinctly explains this point.

> The subject, all phenomena which are included in cause and effect are not other than the substance of consciousness because they are established by the mode of experience which knows them by direct valid cognition. There is a pervasion because if that is the reason then they must abide in the substance of the consciousness. [239]

Śāntarakṣita supports his position on the non-existence of external objects by quoting *The Laṅkāvatārasūtra* in addition to his logical argumentation, thus appealing to both reason and scriptures. After the sūtra quote he then questions the hermeneutics of the Yogācāra school who thinks this explanation is final. Śāntarakṣita corrects what he considers to be a hermeneutical error on the part of Yogācārans by noting that not only do external objects not exist, but that the mind also is empty and does not truly exist, thus turning the corner which bridges the two Mahāyāna philosophical systems into one syncretic system. Śāntarakṣita primarily uses a Mādhyamika analysis to examine lower school's views and then turns to Yogācāra for the beginning point of the soteriological ascent to the correct view before once again ultimately relying on Mādhyamika for the ultimate realization of the correct view.

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[238] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 8a

[239] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 598.

> *The Descent Into Laṅkā Sūtra* (Skt. *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, Tib. *Lang kar gshegs pa*) says, "External forms do not exist. [They only] appear external to our minds." They (Yogācārans) think this teaching is a perfect explanation.
>
> When those powerful minds with strong abiding diligence examine the mind also, for a singular or plural nature, since they do not ultimately see an essence do not assert them to exist in reality.
>
> Therefore,
>
> (#92) By relying on the Mind Only (Skt. cittamatra, Tib. sems tsam pa), know that external entities do not exist. And by relying on this system (which examines all entities as lacking any essence), know that no self at all exists even in that (mind).[240]

rGyal-tshab once again sums up the point in a succinct syllogism explaining that first one knows that all phenomena do not exist but are the mere nature of the mind and then one realizes that the mind also does not truly exist based on the Mādhyamika analysis of the 'neither one nor many' argument.

> That subject (all phenomena which are included in cause and effect) should be known conventionally merely in the nature of mind because it is void of external existence. [241] Ultimately the mere mind is not established because it ultimately does not exist as one or many.[242]

Śāntarakṣita relies heavily on the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* as a scriptural inspiration and support of his views and this is witnessed in his auto-commentary with extensive quotations from that text. For example, his auto-commentary has three quotes from the

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[240] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p.127.

[241] This differentiates SSM from YSM

[242] rGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folio 598.

Laṅkāvatārasūtra leading up to perhaps the most famous stanza of the entire root text of *The Ornament For The Middle Way.*

> The *Descent Into Laṅkā Sūtra* (Skt. *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, Tib. *Lang kar gshegs pa*) says, "By relying on the mind only, do not know them as external objects. Having actually seen them, one should also become very familiar with [them as] mind only. Having become familiar [with them as] mind only become very familiar with the lack of appearance. Yogis who abide on the lack of appearance spontaneously engage in seeing the Mahāyāna and peace is purified by the pure path of aspiration. Selfless holy wisdom will not see non-existent [external] appearances." Thus it says.
>
> [The *Descent Into Laṅkā Sūtra*] also [says], " Causes and conditions are mistaken; causes are also certainly negated; mind only is established; therefore the lack of production is definitely demonstrated. There are no external entities. There is also no mind which is actually held (Tib. *yongs su gzung*) because all wrong views are eliminated. It thus has the characteristic of non-production."
>
> This [*Descent Into Laṅkā Sūtra*] also says, "How is there no production and also no cessation? Production and cessation are only mere consciousness. The four explained elements are actually gathered in the consciousness. Knowing that, if [they are thought to be] related [with production and cessation], is that not a mistaken imputation?"
>
> (#93) Therefore due to holding the reigns of logic as one rides the two chariots [of Yogācāra and Mādhyamika], one obtains [the path of] the actual Mahāyānist.[243]

The series of *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* quotes culminates in probably the central verse of Śāntarakṣita's text *The Ornament For The Middle Way.* In this one verses we have summed up the final major development of Indian Buddhist, the synthesis of formal Buddhist logic with an integrated understanding of the two major trends in Mahāyāna, namely the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika. This is undoubtedly the most commonly quoted verse from the entire text. Śāntarakṣita elaborates a bit more after the root text verse in his auto-commentary.

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[243]Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp.131-132.

> Those who engage with the inferential logic which abides with the power of entities are summarized by the speech of the two systems [Mādhyamika and Yogācāra]. The Tathāgatas and the Mahāyānist followers understand the lack of inherent extremes of entities. Like riders of the great chariot who hold the reigns well, the so-called 'Mahāyānists who possess the meaning' obtain it in reality.[244]

Śāntarakṣita then goes on with a rather lengthy refutation of several non-Buddhist philosophical school in his auto-commentary under the topic heading rGyal-tshab describes as demonstrating the way the nature of the Mahāyāna is more glorious than others (2.3.6). These get summed up in the ninety-forth and ninety-fifth stanzas of the root text which denounces not only Vaiṣnavites and Śiavites, but also Hīnayāna Arhats. For a lengthy discussion of the implications of this verse with regards the path system see chapter five of this study.

> (#94, #95) That cause of abiding on the immeasurable, [the knowledge of dependent arising and emptiness] which has not been experienced even by the highest worldly ones (Hīnayāna Arhats), much less experienced by Vaiṣnavites or Śaivaites, that pure nectar is experienced by none other than the Tathāgata, who is motivated by the causes and conditions of great compassion.[245]

Perhaps most noteworthy here for our purposes, in addition to the proclaimed superiority of the Mahāyāna is the way in which rGyal-tshab deals with these stanzas. Despite rGyal-tshab's criticisms of the path system implications made by Śāntarakṣita that Hīnayāna Arhats do not attain release from saṃsāra, he does not voice them here since his purpose in this commentary is simply to illuminate Śāntarakṣita's views, thus reinforcing the arguments made in the introduction to this work about the proper handling of dGe-lugs commentarial literature. There is a clear separation between this sort of explanatory commentary which

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[244] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 132-133.

[245] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 8a.

aims at mirroring the views expressed by the śāstra author with those of the tenet system text genre which serve other purposes.

> The subject, the wisdom realizing the empty nectar, the actual cause of abiding in the deathless stage for as long as saṃsāra's unestimatable duration is not experienced by any non-Buddhists including Viṣnu and Śiva, etc. and not even by the crowns of worldly existence, the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas because this is directly, independently experienced only by the Tathāgatas who are the result of pure compassion.[246]

rGyal-tshab himself disagrees with the points made here regarding Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas but refrains from criticism once again to allow the purpose of this commentary be to accurately explain Śāntarakṣita's views.

rGyal-tshab's outline of topics describes the demonstration of how if one knows this system, s/he knows the cause of the generation of compassion and faith (2.3.7) as the final topic of the text being summed up in the final two stanzas. Those who have realized the meaning of this great system and understand emptiness and the way to liberation from suffering see the continuum of suffering of all sentient being very clearly according to Śāntarakṣita. It is therefore argued that they generate great compassion and the wish to work for the alleviation of all suffering, the Mahāyāna motivation.

> (#96) Therefore compassionate intelligent being who follow the system of [the Tathāgata] should generate [such great compassion] for those believing in tenets which teach mistaken [views].
>
> > By generating great compassion without mixing their minds with contrary views and having come to the supreme teaching of suchness after searching for the view, those who accept the family of the lineage of the teaching of the Sugata take on the heavy burden of beings such as the disciplined followers of mistaken teachings who subsequently have a causal relationship with a continuum of the suffereing of themselves and others for not just a few aeons. This is the great compassion which wishes to separate others from suffering. If the cause of the suffering of those [influenced by

[246] rRGyal-tshab, *dbU ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*, folios 598-599.

> wrong views] increases, then so too will the generation [of great compassion] like when one adds kindling, the blaze of a fire increases.[247]

The Mahāyāna motivation becomes so strong that Śāntarakṣita maintains that as suffering increases it is only fuel on the fire of great compassion working towards its extinction. Śāntarakṣita concludes in the final verse of the text by showing the entrance to the correct view, even for non-Buddhists is the generation of great respect for the Buddha.

> (#97) Therefore due to possessing wisdom and wealth one sees that there is no essential worth to those other systems and they generate great respect for the Protector (the Buddha).[248]

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[247] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 144-145.

[248] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 8a.

Chapter 5

Madhyamakālaṃkāra and the dGe-lugs School

Introduction

The relationship of the dGe-lugs school with Śāntarakṣita, his text *Mādhyamakālaṃkāra*, and the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika system for which his text serves as the fundamental exposition is a curious one. As has been mentioned in previous chapters, the dGe-lugs school has dealt with this text and system of thought quite extensively both in commentaries written directly on the root text which specifically comment on each verse of *The Ornament For The Middle Way*, as well as in general treatises on Mahāyāna thought, in tenet system texts, monastic text books and in oral commentaries on the aforementioned categories of texts by eminent representatives of the living tradition today. A treatment of the variance in dGe-lugs representations of Śāntarakṣita in the three categories of commentarial literature discussed in the preceding chapters is a fruitful starting point for the project. These distinct dGe-lugs presentations deal with a number of issues concerning the text and the philosophical system it represents and depending on the category of commentarial literature, it has presented specific issues in different ways. I will first briefly outline five areas of contention between the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika system and its dGe-lugs interpreters before engaging in a detailed examination of each later in this chapter.

The logical beginning point for engaging the dGe-lugs approach to Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika is by investigating their own comparative examinations of Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika hermeneutics with Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika

hermeneutics. The hermeneutical division between these two systems is particularly concerned with the process of determining definitive and interpretable canonical texts and the implications of the conclusions drawn with regards to these determinations. Emerging from the disputed grounds of correct hermeneutical stances come a series of dGe-lugs critiques of specific issues concerning the philosophical system which is based on Śāntarakṣita's primary work.

There are four primary doctrinal issues that dGe-lugs scholars contest with regards to the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika system for which Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* serves as the foundational representation. The first issue is so central to analysis of the sub-schools of Mādhyamika that the schools find themselves partially designated by their stances on this issue in Tibet, specifically the type of logic which is appropriate for holders of Mādhyamika tenets. Śāntarakṣita, like his predecessors Bhāvaviveka and Jñānagarbha felt that Mādhyamikans must both engage with opponents and assert a view and therefore must use autonomous syllogisms (Skt. *svatantra-prayoga*. Tib. *rang rgyud kyi spyor ba*) to do so. The dGe-lugs school which holds the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika as the highest Buddhist philosophical system and correct interpretation of Mādhyamika feel that to use autonomous syllogisms is inappropriate for holders of Mādhyamika tenets because by the very use of this system of logic is implied a subtle adherence to the inherent existence of the component parts of the syllogism and thus of phenomena in general. This school uses consequentialist (Skt. *prasaṅga*, Tib. *thal gyur*) arguments instead and a form of tri-modal syllogism which is not svatantric and thus does not entail the same sort of implied adherence to wrong views.

The second issue upon which dGe-lugs pa's critique the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika is on a very subtle point pertaining to the path system literature and specifically the descriptions of obstacles abandoned on the path. Grasping at objects as inherently existent according to Tsong-kha-pa's description of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-

Mādhyamikan's view[249] is a knowledge obstacle (Skt. *jñeyāvarana*, Tib. *shes sgrib*) and therefore the among the last category of obstacles which need to be removed on the ascent to perfect Buddhahood. But the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans are incorrect according to Tsong-kha-pa and this category of grasping at inherent existence should be categorized as an afflictive obstacle (Skt. *kleśāvaraṇa*, Tib. *nyon sgrib*). The implication of this is that if Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans consider the grasping at inherent existence as the final obstacle before the attainment of Buddhahood then they must cease all efforts at that point and therefore never remove the actual more subtle knowledge obstacle which dGe-lugs-pas describe as necessary to be abandoned for the attainment of Buddhahood. Thus someone holding Svātantrika-Mādhyamika views will not attain perfect Buddhahood until they adopt the Prasaṅgika perspective according to Tsong-kha-pa.

The third major subject of doctrinal dispute between dGe-lugs pas and Śāntarakṣita's system concerns issues regarding the nature of conventional truth. These issues pertain to the ontological status of conventional truth, the soteriological role of conventionality and the proper language with which to designate conventional truth. Like the systems of logic, the issues concerning conventional truth are so central that the two sub-schools have been partially designated in Tibet by way of these views. The subject of conventional truth additionally is at the heart of the methodological issues concerning the politics of representation which is a theme throughout this study since dGe-lug authors represent Śāntarakṣita's views on this topic in different ways in different contexts. In direct commentaries they aim to echo the intentions of the Śāntarakṣita. In tenet system and related Mahāyāna treatises views are streamlined and assertions are attributed to Śāntarakṣita which he does not explicitly state. In oral commentary there is a melding of the two where

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[249] Tsong-khapa, *Byang-chub Lam Rim Chen-mo*, (Samath: Gelugpa Student Welfare Comittee, 1993), pp.766-767.

Śāntarakṣita's actual words are acknowledged, but there is a tendency to attempt to frame the views within the tenet text framework of analysis.

The fourth and final doctrinal subject of contention between these two sub-schools of Mādhyamika and a basis of Tsong-kha-pa's critique is on the issue of self-cognizing cognition (Skt. *svasaṃvedana*, Tib. *rang rig*). The difference on this issue on a simplistic level is quite straightforward. Like Yogācārans, Śāntarakṣita maintains that persons have self-cognizing cognition and that it is a defining characteristic of consciousness. dGe-lugs pas disagree and site specific logical fallacies with the holding the position that consciousness is self-cognizing. These include the fallacy of infinite regress, that if self-cognizing cognition were the case that that consciousness would be self-conscious and that new consciousness would be self conscious, etc. This chapter will investigate this issue and each of these five major contested issues is detail.

dGe-lugs Hermeneutics and Śāntarakṣita

> In all the Buddhist traditions, faith is but a way to wisdom, doctrines but prescriptions for practices, and thus Scripture has less authority than reason. It should not be surprising therefore that hermeneutics, the science of interpretation of sacred doctrine (Skt. *saddharma*), should be central in the methodology of enlightenment, the unvarying goal, though variously defined, of all the Buddhist traditions. [250]

The question of how to deal with the vast body of texts which comprise the Buddhist canon has been a daunting one, particularly given that the Buddha is purported in the Sūtras to have taught in distinct ways, with differing degrees of subtlety, at different times, for different purposes, and for the propensities of different disciples. Every Buddhist tradition to emerge after the first several centuries of the common era when the Sanskrit Mahāyāna canon which contained several distinct understandings of Buddhist 'truth' was prevalent had to develop an interpretive framework for understanding these variances. Perhaps the clearest and most succinct exposition of the dGe-lugs pa hermeneutical position comes in the early parts of the "Superior Insight" (Tib. *lHag mthong*, Skt.*vippassana*) chapter of Tsong-kha-pa's *Great (Exposition on the) Stages of the Path to Enlightenment* (Tib. *Lam-rim Chen-mo*), though these issues are also discussed in his treatise *The Essence of Eloquence* (Tib. *Legs bshad snying po*). Tsong-kha-pa is concerned here with demonstrating the process for determining among the vast canon of Buddhist sūtras, which are interpretable (Skt. *neyārtha*, Tib. *drang don*) and which are definitive (Skt. *nītārtha*, Tib. *nges don*) from the perspective of what he considers to be the correct final philosophical view, the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika. Therefore in setting up the criterion by which one may correctly distinguish canonical texts of definitive meaning from those of interpretable

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[250] Robert A.F. Thurman, "Buddhist Hermeneutics," in *The Journal of The American Academy of Religion*, (XLVI/1, 1978), p. 20.

meaning he does so by contrasting his approach to the approach taken by the other divisions of Mādhyamika.

Knowing which texts are interpretable and which are definitive is an indispensable prerequisite for obtaining the correct view according to Tsong-kha-pa. By way of introduction to his discussion of the topic Tsong-kha-pa presents the dilemma and offers a simple solution, but one that requires one to already know ultimate truth to some degree.

> Those who wish to realize suchness must rely on the Conqueror's scriptures. However, due to the various thoughts of trainees, the scriptures vary. Hence you might wonder in dependence on what sort [of scripture] you should seek the meaning of the profound. Suchness should be realized through reliance upon scriptures of definitive meaning.
>
> Should you wonder, "What sort [of scripture] is of definitive meaning and what sort requires interpretation?", this is posited by way of the subjects discussed. Those teaching the ultimate are held to be scriptures of definitive meaning and those teaching conventionalities are held to be scriptures whose meaning requires interpretation.[251]

In addition some sūtras teach both conventional and ultimate truth but their principle purpose is to illuminate the meaning of the ultimate and are thus considered as definitive scriptures (Tib. *nges don gsung rab*). Tsong-kha-pa also describes certain commentarial literature such as that of Nāgārjuna's which was prophesied in several sūtras and tantras as being non-erroneous or definitive as well. He proceeds to argue that since all the great Mādhyamika commentators including Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, Chandrakīrti, and Śāntarakṣita consider the works of Nāgārjuna's disciple Āryadeva as non-erroneous commentaries on *The Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras*, that he too considers the works of Āryadeva as definitive. The point is that definitive scriptures require no further interpretation because there is no further

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[251] Tsong-kha-pa, *Byang chub lam rim chen mo*,trans. by Elizabeth Napper, in *Dependent Arising and Emptiness*. (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1989). p. 159. For the original Tibetan see Tsong-khapa, *Byang-chub Lam Rim Chen-mo*. (Gelugpa Student Welfare Comittee, Sarnath: 1993), p. 568-569.

meaning beyond them to find. A definitive text is so called not so much because it is to be taken literally as because the meaning it aims to convey is definitive.

Interpretable scriptures (Tib. *drangs don gsung rab*) are therefore those which require interpretation of the meaning, those for which there is a higher meaning beyond them, those for which the subject is conventional truth or those for which the subject is the presentation of one of the lower Buddhist views. In the Superior Insight chapter, Tsong-kha-pa quotes Kamalaśīla from his treatise *Illumination of the Middles Way* (Skt. *Madhyamakāloka*, Tib. *dbU ma snang ba*) in order to support of his own position.

> Therefore, it should be understood that, "Only those which discuss the ultimate are of definitive meaning and the opposite are of interpretable meaning."[252]

Despite this statement of apparent concurrence with Tsong-kha-pa's views, dGe-lugs treatments of both divisions of Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans consider them as diverging on the issue of interpretable verses definitive scriptures from the dGe-lugs' own Prāsangika-Mādhyamika system. The primary discrepancy regards texts which discuss ultimate meaning but whose exposition requires interpretation because they are not valid just as they are expressed (Tib. *tshad ma ma byed pa*). For example *The Heart Sūtra* is considered as a definitive text for dGe-lugs-pas but according to them it is not considered definitive for Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas because there are so many instances of negation without qualification. Stating that there is no form, no feeling, etc. without qualifying these statements with terms such as 'ultimately existing' or 'truly existing' requires further interpretation. The problem arises over linguistic discrepancies on how to describe conventional truth, a topic which will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter under

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[252] Tsong-kha-pa, *Byang chub lam rim chen mo*, Trans.by Elizabeth Napper, in *Dependent Arising and Emptiness*. (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1989). p. 161. For the original Tibetan see Tsong-kha-pa, *Byang-chub Lam Rim Chen-mo*. (Gelugpa Student Welfare Comittee, Sarnath: 1993), p. 569.

the heading of the two truths. Suffice it to say for now that dGe-lugs-pas claim that Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans demand qualification because they accept that one can say entities 'inherently exist' (Tib. *rang bzin kyi grub*) conventionally and do 'exist by way of their own characteristics' (Tib. *rang gi tsan nyid kyi grub*). Therefore according to the dGe-lugs-pa presentation of Svātantrika hermeneutics, texts must qualify statements about the status of entities or else the text must be considered as interpretable or requiring interpretation. It is not clear if this is presented in this way by dGe-lugs-pas to illuminate points about conventional truth, to further clarify their own hermeneutical stance, or that perhaps this presentation reflects the position of Bhāvaviveka and it has been generalized to be considered as the position of all Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans. But it is clear that Śāntarakṣita does not follow this argument either in his use of language to describe ultimate truth in his own texts or that he feels compelled himself to qualify terms such as 'not existent' with 'ultimately' or 'truly' in his own writings. There are numerous instances which confirm that he does not feel the need to always qualify 'non-existence' with 'truly' or 'ultimately'. And while Kamalaśīla discusses issues concerning interpretable and definitive scriptures, Śāntarakṣita does not. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are commonly grouped together under the common heading of Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, but it is not clear that their positions are identical or that they historically ought to be treated as representatives of identical positions. In the Superior Insight chapter of *The Great [Exposition On] The Stages of the Path to Enlightenment,* a text which belongs to the second category of the tri-fold division of dGe-lugs philosophical texts, Tsong-kha-pa's aim is not to give a historical, narrative account of the views of all Indian Buddhist pandits. Rather, he presents streamlined accounts of general systems of thought which are most likely amalgamations of several author's views, against which he can contrast and draw forth his own views.

Autonomous Syllogisms (Svantantra-prayoga) and Consequences (Prasaṅga)

One of the most serious points of departure for Śāntarakṣita and his dGe-lugs-pa critics centers on the implications of methodological concerns about which form of logic is appropriate for use among holders of Mādhyamika tenets. This is a major topic of study in the dGe-lugs-pa curriculum on Mādhyamika and Śāntarakṣita devotes a significant section of his text, *The Auto-Commentary on The Ornament For The Middle Way* to it as well. Śāntarakṣita, like several of his Mādhyamika predecessors such as Bhāvaviveka and his own teacher Jñānagarbha, thought that autonomous syllogisms (Skt. *Svantantra-prayoga*, Tib. *rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba*) were a necessary component of the philosophical activities of a Mādhyamikan in the work of arguing with opponents for the purpose of demonstrating the correct view to them and for logically establishing emptiness. dGe-lugs-pas such as Tsong-kha-pa who follow the critique leveled against the use of tri-modal autonomous syllogisms[253] as it was first outlined by Chandrakīrti consider that by the very use of such syllogisms, there is an implied attachment to subtle or not so subtle degrees of inherent existence and are thus their use is incompatible with Mādhyamika tenets.

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[253] The tri-modal autonymous syllogism was formalized by the great Buddhist logicians Dignaga and Dharmakirti but was in use before their time. The basic structure of the syllogism has three parts: a subject, a predicate and a reason. There is also an optional example given at the end. The most common example of such a syllogism given in introductory text books on logic is, 'Sound, the subject, is impermanent because it is a product (i.e. produced thing), like a pot. The subject, 'sound' is the basis about which something is to be prooved. The predicate, that it 'is impermanent' is that which is to be prooved. And the reason, 'because it is a product' is the justification of the predicate. For such an autonymous syllogism to be valid it must pass three modes of criterion. The first is that the subject has the propert of the reason. In this example the first criterion is satisfied if all sounds actually are products. The second modal criterion is what is known as forward pervasion. Here is the first of a two part examination of the relationship between the predicate and the reason. This criterion is satisfied in the given example if all things impermanent are produced. The final criterion is the counter pervasion and this is satisfied in the given example if there are no products which are not impermanent. So one can see how this tri-modal criterion creates an air-tight form of logical syllogism.

Śāntarakṣita begins his discussion of the proper use of logic in the seventy-fifth stanza of his root text when he writes that, "Those [who realize emptiness are] those who know it inferentially with the logical proofs which make [the lack of real existence] known and that cut unreal assertions..."[254] Proper use of autonomous syllogisms is thus an integral part of the acquisition of the correct view regarding the status of entities. Without such logical forms there can be no valid logical inference for establishing emptiness of all entities and disproving the mistaken assertions of opponents.

Śāntarakṣita does not name Chandrakīrti or a school named Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika, but it is clear by his arguments that he is aware of Mādhyamikans who maintain such a perspective and he addresses them specifically. I will first provide some background on the Prasaṅgika critique of the use of autonomous syllogisms to set the stage for Śāntarakṣita's critique of not using autonomous syllogisms. The root of the Prāsaṅgikas' critique is that proponents of autonomous syllogisms such as Bhāvaviveka and Śāntarakṣita maintain that there needs to be a compatibly established subject between both parties engaging in the debate in this form of logical argument. When a Vaibhāṣhika refers to a subject such as a book they refer to something altogether different from what a Prasaṅgika refers to when they say book, so there is no establishment of a common subject on which to base the argument. Proponents of the use of autonomous syllogisms would assert according to their Prasaṅgika dGe-lugs critics that there is non-erroneous valid cognition (Skt. *pramāna*, Tib. *tshad ma*) which establishes a common subject for both parties involved in the argument regardless of the particular tenets they maintain upon entrance into the argument. dGe-lugs-pas would disagree saying that the valid cognition could only be non-erroneous if in fact its object was established by way of its own characteristics, an ontological impossibility according to dGe-lug-pas and according to a correct understanding of Mādhyamika they would maintain. Thus

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[254] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 7a.

to accept a common subject on the basis of non-erroneous valid cognition is to accept that entities exist by way of their characteristics and are thus not empty of inherent existence. Therefore to make use of such a form of syllogistic reasoning is to accept inherent existence on some level which according to dGe-lugs-pas is incompatible with Mādhyamika tenets.

Śāntarakṣita counters this position put forth by both Chandrakīrti and his later dGe-lugs-pa interpreters. He argues that one *must* utilize such validly established arguments precisely to establish the emptiness of inherent existence which is the singularly most important Mādhyamika tenet. He writes.

> If no reason is asserted which establishes all phenomena as lacking inherent existence, then at that time since there is no reason established for the lack of [inherent] existence, the meaning of your assertions is not established.[255]

He directly addresses here those Mādhyamikans who follow the line of argumentations presented by scholars such as Chandrakīrti though there was no nominally designated Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika school in India at the time. Śāntarakṣita follows this statement with what he feels would be their critique of his use of autonomous syllogisms:

> If [a reason] is asserted [which establishes all phenomena as lacking inherent existence], then there is an [inherently] existent reason. If that is the case then the meaning of your assertions would not be established since the lack of inherent existence of all phenomena would not be established [since you must admit that the reason is inherently existent].[256]

The critique leveled by actual, not hypothetical, Prāsaṅgikas such as Chandrakīrti and the later dGe-lugs school in Tibet once again center this argument on the basis that Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans argue that subjects and reasons can be established on the basis of non-

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[255] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, p. 108.

[256] Ibid.

erroneous valid cognition as described above. Śāntarakṣita sees one of the keys to establishing a common subject is properly dealing with the argument that different people engage objects differently based on the tenets they hold. His attempt at establishing a common subject is based on three primary criterion: that they are known by all, that they are not generated by tenets, and that the sounds of the words used in the syllogism refer to objects which possess 'the taste of appearances' they intend to represent and which therefore can serve as objects of a syllogism which is verifiable by use of the three criterion (Tib. *tshul gsum*) of a valid syllogism. Śāntarakṣita explains this in the following verse from his root text and his own commentary on it.

> (#78) Because we have not rejected entities with regards to their possessing the taste (Skt. *rasa*, Tib. *ngang*) of appearances, we are unshaken with regard to the establishment of the subject and the thesis.
>
> > Inferential valid cognition and designational objects to be inferred must be given up completely [since they depend on] different subjects generated by incompatible tenets [according to you Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikans].
> >
> > [However,] consciousness of ears, nose, etc. of everyone from masters to women to children [are a referent] for engaging [in autonomous syllogisms] by relying on subjects which are the sound of the three criterion (Tib. *phyogs sgra la sogs pa*) which possess the taste of appearances.[257]

Though he does not explicitly say that he accepts objects are established by non-erroneous valid cognition, I do not think it is a stretch on the part of his Prasaṅgika critics to claim that he must, due to the implications of his statement that he does 'not reject entities with regards to their possessing the taste (Skt. *rasa*, Tib. *ngang*) of appearances.' Śāntarakṣita's acceptance of that seems to imply a tacit acceptance that entities do exist by way of their own characteristics (Tib. *rang gi tshan nyid kyi grub*) as dGe-lugs authors and tenet-system text writers maintain despite the fact that Śāntarakṣita never uses that precise language. While the

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[257] Ibid.

centrality placed on the use of specific language in tenet system texts may be overdone considering Śāntarakṣita does not use that specific language, the meaning of the argument corresponds with his views.

Śāntarakṣita goes on to emphasize the importance of using logical inference to show how if we cannot establish common subjects on the basis which he describes, that all logical reasoning which we can clearly know as valid must be discarded. One example he gives of such a syllogism is the common argument demonstrating how one can logically infer fire from the existence of smoke. He proceeds then to reassert the importance of his project of logical inference, given that it is approached in the appropriate manner. Śāntarakṣita goes on to offer a pointed criticism of his Prasaṅgika critics, finally labeling them as nihilists who threaten the Holy Dharma.

> As long as we do not rely on polluted grasping, designations will be thoroughly established. If one becomes a master in designations, they will not be obscured in their understanding of the meaning of the *śāstras*.[258]
>
> The view of those subjugators who have animosity toward the system of those postulating meaningful [arguments], the view that all phenomena lack any inherent existence is like the view of complete non-existence from the crown to the body.
>
> According to that view causes and conditions which exist will be held as non-existent. By that wrong view, the virtuous side will be uprooted, the golden crop of the Holy Dharma will be like flowers in the sky and those who wish well (with the correct view) will be abandoned far away.[259]

Clearly this was an issue of serious contention for Śāntarakṣita and one about which he was significantly concerned. While we do not have evidence for nominally designated distinct Mādhyamika schools at this time and Śāntarakakṣita does not name his opponent either, he

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[258] Śāntarakṣita here refers to the conceptual doctrinal categories employed to generate an inferential understanding of Buddhist views as represented in the Śāstras.

[259] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 110-111.

was clearly well aware of a very specific view rejecting the use of autonomous syllogisms for Mādhyamikans and felt the need to exhaustively address this view in both his root text and auto-commentary. But even after this rebuttal, Śāntarakṣita's view is not without criticism by his later dGe-lugs counterparts.

When Śāntarakṣita says, 'as long as we do not rely on polluted grasping...' his Prasaṅgika critics would maintain that as long as he is using autonomous syllogisms he is relying on 'polluted grasping'. Tsong-kha-pa's disciple mKhas-grub explains that there is a difference between the tri-modal type of argument used by Mādhyamikans such as Śāntarakṣita and Bhāvaviveka and the type of tri-modal syllogistic argument that may be used by Prāsaṅgikas. While the *svatantra* form of tri-modal syllogism which Bhāvaviveka and Śāntarakṣita, etc. employ requires one to establish a common subject between the proponent and the opponent in the argument, a criterion which Prāsaṅgikas consider impossible for correct holders of Mādhyamika tenets, there is a form of tri-modal syllogism, in addition to the use of consequentialist arguments (Skt. *prasaṅga*, Tib. *thal gyur*) which they find acceptable. The structure of this form of tri-modal syllogism accepted by such Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikans is essentially the same yet is not a *svatantra* due to one significant difference. There is not considered to be a need to find a common subject among the proponent and opponent in this form of syllogism. Jose Cabezon quotes his own translation of mKhas-grub's *sTong thun chen mo* is his discussion of this form of reasoning accepted by Prāsaṅgikas.

> ...a syllogistic reason in which the subject, though not perceived by *pramāna* in a way that is compatible to both the proponent and the opponent, is nonetheless perceived by a *pramāna* in the system of the proponent and by a *pramāna* in the system of the opponent and is posited (by the opponent) while "feigning the

> acceptance" (*'khris nas*) of what the opponent believes in his/her system as regards the perception of the subject by a *pramāna*.[260]

Thus dGe-lugs pas such as mKhas-grub argue that one can use a syllogistic form of reasoning of basic tri-modal structure which is not a *svatantra* and thus does not require a commonly known subject, but merely a subject know by the valid cognition of the proponent according to his/her views and by the opponent according to his/her views. The Prasaṅgika proponent in this type of reasoning merely feigns the acceptance of the subject which his/her opponent accepts on the basis of valid cognition, while understanding that actually that subject does not exist in such a way as is presumed by the opponent.[261] But the structure and tri-modal criterion of the syllogism can still be employed. Cabezon notes that it is still yet to be conclusively determined if this is a dGe-lugs-pa innovation or if this follows the precedent of Indian Prāsaṅgikas to which dGe-lugs-pas claim heir. In either case, for our study of Śāntarakṣita's views in both contexts the questions raised over issues of logic have far reaching implications and we will investigate some of these even further in the later sections of this chapter of the study.

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[260] mKhas-grub, *sTong thun chen mo*. Toh 5459. Trans. by Jose Cabezon in "The Prasaṅgikas' View on Logic: Tibetan dGe-lugs pa exegesis on the Question of Svatantras" in *The Journal of Indian Philosophy* Vol. 16, 1988, p.221.

[261] Jose Cabezon. "The Prasaṅgikas' View on Logic: Tibetan dGe-lugs pa exegesis on the Question of Svatantras" in *The Journal of Indian Philosophy* (Vol. 16, 1988).

Path System Discrepancies and Their Implications

The Mahāyāna path system, the map-like descriptions of the states of consciousness and their obstacles to perfect enlightenment of adherents on all stages of the Buddhist path from utter ignorance to complete Buddhahood finds its foundational exposition in *The Ornament For Clear Realization* (Skt. *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, Tib. *mNgon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi mdo*). While Śāntarakṣita did not himself write a commentary on this text he has made some important statements with implications for path system literature and as such for the soteriological purpose of attaining Buddhahood in dependence on his views. Additionally two of his primary disciples wrote commentaries and treatises on the Mahāyāna path system which are among the most widely studied by all schools of Tibetan Buddhism on the subject. These are Kamalaśīla's three volume work on the path system entitled *The Stages of Meditation* (Skt. *Bhāvanākrama*, Tib. *sGom pa'i rim pa*) and Haribhadra's two commentaries on *The Ornament For Clear Realization* as well. It is generally agreed upon even by the dGe-lugs school[262] that *The Ornament For Clear Realization* was composed from the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika perspective. On most counts, this is not problematic for dGe-lugs-pas but there is one very critical issue on which Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikans disagree with Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans with regard to the path system and specifically how certain obstructions are classified and when they are abandoned, the implications of which cannot be overestimated.

There are two different types of obstacles as described in the Mahāyāna path system literature: afflictive obstructions (Skt. *kleśāvarana*, Tib. *nyon mong pa'i sgrib pa*) which are obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence and knowledge obstructions (Skt. *jñeyāvarana*, Tib. *shes bya'i sgrib pa*) which obstruct omniscience or complete Buddhahood.

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[262] mKhas-grub has argued that *The Ornament of Clear Realization Sutra* was written from a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika perspective, but his view is an exception to the mainstream dGe-lugs position on the subject.

The particular point of contention regards how the obstruction of *grasping* at objects as inherently existent is understood and categorized. As one proceeds along the path afflictive obstructions are removed first and then knowledge obstructions are removed. Both sub-schools of Svātantrika-Mādhyamika claim that grasping at inherent existence in objects is a knowledge obstruction whereas Prāsṅgika-Mādhyamikans such as the dGe-lugs-pas consider such grasping at inherent existence in objects as a mere afflictive obstruction which prevents liberation from saṃsāra. Thus those who remove the grasping attain Buddhahood according to Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans since it is among the very last obstructions removed. It is for this reason that they say that Hīnayāna Arhats such as Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas do not have a realization of emptiness and thus do not attain Buddhahood. We find corroberation of this dGe-lugs presentation of Svātantrika-Mādhyamika views in Śāntarakṣita's statement in *The Ornament For The Middle Way,* despite his limited treatment of path system issues in that text. Nonetheless, as a part of a rejection of the notion of certain non-Buddhists attaining liberation he makes the following comments about Hīnayāna Arhats as well.

> (#94, #95) That cause of abiding on the immeasurable, [the knowledge of dependent arising and emptiness] which has not been experienced even by the highest worldly ones (Hīnayāna Arhats), much less experienced by Vaiṣnavites or Śaivaites, that pure nectar is experienced by none other than the Tathāgata, who is motivated by the causes and conditions of great compassion.[263]

This point is further emphasized when commenting on these root text verses in his auto-commentary:

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[263] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folios 8a-8b.

> Likewise, having first realized selflessness if [Buddhahood is not attained] even by the pure Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas then how could there be a ground for those with a strong view of self like the great gods Bramha and Viṣnu.[264]

Additionally, he makes related comments in the eighty-third verse of his root text which seem to corroberate the dGe-lugs representation of his position as a Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhymikan. 'Masters who know selflessness of phenomena' which refers to Mahāyāna Arhats are clearly contrasted with those Hīnayāna Arhats who have not become fully accustomed to the lack of inherent existence of phenomena, but only to the selflessness of persons, thus implying that they have not removed all afflictive obstacles arising from wrong views and therefore are still bound to cyclic existence.

> (#83) Masters who know the selflessness of phenomena, having become accustomed to the lack of inherent existence, they abandon from the root the afflictions and obstacles which arise from perverted views.[265]

While the context is different the meaning comes across that Hīnayāna Arhats do not realize emptiness and because they do not abandon grasping at inherent existence, a knowledge obscuration that thereby prevents them from 'abiding in the immeasurable,' that nectar experienced only by the Tathāgata. dGe-lugs-pas on the other hand, as represented by the exposition on the topic by Tsong-kha-pa in the Superior Insight chapter of his *Great Exposition on The Stages of the Path To Enlightenment* claim to follow Chandrakīrti and describe such grasping as an afflictive obstruction rather than a knowledge obstruction.

> Other Mādhyamikans assert grasping at the self of phenomena (*chos kyi badge 'dzin*) [as knowledge obstacles], [whereas] this master [Chandrakīrti] asserts them to be afflicted ignorance (*nyon mongs can gyi ma rig pa*)[266]

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[264] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 143-144.

[265] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folios 8a-8b

Thus they would claim contrary to Śāntararkṣita, that Hīnayāna Arhats do realize emptiness and can obtain liberation from cyclic existence since they do remove this grasping at inherent existence, though like eighth ground bodhisattvas, they still have the subtle appearance of inherent existence upon rising from meditation which is a knowledge obstacle preventing the attainment of perfect Buddhahood. One of the primary differences between the Hīnayāna Arhat and the eigth ground bodhisattva is bodhicitta, the altruistic aspiration to attain Buddhahood for the benefit of others and the vast amounts of merit that ensue from that motivation. According to the Prāsangika Mahāyānist, with wisdom one can attain liberation from cyclic existence but only with wisdom and bodhicitta can one attain Buddhahood.

More important however than the discrepancy about the achievements of Hīnayānists is the delineation dGe-lugs-pas make about a practitioner's degree of attachment to inherent existence. Tsong-kha-pa[267] differentiates between the grasping at inherent existence, an afflictive obstruction removed even by Hīnayānists, and the subtle seeing of inherent existence without grasping at it, that is experienced by such advanced Mahāyānists as bodhisattvas on the eighth ground upon rising from meditation. Though these bodhisattvas understand the lack of inherent existence and do not grasp at it, still due to subtle predispositions which are obstructions to knowledge yet to be abandoned, they see phenomena appearing as real. Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans such as Śāntarakṣita do not make this subtle distinction because they are not aware of it according to Tsong-kha-pa. They feel the goal is accomplished after having abandoned the grasping at inherent existence according to dGe-lugs-pas and thus they do not abandon the subtle knowledge obstructions necessary

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[266] Tsong-kha-pa, *Byang-chub Lam Rim Chen-mo.* (Gelugpa Student Welfare Comittee, Sarnath: 1993), p.766.

[267] This subject is also treated extensively by mKhas-grub in his *sTong thun chen mo.* See Jose Cabezon's translation of the said section of mKhas-grub's text in Cabezon (1992) pp. 201-256.

for the attainment of perfect Buddhahood.[268] Therefore it is necessary to adopt the view of the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika in order to obtain perfect Buddhahood because the system of Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans such as Śāntarakṣita will not lead the practitioner to perfect enlightenment, but will leave them with subtle stains which are obstructions to the perfect omniscience of the Buddha according to Tsong-kha-pa and his dGe-lugs followers.

This assessment of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika as insufficient for the attainment of perfect Buddhahood is a pointed blow to Śāntarakṣita and his followers. Since more than six hundred years had passed since his death and three hundred years since the school had fallen from prominence in Tibet, it is difficult to discern how holder's of Śāntarakṣita's views might respond to such criticism. Much like their criticism on issues of proper forms of logic to be utilized, dGe-lugs-pas level some very serious critiques of Śāntarakṣita which describe subtle yet a very present adherence to inherent existence implied by his presentation of Mādhyamika. Tsong-kha-pa demonstrates an incredible ability to assess broad-based doctrinally systematic claims by his opponents and identify extremely subtle points, either stated or implied, which have enormous import to the greater goal of attainment of Buddhahood. By means of this genius it is felt by the dGe-lugs-pa school, Tsong-kha-pa has not only decisively determined the correct philosophical understanding for attainment of that final goal, but outlined a manner of studying the lower schools as a proper precursor on the ascent to that correct view. This all became more formally systematized in the tenet system literature which emerged later in dGe-lugs-pa evolution.

Śāntarakṣita does not specifically discuss many of these particularities for which he is criticized by Tsong-kha-pa including specifically that he makes no direct statements about knowledge obstructions or afflictive obstructions. Nevertheless, many of the claims are directly implied. Tsong-kha-pa probably inferred that Śāntarakṣita's views about the path

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[268] Tsong-kha-pa, *Byang-chub Lam Rim Chen-mo.* (Gelugpa Student Welfare Comittee, Sarnath: 1993), p.766-768.

system were like those of his disciple's Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra who were also famous holders of Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika views. And though he makes very few claims himself in *The Ornament For The Middle Way* those relevant claims he does make seem to corroberate this assumption. Thus given such a stinging criticism it is unfortunate that neither Śāntarakṣita nor any of his close disciple ever heard such critiques so as to be able to defend their position.

The Two Truths

The positions of the two divisions of Svātantrika-Mādhyamika on the two truths, conventional truth (Skt. *saṃvṛtisatya*, Tib. *kun rdzob bden pa*) and ultimate truth (Skt. *paramārthasatya*, Tib. *don dam bden pa*) are so central to their views, as mentioned above, that the schools have been differentiated nominally in Tibetan analysis by way of their positions on conventional truth. While the two schools maintain almost identical positions on ultimate truth and issues concerning logic, their divergent stances on the status of conventional truth are more significant and correspond to the lower Buddhist views from which their names derive. Thus because Bhāvaviveka's position on conventional truth and his acceptance of external entities most closely corresponds with the Sautrāntika school, the school of thought he was posthumously credited with founding is designated as Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika in Tibet. Śāntarakṣita on the other hand, whose positions on conventional truth corresponds more closely with the Yogācāra school is considered as the primary exponent of Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. In this section we will examine how Śāntarakṣita presents his own views on conventional truth in his text *The Ornament For The Middle Way* and its auto-commentary and contrast this with the way his views have been represented in various dGe-lugs representations. In the contrastive analysis I hope to draw out some insights not only into Śāntarakṣita's views and the dGe-lugs criticisms of thembut also into issues concerning the dGe-lugs investigations and presentations of Indian philosophical tenets.

This study will begin by examining other Mādhyamika views on conventional and ultimate truth in dGe-lugs analysis in order to set up a framework for penetrating key issues. With that as a backdrop we will proceed to analyze Śāntarakṣita's representation of his own views and look contrastively at how their views are represented in dGe-lugs analysis.

Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikans such as Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa hold an ultimate truth to be an entity's emptiness or lack of inherent existence. Most Mādhyamika descriptions of conventional truth are ontological in their perspectives, particularly when viewed within the framework of dGe-lugs tenet system texts. The definition of a conventional truth for Prāsaṅgikas is, "an object found by valid cognition that distinguishes a conventionality (that is, any existent except an emptiness)."[269] Conventional truth, being called 'truth' as such is in fact a misnomer for Chandrakīrti (and Tsong-kha-pa) because a conventional truth (any entity which is not an emptiness) is a falsity. It is true only for an unenlightened consciousness, one for whom the true way in which things exist is concealed, veiled or covered. Concealer truths are not real like they appear but only true to the face of ignorance. It relates to the common way of perceiving objects as truly existent, or existent by way of their own characteristics. For Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamikans such as Tsong-kha-pa the following terms are therefore synonymous in their referent meaning: *rang bzhin gyis grub* or 'inherently existent', *rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub,* 'existent by way of their own characteristics', *den par grub,* 'truly existent', and *don dam par grub,* 'ultimately existent'. And according to Tsong-kha-pa's Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika no objects exist or are true in any of those four ways or descriptions either ultimately or conventionally.

Bhāviviveka, the primary exponent of Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika (hereafter Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika) according to dGe-lugs-pas, would disagree with this. They would assert that the four terms are not synonymous in their referent meaning. For Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikans it would be correct to explain that entities do not 'truly exist' (Tib. *den par grub*) or 'ultimately exist' (Tib. *don dam par grub*), but according to Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikans entities do conventionally 'exist by way of their own characteristics' (Tib. *rang gi mthsan nyid kyis grub*) and do 'inherently exist' (Tib. *rang*

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[269] Sopa and Hopkins (1989), p. 305.

bzhin gyis grub) conventionally as the system is presented in dGe-lugs tenet system texts. If this were not the case according to Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikans, karma would have no causal efficacy. This can also be verified by the fact that when entities are searched for, they are found. Conventional entities are asserted to externally exist in much the same way as is put forth by the Sautrāntika school asserts and thus the name of that school is incorporated into the name of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school as it is designated in Tibet. Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikans argues that conventionally, there is some nature (Tib. *rang bzhin*) on the side of entities which causes an ignorant consciousness to impute its label and that they do exist by way of those characteristics which appear to that consciousness. Chandrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa counter that if one holds that entities inherently exist or exist by way of their own characteristic, even conventionally, then by way of that view they are still clinging subtly to inherent existence which of course keeps one bound to saṃsāra and has numerous implications on the Buddhist path.

Thus far this has been discussed as a necessary background for the points to be made concerning the dGe-lugs pa presentation of Śāntarakṣita's views according to his *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*. When dGe-lugs pas examine the varying school's positions on the topic of conventional truth in fundamental treatments of Mādhyamika such as the "Superior Insight" chapter of Tsong-kha-pa's *Lam-rim Chen-mo* as well as in tenet system texts such as dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po's *Precious Garland of Tenets*, lCang-sgyas's *Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets*, 'Jam-dbyang-bzhad-pa's *Great Exposition of Tenets*, a curious move by dGe-lugs pas occurs. There is a tendency to lump the positions concerning conventional truth of the two subdivisions of Svātantrika-Mādhyamika into one harmonious position. The distinction between the two sub-divisions of Svātantrika-Mādhyamika are then delineated by their adherence or lack thereof to the doctrine of self-cognizing cognition (Skt. *svasaṃvedana*, Tib. *rang rig*) and related epistemological issues but not to their positions on conventional truth which are presented as being in congruence with

one another. lCang-sgya's tenet system text (Skt. *siddhānta*, Tib. *grub mtha*), *Clear Exposition of the Presentation of Tenets*, which is one of the two or three most commonly studied tenet system texts in the dGe-lugs tradition, makes this point which is common to dGe-lugs presentations of Śāntarakṣita's view. It may be worth noting that throughout the dGe-lugs literature on Mādhyamika, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalśīla are said to be the key exponents of this system. In the beginning of his abbreviated exposition on the two truths from the perspective of Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans, lCang-sgya says,

> The basis of division of the two truths, the divisions, the difference between real and unreal conventional truths, the sameness and difference of the two truths and so forth are similar to what was explained in the context of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhymamika [in the preceding chapter]"[270]

He thus implies that a regurgitated explanation of the two truths from the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika perspective is unnecessary after already discussing the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika. This presentation of the two lower sub-schools of Mādhyamika as having harmonious positions on conventional truth is common among dGe-lugs renditions of Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. I have discussed in the introductory chapter to this study that at least with regards to what dGe-lugs-pas consider as the lower Mādhyamika schools (and most likely with the representation of other Buddhist schools)[271], the purpose of the tenet system texts and the related texts on Mahāyāna doctrinal systems is to lead the student, step by step up the graded ladder of philosophical views to the highest, the

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[270] lCang-skya-rol pa'i-rdo-rje, *Grub mtha'i rnam bzhag*, (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1970), trans. by Lopez in *A Study of Svātantrika*. (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1987), p.380.

[271] I have not done the exhaustive study necessary to make this claim with certainty, but it seems like the representation of views of other Mādhyamika and lower schools in the tenet system texts represent a similar streamlined model which may not exactly correspond with the views of the specific Indian pandits on which the presented views are based. They appear to be more general presentations of tenet systems based on an amalgamation of the views of several distinct holders of a specifically designated tenet system. For a discussion of many of the issues surrounding dGe-lugs tenet system literature see Hopkins (1996).

Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika and not necessarily to mirror the actual positions asserted by specific Indian pandits whose canonized texts serve as the actual basis for the designated schools. This point will be made clear here in relation to Śāntarakṣita's views on conventional truth. As we examine Śāntarakṣita's views on conventional truth clear discrepancies between them and those represented as his in dGe-lugs tenet system texts become apparent. Let us turn now to Śāntarakṣita's own presentation of his view and then return to its representation in the dGe-lugs literature.

Having completed his 'neither one nor many' argument which demonstrates that no entities have any inherent existence (Tib. *rang bzhin med*) in the first sixty-one verses of *The Ornament For The Middle Way* he proceeds in the next three verses to begin his discussion of conventional truth.

> (#62) An [ultimately existing] entity which has aspects and which does not have either a single or plural [nature] does not make sense since the two alternatives are mutually exclusive (and inclusive of all possible alternatives).
>
> (#63) Therefore all entities are characterized only by conventionality. If one accepts them as ultimate what can I do for them?
>
> (#64) Those phenomena which are only agreeable when not put to the test of (ultimate) analysis, those phenomena which are generated and disintegrate, and those which have the ability to function are known to be of a conventional nature.[272]

After declaring that though entities do not exist ultimately, that they do in fact exist conventionally, Śāntarakṣita proceeds to offer three criterion which define a conventionally existent entity. They are 1) "phenomena which are only agreeable when not put to the test of (ultimate) analysis," and 2) "those phenomena which are generated and disintegrate (i.e. are

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[272] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 6a.

impermanent)," and 3) "those which have the ability to functions."[273] In a further division delineated in his auto-commentary Śāntarakṣita designates the criterion by which one can distinguish real conventional truth from unreal conventional truth. He writes:

> Dependently arisin entities which function and are seen, because they cannot withstand (ultimate) analysis, they are [called] real conventionalities.

The main factor which distinguishes real conventionalities from unreal conventionalities has to do with their ability to function in the way they appear. The common example is that water is a real conventional truth because it is wet and can satisfy thirst, etc. An example of an unreal conventional truth would be a mirage because though it looks like water it is in fact not wet, cannot satisfy thirst or perform any of the other functions of water.

In addition to ontological descriptions such as these which do make his view concerning conventional truth look very much like Bhāvaviveka's, Śāntarakṣita has more to say about conventional truth in relation to its marriage with a Yogācāra perspective and both the ontological and soteriological implications of that. Unlike Bhāvaviveka who holds that entities exist externally, Śāntarakṣita maintains that all conventional truths are merely the nature of the mind.

> (#91) That which is cause and result is merely consciousness only. Whatever is established by itself[274] is consciousness.[275]

This root text verse provides the vital bridge in Śāntarakṣita's view between both the Yogācāra and Mādhyamika schools which he so skillfully synthesizes into one system, and

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[273] Ibid.

[274] "Whatever is established by itself" ('*rang gi grub pa gang yin pa*') refers here to conventional entities and should not be confused with self-generated entities.

also between the simply ontological description of conventional truth presented by Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans as presented in dGe-lugs tenet system texts with a presentation of conventional truth which quite significantly maintains a soteriological purpose as well. While Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikans mention that discussion of conventional is a necessary component for realizing the ultimate truth, Śāntarakṣita seems to be the one Mādhyamikan who really stresses the soteriological place of conventional truth and uses it as a centerpiece in the exposition of his view of Mādhyamika. He writes:

> (#92) By relying on the mind only, know that external entities do not exist. And by relying on this [Mādhyamika] system [which analyzes all entities as lacking any essence], know that no self at all exists even in that (mind).
>
> (#93) Therefore due to holding the reigns of logic as one rides the two chariots [of Yogācāra and Mādhyamika], one obtains [the path of] the actual Mahāyānist.[276]

Thus the difference seems striking enough to warrant separate treatment from that of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika. It is unclear from the ninty first stanza and from Śāntarakṣita's auto-commentary as to what he meant by, "whatever is established by itself" (Tib. *rang gi grub pa gang yin pa*). It appears to be very close to saying "(whatever) exists by way of its own characteristics" (Tib. *rang gi tsan nyid kyis grub*, Skt. *svalakṣaṇasiddha*) which would correspond with the way Yogācārans describe the thoroughly established [nature] (Skt. *pariniṣpanna*, Tib. *yongs grub*) and the other powered [nature] (Skt. *paratantra*, Tib. *gzhan dbang*), as existing by way of their own characteristics and which would make sense given his conventional acceptance of components of the Yogācāra system and thus correspond with the dGe-lugs pronouncements about his views on conventional truth. But Śāntarakṣita

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[275] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 8a.

[276] Ibid.

never explicitly says the words "exists by way of its own characteristics" in his elaborations on conventional truth here nor does Kamalaśīla in his commentary on *The Ornament For The Middle Way.* And if one were to follow this reasoning which argues that because Yogācārans assert that throroughly established natures and other dependent natures exist by way of their own characterisitics and Śāntarakṣita utilizes some Yogācāra insights conventionally that he must accept conventional truths in that way too, we quickly come upon contradictions since Yogācārans also assert that those two natures truly exist and ultimately exist, two claims Śāntarakṣita certainly would not make. Even if one could infer without question that Śāntarakṣita accepts that entities conventionally exist by way of their own characterisitics, precisely what that would mean in this context is unclear since Tsong-kha-pa himself says that what Yogācārans mean by 'existing by way of their own characteristics' (Tib. *rang gi tsan nyid kyis grub*, Skt. *svalakṣaṇasiddha*) and what Mādhyamikans mean by that term are different in his major work, *Essence of Excellent Explanations Discerning the Interpretable and the Definative* (Tib. *Drang ba dang nges ba'i don mam par phye ba'i bstan bchos legs bshad sying po*)[277]. Because the original Sanskrit of the verse is no longer extant we are left to speculate as to the specific correlation on this issues concerning the Yogācāra system on its own and its incorporation on the conventional level into Śāntarakṣita's presentation of Mādhyamika. From his own auto-commentary the ninty first śloka seems to be more concerned with emphasizing that objects are the nature of mind and not about their existing by way of their own characteristics. Surely one could argue it is simplistic to write off Śāntarakṣita's views on conventional truth as generally in concurrence with what is described as Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika positions on the topic in the dGe-lugs pa literature. When Bhāviviveka discusses his views on conventional truth he argues on the basis of ontology and the ontological status of conventional entities,

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[277] Tsong-kha-pa, *Drang ba dang nges ba'i don mam par phye ba'i bstan bchos legs bshad sying po.* (Bylakuppe: Sera-Mey Computer Progect Center), p. 10.

conventional entities which exist external to the subject which perceives them and by way of their own characteristics. Śāntarakṣita on the other hand, discusses conventional truths in terms of entities which are not distinct from the mind which perceives them, much like Yogācārans. And this entire description of conventional truth as Mind Only for Śāntarakṣita occurs in the context of describing a soteriological ascent to the Mādhyamika standpoint, the ultimate view as was made quite clear in the root text verses quoted above. This soteriological purpose and its distinctiveness from Bhāvaviveka's views are acknowledged in rGyal-tshab's direct commentary on Śāntakṣita's root text as it was in the oral commentaries I received on the texts.

The question then arises as to why if the dGe-lugs pa thinkers acknowledge this soteriological process involved in Śāntarakṣita's presentation, do they dismiss his views on conventional truth as more or less the same as Bhāvaviveka's and therefore not worth regurgitating in tenet system texts like lCang-sgya's, when it seems clear that Śāntarakṣita has a distinct view with a distinct agenda which they acknowledge. One might first assume that they do so in order to set up an easy model for refutation. However, dGe-lugs pas already have sufficient grounds for refuting Śāntarakṣita's views on the grounds of his acceptance of autonomous syllogisms and of self-cognizing cognition as well as on issues concerning the path system discussed above. This therefore becomes a puzzling question. I postulate that this occurs in order to maintain a clear and fluid presentation of ideas, one which fits clearly into the tenet system structure for simplicity of access and because the primary concern in this context for dGe-lugs-pas is not to mirror Śāntarakṣita's views point for point, but rather to present the student with an outline of a general Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika view, perhaps based on the writings of many authors, but which most importantly helps facilitate compartmental understanding with the intention of being surpassed as a view on the ascent toward the correct view, Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika. Thus

when Western scholars rely on these dGe-lugs tenet system texts as mirrors of the Indian texts and views rather than as aids to engaging in those Indian texts but ones which need to be understood in their context, problems of accuracy will certainly arise, as will be further demonstrated below..

To proceed further with this examination, if one were to undertake a strict critical analysis of the dGe-lugs presentation of Śāntarakṣita's views in their tenet system literature, their discussions with regards to proper use of descriptive language for holders of varying perspectives on Mādhyamika does not seem to hold up. This genre of dGe-lugs literature claims that Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans as represented by Śāntarakṣita and his disciple would make the same claims about the appropriate terms for describing conventional and ultimate truth as the way they describe Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans. For example, it is stated that both Svātantrika-Mādhyamika schools hold that while it is appropriate to say that entities do not ultimately exist (Tib. *don dam par med*) and do not truly exist (Tib. *bden par med*) that such Mādhyamikans would claim that it is incorrect to say that entities do not inherently exist (Tib. *rang bzhin med*) or do not exist by way of their own characteristics (Tib. *rang gi tshan nyid med*). This quite simply does not correlate with Śāntarakṣita's own words. First, Śāntarakṣita regularly describes ultimate truth as lacking inherent existence and may in fact be the most frequent way in which he describes it other that to simply say something to the effect of 'all phenomena do not exist' (Tib. *chos thams chad med*). And this too contradicts claims made about Śāntarakṣita's hermeneutics with regards to definitive and interpretable texts where for example Tsong-kha-pa claims in the "Special Insight" chapter of *Lam rim chen mo* that Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans require a qualification of descriptions of the lack of existence with the terms 'ultimately' or 'truly'. Śāntarakṣita in fact makes no mention whatsoever of terminology for qualifying descriptions of ultimate truth nor does he even broach the topic with regards to conventional truth of entities being inherently existent conventionally or existent by way of their own

characteristics conventionally. Yet these points are made emphatically in dGe-lugs tenet system and related literature and any dGe-lugs scholar will tell you that Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans make such claims. The claim that Śāntarakṣita says entities 'inherently' exist conventionally seems to have no textual basis, but the claim that he would say that entities exist by way of their own characteristics is not quite as far fetched. Although he does not overtly make that claim anywhere in his root text or auto-commentary he verges into that territory in his discussions of logic and specifically in establishing a common subject among the proponent and opponent in an autonomous syllogism. In that context he does make the following statement.

> I have not rejected entities with regards to their possessing the taste (Skt. *rasa*, Tib. *ngang*) of appearances.[278]

Stating that entities have the taste of their appearances in the context of establishing common subjects for logical inference seems to come close to saying that they exist by way of their own characteristics and it is in this context that dGe-lugs-pas extract this assertion from Śāntarakṣita.

rGyal-tshab does not force these claims onto Śāntarakṣita in his commentary on *The Ornament For The Middle Way*. This is only done explicitly in the tenet system texts and other related doctrinal texts I put into the second category of dGe-lugs commentarial literature in the Introduction to this study. Thus I think it is clear that there is not a misunderstanding of the Indian authors on the part of the dGe-lugs authors, but rather that they have created for themselves a genre of literature which streamlines the tenets postulated by various Indian pandits such a Śāntarakṣita in generic 'views' which in the context of a dGe-lugs ascent to

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[278] Ibid., folio 7.

the correct view prove to successfully engender a swift ripening of the mind for understanding that highest view, the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika. Adoptions and adaptation of Indian tenets are used merely as a heuristic device for their own soteriological purposes. But without proper attention to such intents present in different genres of dGe-lugs commentarial material, the modern scholar can be prone to making significant interpretive errors.

Self-Cognizing Cognition

The concept of self-cognizing cognition[279] (Skt. *svasaṃvedana*, Tib. *rang rig*) operates as a critical issue in the thought of Śāntarakṣita as well as a serious object of rejection in the thought of his dGe-lugs critics who include this rejection as among the eight unique tenets of the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika. The first two-thirds of his text *The Ornament For The Middle Way* comprise an expanded rendition of the 'neither one nor many' argument over the course of which Śāntarakṣita proceeds to systematically reject a series of positions held by other Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents. The only issue about which he makes an affirming statement is that of self-cognizing cognition, albeit still in the context of refuting true singular existence. He begins the discussion of the topic in the sixteenth verse of his root text when he writes:

> (#16) Consciousness is produced in the opposite way from that which is of an inanimate nature. That which is the nature of not being inanimate is this self-knowledge[280] (Tib. *badge nyid shes pa*).[281]

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[279] The term has been translated in a number of ways by various scholars and there seems to be little agreement. It has been translated variously as 'self-awareness', 'self-knowledge', 'self-consciousness', 'auto-cognition', 'reflexive-consciousness' and 'reflexive awareness'. Among those I did not choose to use, I think think the latter two probably come closest to the actual meaning of the terms in the original languages. I chose to use the term 'self-cognizing cognition' on the recommendation of Geshe Ngawang Samten. He pointed out that the connotation of the term is not merely that of the relatively vague term, self-awareness, but rather of a substantial consciousness which actually cognizes itself. Thus either self-cognizing consciousness or self-cognizing cognition would be appropriate translations in this context. Perhaps as Williams has suggested, the term is variously used by different authors in different contexts and a variety of translations are appropriate for different situations. For the purposes of our study here I feel self-cognizing cognition is the most appropriate term for translation.

[280] 'Self-knowledge' (Tib. *bdag nyid shes pa*) here is a synonym for 'self-cognizing cognition' (Tib. *rang rig*).

[281] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 3a.

The topic is brought up by Śāntarakṣita in the context of a refutation of the Vaibhāṣhika position concerning the tenability of knowing objects which are external to the consciousness, a notion which Śāntarakṣita refutes. This of course is a primary bridge for Śāntarakṣita's brand of Mādhyamika to the Yogācāra view which he conventionally accepts and which asserts that objects do not exist externally with a nature separate from the consciousness which perceives them. In fact it is from his Yogācāra antecedents that the notion is derived by Śāntarakṣita. One of the principle differences between the two understandings of self-cognizning cognition is that it is only accepted conventionally by Śāntarakṣita while that limitation is not placed on its validity in the Yogācāra context. But it has been suggested that Śāntarakṣita's use of the concept is not a mere mirror of a Yogācāra concept, qualified by conventionality in his context. Paul Williams notes that while there may be some precedence to be found in Dharmakīrti's *Pramānaviniścaya*, "the idea of portraying self-awareness as the quality of consciousness understood as the reverse of insentience (Tib. *bems po*) may well have originated with Śāntarakṣita."[282] Williams also notes that it is Śāntarakṣita who is usually cited on this point in subsequent commentaries in which the topic arises. Thus for Śāntarakṣita it is the quality of being self-conscious that defines sentience. Unlike inanimate objects which rely on sentient consciousnesses to be known, consciousness need not rely on anything for this purpose. Śāntarakṣita writes:

> Not relying on others to be illuminated, the nature which illuminates (Tib. *gsal ba*) itself is called the self-cognizing cognition of consciousness.[283]

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[282] Williams, Paul. *The Reflexive Nature of Awareness: A Tibetan Mādhyamika Defence.* (Richmond Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998), p. 25.

[283] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, pp. 39-40.

This line in the auto-commentary is followed by the first two lines of the eighteenth stanza of the root text.

> Because of that, this [consciousness] is capable of self-consciousness since it is the nature of consciousness.[284]

Perhaps the most common example given to illustrate the meaning of the term self-cognizing cognition is that of a lamp. It is explained that much like a lamp illuminates itself at the same time as it illuminates a room, so too does consciousness illuminate or become conscious of itself as it is conscious of other objects. In other words it becomes conscious of itself being conscious of other objects. The other explanation for the existence of self-cognizing cognition is founded on the basis of memory. It argues that because we can not only remember seeing an object, but also the consciousness which was cognizing (the object), that this consciousness whose object is consciousness must be a function of self-cognizing consciousness as well. It is claimed in fact that memory is only possible because consciousness is self-conscious. The relationship between consciousness and self-cognizing consciousness is said to be a non-dual one in which there is no actual dichotomy of subject and object but a relationship of simultaneous arising. This notion has been the object of sharp criticism of numerous Indian Mādhyamikans including Bhāvaviveka, the so-called founder of the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika system, and by those most commonly associated with the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika such as Chandrakīrti and Śāntideva, not to mention the attack leveled against it by Tsong-kha-pa and his followers from the dGe-lugs tradition.

In turn the great 19th century Nying-ma scholar Mi-pham rGya-tsho (1846-1912) has defended Śāntarakṣita's position, even in the context of Prāsaṅgika scholars such as

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[284] Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, folio 3a.

Chandrakīrti and Śāntideva by arguing that even their rejections of the concept are only rejections of its ultimate existence and not that self-cognizing cognition is not a viable concept for conventional understanding.[285] Many of the arguments made however by both Chandrakīrti and Śāntideva seem to be concerned only with rejecting this concept and not with the mere rejection of its ultimate existence. Mi-pham however can find support for this position in Śāntideva's closing discussion of the topic although it is a bit ambiguous weather his temperance is an affirmation of the conventional existence of self-cognizning cognition or not.

> The manner in which something is seen, heard, or cognized is not what is refuted here, but the conceptualization of its true existence, which is the cause of suffering, is rejected here.[286]

There are several arguments on which basis self-cognizning cognition is refuted stemming primarily of the arguments originally made by Śāntideva in the ninth chapter of the *Bodhiacryāvatāra* and by Chandrakīrti in his *Madhyamakāvatāra*. Perhaps the most well known is the refutation based on the absurdity of an ensuing infinite regress. The basis of this argument is that if consciousness is self-conscious and that those two are non-dual then that self-consciousness must also be a consciousness which is self-conscious, and that must be a consciousness which is self-conscious, and so on. Thus conscious activity would be caught up in an endless net of self-consciousness in the course of this infinite regress.

The dGe-lugs school additionally argues against the notion of self-cognizing cognition based on the argument of its proponents who assert that memories of

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[285] Mi-pham has a great deal at stake here in his attempts at defending the notion of self-cognizing cognition because it is an important part of a philosophical standpoint which can serve as the basis of Dzogchen. For a detailed treatment of this subject see Williams (1988) pp. xi-xix.

consciousness necessitate self-cognizning consciousness and thus because we have memories we must have self-cognizing cognition. These proponents argue that as with the way that we can deduce the existence of fire by the existence of smoke so too can we deduce the existence of self-cognizing consciousness on the existence of memory. In the syllogistic format there must exist a causal relationship between the subject and the reason. dGe-lugs-pas argue that such a syllogism is completely absurd and that there in fact is no direct causal relationship between cognition and memory. They would turn to Śāntideva who responds to the argument based on memory in the following manner.

> *[Yogācārin:]* If self-cognizing awareness does not exist, how is consciousness recalled?
> *[Mādhyamika:]* Recollection comes from its relation to something else that was experienced, like a rat's poison.[287]

Tsong-kha-pa additionally argues that memory does not necessitate self-cognizing cognition as a bridge between earlier and later moment of consciousness because a memory is nothing other that a return of a consciousness to its original object, albeit from a distance of time. In this respect his response draws heavily on the arguments made by Chandrakīrti in the refutation of self-cognizing cognition. Chandrakīrti writes,

> The memory of a given event is simply 'memory of an object' and not 'memory of an experience.' Why is this so? If memory included 'memory of an experience' then a second 'experiential cognition' would be required to experience the memory

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[286] Śāntideva. *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Trans. by Vesna A. Wallace and B. Alan Wallace in *A Guide To The Boddhisattva Way of Life*. (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1997), p.119.

[287] It is additionally noted by the Wallaces that: "According to the *sPyod 'jug rnam bshad rnGyal sras 'jug ngogs*, the analogy here refers to an animal, such as a bear, which while sleeping is bitten and infected by a rat. Although the bear is not conscious of being poisoned at the time it is bitten, it 'recalls' this upon waking up and sensing the inflammation of the bite." Śāntideva. *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Trans. by Vesna A. Wallace and B. Alan Wallace in *A Guide To The Boddhisattva Way of Life*. (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1997), p.118.

> itself, and a third to experience this second 'experiential cognition'.....This would involve the fallacy of infinite regression.[288]

Thus the argument favoring self-cognizing cognition based on memory also falls into the absurdity of infinite regress according to Chandrakīrti. In addition Chandrakīrti seems quite clearly to reject self-cognizning convention both ultimately and conventionally as do his dGe-lugs followers. This runs contrary to Mi-pham's claim that Chandrakīrti only rejects self-cognizning cognition ultimately but not conventionally. Chandrakīrti says:

> If this is supposed to be proven from the ultimate point of view, that is, postulating the presence of intrinsically existent realities referred to as 'cognition,' 'memory,' and 'object,' then we suggest that our opponent consult our previous arguments concerning this issue. If, however, it is to be proven from the perspective of everyday experience, then there is a logical fallacy in the argument which must be acknowledged. Reflexive awareness is taken as the proof of memory, while at the same time memory is used as the proof of reflexive awareness. The argument is circular and therefore invalid.... How could the unsubstantiated [concept of] reflexive awareness be proven by the unsubstantiated [concept of] memory?[289]

Here Chandrakīrti clearly rejects self-cognizing cognition from the conventional perspective of everyday experience, thus undermining Mi-pham's claim to his conventional acceptance of the concept.

The entire subject of self-cognizning cognition is often times an ambiguous one. The term has been variously defined by differing proponents and opponents and rarely has it been made clear on either end. Śāntarakṣita is considered as one of the major proponents but he spends very little time relatively speaking on the subject. And while most of the critics of self-cognizing cognition came after him, Śāntarakṣita seems to be either unaware of or unconcerned with (perhaps due to thinking they only reject it ultimately and not

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[288] Chandrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* trans. by C.W. Huntington and Geshe Namgryal Wangchen, in *The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction To Early Indian Mādhyamika,* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), p. 244.

[289] Ibid., p. 244.

conventionally) Chandrakīrti's or Bhāvaviveka's critiques as he does not address them. The dGe-lugs school is vehemently opposed to the concept as it seems to imply a sort of inherently existing consciousness according to the way they understand its proponent's explanations. It could be argued on historical grounds that since the dGe-lugs school saw itself as reforming degenerate forms of Buddhism in Tibet and their accompanying practices that rejection of self-cognizing cognition which was so fundamental to opposing Tibetan schools was an important part of a wholesale reformation. And while the Nying-ma scholar Mi-pham is strongly supportive, his interest seems to come in relation to issues concerning 'Dzogs chen which probably did not exist when the notion was originally formulated in early first millennia India, but perhaps needed to be redeemed in nineteenth century Tibet. Regardless of all these potentialities the topic seems to be a heated one whenever it comes up, so despite the ambiguities, the subject cannot be ignored.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The aim of this study has included several components. First and most generally this work has attempted to provide a broad-based entrance into the thought of Śāntarakṣita as represented by his major treatise on the correct Buddhist view, *The Ornament For The Middle Way* along with his *Auto-Commentary on 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'*. These texts have been seriously understudied to date in Western scholarship despite their undeniable importance to the history of Buddhist thought both in India and the Tibetan cultural complex. This work aims toward beginning to fill that gap in Western scholarship and additionally to serve as a springboard for further investigation into Śāntarakṣita and his ideas. As a part of this process, this work offers a contextual framework for situating Śāntarakṣita within the history of Indian Buddhist ideas. This has included a discussion of the major Mahāyāna authors and texts which preceded and influenced Śāntarakṣita's thought, the socio-historical context in which he wrote which in part dictated the ideas and schools he needed to address, the originality and innovations in his own ideas and finally, discusses some of the impact Śāntarakṣita's ideas had on thinkers during the final centuries of Buddhism in India and the tradition's Tibetan inheritors. In addition I have included a narrative account of each argument he makes in his root text and examined the way he has elaborated on these arguments in his own commentary and supplemented this with the usually supportive and occasionally contrastive commentary of the great dGe-lugs-pa scholar/adept rGyal-tshab-je. This narrative account includes translations of large sections of Śāntarakṣita's *Auto-Commentary on 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'* made available

in English for the first time here. I have also included in the Appendix complete translations of both Śāntarakṣita's root text, *The Ornament For The Middle Way* and rGyal-tshab-je's *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'* also available in English for the first time. It is my hope that this aspect of the study on its own stands as a valuable contribution to the study of the history of ideas. This historical contextualization, the examination of the ideas and the texts and the included translations together combine to create an increased accessability to the Western audience of one of the most important and influential religio-philosophical figures in Indian history.

I have utilized this comprehensive entrance into Śāntarakṣita and his system of thought as it exists in the history of Indian Buddhist ideas to segue into an examination of the role his ideas have played in the history of Buddhist thought and particularly of Mādhyamika in Tibet. One of the underlying premises of this study has been that a system of philosophical thought can be most successfully approached and penetrated by examining it in a two-fold manner. The first part is to take the ideas as they present themselves on their own terms which itself is a two step process. By examining both socio-historical context of Śāntarakṣita's ideas within the Buddhist world of 8th century India and hypothesizing about influences on his writings in that context we complete the first part of the first step. There has been a significant movement in Buddhist Studies in the West to increase the amount of historicism involved in the study of Buddhist thought and this will certainly draw out new insights over time into the purposes and motivations behind the works rather than just looking at them as ideas devoid of any historical context as has been the common mode of analysis in the past. But this too only presents part of the picture and it runs the risk of reducing genuine philosophical insights into the mere intellectual offspring of historical circumstance. If taken on their own terms the tenets of Buddhist thinkers such as Śāntarakṣita describe the nature of reality as they understand it, and the penetrating of truth which they believes remains regardless of historical circumstance. As Śāntarakṣita explains,

a central tenet of his thought is that, 'all phenomena are empty in the past present and future'. Whether the investigating scholar is sympathetic or not, credence must be given to the author's own conception of his or her ideas in attempting to understand them.

Thus the second part of the first step after historically contextualizing the arena in which the ideas arise is to investigate the ideas as they are on their own terms. This is the same sort of method which is applied in Departments of Philosophy whose main object of study is the history of Western philosophy. This does not mean one should ignore the fact that in the case of Śāntarakṣita for example that he was alive at a time when the Buddhist logical systems formalized by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were in wide currency nor that a major competing Mahāyāna system had widespread popularity and influence and that he had to address these issues. Nor should it be overlooked that all the philosophical schools critiqued within his rendition of the 'neither one nor many' argument in the first two thirds of his text were there partially as a result of historical circumstance. After all, Śāntarakṣita did not critique Aristotle or Plato. But I contend that the systems he chose to take up in his critique were not only chosen because of their popular currency in India at the time, but also because through a form of negative dialecticism, these criticized systems helped Śāntarakṣita illuminate his own views. There is a subtle danger in this new historicism which has so enamored scholars of Buddhism in recent years. There is an underlying presumption that the original thinker is not describing the nature of reality as they understand it and say they are doing because it can be presumed if one uses this methodology exclusively that religious or philosophical thinkers only respond to their times and circumstances. In other words, to say that ideas cannot correctly be understood without knowledge of their historical context presumes if taken to its extreme that doctrinal shifts on subtle points of metaphysics have to do only with history rather than insight and this verges into the sort materialist reductionism characteristic of many Marxist thinkers. Every philosopher or religious thinker teaches and writes in history. And they most likely write for an audience in their own place and time.

My point here though is that this does not necessarily undermine the importance of taking the ideas on their own for what they are while also armed with knowledge of the circumstances around them which may have some relevance for a complete understanding.

After engaging a philosophical text such as *The Ornament For The Middle Way* on its own terms by examining its arguments as its author, Śāntarakṣita presents them, with an eye to the circumstantial context in which they arose, the second part of this two-fold methodological premise of this study is the presumption these ideas and their impact can also best be understood in conjunction with a critique of them. It is not just any critique that would be sufficient here for penetrating into the core issues of the text. For example a critique based on the premises of a monotheistic religion may not be of much value for getting at Śāntarakṣita's ideas. But a critique coming from fellow Buddhists and moreover, fellow Mādhyamikans it was felt would zero in on the central issues of the text and its doctrines. This methodological presumption was made on the basis that first of all, fellow Mādhyamikans know from an insider's perspective what the key components of that system of thought ought to be and thus are more keenly attuned to those critical ideas and issues. Thus by way of examining a critique we draw out the key components of the system as they naturally become elements of contention for those most heavily invested in the proper presentation of the system.

With the second part of my two-fold methodological premise serving as a guidepost, I chose to examine Śāntarakṣita's ideas from the perspective of the dGe-lugs-pa school of Tibetan Buddhism. Here was an innovative Buddhist school which emerged in Tibet six hundred years after Śāntarakṣita played such an integral role in the foundation of Buddhism in that country. Thus, the views of the founder, Tsong-kha-pa, who studied with dozens of the top scholars of his day yet eventually delineated an understanding which differed from each of them, can be seen as a view which in some respects represents the culmination of the first six hundred years of Mādhyamika studies in Tibet. He was a thinker of such import in

Tibet that all Mādhyamikans to come after him had to respond to his views even if they disagreed with them. Tsong-kha-pa and the dGe-lugs tradition which follows him are critical of Śāntarakṣita's understanding of Mādhyamika. I have outlined five major points on which the dGe-lugs-pa school takes exception to Śāntarakṣita's understanding of Mādhyamika including hermeneutics, logic, self-cognizning cognition, obstacles removed on the path, and the two truths. It becomes clear that these are the pivotal points which in fact illuminate Śāntarakṣita's system and that these are drawn to the forefront specifically by examining Śāntarakṣita's system through the eyes of fellow Mādhyamikans in the process of a critique of his views.

This examination of Śāntarakṣita's views through the eyes of his dGe-lugs-pa critics has illuminated not only important details concerning Śāntarakṣita's views, but also about the dGe-lugs-pa school as well. Through an extensive study of the dGe-lugs-pa commentarial literature on Śāntarakṣita and the Yogācāra-Svātantrika sub-school of Mādhyamika, this study has offered a new framework through which it is argued such literature may be successfully approached and utilized and which in turn offers the reader a more complete understanding of the dGe-lugs-pa project. Tsong-kha-pa's major work, *The Great Exposition on The Stages of the Path to Enlightenment* (Tib. *byang chub lam rim chen mo*) is an extensive and detailed description of the entire Buddhist path inclusive of all three vehicles (Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna) and is considered to be a premier summation in this respect of the entirety of the Buddha's teachings organized in a systematic, methodical, and internally consistent manner which engenders both ease of approach and fluidity of movement. The inclusivity of the dGe-lugs path which encompasses all Buddhist systems from the lowest to the highest is an integral part of the way the dGe-lugs tradition operates and functions from the standpoint of the practitioner.

When we turn the microscope of this inclusivity to the case of Śāntarakṣita and the views of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika as they operate within the dGe-lugs system,

it becomes apparent that standard mode with which scholars have utilized dGe-lugs commentarial literature on Indian philosophical schools falls short both in their handling of the Indian side and with their handling of the dGe-lugs side. I argue in this study that the shortcomings on both sides stem from a failure to acknowledge a fundamental three-fold framework under which dGe-lugs genres of philosophical commentary operate.[290] I contend that the dGe-lugs treatment of Śāntarakṣita in their oral and written commentarial literature, is best understood precisely through a three-fold framework I outlined in the introduction to this study. This framework divides dGe-lugs commentarial literature on Śāntarakṣita into three categories. It understands the direct dGe-lugs-pa commentaries on the Śāntarakṣita's root text to operate under the first hermeneutical/pedagogical category in which the manner of exposition and interpretation aims primarily to illuminate Śāntarakṣita's views as expressed in *The Ornament For The Middle Way* on their own terms. This category includes the two direct dGe-lugs commentaries on Śāntarakṣita's root text, rGyal-tshab's *Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'*, and Tsong-kha-pa's *Notes On (Śāntarakṣita's) Ornament For The Middle Way.* The second category which includes dGe-lugs-pa tenet system texts as well as major treatises on Mahāyāna philosophy in general or Mādhyamika in particular operates with a different objective. Here the dGe-lugs authors' primary purpose is to lead the student to the correct view, the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika, the correct understanding of which is an essential component of the path to Buddhahood in the dGe-lugs tradition. The process by which dGe-lugs-pa authors have facilitated this goal has been to establish a categorical framework for investigating major Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian schools of thought. At times multiple schools were streamlined into one homogenous school. This was

[290] I will state by way of a disclaimer that the comments made here pertain only to the dGe-lugs treatment of Śāntarakṣita and the representation of his views as primary exponent on Yogācāra-Svātantrika-madhyamika and does not claim to make statements on the dGe-lugs treatment of other Buddhist philosophical systems they consider as lower. While I think many of these insights may in fact have significant relavence for those other cases, I have not surveyed either the Indian or dGe-lugs-pa literature to the extent necessary to make such claims in those other areas.

the case for example with the Vaibhāṣhika school which is considered as representative in the dGe-lugs doxographical literature of the eighteen early Abhidharma schools in India. Since the purpose of this genre of literature which is so central to the dGe-lugs-pa scholastic curriculum is to lead the student to their version of the correct view, treatments of lower schools are executed with that in mind and with less rigorous attention to the actual Indian śāstra literature than one would find in the dGe-lugs commentaries in the first category I describe. Positions of schools are made to fit into the specific categories of the given interpretive framework which is based on the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika and certain positions are exaggerated or created in order to help elucidate for the student by way of contrast, certain central elements of the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika. And amalgamations of the views of several Indian authors considered as representatives of the particular system are homogenized into one generalized presentation of that system. This delineation of sometimes exaggerated positions is certainly the case with the exposition of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika as it is represented in the tenet system and related dGe-lugs literature. The purpose is not to mirror Śāntarakṣita's views per se here, but to offer a rough version of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika which helps facilitate ascent to the correct view in the manner just described. The third and final category of my three-fold model deals with oral commentary and can be divided into two sub-categories on the basis of whether the oral commentary is commenting on a text from the first or second category of literature discussed above. If it comments on a tenet system text then the interpretive framework will operate in the same manner as the text. My experience of oral commentaries on either Śāntarakṣita's own texts or on direct dGe-lugs commentaries on those texts is that they hedge a balance somewhere between the two, where there is a tangible commitment both to author's words and to the tenet system portrayal of the views. This tension can at times can create some unease in the commentator. This of course could have been spurred on by my questioning of

specific discrepancies, between the two, but I sense that such would be the case under any circumstances.

Given this three-fold framework for dealing with dGe-lugs commentarial literature which I have proposed in this study, I will now make some remarks about the previous use of this literature by modern scholars and discuss how the failure to recognize this three-fold pedagogical hermeneutic of representation has been a cause for misunderstanding of this genre dGe-lugs literature. Much of the scholarship on 'Indo-Tibetan Buddhism' during the 1970's and 1980's relied on dGe-lugs tenet system and related commentaries to get at the original intention of the Indian authors they represented. It was assumed that the representatives of the dGe-lugs school of Tibetan Buddhism were the most rigorous purveyors of the Indian Buddhist traditions and that thus their commentarial literature, particularly the tenet system texts, could effectively serve as mirrors or direct windows into the tenet systems proposed by the great Indian pandits and the debates which took place within that arena and thus could serve as a key element in the reconstruction of Indian Buddhism. Often original Indian sources were pushed aside in favor of this logical, systematic dGe-lugs literature which so neatly presented all the philosophical systems. There was never a question as to weather the dGe-lugs project was the same as that of the Western scholar who aimed at the reconstruction of the history of Indian Buddhism. A great deal of top rate work was done at this time and large methodological advances were made as we witness for the first time an attempt at letting the traditions speak for themselves rather than through the lens of any of a number of preconceived biases. But by assuming that the dGe-lugs doxographical literature aimed at a tight mirror-like reconstruction of the ideas of Indian Buddhist pandits, much of this scholarship drew inaccurate conclusions about the Indian predecessors of their Tibetan representors.

This was of no fault of the dGe-lugs doxographers. Their purpose was different and they cannot be blamed for the failure of modern scholars to realize that. The purpose of the

dGe-lugs doxographical literature was to present a streamlined hierarchy of philosophical views based roughly on the Indian tenet systems, to examine their positions in pre-set categories in order to lead the student up this hierarchy to the correct view, the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika. Because the presentations of the Indian views in these dGe-lugs doxographies were so close to the view of those Indian pandits on first approach, it was assumed by many modern scholars that these could be taken as effective mirrors of those views. The problem was that many scholars did not read the original Indian sources yet made claims about them based on statements in dGe-lugs doxographies. For example it could be claimed that that according to Śāntarakṣita one cannot say that entities do not inherently exist (Tib. *rang bzhin med*) because he says that they do inherently exist conventionally. This is a common statement ascribed to Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikans as represented by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in dGe-lugs doxographies but it is absolutely not an accurate representation of their actual views. Śāntarakṣita repeatedly describes entities as lacking inherent existence (Tib. *rang bzhin med*) without qualification and never says anything in this language about entities inherently existing conventionally or about the proper terms for describing ultimate or conventional truths. This move is made in the doxographies for specific reasons that have to do with leading the student to the correct view which is the purpose of those doxographies. The dGe-lugs tradition is not unaware of these discrepancies. One only need look at Tsong-kha-pa or rGyal-tshab's commentaries on *The Ornament For The Middle Way* to verify that they do accurately portray the intentions of the Indian author in those direct commentaries, but those serve a different function from the tenet system texts.

While the failure to recognize discrepancies between the doxographies and the actual Indian śāstras signals one side of the problem, there is another. In more recent work scholars have argued upon realizing those discrepancies that actually the dGe-lugs-pas got it wrong. While there is at least an effort here to verify claims by investigating the actual Indian śāstras, there is still a failure to recognize the purpose of the doxographical literature

and a failure to recognize what is going on within the larger dGe-lugs framework. As was mentioned above, the dGe-lugs tradition aims at encompassing the entirety of the Buddhist tradition into one complete, internally consistent system. This includes all three Buddhist vehicles, all the major philosophical positions, the entirety of the Buddhist path system, and beings of the three types of motivations. Within the study of philosophical positions there are both tenet system texts and direct commentaries on śāstras. For the vast majority in the dGe-lugs monastic setting the study of doctrine is in fact limited to monastic text books, the tenet system literature and the treatises of Tsong-kha-pa on the Mahāyāna philosophical doctrines which served as a forerunner the popular tenet system texts. But this does not preclude the fact that there are specific direct commentaries on the Indian śāstra such as is the case with Śāntarakṣita's *The Ornament For The Middle Way* which can be and are studied by many of the tradition's top scholars. In fact during a recent visit to Sera Monastery in Bylakuppe, His Holiness the Dalai Lama strongly encouraged the monks there to not only study the doxographical literature but to also devote sincere efforts to the study of the actual Indian śāstras. The point is that much like the larger and encompassing dGe-lugs vision of portraying a complete Buddhist path, the same occurs in microcosm within the study of the philosophical literature. There is an abridged and streamlined version, the tenet system literature which serves as its primary function to give an overview of the Indian schools and skillfully lead the disciple to the ultimately correct view, the Prasaṅgika-Mādhyamika. For the more enthusiastic scholars there is the entire canon of Indian Mahāyāna śāstras and both Indian and Tibetan direct commentaries on those which scholars are strongly encouraged to investigate. Thus the dGe-lugs treatment of the Buddhist philosophical tradition aims to encompass the entirety of the translated Sanskrit canon while offering an abridged version geared toward the ultimate soteriological goal of attaining the correct view as an essential component on the path to perfect Buddhahood.

It is my hope that this study has had some measure of success in opening accessability of the thought of the great Indian pandit Śāntarakṣita in a number of the contexts in which that thought appears. I also hope that my insights into the purposes and uses of the dGe-lugs philosophical commentarial literature will help shed light on the larger dGe-lugs project of which it is but one of several key components. Additionally it is my hope that this study may be of benefit to those making use of this literature by offering a more accurate framework for contextualizing the writings within the schemata of their own authors' intentions, thus maximizing accuracy in understanding these text and consequently maximizing their fruitful utility. It is not only what texts say that matters, but also why texts say what they say. This study has attempted to get at the what and the why.

Appendix # 1

Outline of Topics in *Mādhyamakālaṃkāra* Based on Divisions Cited In rGyal-tshab's Commentary

1.0 The meaning of the title.

2.0 The detailed explanation of the nature of the Śhāstra.

2.1 Demonstration that entities do not ultimately exist.

2.1.1 Putting forth the argument.

2.1.2 Establishing the [three] modes (Tib. *tshul sgrub*) of validating the argument.

2.1.2.1 Proving that the reason has the property of the subject (Tib. *phyogs chos*).

2.1.2.1.1 Establishment of the lack of the true singular existence of entities.

2.1.2.1.1.1 Refutation of all-pervasive singularity.

2.1.2.1.1.1.1 Refutation of truly singular permanent entities.

2.1.2.1.1.1.1.1 Refutation of permanent entities asserted by other schools.

2.1.2.1.1.1.1.2 Refutation of permanent entities asserted by our schools.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2 Refutation of truly singular permanent persons.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1 Refutation of the two systems postulated by our own substantialist schools.

2.1.2.1.1.2.1.1 Refutation of Non-Aspectarian Vaibhāṣikans

2.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.1 Establishing the difference between self-cognizing cognition and consciousness cognizing external objects.

2.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.1.1 Establishing the correctness of self-cognizning cognition.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.1.1.1 Putting forth the reasoning.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.1.1.2 Establishing the pervasion.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.1.1.3 Synopsizing the meaning.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.1.2 Establishing the incorrectness of consciousness cognizing external objects.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.1.2.1 Sautrāntika Non-Pluralists.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.1.2.2 Sautrāntika Half-Eggists.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.1.2.3 Sautrāntika Proponents of an Equal Number of Consciousnesses As Aspects

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.1.2 Establishing the difference between the two substantialist Buddhist schools.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2 Refutation of Sautrāntikas

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.2 Refutation of Vijñaptivadins (True Aspectarians)

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.2.1. Expressing their view.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2. Examining the truth and mistakes.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3. Refuting their views.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1 True Aspectarians (Skt. *satyākāravādin*, Tib. *mam bden pa*).

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1.1 Half-Eggist (Tib. *sgo nga phyed tshal pa*).

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1.1.1 Positing the absurdum.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1.1.2 Pointing out the mistakes in their view.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1.1.3 Expressing the mistakes in what they accept.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1.2 Proponents Of An Equal Number of Subjects and Objects (Tib. *gzung 'dzin grangs mnyam pa*).

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1.3 Non-Pluralists (Tib. *sna tshogs gnyis med pa*)

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.2 False Aspectarians (Skt. Alīkākāravādin, Tib. *mam brdzun pa*)

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.2.1 Putting forth their assertions

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3.2.2 Refuting them.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3 Vijñaptivādins (False Aspectarians)

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.1 Putting forth their assertions.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2 Refuting them.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.1 The absurdum that the experience of aspects by consciousness is incorrect.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.2 The absurdum of the incorrectness of experiencing aspects at all.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.3 The absurdum showing the incorrectness of direct experience.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.4 The absurdum of the incorrectness of experience having examined the aspect.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.5 The absurdum of the incorrectness of the relationship between aspects and consciousness.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.6 The absurdum of the incorrectness of being occasionally arisin.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.7 The absurdum of being a mere subjective aspect.

2.1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3.2.8 The absurdum of being a dependent entity.

2.1.2.1.1.2 Refutation of non-pervasive singularity.

2.1.2.1.2 Establishment of the lack of the true plural existence of entities.

2.1.2.2 Establishment of the pervasion (Tib. khyab pa sgrub pa)

2.2 Demonstration that entities do exist conventionally.

2.2.1 Identifying the characteristics of entities

2.2.2 Identifying the characteristics of conventional existence

2.2.3 The refutation of the ultimate existence of the cause of the illusion

2.3 The refutation of dissenting arguments of other schools.

2.3.1 Dispelling the contradictions with direct perception.

2.3.2 Dispelling the contradictions with scripture.

2.3.3 Expressing ultimate truth.

2.3.4 Dispelling dissenting arguments regarding ultimate truth.

2.3.4.1 The absurdum that those of low intellect know emptiness through direct perception.

2.3.4.1.1 Dispelling the arguments.

2.3.4.1.2 Responding to objections.

2.3.4.2 The absurdum that there would be nobody who directly cognizes emptiness.

2.3.4.3 The absurdum that there would be no agreed upon, established speech.

2.3.4.4 The absurdum that there would be no karma and effects.

2.3.4.4.1 The absurdum regarding the invalidity of previous and later lives.

2.3.4.4.1.1 Positing the reasoning

2.3.4.4.1.2 Establishing [the pervasion]

2.3.4.4.1.3 [Avoiding] the faults [of the two extremes] of permanence and nihilism.

2.3.4.4.1.4 Demonstrating the possibility of liberation from cyclic existence

2.3.4.4.2 The absurdum regarding the invalidity of afflictive emotions.

2.3.4.4.3 The absurdum regarding the invalidity of the accomplishment of accumulations.

2.3.5 Putting forth the nature of conventional truth.

2.3.6 Demonstrating the way the nature of the Mahāyāna is more glorious than others.

2.3.7 Demonstrating how if one knows this system, s/he knows the cause of the generation of compassion and faith.

3.0 The concluding explanation.

Appendix # 2

The Ornament For The Middle Way

(Translation)

In Sanskrit [this text is called] *Madhyamakālaṃkāra.*

In Tibetan [this text is called] *The Ornament For The Middle Way.*

Homage to the youthful Mañjuśrī (Mañjuśrī Kumarabhuta).

(#1) Those entities put forth [as real] by our [Buddhist schools] and other [non-Buddhist] schools, because in reality they have neither singular nor plural nature, they have no nature at all, like a reflected image.

(#2) Since effects are produced gradually [over time], permanent [causal] entities are not themselves singular. If each successive effect is distinct, then [the argument for] permanent, [causal] entities degenerates.

(#3) Even those uncompounded objects of knowledge known by the knowledge which arises in meditation as asserted by the system (of the Vaibhāṣikas) are not unitary because they are related to successive moments of wisdom.

(#4) If the nature of the object known by a previous consciousness continues subsequently, then the previous cognition would still exist in the latter, and in that way also the latter would exist in the former.

(#5) Since the nature of the (later) object does not arise in the earlier and (the earlier object) does not arise in later times, uncompounded phenomena like consciousness must be objects known to arise momentarily.

(#6) If the previous (uncompounded object) arises from the power of (the causes and conditions of the uncompounded object of) an earlier moment, then this would not [actually] be uncompounded, like minds (Skt. *citta*, Tib. *sems*) and mental states (Skt. *caitta*, Tib. *sems las byung ba*).

(#7) If you accept that these momentary (objects) arise independently because there is no dependence on others, then they must either exist permanently or not exist at all.

(#8) What is the purpose of investigating objects which have no meaningful ability to act? What is the purpose of a lustful person inquiring as to whether a eunuch is attractive or not? [1]

(#9) Since it is unsuitable to demonstrate persons as being either momentary or non-momentary (according to Vatsiputrians), it is clearly known that they have neither a singular nor plural nature.

(#10) How can pervasive [entities such as space] be singular given that they are related with a variety of directions? Gross (non-pervasive entities) are also not singular since [some parts] of such entities can be visible [while other parts] are not visible.

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[1] This śloka is the only śloka in the root text which was not composed by Santaraksita. It is drawn from Dharmakīrti's *Pramanāvārttika* ch 1. 211 to support the argument being made. It is unclear wether Santaraksita inserted this quote himself or if perhaps his discipe Kamalasila inserted it.

(#11)What is the nature of the central [atom] which faces singly towards [another] atom yet abides [with other atoms in various directions] either [around and] joining with it or around it [with space between them] or around it without space between?

(#12) If it is asserted that [the central atom] also faces entirely toward another atom, then if that were the case how could land and water be expansive?

(#13) If you accept [atoms with] sides which face other atoms [in different directions,] then if that is the case, how could atoms be singular and partless?

(#14) Atoms have thus been established to have no inherent nature. Therefore it is evident that sight and substance and the like which are asserted [as real] by many of our own [Buddhist] schools and other [non-Buddhist] schools also have no inherent nature.

(#15) The nature of these [entities] is [said to be] comprised of those [atoms]. The qualities of these [entities], their own actions, and even their generalities (Skt. *sāmānya*, Tib. *spyi*) and particularities (Skt. *viśeṣa*, Tib. *khyad pa*), are said to be possessed of those [atoms] (and therefore also do not inherently exist).

(#16) Consciousness is produced in the opposite way from that which is of an inanimate nature. That which is the nature of not being inanimate is the self knowledge of this (consciousness).

(#17) [If Vaibhāṣhikas were to accept self-cognizing cognition], self-cognizing cognition would not actually [be asserted as] action and agent because it would be incorrect for

consciousness which is of a single partless nature [to be understood as] three [knower, knowing, and known] since [consciousness] is of a single, partless nature.

(#18) Because of that, this [consciousness] is capable of self-consciousness since it is the nature of consciousness. How [though] could that cognize the nature of objects from which it is different?

(#19) [Since] its nature does not exist in external objects (Tib. *gzhin*), given that you assert that objects of consciousness and consciousness are different, how could consciousness know objects other than consciousness?

(#20) According to the (Sautrāntika) position that the consciousness possesses aspects, although in actuality the two are distinct, since it is just like a mirror reflection it can be suitably experienced as an imputation.

(#21) There can be not even be externally cognized aspects for those who do not assert a consciousness which reflects aspects of objects.

(#22) Since [aspects] are not different from the single consciousness (as Sautrāntika Non-Pluralists assert) there would not be a multiplicity of aspects. Therefore one would not be able to establish knowledge of objects by the power of that [mere appearance].

(#23) Since aspects are not separate from consciousness, consciousness cannot be unitary. If that is not the case, how can the two (aspects and consciousness) be explained as a unitary?

(#24) [Colors such as] white and the like arise in succession to the consciousness yet because of arising quickly foolish people think they arise simultaneously.

(#25) Why when the mind which hears the sound of such words as "*latā*"[2] [and "*tālah*"] arise very quickly does it not hear them as arising simultaneously?

(#26) Even for the conceptual mind alone, they (i.e. the aspects) will not be known in succession. Since they do not remain for a long time, all minds are similar in the rapidity with which they arise.[3]

(#27) Therefore all objects are not apprehended gradually, but instead are apprehended like manifold aspects which appear to be apprehended simultaneously.

(#28) Even with regards to [the example of] a burning torch, (Sautrāntika Half-Eggists assert) [that torch] gives rise to the mistaken instantaneous appearance of a wheel [of fire] (from memories of distinct perceptions of the torch) because it appears very clearly.

(#29) This joining of intermediate gaps is done by the memory [of the mental consciousness] not by the seeing [of an eye consciousness] because that [eye consciousness] cannot grasp past objects.

(#30) Since the object of that [memory] has passed, it is not clear. Therefore the appearance of the wheel is of a type which is not clear.

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[2] The Sanskrit word 'latā' is translated into Tibetan as "lcug ma" and into English as "creeping plant."

[3] This verse corresponds with Dharmakirti's *Pramanāvārttika*, (3.138).

(#31) If one agrees with (those Sautrāntika Proponents of an Equal Number of Conciousnesses and Aspects) then one would understand that when someone sees the base of a painting then as many minds will arise simultaneously as there are aspects in that painting.

(#32) If that is the case then even when consciousness knows one type of aspect such as the color white, etc., since there is a distinct beginning, middle and end to that there will be a variety of observed (aspects within the one aspect).

(#33) I honestly do not feel there has ever appeared any cognition of an [aspect] such as white, etc. which is singular and like the nature of an atom [as you assert them].

(#34) (According to Sautrāntikas) the five [sense] consciousnesses have aspects of objects [made of] accumulated [partless atoms as their sources of perception]. Objects such as minds (Skt. *citta*, Tib. *sems*) and mental states (Skt. *caitta*, Tib. *sems byung*) are established in the sixth (source of perception).

(#35) Even according to the scriptures of outsiders (such as the Viaśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas) it would be illogical to hold the appearance [of gross objects] as singular since substances and the like are known to posses qualities (Skt. *guna*, Tib. *yon tan*).

(#36) (According to the views of the Jains and the Mīmāmsakas) all entities are (plural) like the nature of a gem (emitting colorful) rays. It would be irrational for the mind which apprehends those (entities) to appear in the nature of singularity.

(#37) Even for those who accept the (Lokāyata) system which establishes all sense faculties and objects as compounds of (the four elements,) earth, and the like, (cognition) is still incompatible with a singular (manner of) engaging entities.

(#38) Even according to the position (of the Sāṃkhyas) (the five mere existences) such as sound, etc. are (only the nature of the three qualities such as) courage, and the like.[4] It is illogical to cognize the appearance of a singular object because objects appear as the nature of the three (qualities).

(#39) Regarding the triple aspect nature of entities, if [consciousness] which is of single aspect nature appears without corresponding compatibility to that [object], how could it be asserted to grasp that object?

(#40) Even though external objects do not exist, the suitability of maintaining (as Vedantins do) a permanent, (singular) consciousness to which arises either simultaneously or successively, various appearances [of aspects] is extremely difficult [to accept].

(#41) Even for the cognition of (the three unconditioned phenomena such as) space, etc., because of the appearance of many conceptual images of letters for the appearance of the mere name, many [aspects] clearly appear.

(#42) Even if there are some conciousnesses of appearances which are not manifold, still, it is not suitable to establish the existence of these in reality because you will see that it is logically incompatible with the possessor of characteristics).

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[4] Courage is the first of the three qualities (Skt. guna, yon tan) all five mere existences are comprised of. The other two are qualities are atoms (Skt. *paramāṇu*, Tib. *rdul phran*), and darkness (Skt. *tamas*, Tib. *mun pa*).

(#43) Therefore it is established from all (perspectives), that the consciousness to which appears manifold aspects, as with differing aspects [themselves] cannot logically be of a single nature.

(#44) Aspects are manifest due to the ripening of latent potentialities of (the same) beginningless (personal) continuum (according to Yogācārans), yet they appear as a result of a mistake like the nature of an illusion (according to their view).

(#45) Their view (i.e. the Yogācāra view) is virtuous, but are the entities of (consciousness) [accepted by] Yogācārans [truly] existent in reality or are they something contentedly accepted only when they are left unanalyzed.

(#46) Since there are contradictions if the actual (Tib. *yang dag*) consciousness is manifold or if it is a unity, [consciousness and objects] are undoubtedly separate entities.

(#47) If aspects are not different from (the singular consciousness) then it will be very difficult to respond to the following consequence that with regards to moving and rest and the like, by the movement of one, all would move.

(#48) Even according to the system of those maintaining external objects, if aspects are not separate (from each other)[5]then they would all also certainly become single phenomena and would not be other than that.

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[5] Ichigo says "(knowlege and its image) are inseparable" I think he missed the point of the argument tha t Santaraksita is saying even if a singular consicousness is not the issue because objects are external, there is still a problem with maintaining truly existent aspects as he establishes in the root text verse and explains in his autocommentary. See Ichigo (1989), p. 207.

(#49) If you accept an equal number of consciousnesses as aspects, then it would be difficult to overcome the same type of analysis as is made regarding atoms.

(#50) If one [consciousness experiences] manifold [aspects] wouldn't that be like the system of the Sky Clad (Digambaras), etc.? Manifold objects are not the nature of singularity just as manifold precious [gems] and the like [are not the nature of singularity].

(#51) If manifold [objects appear to a consciousness of a] single nature, how could they appear in the nature of many and how could parts such as being obstructed and non-obstructed, etc. be distinguished?

(#52) [According to the Yogācāra False Aspectarians (Alīkākāravāda-Yogācāra)] the aspects in the nature of that (object) do not exist. In reality aspects do not exist but appear by virtue of a mistake committed by the consciousness.

(#53) If [aspects] do not exist, how can consciousness clearly experience those [objects]? There is no consciousness which is distinct from the entities of those [aspects which appear to it].

(#54) That will not be known by anyone for whom entities are without [aspects]. Likewise pleasure is not experienced in suffering and non-white is not seen in white.

(#55) With regards to aspects, 'knowledge' is not the correct term [for explaining] direct [perception] because this type of direct [perception] is completely separate from the nature of knowledge, like flowers in the sky, etc.

(#56) [The subject, consciousness,] is incapable of experiencing [aspects] even when examining them because non-existent [aspects] have no [causal] ability like the horn of a horse. The ability of non-existent [aspects] to [cause the] generation of an appearing consciousness is unsuitable.

(#57) What is the relationship of those [aspects] which are definitely experienced with the consciousness? It is not the nature of that [consciousness] and does not arise from it.

(#58) If there were no cause [for aspects,] how is it they arise only on occasion? If they are possessed with a cause, how could some not be [produced] by dependent nature (Skt. *paratantra-svabhaava*)?

(#59) If aspects do not exist, then consciousness [with aspects] also [would not exist] by virtue of the non-existence of aspects. Consciousness then, like a clear crystal, would not experience [objects].

(#60) If they say this [eye consciousness which sees a mirage] is an erroneous (Tib. *khrul*) consciousness, then why does [this system] rely on errors? Even if it arises by the [power of delusion] still then [consciousness of a mirage is] dependent on the power of others (Skt. *paratantra*, Tib. *gzhin gi dbang*).

(#61) When analyzing any entity, [we find] there are none which are truly single. For those for whom there is nothing which is truly single, there must also be nothing which is manifold.

(#62) An [ultimately existing] entity which has aspects and which does not have either a single or plural [nature] does not make sense since the two alternatives are mutually exclusive (and inclusive of all possible alternatives).

(#63) Therefore, all entities are characterized only by conventionality. If one accepts them as ultimate, what can I do for them?

(#64) Those phenomena which are only agreeable when not put to the test of (ultimate) analysis, those phenomena which are generated and disintegrate, and those which have the ability to function are known to be of a conventional nature.

(#65) Although they are agreeable only when not analyzed (by ultimate analysis), since it depends on the earlier causal self, the subsequent fruit arises in correspondence with that.

(#66) Therefore, if there is no conventional cause, that is said to be incorrect and is no good. If its substantial cause (Skt. *upādāna*, Tib. *nyer len*) is said to be real then that must be explained.

(#67) As for the inherent nature of all entities, we have cleared away such claims of others following the path of reasoning. Therefore there is nothing to be disputed [in our position].

(#68) If they are earnest, those [holders of lower school views] will not be able to argue from any angle against those who assert neither existence nor non-existence nor both existence and non-existence.

(# 69) Therefore, in reality there are not any established entities. Due to that the Tathāgatas taught the non-production of all phenomena.

(#70) Because they are harmonious with ultimate truths (Tib. *dam pa'i don*)[6] some call this [non-production] ultimate truth, but in reality they (ultimate truths) are free from all accumulations of elaborations (Skt. *prapanca*, Tib. *spros pa*).

(#71) Because of the lack of (ultimate) production, non-production, etc. does not exist. Because of the refutation of that, the sound of the words of that does not exist.

(#72) There is no good in applying [words] of negation to a non-existent object. Even if one relies on conceptual thought it would be conventional, not ultimate.

(#73) Well then,[if someone were to say that] since they know those [entities], even non-masters should directly intuit the [ultimate] nature of them. Why shouldn't they know [the ultimate nature of] entities in this way?

(#74) They do not. Because of the power of false imputations of real existence onto entities by the burdened continuums of all sentient beings from beginningless time, [emptiness] is not known directly by any animate life form.

(#75) Those [who realize emptiness are] those who know it inferentially with the logical proofs which make [the lack of real existence] known and that cut unreal assertions, as well as those powerful yogis who know it clearly by direct perception.

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[6] Literally, "the object of the holy ones'(*dam pa'i don*), the term refers here to an object realized as an emptiness by the wisdom of an aryan in meditative equipose. In other words an 'object of the holy ones' is an ultimate truth.

(#76) Having discarded [preferred views] based on particular established speech concerning how subjects [exist], there are entities which are well known by everyone from masters to women to children.

(#77) These entities which are established and will be established are thoroughly engaged as such. If that were not the case, how would you respond to the argument that the base (of the logical mark) is not established?

(#78) Because I have not rejected entities with regards to their possessing the taste (Skt. *rasa*, Tib. *ngang*) of appearances, we are unshaken with regard to the establishment of the subject and the thesis.

(#79) The seeds of a [previous] similar type which [stimulate] knowledge of entities and entitylessness, etc. in the continuums [of beings] from beginningless existence are objects of inferential [knowledge].

(#80) Regarding this, because these (notions of entities and entitylessness) [ultimately] do not exist, they do no arise by the power of [external] entities. The nature of entities themselves is thoroughly rejected in an extensive manner.

(#81) Because they arise gradually, they are not sudden. Because there is no permanent arising there is nothing which is permanent. Because they themselves are likewise accustomed to that, entities arise from their own kind (Tib. *rang gi rigs*).

(#82) Therefore, the views of [the two extremes of] eternalism and absolute non-existence (Tib. *chad pa*) remain far away from this text. [Entities arise,] change and decay like a seed, sprout and plant.

(#83) Masters who know the selflessness of phenomena, having become accustomed to the lack of inherent existence, they abandon from the root the afflictions and obstacles which arise from perverted views.

(#84) Since entities which are causes and results are not negated conventionally, there is no confusion about what is purified and what is defiled.

(#85) Since this teaching of cause and result is established, the accumulations [of wisdom and merit] without stains is a suitable position according to this text.

(#86) Pure effects arise from pure causes like the pure limbs, etc. which arise from the ethics of the correct view.

(#87) Likewise, impure effects arise from impure causes like sexual misconduct, etc. arises by the power of wrong views.

(#88) Seeing entities as [truly] existent is like consciousness of a mirage. Since there is harm to valid cognition, it is known as mistaken.

(#89) Because of that [arising from strongly grasping at ultimate existence], accomplishing the [six] perfections will be of little power like [accomplishments] arising from wrong views [which cling to] 'I' and 'mine'.

(#90) There is a great fruit arising from not seeing entities as [ultimately] existent because they arise from an increasing cause like a sprout [arising from] a powerful seed, etc.

(#91) That which is cause and result is merely consciousness only. Whatever is established by itself is consciousness.

(#92) By relying on the mind only, know that external entities do not exist. And by relying on this [Mādhyamika] system, know that no self at all exists even in that (mind).

(#93) Therefore due to holding the reigns of logic as one rides the chariots of the two systems [Yogācāra and Mādhyamika], one obtains [the path of] the actual Mahāyānist.

(#94, #95) Regarding the cause of abiding on the immeasurable, [the knowledge of dependent arising and emptiness] which has not been experienced even by the highest worldly ones (Hīnayāna Arhats), much less experienced by Vaiṣnavites or Śaivaites, that pure nectar is experienced by none other than the Tathāgata, who is motivated by the causes and conditions of great compassion.

(#96) Therefore compassionate intelligent beings who follow the system of [the Tathāgata] should generate [such great compassion] for those believing in tenets which teach mistaken [views].

(#97) Therefore due to possessing wisdom and wealth one sees that there is no essential worth to those other systems and they generate great respect for the Protector (the Buddha).

(Colophon:)

The verses of *The Ornament For The Middle Way* were composed by the great master Śāntarakṣita who has crossed to the other side of the ocean of the tenets of our own Buddhist schools and other's non-Buddhist schools and took the crown of his head to the nectar of the stainless lotus feet of the Lord of Speech (The Venerable Mañjuśrī).

This text was collected and translated by the Indian abbot Śīlendrabodhi and the great translator Ye-shes-sde.

Appendix # 3

Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'

(Translation)

Homage to [my] lama and to the venerable Mañjuśrī. There are three [topics taught] in the verses of *The Ornament For The Middle Way* composed by the great master Śāntarakṣita: the meaning of the title, the detailed explanation of the nature of the Śāstra, and the concluding explanation. The first is easy to understand. As for the second, [there are three divisions]; [one,] it is demonstrated that entities (*dngos bo*) do not ultimately exist; [two,] it is demonstrated that they do exist conventionally; and [three] the refutation of dissenting arguments [of other schools]. Regarding the first [of these, there are two divisions:] to put forth the reasoning and to establish the [three] modes.

(#1) Those entities put forth [as real] by our [Buddhist schools] and other [non-Buddhist] schools, because in reality they have neither singular nor plural nature, they have no nature at all, like a reflected image.

As for the first, the four [lines in the root text beginning with] "Those," etc. pertain. The subject, all inner and outer entities have no true existence as put forth by our schools and others, because they lack being truly one or many like a reflected image.

As for the second [there are two things which need to be proven, there is [first, that the logical mark or reason is of] the property of the subject (Tib. *phyogs chos*) and [second] the establishment of the pervasion (Tib. *khyab pa sgrub pa*). Regarding the first, [there are two divisions:] the establishment of the lack of true singular existence of entities and the establishment of the lack of true plural [existence of entities]. Regarding the first [of those two] the singularity which (is all) pervasive is refuted and the singularity which is non-pervasive is refuted. [Regarding the first there are two divisions] Truly singular permanent entities are refuted. [And] truly singular, permanent persons are refuted. [Regarding the first among those two,]the permanent entities [asserted] by] other schools is refuted and the permanent products [asserted] by our schools are refuted.

As for the first, [the permanent entities held by other schools], the two [lines in the root text beginning with] " Since," etc. pertain.

(#2) Since effects are produced gradually [over time], permanent [causal] entities are not themselves singular.

If (we) were to construct a concequentialist argument [it would be as follows]: the subject, the Prākriti (the Universal Principle of the Sāṃkhya system), would not be of truly singular nature, because it aids in periodic benefits for many successive fruits [over time]. If one were to use an autonomous syllogism [it would be that] the subject, all mere fruits, [must] arise simultaneously because all arise from the one unobstructed, capable direct cause, [Prākriti]. If you accept this then it is made clear by direct perception. Since such a fallacy comes, therefore the mere cause, the subject [of

the syllogism] is not truly singular because it aids in the production of many successive fruits. Therefore, having refuted the true, singular existence of the mere cause (by the reasoning set forth in the consequence and the autonomous syllogism above), the truly, existent Fundamental Nature, [Prākriti] is refuted.

(#2 cont.) If each successive effect is distinct, then [the argument for] permanent [causal entities] degenerates.

Regarding the two [lines in the root text pertaining to] the subsequent pervasion of this, if one says that even for the truly singular fundamental nature [Prākriti] it is not a contradiction to aid in the production of periodic fruits, then is it that the fundamental nature must have the ability to produce results successively [over time]or not? If not, then it must produce [all] fruits simultaneously because whatever produces fruits would not have the ability to gradually produce [over time]. If so then truly singular permanence is contradicted because [the fundamental nature] has many different abilities to produce successive fruits.

As for the second (the actual permanence held by our schools), the collection of twenty [lines in the root text beginning with] "Even," etc. pertain.

(#3) Even those uncompounded objects of knowledge known by the knowledge which arises in meditation as asserted by the system (of the Vaibhāṣikas) are not unitary because they are related to successive moments of wisdom.

The subject, three non-compounded phenomena known by the meditative equipoise of an āryan which the Vaibhāṣika system asserts to be truly singular are necessarily

not truly singular because they are related as subject and object with the various successive [moments of] wisdom obtained through meditation. The pervasion is established since the wisdom which is obtained from such meditative equipoise would be out of order, and the three uncompounded phenomena are necessarily momentary.

As for the first, in reference to [the lines in the root text which begin with] "If the nature," etc., pertain.

(#4) If the nature of the object known by a previous consciousness continues subsequently, then the previous cognition would still exist in the latter and in that way also the latter would exist in the former.

If it is said that even if they are related as subject and object with the various successive [moments of] wisdom obtained through meditation that they are intrinsically singular, then do the three uncompounded phenomena which are the object of the previous wisdom obtained from meditative equipoise still exist in the later meditative wisdom(i.e. wisdom obtained from meditative equipoise) or not? In the first case, it would be that the wisdom of the previous meditative equipoise would exists at the time of the later because of that previous statement. And would it not be that the later meditative wisdom would exist at the time of the former because the later object would exist at the time of the former? If the pervasion is not established then [your assertion that] consciousness and object occur simultaneously degenerates.

In the second case, the four [lines in the root texts beginning with] "If the nature, " etc. pertain.

(#5) Since the nature of the (later) object does not arise in the earlier and (the earlier object) does not arise in later times, uncompounded phenomena like consciousness must be objects known to arise momentarily.

The subject, the three uncompounded phenomena would necessarily be momentary because the nature of the previous would not come to exist in the latter and the nature of the latter would not come to exist in the former, like for example the consciousness of meditative equipoise.

The subject, subsequent uncompounded phenomena, would not be uncompounded phenomena because they are arise from the power of previous uncompounded phenomena like consciousness. If the mark is not established [by you Vaiabhāṣikas,] then the four [lines in the root text which begin with] "If," etc., pertain.

(#6) If the previous (uncompounded object) arises from the power of (the causes and conditions of the uncompounded object of) an earlier moment, then this would not [actually] be uncompounded, like minds (Skt. *citta*, Tib. *sems*) and mental states (Skt. *caitta*, Tib. *sems las byung ba*).

The subject, those [three uncompounded phenomena] must arise from their own power because they [would otherwise have to] arise without dependence on other causes. If it is accepted, then they must permanently exist because this is an entity

which does not cease after the cause ceases (or) it never exists because it is a phenomena which does not follow after a cause.

As for the intrinsic singular existence of persons, the four [lines in the root text which begin with] "If you accept," etc., pertain .

(#7) If you accept that these momentary (objects) arise independently because there is no dependence on others, then they must either exist permanently or not exist at all.

(#8) What is the purpose of investigating objects which have no meaningful ability to act? What is the purpose of a lustful person inquiring as to whether a eunuch is attractive or not? [7]

(#9) Since it is unsuitable to demonstrate persons as being either momentary or non-momentary (according to Vatsiputrians), it is clearly known that they have neither a singular nor plural nature.

When Vatsuputrians say that there are intrinsically singular persons which are inexpressibly [neither] permanent [nor] impermanent (then the syllogism would be as follows). The subject, persons, would not be truly singular because they are not expressed as permanent. [And] they would not be truly many because they are not expressed as impermanent. There is a pervasion since if entities do not have a manifold nature they must me singular [and] if entities are of many natures they must be manifold. In brief, they must not be truly singular because they are not expressible as impermanent or permanent.

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[7] This sloka is the only sloka in the root text which was not composed by Santaraksita. It is drawn from Dharmakirti's *Pramanavartika* (1. 211) to support the argument being made. It is unclear wether Santaraksita inserted this quote himself or if perhaps his discipe Kamalaśīla inserted it.

As for the refutation of the truly singular space which is pervasive, the two lines in the root text beginning with "How can," pertain.

(#10) How can pervasive [entities such as space] be singular given that they are related with a variety of directions?

The subject, [pervasive] time and space, etc. would not be truly singular because a tree, etc., which belongs to different directions like east and the like are simultaneously related with time. Regarding the refutation of inherently singular pervasiveness, there is the refutation truly singular external [objects] and the refutation of inherently singular consciousness. Regarding the first [of those two] there is the refutation of truly singular gross [forms] and that of particles, and the meaning which is established by those [two] and their conclusion.

As for the first, the two [lines in the root text which begin with] "Even," etc. pertain.

(#10 cont.) Gross (non-pervasive entities) are also not singular since [some parts] of such entities can be visible [while other parts] are not visible.

The subject, a jar is not truly singular because there are three contradictions; there is a contradiction with being exposed and unexposed with regard to the substance, etc. (which includes) contradiction with its dependence on mobile and immobile actions, and a contradiction of being colored and uncolored on the grounds of its of qualities.

As for the refutation of the truly singular of atomic particles, the twelve [lines in the root text which begin with] "What is the nature," etc. pertain.

(#11) What is the nature of the central [atom] which faces singly towards [another] atom yet abides [with other atoms in various directions] either [around and] joining with it or around it [with space between them] or around it without space between?

(#12) If it is asserted that [the central atom] also faces entirely toward another atom, then if that were the case how could land and water be expansive?

(#13) If you accept [atoms with] sides which face other atoms [in different directions,] then if that is the case, how could atoms be singular and partless?

The subject, a particle which abides in the center of the ten directions, would not have a different places [of abiding from] the particle to the east and in the nine other directions because the part of the subject facing to the east and the part of the subject facing the other nine directions are one. If you accept this, then it would not be possible to develop into gross form like earth because of accepting that [previous syllogism]. If you accept each of the [10] faces then that subject (the particle in the center of the 10 directions) must not be singular and without parts because the subject would have ten different faces facing the [surrounding] particles in the ten directions.

> Thirdly, therefore [to put forth] the meaning established by them [their are two divisions:] establishing the reasoning and establishing the pervasion as demonstrated in the four lines [in the root text beginning with] "Atoms"[8]

(#14) Atoms have thus been established to have no inherent nature. Therefore it is evident that sight and substance and the like which are asserted [as real] by many of our own [Buddhist] schools and other [non-Buddhist] schools also have no inherent nature.

> The subject, objects of knowledge,[9] it is made known and established that the [five] aggregates (Skt. *skandha*), [eighteen] spheres (Skt. *dhātu*) and [twelve] constituent elements (Skt. *āyatanas*) postulated by our schools and the substance of that which possesses parts postulated by other [non-Buddhist] schools do not have a true nature because there are no truly existent particles.

(#15) The nature of these [entities] is [said to be] comprised of those [atoms]. The qualitics of these [entities], their own actions, and even their generalities (Skt. *sāmānya*, Tib. *spyi*) and particularities (Skt. *viśeṣa*, Tib. *khyad pa*), are said to be possessed of those [atoms] (and therefore also do not inherently exist).

> [Regarding the four lines in the root text beginning with "The nature" etc.,] there is a pervasion because our schools assert the 10 forms[10] are in the nature of combined

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[8] An error was made in the committment of the text to print where instead of referring to the line beginning with *rdul phrin* which is the first word of the four line 14th sloka, the text erroneously refers to the four lines beginning with *pyir* which is actually the first word of the second line of the stanza.

[9] Geshe Jigme Dawa suggested that this in particular is used as the subject by Gyal-tsep to beautify the text and that this usage is fairly common for this purpose.

[10] The ten forms (*gzugs can*) refer here to the five sense organs and the five sense objects within the scheme of the twelve āyatanas elaboraed upon specifically within the Vaibhāṣika system and most notably in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa.*

particles (*gzugs can*) and because other schools[11] hold that the substance of parts is constituted by particles. In addition, since they accept that there is a relationship to the substance of the gross parts with qualities such as form, smell, etc. and with [the qualification] of actions such as lifting up and putting down, etc., and they accept the existence [only] of a great generality and a partial generality of all these particularities such as blue, etc., the pervasion is established.

In order to refute truly singular consciousness[there are three topics]. there is the refutation of the two systems postulated by our own substantialist schools, the refutation of the systems of non-Buddhists, and the refutation of the system of Vijñaptivādins (Tib. *rnam rig*). Regarding the first [of those three, there are two sub-topics the refutation of the system postulated by the Non-Aspectarian Vaibhāṣikans and the refutation of the system of the Sautrāntika. Regarding the first [of those two sub-topics there are two further divisions] to establish the difference between consciousness cognizing external objects (Tib. *don rig*) and self-cognizing consciousness (Tib. *rang rig*) and to establish the difference between the two substantialist [Buddhist schools]. Regarding the first [of those two divisions], the correctness of self-cognizing consciousness will be established and the incorrectness of the consciousness cognizing external objects. Regarding the first of those subdivisions (the correctness of the view of self-cognizing cognition, there are three further subdivisions): putting forth the reasoning, establishing the pervasion, and synopsizing the meaning. As for the first [of these three] the four [lines in the root text beginning with] "consciousness," etc., pertain.

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[11] Refers to the non-Buddhist schools, particularly the Vaiśeṣika system.

(#16) Consciousness is produced in the opposite way from that which is of an inanimate nature. That which is the nature of not being inanimate is the self knowledge of this (consciousness).

> [Regarding] the subject, consciousness, it should be [characterized as] self- cognizing because its production is unlike the nature of [the manner of production of] an inanimate object. There is a pervasion because apprehending consciousness (*'dzin mam*) which is in the nature of being non-inanimate is the self-cognizing consciousness of that mind. In order to establish the pervasion the four [lines in the root text beginning with] "[If Vaibhāṣikas," etc., pertain.

(#17) [If Vaibhāṣhikas were to accept self-cognizing cognition], self-cognizing cognition would not actually [be asserted as] action and agent because it would be incorrect for consciousness which is of a single partless nature [to be understood as] three [knower, knowing, and known] since [consciousness] is of a single, partless nature.

> The self-cognizing cognition of that subject, [consciousness,] does not exist in a manner of substantive difference from the three: knower, knowing and known because the subject is one without any substantive parts. [12] This pervasion is established because it would be incorrect to posit three different substances (such as) knower, knowing (and known) to one which does not have substantial parts. To briefly synopsize the meaning, the two [lines in the root text beginning with] "Therefore," pertain.

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[12] There is a small difference between commentary and root text. The root text says no difference between consciousness and the three and commentary says consciousness's self-cognizing cognition is not different from the three.

(#18) Because of that[13], this [consciousness] is capable of self-consciousness since it is the nature of consciousness.

> That subject, [consciousness], would be correctly posited as self-cognizing consciousness[14] because the subject is the nature of the apprehending consciousness (*'dzin rnam*).

> As for the incorrectness of (holding the view of) consciousness cognizing external objects (Tib. *don rig*) the six [lines in the root text beginning with] "Since" etc., pertain.[15]

(18 cont.) How [though] could it cognize the nature of objects from which it is different?

(#19) [Since] its nature does not exist in external objects (Tib. *gzhin*), given that you assert that objects of consciousness and consciousness are different, how could consciousness know objects other than consciousness?

> It would be incorrect [to posit] directly experienced external objects (Tib. *don dngos su myong*) because the object [and] the consciousness are different substances.

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[13] "Because of that" refers here to the point just made in the autocommentary and not necessarily to the previous sloka of the root text which adds to the argument some early Buddhist scholars have made that the root text and commentary are actually one text composed in both verse and prose and later separated along those lines. Otherwise the root text verses, if separate, would not refer to arguments made in the autocommentary.

[14] The root text clearly says consciousness *is* self cognizing consciousness whereas the commentary is vague and could also translate this as "could be correctly posited as *having* self-cognizing consc."

[15] The commentary probably mistakenly says the next 'six' lines pertain instead of the next 'four' lines since the next reference to the root text in the commentary begins with a reference to the four lines in the root text beginning with the first line of the 20th śloka.

That is the case because the nature of the object does not exist in the [perceiving] consciousness and the nature of the [perceiving] consciousness does not exist in the object. It would be incorrect [to posit] consciousness cognizing external objects in the same way as [the positing of] the correctness of self-cognizing consciousness because the object of consciousness (and the consciousness) are unrelated different substances.

Regarding the dissimilarities in the two systems postulating objects [we will first investigate what is considered as] the validity of the experience [of objects] having analyzed them with regard to the system of the Sautāntikas and [then secondly we will] demonstrate the incorrectness also of analyzing according to the system of the Vaibhāṣikas. As for the first, the four [lines in the root text beginning with "According to" pertain.

(#20) According to the (Sautrāntika) position that the consciousness possesses aspects, although in actuality the two are distinct, since it is just like a mirror reflection it can be suitably experienced as an imputation.

Even though objects and consciousness are of different substance according to Sautrāntika, having analyzed objects, they hold the validity of the experience (of objects by the consciousness perceiving them) because they accept aspects of the object

As for the second, the four [lines in the root text beginning with] "For those," etc. pertain.

(#21) There can be not even be externally cognized aspects for those who do not assert a consciousness which reflects aspects of objects.

> Having analyzed objects according to the system of the Vaibhāṣikas even with this mode of experience, their system would be incorrect because they do not accept the concept of aspects.

> Regarding the refutation of the system of the Sautrāntikas, there is the refutation of the systems of the Non-Pluralists (Tib. *sNa tshogs gnyis med pa*), the Half-Eggist (Tib. *sGo nga phyed tshal ba*) and the Proponents of an Equal Number of Aspects and Consciousnesses (Tib. *gzung 'dzin grangs mnyam pa*). As for the first [of these three divisions of Sautrāntika] the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Since," etc. pertain.

(#22) Since [aspects] are not different from the single consciousness (as Sautrāntika Non-Pluralists assert) there would not be a multiplicity of aspects. Therefore one would not be able to establish knowledge of objects by the power of that [mere appearance].

> When the appearance of many aspects [such as] blue, yellow, white, and red arise to a single consciousness, these aspects would not be of distinct substance, because they are not different from the one partless consciousness. If you accept this, then it would be improper to accept the establishment that the object is substantially different from the [consciousness which apprehends the appearance of the object] because those aspects are not of different substance.

(#23) Since aspects are not separate from consciousness, consciousness cannot be unitary. If that is not the case, how can the two (aspects and consciousness) be explained as a unitary?

> Regarding the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Since aspects," etc., the subject, a consciousness apprehending an array of colors would not be truly singular because it would be of one substance with [those] many aspects. If there is no pervasion [according to Sautrāntikas] then the subject, (a consciousness apprehending an array of colors) would not be truly one substance with those aspects because the subject is a singular substance and those aspects are truly many substances.

> Second, regarding the refutation of the system of the Half-Eggist, [there are two sub-topics,] stating their assertions and the rejection [of their assertions].

(#24) [Colors such as] white and the like arise in succession to the consciousness yet because of arising quickly foolish people think they arise simultaneously.

> First, regarding the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "[Colors," etc., he (the Half-Eggist) claims, "We do not have those faults because when numerous aspects such as blue, yellow, etc., appear to one consciousness, even though the aspects such as white etc. [actually] appear successively to the consciousness, because of the rapidity of the process it mistakenly seems to have appeared simultaneously. For example, even though [circle of] a burning end of a stick [forms] gradually it is said to be known mistakenly [as a circle appearing] at once.

Regarding the second [sub-topic, there are two further divisions,] the rejection of the assertion and the rejection of the examples. Regarding the first [of these two, there are again three further sub-topics] the incorrectness of the consciousness focusing on the sound of the letter, the incorrectness in terms of the approach of the bare conceptual thought toward the object, and the improperness in terms of all consciousness. As for the first [of these three further sub-topics, the four lines in the root text beginning with,] "Why then" etc. pertain.

(#25) Why when the mind which hears the sound of such words as "*latā*"[16] [and "*tālah*"] arise very quickly does it not hear them as arising simultaneously?

When "sara" and "rasa" are spoken, does a misconception arise to have heard simultaneously "rasa" and "sara", the result [of the two spoken words,] because they are heard so quickly? If you accept this then it is rejected by direct perception. As for the second, the two [lines in the root text beginning with] "Even for," etc. pertain.

(#26) Even for the conceptual mind alone, they (i.e. the aspects) will not be known in succession.

When some conceptual cognitions approach the object there arises a misconception that [the bare thoughts] apprehends the object instantaneously because it will apprehend the object very quickly.

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[16] The Sanskrit word 'latā' is translated into Tibetan as "lcug ma" and into English as "creeping plant"

As for the third, the six lines [in the root text beginning with] "Since," etc., pertain.

(#26 cont.) Since they do not remain for a long time, all minds are similar in the rapidity of their arising.

(#27) Therefore all objects are not apprehended gradually, but instead are apprehended like manifold aspects which appear to be apprehended simultaneously.

Is it misconceived that all the minds apprehend objects simultaneously without certainty of apprehending the objects successively because the apprehension of objects is very quick, and because it doesn't abide longer because of being momentary like for example the aspects which you accepted?

Now regarding the second point, (the refutation of the example), [there are two subdivisions:] positing the absurdum and establishing the pervasion. As for the first, the four (lines in the root text beginning with) "Even with regards," etc. pertain.

(#28) Even with regards to [the example of] a burning torch, (Sautrāntika Half-Eggists assert) [that torch] gives rise to the mistaken instantaneous appearance of a wheel [of fire] (from memories of distinct perceptions of the torch) because it appears very clearly.

The subject, a mind which misapprehends burning end of a stick as a circle would be a perception of a non-conceptual mind rather than a mind which connects the edges of the earlier and the later moments of a consciousness because the object

appears clearly. Regarding the second point, the eight [lines in the root text beginning with] "This joining," etc. pertain.

(#29) This joining of intermediate gaps is done by the memory [of the mental consciousness] not by the seeing [of an eye consciousness] because that [eye consciousness] cannot grasp past objects.

(#30) Since the object of that [memory] has passed, it is not clear. Therefore the appearance of the wheel is of a type which is not clear.

If one replies, "No pervasion," there would be a pervasion to that (syllogism) because if it is a mind which joins the earlier and the later, then there must be memory. The subject, non-conceptual consciousness would not join the former and later because it would not hold onto past objects. To such a mind as that of the subject, a mind which joins the former and later, there must be a clearly appearing object because it apprehends past objects. The subject, a mind which misapprehends the burning end of a stick as a circle would not be a mind which joins former and later because if it is, the object would not clearly appear to it, but the object does appear clearly.

Regarding the refutation of those [Sautrāntikans who posit] an equal number of aspects and consciousnesses (there are two sub-topics:) to put forth their assertions and to reject them. As for the first, the four (lines in the root text beginning with,) "If one agrees," etc. pertain.

(#31) If one agrees with (those Sautrāntika Proponents of an Equal Number of Conciousnesses and Aspects) then one would understand that when someone sees the base of a painting then as many minds will arise simultaneously as there are aspects in that painting.

> They say that even when one sees a painting, as with the canvass [example] of the four (root text lines) etc., when there appears many (different) aspects such as blue and yellow, since [we hold that as] many consciousnesses [as aspects] also arise simultaneously we do not have the faults [ascribed by Mādhyamikans] to those [other Sautrāntika schools like Non-Pluralists and Half Eggists]. If one says that, [then we come to] the second [sub-topic, the rejection of what they put forth.] [There are two further subdivisions,] establishing that all minds exist with (the appearance of) many aspects, and demonstrating the impossibility of single partlessness. As for the first, the four [lines in the root text beginning with] "If that", etc. pertain.

(#32) If that is the case then even when consciousness knows one type of aspect such as the color white, etc., since there is a distinct beginning, middle and end to that there will be a variety of observed (aspects within the one aspect).

> The subject, a consciousness perceiving only the aspect of white must be perceiving many aspects because that white would have many different [aspects such as] north, south, etc. If you accept this then it would be impossible for a consciousness to hold only one aspect.

> As for the second [subdivision] the eight [lines in the root text beginning with,] "I honestly do not feel," etc. pertain.

(#33) I honestly do not feel there has ever appeared any cognition of an [aspect] such as white, etc. which is singular and like the nature of an atom [as you assert them].

> A truly singular partless [particle] would be impossible because although it is not perceptible, it cannot not be perceived. If one say the reason is not established, [then the four lines in the root text beginning with, "(According to," , etc. pertain.

(#34) (According to Sautrāntikas) the five [sense] consciousnesses have aspects of objects [made of] accumulated [partless atoms as their sources of perception]. Objects such as minds (Skt. *citta*, Tib. *sems*) and mental states (Skt. *caitta*, Tib. *sems byung*) are established in the sixth (source of perception).

> If that (reason) is not established then with regards to the five [sense] consciousnesses such as the eye consciousness, etc., they aim [as their object] at the accumulation of atomic particles. And as for the mental consciousness which follows after that, it is similar to that (accumulation), but those mental consciousnesses which do not follow after it aim at the accumulation of mental factors and minds.

> Regarding the refutation of the systems of the non-Buddhists, there is the general refutation and the particular refutation.

(#35) Even according to the scriptures of outsiders (such as the Viaśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas) it would be illogical to hold the appearance [of gross objects] as singular...

As for the first [of these two] and regarding the two [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Even according," etc. even according to the non-Buddhist system [of the Particualarists (Vaiśeṣikas)] a consciousness apprehending only one object would be impossible because all minds exist with the appearance of many aspects.

(#35 cont.) ....since substances and the like are known to posses qualities (Skt. *guna*, Tib. *yon tan*)

As for the first among the five in the rejection of the five classes [of non-Buddhists] and regarding the two [lines in the root text beginning with,] "quality," etc., according to the system of the Particularists (Vaiśeṣikas) and the Logicians (Naiyāyikas)[17] (a mind which apprehends only one object) would be impossible because substances and the like which have parts must be apprehended with the qualification of qualities, actions, collections, particularities, etc.

As for the second, the four [lines in the root text beginning with] "jewel," etc. pertain.

(#36) (According to the views of the Jains and the Mīmāmsakas) all entities are (plural) like the nature of a gem (emitting colorful) rays. It would be irrational for the mind which apprehends those (entities) to appear in the nature of singularity.

[17] The dGe-lugs school does not consider the tenets of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas to differ signigicantly enough to warrent separate treatment though it is acknowledged that there are some differences.

According to the system of the Jains and the Mīmāmsakas, that (consciousness apprehending only one object) would be impossible because all entities are truly many like the rays of a jewel.

As for the third (class of non-Buddhists) the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Even for those," etc. pertain.

(#37) Even for those who accept the (Lokāyata) system which establishes all sense faculties and objects as compounds of (the four elements,) earth, and the like, (cognition) is still incompatible with a singular (manner of) engaging entities.

Even according to the system of the Lokāyatas (Hedonists), the previous predicate (a consciousness perceiving only one object is impossible) because they accept that all forms, etc. such as objects and organs such as the eye organ, etc. are in the nature of a collection of the four elements. As for the forth, the eight [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Even according to the position," etc. pertain.

(#38) Even according to the position (of the Sāṃkhyas) (the five mere existences) such as sound, etc. are (only the nature of the three qualities such as) courage, and the like. It is illogical to cognize the appearance of a singular object because objects appear as the nature of the three (qualities).

(#39) Regarding the triple aspect nature of entities, if [consciousness] which is of single aspect nature appears without corresponding compatibility to that [object], how could it be asserted to grasp that object?

> Even [adherents of] the system of the Enumerators (Skt. *Sāṃkhya*) would have to accept that (a consciousness perceiving a single object is impossible) because of accepting that the five mere existences (Tib. *de tsam lnga*), form, sound, etc. appear to the mind as objects which are the nature of the three [qualities] (Skt. *gunas*, Tib. *yon tan*): particles (Skt *rajas*, Tib. *rdul*), darkness (Skt. *tamas*, Tib. *mun*) and courage (Skt. *sattva*, Tib. *snying stobs*). If one says, "There is no pervasion." [then in order to establish the pervasion:] the subject, a consciousness apprehending those five mere existences, would likewise not apprehend the reality of the object because the five mere existences are in the true nature of the three [gunas:] happiness, suffering and equanimity and only one aspect of the object would appear to it. As for the fifth the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Even though" etc. pertain.

(#40) Even though external objects do not exist, the suitability of maintaining (as Vedantins do) a permanent, (singular) consciousness to which arises either simultaneously or successively, various appearances [of aspects] is extremely difficult [to accept].

> Even according to the system put forth by the Vedāntists (Tib. *rigs byed gsang ba'i mthar smwa*) [the existence of] that [consciousness apprehending only one object] would be [impossible] because there is a gross mind to which appears various objects.

(#41) Even for the cognition of (the three unconditioned phenomena such as) space, etc., because of the appearance of many conceptual images of letters for the appearance of the mere name, many [aspects] clearly appear.

As for the refutation of the system of the Sautrāntikas the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Even for," etc. pertain. The subject, a mind apprehending non-compounded phenomena would exist with the aspects of various objects because many generalities, [such as] sound generalities of letters appear to it.

(#42) Even if there are some conciousnesses of appearances which are not manifold, still, it is not suitable to establish the existence of these in reality because you will see that it is logically incompatible with the possessor of characteristics).

(#43) Therefore it is established from all (perspectives), that the consciousness to which appears manifold aspects, as with differing aspects [themselves] cannot logically be of a single nature.

Regarding the eight [lines in the root text beginning with,] "consciousness," etc. even if there were a few consciousnesses to which a variety of objects do not appear, still these would not be truly existent because true existence is defeated by reason. The subject, consciousness cannot be of truly singular nature because of the appearance of various aspects [to it] like for example the many aspects.

Regarding the refutation of the Proponents of Cognition (Skt. *Vijñavādins*, Tib. *rNam rig*) [there are three topics:] stating their assertions, examining the truth and mistakes, and refuting this [view]. As for the first [of these,] the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Aspects," etc. pertain.

(#44) Aspects are manifest due to the ripening of latent potentialities of (the same) beginningless (personal) continuum (according to Yogācārans), yet they appear as a result of a mistake like the nature of an illusion (according to their view).

> From beginningless time, the appearance of objects which are produced, by emanations resulting from the ripening of latent impressions (Skt.*vāsanā*, Tib. *bag cha*) appear as coming objects; they are said to be like the nature of magical illusions appearing as objects even when there are no objects.

> As for the second [topic,] (examining the truth and the mistakes,) the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Their view," etc. pertain.

(#45) Their view (i.e. the Yogācāra view) is virtuous, but are the entities of (consciousness) [accepted by] Yogācārans [truly] existent in reality or are they something contentedly accepted only when they are left unanalyzed.

> Although that view is good and virtuous since it dispels many of the bad adherences of the Sautrāntika and lower schools, however is that non-dual consciousness [and its object] which is pleasant and singular when unexamined, true or is it false?

> In the first case (if it is true), then regarding the third point [refuting this], there are two [further divisions:] refuting the True Aspectarians and refuting the system of the False Aspectarians. And regarding the first [of these two divisions, the refuting of the True Aspectarians,] there are three [further subdivisions:] the refutation of the system

of the Half Eggist, the refutation of the system of the Proponents of an Equal Number of Consciousnesses and Aspects, and the refutation of the system of the Non-Pluralists. In regards to the first of these three further subdivisions (the refutation of the system of the Half Eggists) there are still three further sub-topics: positing the absurdum, demonstrating the [arguments which] harm in their assertions, demonstrating the similar faults even to those who accept objects.

As for the first (the positing of the absurdum of the Half-Eggist), the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Since", etc. pertain.

(#46) Since there are contradictions if the actual (Tib. *yang dag*) consciousness is manifold or if it is a unity, [consciousness and objects] are undoubtedly separate entities.

[If there exists a truly existing consciousness which is non-dual with the objects it perceives], that consciousness would have to be [the nature of] many, because it is truly one with many aspects. Otherwise the aspects would be truly singular because they are truly substantially one with the (truly singular) consciousness. If you say, "There is no pervasion." then those two would be separate substances because the aspects are truly many and the consciousness is [truly] singular. If you accept this consequence, then as for the second point (demonstrating the [arguments which] harm in the assertions of the Half-Eggists), the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "If aspects," etc. pertain.

(#47) If aspects are not different from (the singular consciousness) then it will be very difficult to respond to the following consequence that with regards to moving and rest and the like, by the movement of one, all would move.

When we see the movement of one object, all would move, and when one is yellow, all would be yellow because all aspects are one. As for the third point (demonstrating the similarity of the faults even with those who accept objects) the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Even according to,' etc. pertain.

(#48) Even according to the system of those maintaining external objects, if aspects are not separate (from each other)then they would all also certainly become single phenomena and would not be other than that.

Even according to the system of those who accept external objects the aspects would not be truly singular because those faults cannot be avoided.

Regarding the second [topic] refuting the proponents of an equal number of consciousnesses and objects, the four [lines in the root text beginning with] "If you accept," etc. pertain.

(#49) If you accept an equal number of consciousnesses as aspects, then it would be difficult to overcome the same type of analysis as is made regarding atoms.

Could not many similar kinds of eye consciousnesses simultaneously be generated since the faults shown with regard to the accumulation of many simultaneous partless atoms would be applicable.

As for the third topic (refuting the Yogācāra-Non-Pluralists), the eight [lines in the root text beginning with,] "If one," etc. pertain.

(#50) If one [consciousness experiences] manifold [aspects] wouldn't that be like the system of the Sky Clad (Digambaras), etc.? Manifold objects are not the nature of singularity just as manifold precious [gems] and the like [are not the nature of singularity].

(#51) If manifold [objects appear to a consciousness of a] single nature, how could they appear in the nature of many and how could parts such as being obstructed and non-obstructed, etc. be distinguished?

> If one asserts various aspects are truly in the nature of a singular consciousness (as the Non-Pluralists assert) [and] like the system of the Vedāntists and the Digambaras, then if that truly singular consciousness to which appears various objects is asserted, there is a pervasion since if various aspects appear [to it, it] would not be truly singular, like a heap of jewels. Therefore there is also an appearance of various aspects to the consciousness. If you accept the singularity of aspects, then it would be impossible for there to appear many different aspects such as 'visible' and 'invisible', etc. and aspects of various sorts such as blue and yellow, etc. because the various aspects are truly singular.
>
> As for refuting the False Aspectarian Yogācārans (Skt. *Alīkākāravāda-Yogācāra*,), [there are two topics:] putting forth their assertions and refuting them.

(#52) [According to the Yogācāra False Aspectarians (Alīkākāravāda-Yogācāra)] the aspects in the nature of that (object) do not exist. In reality aspects do not exist but appear by virtue of a mistake committed by the consciousness.

Regarding the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "According to", etc., they say, "We don't have the faults [of those True Aspectarians] with regards to distinct and single substantial aspects since (according to our view) the aspects appear even without existing in reality.

Regarding the second (refuting their assertions) and as for the first of the eight absurdums (used to refute the False Aspectarians) such as [the absurdum] that experiencing aspects would be, incorrect, and the [absurdum of] incorrectness of consciousness in general, etc.; the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "If," etc. pertain.

(#53) If [aspects] do not exist, how can consciousness clearly experience those [objects]? There is no consciousness which is distinct from the entities of those [aspects which appear to it].

For the subject, aspects (of object possessors) the clear experience of them would be incorrect because they do not exist in reality. There is a pervasion because there is no consciousness which is without aspects and [none which] is distinct from the entities of those aspects [which appear to it].

As for the second [absurdum], the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "For anyone," etc. pertain.

(#54) That will not be known by anyone for whom entities are without [aspects]. Likewise pleasure is not experienced in suffering and non-white is not seen in white.

The subject, consciousness, would incorrectly perceive the aspect , for example, because bliss cannot be known in suffering and blue cannot be seen in white [respectively].

As for [the absurdum showing] incorrectness of direct experience the four lines in the root text beginning with, "With regards," etc. pertain.

(#55) With regards to aspects, 'knowledge' is not the correct term [for explaining] direct [perception] because this type of direct [perception] is completely separate from the nature of knowledge, like flowers in the sky, etc.

It would be incorrect to experience the subject, aspects, directly because it is not of the substance of consciousness, like flowers of the sky.

As for [the 4th absurdum showing] the incorrectness of experience [having] examined [the aspect], the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "The subject," etc. pertain.

(#56) [The subject, consciousness,] is incapable of experiencing [aspects] even when examining them because non-existent [aspects] have no [causal] ability like the horn of a horse. The ability of non-existent [aspects] to [cause the] generation of an appearing consciousness is unsuitable.

The subject, consciousness, would be incorrect in its experience of the aspect having examined it because the aspect does not have the ability to produce itself as an aspect possessed by consciousness for example like an impotent horse.[18]

There is a pervasion because if they do no exist in reality it would not have the ability to produce the consciousness to which it appears. [For] the subject, a consciousness to which the atomic particles to the east appears nearer and the atomic particles abiding to the west appears farther, wouldn't the atomic particle to the east appearing to be nearer be [the same as] the atomic particles to the west which appear to be farther because atomic particle of the east which appears nearer is partless. If you accept this, then the particles to the east would [also] appear farther. If you accept this then it is contradicted by direct perception.

As for the [5th] absurdum, that there would be no relationship between aspects and consciousness, the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "What," etc. pertain.

(#57) What is the relationship of those [aspects] which are definitely experienced with the consciousness? It is not the nature of that [consciousness] and does not arise from it.

When the consciousness is experienced it would be incorrect to experience various aspects because there is no relationship between consciousness and aspects. That is so because there is no causal relationship or relationship of identity.

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[18] The root text says '*rta ru*' (horse horn) whereas rGyal-tshab's commentary uses the tradional example of an impotent horse as an example of something without causal efficiency. This makes more sense in this instance. Perhaps there was a mistake in this rescension of the root text. Ichigo's critical edition also say, '*rta ru*.'

As for the [6th] absurdum of the incorrectness of being occasionally arisin the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "If," etc. pertain.

(#58) If there were no cause [for aspects] how is it they arise only on occasion? If they are possessed with a cause, how could some not be [produced] by dependent nature (Skt. *paratantra-svabhaava*)?

Is there a cause of aspects or not? If not, then the subject, aspects, would be incorrect to have arise occasionally since it has no cause. If [you respond] that the reason (Skt. *hetu*, Tib. *rtags*) is not established, then there is an absurdum because it would be a dependent entity due to being produced by an illusory cause(*'khrul pa'i rgyu pa*).

As for the absurdum of being only the aspect of the subject , the four [lines in the root text beginning with], "If aspects," etc. pertain.

(#59) If aspects do not exist then consciousness [with aspects] also [would not exist] by virtue of the non-existence of aspects. Consciousness then, like a clear crystal, would not experience [objects].

If one says it is without aspects of objects , then the subject, consciousness, without aspects of objects would merely consist of aspects of the subject because it is consciousness without aspects of objects (Tib. *gzung rnam*). If you accept this then like the round shaped glass for instance, which is void of the aspects of the object,

there would be no aspect of the subject because it is not perceived although it should be perceived.

As for the absurdum of being a dependent entity, the four lines in the root text beginning with, "If they say," etc. pertain.

(#60) If they say this [eye consciousness which sees a mirage] is an erroneous (Tib. *khrul*) consciousness, then why does [this system] rely on errors? Even if it arises by the [power of delusion] still then [consciousness of a mirage is] dependent on the power of others (Skt. *paratantra*, Tib. *gzhin gi dbang*).

If one says that although in reality there are no aspects, that aspects appear due to illusions, then the subject, aspects would be a other dependent because they depend on illusion since it is arisin from the force of delusion.

As for the refutation the establishment of being void of truly many, the four [lines in the root text beginning with] "When analyzing," etc. pertain.

(#61) When analyzing any entity, [we find] there are none which are truly single. For those for whom there is nothing which is truly single, there must also be nothing which is manifold.

The subject, entities would not be established as being truly many because there are no truly singular [entities]. As for establishing the pervasion, the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "An," etc. pertain.

(#62) An [ultimately existing] entity which has aspects and which does not have either a single or plural [nature] does not make sense since the two alternatives are mutually exclusive (and inclusive of all possible alternatives).

> If the true existence of one and the true existence of many is not established, then there must be no true existence because there are no entities not belonging [either] to the class of one or many. That is so because [the categories of] one and many are a mutually exclusive and inclusive of all alternatives.
>
> Regarding the demonstrating that entities do exist conventionally, [there are three topics:] identifying the characteristics of entities, and of conventional existence, the refutation of the ultimate [existence of the] cause of the illusion. As for the first [of these three topics] the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Therefore," etc. pertain.

(#63) Therefore, all entities are characterized only by conventionality. If one accepts them as ultimate, what can I do for them?

> The subject, these entities must exist falsely because their basis is established and the establishment of true existence is [already] refuted. Regarding the subsequent two (parts of the reason of the previous argument), for that subject, (entities), it would be incorrect for me to refute that which I have truly established because that is truly established by valid cognition. Otherwise it would be incorrect to refute by valid cognition because it arises from previous causes. Therefore it is not established merely by one's wish,

As for the second [topic] the four lines in the root text beginning with, "Those," etc. pertain.

(#64) Those phenomena which are only agreeable when not put to the test of (ultimate) analysis, those phenomena which are generated and disintegrate, and those which have the ability to function are known to be of a conventional nature.

The subject, the [entities possessing three [criterion for real conventional entities: objects which] cannot endure the examination of ultimate analysis, which are produced and cease, and which are able to function, are conventional truths because these are findable objects by the conventional valid cognition (*tha snyad pa'i tshad ma*).

As for the third [topic] (the refutation of the true existence of the cause of the illusion), the eight [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Although," etc. pertain.

(#65) Although they are agreeable only when not analyzed (by ultimate analysis), since it depends on the earlier causal self, the subsequent fruit arises in correspondence with that.

(#66) Therefore, if there is no conventional cause, that is said to be incorrect and is no good. If its substantial cause (Skt. *upādāna*, Tib. *nyer len*) is said to be real then that must be explained.

By saying that it is incorrect if [one holds the view that] there is no true cause of a pot, etc., this statement (of the Yogācārans) is not good because even though there is

no true cause, subsequent fruits arise from previous similar types. Truly existent causes are impossible because true existence has already been refuted.

Regarding the refutation of [dissenting] arguments, there are seven sub-topics: abandoning the contradictions with direct perception, abandoning the contradictions with scripture, expressing the ultimate truth, abandoning (dissenting) arguments regarding that (ultimate truth), putting forth the nature of conventional truth, showing the way the nature of the Mahāyāna is more glorious than the others, and [showing how] if one knows this system, [s/he knows] the cause of the generation of compassion and faith.

As for the first [of these seven], the eight[19] [lines in the root text beginning with,] "As for the," etc. pertain.

(#67) As for the inherent nature of all entities, we have cleared away such claims of others following the path of reasoning. Therefore there is nothing to be disputed [in our position].

(#68) If they are earnest, those [holders of lower school views] will not be able to argue from any angle against those who assert neither existence nor non-existence nor both existence and non-existence.

If one says, " If there are no entities which are established as truly existent, that contradicts direct perception." I respond that, by refuting true existence, there are no faults of contradiction with direct perception because although entities bearing the

[19] The commentary has actually erroneously said that "four" line in the root text pertain to this topic meaning just stanza #67, but actually there are two stanzas pertaining to this topic upon which Gyal-tsap comments, stanzas #67 and #68.

investigation by the knowledge of final examination are refuted, objects found by the conventional valid cognition (*tha snyad pa'i tshad mas*) are not refuted. There would be no faults of contradictions, etc. with direct perception with that explanation (above) because we do not accept the true existence of the four extremes of existence, non-existence, both or neither.

As for the second point the four [lines in the root text beginning with] "Therefore," etc. pertain.

(# 69) Therefore in reality there are not any established entities. Due to that the Tathāgatas taught the non-production of all phenomena.

There is a reason for stating in the scriptures that all phenomena are not produced and do not cease. It is because there are no entities which are truly established.

As for the third, the twelve lines in the root text beginning with, "Because," etc. pertain.

(#70) Because they are harmonious with ultimate truths (Tib. *dam pa'i don*) some call this [non-production] ultimate truth, but in reality they (ultimate truths) are free from all accumulations of elaborations (Skt. *prapanca*, Tib. *spros pa*).

(#71) Because of the lack of (ultimate) production, non-production, etc. does not exist. Because of the refutation of that, the sound of the words of that does not exist.

(#72) There is no good in applying [words] of negation to a non-existent object. Even if one relies on conceptual thought it would be conventional, not ultimate.

The non- truly existent [aggregation of a] sprout would be merely the enumeration (Tib. *mam grangs pa*) of the (real) ultimate truth (of the object) because whatever object is findable by inferential knowledge, [then] by meditating (on the nature of the aggregation of the object) [one] can newly arise the wisdom realizing the emptiness of a noble one. In ultimate reality it would be free from all elaborations because just as there is no true production, true non-production also does not exist in ultimate reality. If one answers that the reason (*rtags*) is not established, then non-production is not ultimately established[20] because there would be no true production of the object of refutation. There is a pervasion because if there is no true production, then in the meditative equipoise (*mnyam gshyag*) according to the view of the (wisdom realizing emptiness of a noble one) there would not be application of the words which refute it (i.e. true production) That is so because there would be no application of negating words (*dgag sgra*) without a base of negation. If they (Yogācārans) say that there is application of negating words to conceptually designated ones then that would not be established as ultimately real but would be conventional because it would be a negation negating the object of refutation designated by conceptual thought.

Regarding (the forth topic) the abandoning of arguments, [there are four sub-topics;] the absurdum that those of low intellect cognize emptiness through direct perception, the absurdum that there would be nobody who [directly] cognizes emptiness, the

[20] ultimate Non-production

absurdum that there would be no establishing speech (Tib. *sgrub ngag*)' the absurdum that there would be no actions (Skt. *karma*, Tib. *las*) and effects, etc.

Regarding the first [sub-topic, there are two further subdivisions]; [abandoning] arguments and responses [to objections]. As for the first [subdivision], the four [lines in the root text beginning with], "Well then," etc., pertain.

(#73) Well then, [if someone were to say that] since they know those [entities], even non-masters should directly intuit the [ultimate] nature of them. Why shouldn't they know [the ultimate nature of] entities in this way?

If one says that even unintelligent people such as shepherds, etc. would cognize emptiness through direct perception because these people perceive entities directly and all entities arise in the nature of being without true existence, then as for the second (sub-division, the response), the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "They do not.," etc. pertain.

(#74) They do not. Because of the power of false imputations of real existence onto entities by the burdened continuums of all sentient beings from beginningless time, [emptiness] is not known directly by any animate life form.

Even though it is so that there are no true existent entities, there is a reason why shepherds, etc. do not cognize emptiness by direct perception. It is because from beginningless time, [their] mental continuum is deluded by being bound to the illusion which exaggerates things as truly [existent].

Well then, as for the second [sub-topic] if one says that there would [then] not be anybody who cognizes emptiness, then the four lines in the root text beginning with, "Those," etc. pertain.

(#75) Those [who realize emptiness are] those who know it inferentially with the logical proofs which make [the lack of real existence] known and that cut unreal assertions, as well as those powerful yogis who know it clearly by direct perception.

Even though those of low intellect do not cognize [emptiness], there are persons who cognize emptiness. Those bodhisattvas on the path of preparation (Tib. *sbyor lam*) or on the path of accumulation (Tib. *tshog lam*) [cognize emptiness conceptually] by relying on correct reasoning. Bodhisattvas abiding on the (ten) grounds realize [emptiness] directly by [relying on] direct yogic cognition.

As for the third [sub-topic] (the absurdum that there would not be any establishing speech), the twelve[21] [lines in the root text beginning with], "Having," etc. pertain.

(#76) Having discarded [preferred views] based on particular established speech concerning how subjects [exist], there are entities which are well known by everyone from masters to women to children.

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[21] The edition of Gyal-tsab's text from his Collected Works as well as the Sarnath edition say 'four' but I think this is an error and that it should say 'twelve' for several reasons. First of all Santaraksita presents on all twelve root text lines (Stanzas #76-#78 as opposed to just stanza #76) collectively and comments on them together in his autocommentary. Secondly Gyal-tsab also comments on the meaning of all twelve lines together much like Santaraksita. And finally, if we are not to assume that Gyal-tsab intended to say that his following section of commentary was on the three root text stanzas consisting of twelve lines then we would have to assume that he skipped stanzas #77 and #78 because the next stanza he identifies in his work in #79. Since he passes over no other stanzas in his commentary it only makes sense that this 'four' is a mistake and it should read 'twelve'.

(#77) These entities which are established and will be established are thoroughly engaged as such. If that were not the case, how would you respond to the argument that the base (of the logical mark) is not established? (108.17)

(#78) Because I have not rejected entities with regards to their possessing the taste (Skt. *rasa*, Tib. *ngang*) of appearances, we are unshaken with regard to the establishment of the subject and the thesis.

> Though there are no truly existent entities, there would be no faults of lacking the establishing of speech, [and] reasoned syllogisms (Tib. *rtags sbyor*), etc. because by abandoning the subjects of the syllogism etc. which are well known to those holders of uncommon tenets, the mere appearance of entities, subjects of the syllogism, etc. which are well known from the wise down to ordinary people, are posited [correctly for] (the establishing of speech and reasoned syllogisms, etc.). If it is not like this, then since the base is not established, there will be faults with regards to the subject not having the property of the reason (Tib, *phyogs chos*) etc. which [you] would not be able to answer because subject, predicate and reason are given only to holders of incompatible tenets. We do not have the faults of the invalidity of positing established objects (Tib. *sgrub bya*) and that which establishes (Tib. *sgrub byed*) according to us (Mādhyamikans) because [we assert] the mere appearance of entities known to the non-conceptual consciousness, from the wise to the common people is not negated.
>
> Regarding the absurdum of the invalidity of karma and results [there are three further divisions:] the absurdum regarding the invalidity of previous and later lives,

> the absurdum regarding the invalidity of all afflicted emotions, and the absurdum regarding the invalidity of the accomplishment of accumulations. Regarding the first [of these three, there are still four further subdivisions:] positing the reasoning, establishing [the reason], [avoiding] the faults [of the two extremes] of permanence and nihilism, and demonstrating the possibility of liberation from cyclic existence.
>
> As for the first (division of the first sub-topic of the forth topic, positing the reason,) the four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "The seeds," etc. pertain.

(#79) The seeds of a [previous] similar type which [stimulate] knowledge of entities and entitylessness, etc. in the continuums [of beings] from beginningless existence are objects of inferential [knowledge].

> The subject, the conception of entities and entitylessness by a newborn baby is preceded by its similar former type because it is consciousness. In the same way one becomes accustomed to objects of desire. As for the second (division of the first sub-topic of the forth topic) (establishing the pervasion) the eight[22] lines in the root text beginning with, "Regarding," etc. pertain.

(#80) Regarding this, because these (notions of entities and entitylessness) [ultimately] do not exist, they do no arise by the power of [external] entities. The nature of entities themselves is thoroughly rejected in an extensive manner.

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[22] Gyal-tsap's commentary actually says "nine," but this is proabably an error because he comments specifically on the eight lines of the two stanzas which are clearly demarkated in the root text.

(#81) Because they arise gradually, they are not sudden. Because there is no permanent arising there is nothing which is permanent. Because they themselves are likewise accustomed to that, entities arise from their own kind (Tib. *rang gi rigs*).

> That subject (consciousness) would not be able to arise by the power of a partless object because there are no partless objects and because the true existence of entities has already been refuted. It would not be causeless because it occurs in succession. Its nature would not be permanent because it is not permanently arising. Thus a previous consciousness [precedes it] because it is consciousness. As for the third (division of the first sub-topic of the forth topic, avoiding the faults of the two extremes of permanence and nihilism,) the four lines in the root text beginning with, "Therefore," etc. pertain.

(#82) Therefore, the views of [the two extremes of] eternalism and absolute non-existence (Tib. *chad pa*) remain far away from this text. [Entities arise,] change and decay like a seed, sprout and plant.

> The system of Mādhyamika does not have the faults of permanence or nihilism (Tib. *rtags chad*). [There is no fault of] permanence because after the cause is negated (Tib. *ldog*), the subsequent effect is reversed (Tib. *dog*) and there is no fault of nihilism because fruits arise[23] from causes like sprouts arise from seeds. As for the forth (division of the first sub-topic within the forth topic) (the possibility of liberation from cyclic existence), the four lines in the root text beginning with, "Masters", etc. pertain.

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[23] The text actually has "*mi 'byung*" (do not arise) but this is probably a mistake in printing given the context. If it were not it would have to say that "true effects do no arise from true causes" but this does not really make sense in the context of the argument.

(#83) Masters who know the selflessness of phenomena, having become accustomed to the lack of inherent existence, they abandon from the root the afflictions and obstacles which arise from perverted views.

> Ārya Bodhisattvas, the subject, abandon afflictions which arise from the cause of grasping true [existence] without (much) effort because they are familiar with emptiness that is already cognized.

> As for the second (division within the 4th sub-topic of the forth topic, the absurdum of positing the invalidity of all afflicted emotions) the four [lines in the root text beginning with], "Since," etc. pertain.

(#84) Since entities which are causes and results are not negated conventionally, there is no confusion about what is purified and what is defiled.

> The refutation the true existence of extremely afflictive emotions (Skt. *saṃkleśas,* Tib. *kun nyon*) does not cause faults of distortion nor deterioration in (the system of) saṃsāra and liberation because causes and results are accepted conventionally.

> As for the third (division within the forth sub-topic of the forth topic, the absurdum of positing the invalidity of accumulations of merit) the twenty four [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Since this," etc. pertain.

(#85) Since this teaching of cause and result is established, the accumulations [of wisdom and merit] without stains is a suitable position according to this text.

(#86) Pure effects arise from pure causes like the pure limbs, etc. which arise from the ethics of the correct view.

(#87) Likewise, impure effects arise from impure causes like sexual misconduct, etc. arises by the power of wrong views.

(#88) Seeing entities as [truly] existent is like consciousness of a mirage. Since there is harm to valid cognition, it is known as mistaken.

(#89) Because of that [arising from strongly grasping at ultimate existence], accomplishing the [six] perfections will be of little power like [accomplishments] arising from wrong views [which cling to] 'I' and 'mine'.

(#90) There is a great fruit arising from not seeing entities as [ultimately] existent because they arise from an increasing cause like a sprout [arising from] a powerful seed, etc.

According to this system stainless accumulations are possible[24] because having refuted true cause and effect, they are established conventionally. The subject, the merits which rise from the intention of the (wisdom realizing) emptiness rise as

[24] The text erroneously says, "*mi rung*" (unsuitable) instead of, "*rung,*"(suitable). This is clearly a typographical error from the context of the argument. However Geshe Ngawang Samden suggested that if it is omitted it is not an absudum, but rather a straight syllogism like the previous 4 "absurdums" which are really just syllogisms. To accord with the others this is how I have treated it, as a reasoning although Gyal-tsap calls

thoroughly pure results because the cause is thoroughly pure like the morality which abandons taking life, etc. rises from the intention of the correct worldly view. The subject, the merits which rise from the intentions of grasping true [existence] would have the opposite predicate and reason like [for example] sexual desire arisen from the strength of the opposite view. The subject, the fruits of the generosity which does not rise from the intention of the (wisdom realizing) emptiness will be of little power because the cause of giving arises from a perverted view like the fruits which arise from grasping at the 'I' and 'mine'. That is the case because truly established phenomena are harmed by valid cognition like grasping at a mirage as water. The subject, generosity which rises from the intention of the (wisdom realizing) emptiness, produces thoroughly pure effects because of arising from thoroughly pure causes of development. like the rising of a sprout of a fresh corn seed.

As for (the fifth topic) putting forth the nature of conventional [truth], the eight [lines in the root text beginning with,] "That which," etc. pertain.

(#91) That which is cause and result is merely consciousness only. Whatever is established by itself is consciousness.

(#92) By relying on the mind only, know that external entities do not exist. And by relying on this [Mādhyamika] system, know that no self at all exists even in that (mind).

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them absurdums. I have just put this in line with the other 3 "absurdums" which Gyal-tsap presents as reasonings..

The subject, all phenomena which are included in cause and effect are not other than the substance of consciousness because they are established by the mode of experience which knows them by direct valid cognition. There is a pervasion because if that is the reason then they must abide in the substance of the consciousness. That subject (all phenomena which are included in cause and effect) should be known conventionally merely in the nature of mind because it is void of external existence. Ultimately the mere mind is not established because it ultimately does not exist as one or many.

As for (the sixth topic) the exalted nature of the Mahāyāna and the way it is superior compared with other (systems), the twelve [lines in the root text beginning with,] "Therefore, due to," etc. pertain.

(#93) Therefore due to holding the reigns of logic as one rides the chariots of the two systems [Yogācāra and Mādhyamika], one obtains [the path of] the actual Mahāyānist.

(#94, #95) Regarding the cause of abiding on the immeasurable, [the knowledge of dependent arising and emptiness] which has not been experienced even by the highest worldly ones (Hīnayāna Arhats), much less experienced by Vaiṣnavites or Śaivaites, that pure nectar is experienced by none other than the Tathāgata, who is motivated by the causes and conditions of great compassion.

The subject, only bodhisattvas [on the path of] preparation [and on the path of] accumulation will become Mahāyānists characterized as possessors of the (wisdom of)

ultimate reality[25] because they hold the reins of logic previously explained while riding on the chariot of the two systems holding the system of Mind Only as conventional (Tib. *tha snyad*) and the [Mādhyamika]system which holds the non-existence of nature (Tib. *rang gzhin*) ultimately. The subject, the wisdom realizing the empty nectar, the actual cause of abiding in the deathless stage for as long as saṃsāra's unestimatable duration is not experienced by any non-Buddhists including Viṣṇu and Shiva, etc. and not even by the crowns of worldly existence, the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas because this is directly, independently experienced only by the Tathāgatas who are the result of pure compassion.

As for the reason for generating faith and compassion when one cognizes this system, the eight [lines in the root text beginning with], "therefore," etc., pertain.

(#96) Therefore compassionate intelligent beings who follow the system of [the Tathāgata] should generate [such great compassion] for those believing in tenets which teach mistaken [views].

(#97) Therefore due to possessing wisdom and wealth one sees that there is no essential worth to those other systems and they generate great respect for the Protector (the Buddha).

The subject, bodhisattvas on [the path of] accumulation and [the path of] preparation have reason for generating compassion for non-Buddhists because they

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[25] The text says, "*thob par 'gyur te* " (will obtain), but probably should read "*thob te*" (have attained) or "*thob par 'gyur pa yin te*" (will have attained).

see (non-Buddhists)] abide in the tenets which show mistaken paths to liberation. The subject, bodhisattvas who abide on [the path of] accumulation and [the path of] preparation who possess the treasure of wisdom have come to generate great respect for the Buddha because they see the triviality of the mistaken paths to liberation of all systems other than the Buddha's system.

Here is the concluding explanation [the third and final major topic of this text] regarding the qualities of this śāstra composed by the great master Śāntarakṣita. As for these qualities, [the lines in the root text beginning with,] "The verse," etc., [in the colophon] pertain.

The verses of *The Ornament For The Middle Way* were composed by the great master Śāntarakṣita who has crossed to the other side of the ocean of the tenets of our own Buddhist schools and other's non-Buddhist schools and took the crown of his head to the nectar of the stainless lotus feet of the Lord of Speech (The Venerable Mañjuśrī).

He heard this dharma directly from the Venerable Mañjuśrī, the Lord of Speech, like taking the pollen [of Mañjuśrī's lotus feet] to the crown of his head.

Having composed this [commentary] on the well taught *Ornament For The Middle Way* by the possessor of the Lord of Scholars, Śāntarakṣita, and likewise (based) on the speech of (my) lama (Je Tsong-kha-pa), in order that it not be forgotten, I dedicate it to all transmigratory beings' mastery of the supreme system.

May I also, having obtained the basis of good [human] endowments [and] having avoided the abyss of wrong views and relied with respect on the supreme virtuous friends (*bshes gnyen*) be like the powerful master, Śāntarakṣita.

May there be virtue [in this] remembrance [of these] teachings of the omniscient guru of the three realms, bLo-bzang-grags-pa (Je Tsong kha-pa) by rGyal-tshab Chos Je (*rGyal-tshab chos rjes*).

And by this may there also abide vast and increasing for a long time in all the doors of all the directions, the precious teachings of the Buddha..[26]

Manga Lam

[26] This is the printer's dedication.

Appendix #4

The Ornament For The Middle Way

དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་གྱི་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པ

དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་གྱི་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པ་བཞུགས་སོ།།

རྒྱ་གར་སྐད་དུ། མ་ཆུ་མ་ཀ་ཛ་ལཾ་ཀྲ་ར་ཀྲྀ་རི་ཀཱ

བོད་སྐད་དུ། དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་གྱི་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པ།

འཇམ་དཔལ་གཞོན་ནུར་གྱུར་པ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།

བདག་དང་གཞན་སྨྲའི་དངོས་འདི་དག

ཡང་དག་ཏུ་ན་གཅིག་པ་དང་།།

དུ་མའི་རང་བཞིན་བྱལ་བའི་ཕྱིར།

རང་བཞིན་མེད་དེ་གཟུགས་བརྟན་བཞིན། 1

འབྲས་བུ་རིམ་ཅན་ཉེར་སྤྱོད་བས།།

རྟག་རྣམས་གཅིག་ཕུའི་བདག་ཉིད་མིན།།

འབྲས་བུ་རེ་རེ་ཐ་དད་ན།།

དེ་དག་རྟག་ལས་ཉམས་པར་འགྱུར། 2

བསྒོམས་ལས་བྱང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིས།།

ཤེས་བྱ་འདུས་མ་བྱས་སྣ་བའི།།
ལུགས་ལའང་གཅིག་མིན་དེ་དག་ནི།།
རིམ་ཅན་ཤེས་དང་འབྲེལ་ཕྱིར་རོ། 3

རྣམ་ཤེས་སྔ་མས་ཤེས་བྱ་བའི།།
རང་བཞིན་རྟེས་སུ་འབྱང་ན་ནི།།
ཤེས་པ་སྔ་མའང་ཕྱི་མར་འགྱུར།།
ཕྱི་མའང་དེ་བཞིན་སྔ་མར་འགྱུར། 4

སྔོན་དང་ཕྱི་མའི་གནས་རྣམས་སུ།།
དེ་ཡི་ངོ་བོ་མི་འབྱུང་ན།།
འདུས་མ་བྱས་དེ་ཤེས་པ་བཞིན།།
སྐད་ཅིག་འབྱུང་བར་ཤེས་པར་བྱ། 5

སྔ་མ་སྔ་མའི་སྐད་ཅིག་གི།
མཐུ་ཡིས་འབྱུང་བར་འགྱུར་བ་ན།།
འདུས་མ་བྱས་སུ་འདི་མི་འགྱུར།།
སེམས་དང་སེམས་ལས་བྱུང་བ་བཞིན།། 6

སྐད་ཅིག་མ་རྣམས་འདི་དག་ཏུ།།
རང་དབང་འབྱུང་བར་འདོད་ན་ནི།།
གཞན་ལ་ལྟོས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།།
རྟག་ཏུ་ཡོད་པའམ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར།། 7

དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ལ།།
དེ་འདོད་བརྟགས་པས་ཅི་ཞིག་བྱ།།

མ་ནིང་གཟུགས་བཟང་མི་བཟང་ཞེས།།
འདོད་ལྷན་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་བརྟགས་ཅི་ཕན།། 8

སྐད་ཅིག་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པར།།
གང་ཟག་བསྟན་དུ་མི་རུང་བས།།
གཅིག་དང་དུ་མའི་རང་བཞིན་དང་།།
བྲལ་བར་གསལ་བར་རབ་ཏུ་ཤེས།། 9

ཐ་དད་ཕྱོགས་ཅན་དང་འབྲེལ་ཕྱིར།།
ཁྱབ་རྣམས་གཅིག་པུར་གྱུར་ལ་འགྱུར།
བསྒྲིབས་དང་མ་བསྒྲིབས་དངོས་སོགས་ཕྱིར།།
རགས་པ་རྣམས་ཀུང་གཅིག་པུ་མིན། 10

འབྱར་བ་དང་ནི་བསྐོར་བའམ།།
བར་མེད་རྣམ་པར་གནས་ཀུང་རུང་།
དབུས་གནས་དུལ་ཕྱན་དུལ་གཅིག་ལ།།
བལྟས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་གང་ཡིན་པ།། 11

དུལ་ཕྱན་གཞན་ལ་ལྟ་བ་ཡང་།།
དེ་ཉིད་གལ་ཏེ་ཡིན་བརྗོད་ན།།
དེ་ལྟ་ཡིན་ན་ས་ཆུ་སོགས།།
ཇི་ལྟར་རྒྱས་འགྱུར་མ་ཡིན་ནམ།། 12

དུལ་ཕྱན་གཞན་ལ་ལྟ་བའི་ངོས།།
གལ་ཏེ་གཞན་དུ་འདོད་ན་ནི།།
རབ་ཏུ་ཕྱ་དུལ་ཇི་ལྟ་བུར།།

གཅིག་པུ་ཆ་ཤས་མེད་པར་འགྱུར།། 13

རྟུལ་ཕྲན་རང་བཞིན་མེད་གྲུབ་པ།།
དེ་ཕྱིར་མེག་དང་ཇ་ལ་སོགས།།
བདག་དང་གཞན་སྣོས་མང་པོ་དག།
རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་མངོན་པ་ཡིན། 14

དེ་ཡི་རང་བཞིན་དེས་བརྟམས་དང་།།
དེ་ཡི་ཡོན་ཏན་དེ་ལས་བདག།
དེ་ཡི་སྤྱི་དང་ཁྱད་པར་ཡང་།།
དེ་དག་དེ་དང་འདུ་བ་ཅན། 15

རྣམ་ཤེས་བིམ་པོའི་རང་བཞིན་ལས།།
བཟློག་པ་རབ་ཏུ་སྐྱེ་བ་སྟེ།།
བིམ་མིན་རང་བཞིན་གང་ཡིན་པ།།
དེ་འདི་བདག་ཉིད་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན།། 16

གཅིག་པུ་ཆ་མེད་རང་བཞིན་ལ།།
གསུམ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་མི་འཐད་ཕྱིར།།
དེ་ཡི་རང་གི་རིག་པ་ནི།།
བྱ་དང་བྱེད་པའི་དངོས་པོར་མིན།། 17

དེའི་ཕྱིར་འདི་ནི་ཤེས་པ་ཡི།།
རང་བཞིན་ཡིན་པས་བདག་ཤེས་རྟུང་།།
དོན་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གཞན་དག་ལ།།
དེ་ཡིས་ཇི་ལྟར་ཤེས་པར་འགྱུར།། 18

དེ་ཡི་རང་བཞིན་གཞན་ལ་མེད།།
གང་གིས་དེ་ཤེས་གཞན་ཡང་ཤེས།།
ཤེས་དང་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བའི་དོན།།
ཐ་དད་པར་ནི་འདོད་ཕྱིར་རོ།། 19

ཤེས་པ་རྣམ་བཅས་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ནི།།
དངོས་སུ་དེ་གཉིས་ཐ་དད་ཀྱང་།།
དེ་དང་གཟུགས་བརྟན་འདྲ་བས་ན།།
བརྟགས་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས་ཆོར་བར་རྟང་།། 20

དོན་གྱི་རྣམ་པས་བསྒྲུར་ལྟན་པའི།།
རྣམ་ཤེས་སུ་ཞེག་མི་འདོད་པ།།
དེ་ལ་ཕྱི་རོལ་རིག་པ་ཡི།།
རྣམ་པ་འདི་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།། 21

ཤེས་གཅིག་ཐ་དད་མ་ཡིན་པས།།
རྣམ་པ་མང་པོར་མི་འགྱུར་ཏེ།།
དེ་ཕྱིར་དེ་ཡི་མཐུ་ཡིས་ནི།།
དོན་ཤེས་འགྱུར་བར་གཞག་པ་མེད།། 22

རྣམ་པ་རྣམས་དང་མ་བྲལ་བས།།
རྣམ་ཤེས་གཅིག་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ།།
དེ་ལྟ་མིན་ན་འདི་གཉིས་ལས།།
གཅིག་ཅེས་ཇི་སྐད་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ།། 23

དཀར་པོ་དག་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ།།
ཤེས་པ་དེ་ནི་རིམ་འབྱུང་སྟེ།།
མགྲོགས་པར་འབྱུང་ཕྱིར་ཟླུན་པོ་དག།
ཅིག་ཅར་སྐམ་དུ་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན།། 24

ལྷུག་མའི་སྒྲ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་བློ།།
རབ་ཏུ་མགྲོགས་པར་འབྱུང་ཡིན་ན།།
དེ་ཕྱིར་ཅིག་ཅར་འབྱུང་བ་ཡིན།།
འདིར་ཡང་གཅིག་ཕྱིར་འབྱུང་མི་འགྱུར།། 25

ཡིད་ཀྱི་རྟོག་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་ལའང་།།
རིམ་དུ་ཤེས་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ།།
རྗེང་དུ་གནས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པས།།
བློ་རྣམས་ཀུན་ཀྱང་མགྲོགས་འབྱུང་འབྲི།། 26

དེ་ཕྱིར་ཡུལ་རྣམས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ།།
རིམ་གྱིས་འཇིན་པར་མི་འགྱུར་གྱི།།
རྣམ་པ་དག་ནི་ཐ་དད་ལྟར།།
ཅིག་ཅར་འཇིན་པར་སྣང་བར་འགྱུར།། 27

མཁལ་མེ་ལ་ཡང་ཅིག་ཅར་དུ།།
འཁོར་ལོར་སྣང་བའི་འཕྲུལ་པ་འབྱུང་།།
གསལ་བར་རབ་ཏུ་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར།།
མཐོང་བས་མཚམས་སྦྱོར་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།། 28

དེ་ལྟར་མཚམས་རྣམས་སྦྱོར་བ་ནི།།

དྲན་པས་བྱིད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་གྱི།།
མཐོང་བས་མ་ཡིན་འདས་པ་ཡི།།
ཡུལ་ལ་འཇིན་པ་མིན་ཕྱིར་རོ།། 29

དེ་ཡི་ཡུལ་དུ་གང་གྱུར་པ།།
དེ་ནི་ཞིག་པས་གསལ་མ་ཡིན།།
དེའི་ཕྱིར་འགོར་ལོར་སྣང་བ་འདི།།
གསལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་འགྱུར་བའི་རིགས།། 30

རི་མོ་རྒྱང་པ་མཐོང་བའི་ཚེ།།
དེ་ལ་དེ་བཞིན་སེམས་མང་པོ།།
ཇི་སྙེ་གཅིག་ཆའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་སྣ།།
འབྱུང་བར་འགྱུར་བ་འདོད་ན་ཀྱོ། 31

དེ་ལྟ་ཡིན་ན་དཀར་ལ་སོགས།།
རྣམ་པ་སྣ་གཅིག་ཤེས་པ་ཡང་།།
ཐོག་མ་དབུས་མཐའ་ཐ་དད་པས།།
དམིགས་པ་སྣ་ཚོགས་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར།། 32

རྟུལ་ཕྲན་བདག་ཉིད་དཀར་ལ་སོགས།།
གཅིག་པུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཆ་མེད་པ།།
ཤེས་པ་གང་ལའང་སྣང་གྱུར་པར།།
བདག་གིས་རབ་ཏུ་ཚོར་བ་མེད།། 33

རྣམ་ཤེས་ལྟ་ཡི་ཁམས་རྣམས་ནི།
བསགས་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཡིན།།

སེམས་དང་སེམས་བྱུང་དམིགས་པ་ནི།།
དྲུག་པར་བཞག་པ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན།། 34

ཕྱི་གཞུང་རྣམས་ལའང་རྣམ་ཤེས་ནི།།
གཅིག་ཏུ་སྣང་བར་མི་འགྱུར་ཏེ།།
ཡོན་ཏན་ལ་སོགས་ལྡན་པ་ཡི།།
�longམས་ལ་སོགས་པར་དམིགས་ཕྱིར་རོ།། 35

ནོར་བུ་གཟི་ཡི་བདག་ཉིད་ལྟར།།
དངོས་པོ་ཀུན་ཞེས་ལྟ་བ་ལ།།
དེ་ལ་འཇིན་པའི་སེམས་ཀྱང་ནི།།
གཅིག་པུའི་ངོ་བོར་སྣང་མི་རིགས།། 36

ས་ལ་སོགས་པ་འདུས་བ་ལ།།
ཡུལ་དང་དབང་པོར་ཀུན་འཛོག་པ།།
སྤུ་འདོད་དེ་ཡི་ལུགས་ལ་ཡང་།།
དངོས་པོ་གཅིག་དང་མཐུན་འཇུག་མེད།། 37

སྐྱེང་སྟོབས་ལ་སོགས་བདག་སྐུ་སོགས།།
ཕྱོགས་ལའང་དོན་གཅིག་སྣང་བ་ཅན།།
ཤེས་པ་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ།།
གསུམ་གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡུལ་སྣང་ཕྱིར།། 38

དངོས་པོའི་ངོ་བོ་རྣམ་གསུམ་ལ།།
དེ་ནི་གལ་ཏེ་རྣམ་གཅིག་སྟེ།།
དེ་དང་མི་མཐུན་སྣང་ན་ཀ།།

དེ་ནི་དེར་འཛིན་ཇི་ལྟར་འདོད།། 39

ཕྱི་རོལ་ཡུལ་རྣམས་མིད་པར་ཡང་།།
སྣ་ཚོགས་སྣང་ལ་རྟག་པ་སྟེ།།
གཅིག་ཆའམ་ཇི་སྟེ་རིམ་འབྱུང་བའི།།
རྣམ་ཤེས་རྒྱང་བར་ཤིན་ཏུ་དཀའ།། 40

ནམ་མཁའ་ལ་སོགས་ཤེས་པ་དག།
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དངོས་པོ་འདི་འདྲ་ཅིས་མི་རྟོགས། 73

མ་ཡིན་ཐོག་མེད་རྒྱུད་ལྡོ་བར།
དངོས་པོར་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་དབང་བྱས་པས།
དེ་ཕྱིར་སྤོག་ཚགས་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱིས།
མངོན་སུམ་རྟོགས་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། 74

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ཤེས་པར་བྱེད་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱིས།
རྗེས་སུ་དཔོག་རྣམས་ཤེས་པར་བྱེད།
རྣལ་འབྱོར་དབང་རྣམས་མངོན་སུམ་གསལ། 75

གཞུང་གིས་བསྒྲིད་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་གི
ཚོས་ཅན་སྒང་ནས་མཁས་པ་དང་།
བྱད་མེད་བྱིས་པའི་བར་དག་ལ།
གྲགས་པར་གྱུར་པའི་དངོས་རྣམས་ལ། 76

བསླུབ་དང་སླུབ་པའི་དངོས་པོ་འདི།
མ་ལུས་ཡང་དག་འཇུག་པར་འགྱུར།
དེ་ལྟ་མིན་ན་གཞི་མ་གྲུབ།
ལ་སོགས་ལན་ནི་ཇི་སྐད་གདབ། 77

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དངོས་པོ་དགག་པར་མི་བྱེད་དེ།
དེ་ལྟ་བས་ན་བསླུབ་པ་དང་།
བསླུབ་བྱ་གཞག་པ་འགྲུགས་པ་མེད། 78

དེ་ཕྱིར་ཐོག་མེད་སྲིད་པ་རྒྱུད་ནས།
དངོས་དང་དངོས་མེད་རྟོགས་སོགས་ཀྱི།
རིགས་དང་མཐུན་པའི་ས་བོན་ཉིད།
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འབྱུང་བ་མ་ཡིན་དེ་མེད་ཕྱིར།
དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་བདག་ཉིད་དེ།
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རྟག་འབྱུང་མ་ཡིན་རྟག་མ་ཡིན།
དེ་བས་གོམས་འདྲ་དེ་ཉིད་ཕྱིར།
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ཆོས་འདི་རྣམ་པར་གཞག་པས་ན།
ཆོགས་རྣམས་དྲི་མ་མེད་པ་ཡང་།
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ཡང་དག་ལྟས་བྱུང་ཚུལ་བྱིམས་ཀྱི།
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བདག་དང་བདག་གི་ར་ལོག་པ་ལས།
བྱུང་བ་བཞིན་དུ་སྟོབས་ཆུང་ངོ་། 89

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རྒྱས་པའི་རྒྱུ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར།
ས་བོན་གྱུང་པོའི་མྱུག་སོགས་བཞིན། 90

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ཤེས་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཁོ་ན་སྐྱེ།
རང་གིས་གྲུབ་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ།

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ཚུལ་འདིར་བརྟེན་ནས་དེ་ལ་ཡང་།
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དེ་དག་དེ་ཕྱིར་ཇི་བཞིན་དོན།
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དཔག་ཏུ་མེད་པར་གནས་པའི་རྒྱུ།
འཇིག་རྟེན་སྤྱི་བོར་གྱུར་པས་ཀྱང་།
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དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་མ་གཏོགས་པར།
གཞན་གྱི་ལོངས་སྤྱོད་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། 95

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དེ་ལྟགས་རྗེས་འཇུག་བློ་ཅན་རྣམས།
སྙིང་རྗེ་ཉིད་ནི་རབ་ཏུ་སྐྱེ། 96

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ཇི་ལྟར་སྟོང་པོ་མེད་མཐོང་བ།
དེ་ལྟར་དེ་དག་རྒྱུས་པ་ལ།
གུས་པ་ཤིན་ཏུ་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར། 97

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ཟློབ་དཔོན་ཞི་བ་འཚོ་བདག་དང་གཞན་གྱི་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ་རྒྱ་མཚོའི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་སོན་པ་འཕགས་པ་ངག་གི་དབང་ཕྱུག་གི་ཞབས་ཀྱི་པདྨ་རྣམས་པའི་ཟེའུ་འབྲུ་ཐྱི་བོས་ལེན་པས་མཛད་པ་རྫོགས་སོ།། རྒྱ་གར་གྱི་མཁན་པོ་སུ་རེན་དྲ་བོ་ཏིའི་དང་། ཞུ་ཆེན་གྱི་ལོ་ཙྪ་བ་བེཌེ་ཡི་ཤེས་སྡེ་བསྒྱུར་ཅིང་ཞུས་ཏེ་གཏན་ལ་ཕབ་པའོ།། ॥

Appendix # 5

Remembering 'The Ornament For The Middle Way'

དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་གྱི་བརྗེད་བྱང་།

དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་གྱི་བརྗེད་བྱང་བཞུགས་སོ།

བླ་མ་དང་རྗེ་བཙུན་འཇམ་པའི་དབྱངས་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ། བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོ་སྟོང་དཔོན་ཞི་བ་འཆོས་མཛད་པའི་དབུ་མའི་རྒྱན་གྱི་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པ་གསུམ། མཚན་གྱི་དོན་དང་། བསྟན་བཅོས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་རྒྱས་པ་བཤད་པ་དང་། བཤད་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་རྫོགས་པའི་བྱ་བའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། གོ་སླའོ། གཉིས་པ་ ལ། དོན་དམ་བར་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་བསྟན། ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡོད་པར་བསྟན། དེ་ལ་སྐན་ཀ་སྦྱང་བའོ། དང་པོ་ལ། རྟགས་དགོད། ཚུལ་སྒྲུབ་པའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། བདག་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ཕྱི་ནང་གི་དངོས་པོ་དེ་དག་ཆོས་ཅན། རང་སྟེ་དང་གཞན་སྟེས་སྒྲས་པ་ལྟར་བདེན་པར་མེད་དེ། བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་དང་བྲལ་བའི་ཕྱིར། མེ་ལོང་གི་གཟུགས་བརྙན་བཞིན། གཉིས་པ་ལ། ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་དང་། ཁྱབ་པ་སྒྲུབ་པའོ། དང་པོ་ལ་ཁྱབ་པའི་གཅིག་དགག བ་ཁྱབ་པའི་གཅིག་དགག་པའོ། དང་པོ་ལ། རྟག་དངོས་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག གང་ཟག་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པའོ། དང་པོ་ལ། གཞན་སྟེས་བཏགས་པའི་རྟག་དངོས་དགག ངང་སྟེས་བཏགས་པའི་རྟག་དངོས་དགག་པའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། འབྲས་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ཐལ་འགྱུར་དུ་

བྱེད་ན། གཙོ་བོ་ཆོས་ཅན། གཅིག་པུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་བདེན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འབྲས་བུ་སྟ་
ཕྱི་རིམ་ཅན་དུ་མ་ལ་ཕན་པ་སྟ་ཕྱི་རིམ་ཅན་དུ་མ་ཉེ་བར་སྒྲུབ་བའི་ཕྱིར། རང་རྒྱུད་དུ་བྱེད་ན།
འབྲས་བུ་ཙམ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཅིག་ཆར་འབྱུང་བར་ཐལ། དངོས་རྒྱུ་ནུས་པ་ཐོགས་མེད་གཅིག་ལས་
སྐྱེས་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་བསལ། དེ་ལྟར་ཐལ་བ་ལས། རྒྱུ་ཙམ་ཆོས་
ཅན། གཅིག་ཏུ་བདེན་པ་མིན་ཏེ། འབྲས་བུ་སྟ་ཕྱི་དུ་མ་ལ་ཕན་པའི་ཉེ་བར་སྒྲུབ་བའི་ཕྱིར།
དེས་ན། རྒྱུ་ཙམ་གཅིག་བདེན་པ་ཁེགས་པས། གཙོ་བོའང་གཅིག་ཏུ་བདེན་པ་ཁེགས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།
དེའི་ཁྱབ་སྦྱོར་ཕྱི་མ་གཉིས་ལ། གཙོ་བོ་གཅིག་ཏུ་བདེན་ཡང་འབྲས་བུ་སྟ་ཕྱི་ལ་ཕན་པ་ཉེ་བར་སྒྲུབ་བ་མི་
འགལ་ལོ་ཞེན། གཙོ་བོ་ལ་འབྲས་བུ་སྟ་ཕྱི་རིམ་གྱིས་བསྒྲིད་པའི་ནུས་པ་ཡོད་དམ་མེད། མེད་ན།
འབྲས་བུ་ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་བསྒྲིད་པར་ཐལ། འབྲས་བུ་བསྒྲིད་པ་གང་ཞེག རིམ་གྱིས་བསྒྲིད་པའི་ནུས་པ་
མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཡོད་ན་རྟག་པ་གཅིག་བདེན་ལས་ཉམས་པར་ཐལ། འབྲས་བུ་སྟ་ཕྱི་རེ་རེ་བསྒྲིད་
པའི་ནུས་པ་མི་འདྲ་བ་དུ་མ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི། སྒོམ་སོགས་ཀང་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱ་ལ། སྒོམ་
བྱང་འཕགས་པའི་མཉམ་གཞག་ཡི་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བའི་འདུས་མ་བྱས་གསུམ་གཅིག་ཏུ་བདེན་པར་
འདོད་པ་བྱེ་བྲག་སྒྲ་བའི་ལུགས་ལའང་འདུས་མ་བྱས་གསུམ་པོ་ནི་ཆོས་ཅན། གཅིག་ཏུ་བདེན་པ་མིན་
པར་ཐལ། སྒོམ་བྱང་གི་ཤེས་པ་སྟ་ཕྱི་རིམ་ཅན་དུ་མ་དང་། ཡུལ་ཡུལ་ཅན་དུ་འབྱེལ་བའི་ཕྱིར།
དེའི་ཁྱབ་སྦྱུབ་ལ། སྒོམ་བྱང་གི་ཡེ་ཤེས་འཆོལ་བར་ཐལ་བ་དང་། འདུས་མ་བྱས་གསུམ་གཅིག་
ཅིག་མར་ཐལ་བའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། རྣམ་ཤེས་སོགས་ལ། སྒོམ་བྱང་གི་ཤེས་པ་སྟ་ཕྱི་རིམ་ཅན་དུ་
མ་དང་ཡུལ་ཡུལ་ཅན་དུ་འབྱེལ་ཡང་གཅིག་ཏུ་བདེན་ནོ་ཞེན། འོ་ན་སྒོམ་བྱང་གི་ཤེས་པ་སྟ་མའི་ཡུལ་

དུ་གྱུར་པའི་འདུས་མ་བྱས་གསུམ་སྟོམ་བཡུང་གི་ཤེས་པ་ཕྱི་མའི་དུས་ན་ཡོད་དམ་མེད། དང་པོ་ལྟར་ན། སྟོམ་བྱུང་གི་ཤེས་པ་ཐ་མ་དེ་ཕྱི་མའི་དུས་ན་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཕྱོགས་ཐ་དེའི་ཕྱིར། སྟོམ་བྱུང་ཤེས་པ་ཕྱི་མའང་ཐ་མའི་དུས་ན་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཕྱི་མའི་ཡུལ་དེ་ཐ་མའི་དུས་ན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། མ་ཁྲབས་ན། ཡུལ་ཤེས་དུས་མཉམ་ཉམས་སོ། གཉིས་པ་ལྟར་ན། སྔོ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། འདུས་མ་བྱས་གསུམ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྐད་ཅིག་མར་ཐལ། སྔོན་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་དེ་ཕྱི་མའི་གནས་སྐབས་སུ་མི་འབྱུང་ཕྱི་མའི་རང་བཞིན་དེ་སྔོན་གྱི་གནས་སྐབས་སུ་མི་འབྱུང་བའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་སྟོམ་བྱུང་ཤེས་པ་བཞིན། ཡང་འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཕྱི་མ་རྣམས་ཆོས་ཅན། འདུས་བྱས་སུ་མི་འགྱུར་བར་ཐལ། འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཐ་མ་མའི་མཐུ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། དཔེར་ན་སྟོམ་བྱུང་གི་སེམས་སེམས་བྱུང་བཞིན། རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ་ན། སྐད་ཅིག་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། རང་དབང་དུ་འབྱུང་བར་ཐལ། རྒྱུ་གཞན་ལ་ལྟོས་མེད་དུ་འབྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། རྟག་ཏུ་འབྱུང་བར་ཐལ། རྒྱུ་ལོག་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་མི་ལྡོག་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟག་ཏུ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། གཉིས་པ། གང་ཟག་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པ་ནི། སྐད་ཅིག་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། གནས་མ་བྱ་པའི་སྟེ་པ་ན་རེ། རྟག་མི་རྟག་གང་དུའང་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད་པའི་གང་ཟག་གཅིག་པུ་བདེན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན། གང་ཟག་ཆོས་ཅན། བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་བུལ་དུ་ཐལ། རྟག་པར་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། བདེན་པའི་དུ་བུལ་དུ་ཐལ། མི་རྟག་པར་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་པར་ཐལ། རང་བཞིན་དུ་མ་མེད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་སོ། རང་བཞིན་དུ་མའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན་དུ་མ་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར། བསྟན། བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་ཏུ་བུལ་དུ་ཐལ། རྟག་མི་རྟག་གང་དུའང་བརྗོད་དུ་

མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་པའི་ནམ་མཁའ་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པ་ནི། ཐ་དད་སོགས་གཉིས་ལ་ནམ་
མཁའ་དང་དུས་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྣམས་ཆོས་ཅན། གཅིག་ཏུ་མི་བདེན་པར་ཐལ། ཤར་ལ་སོགས་
པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཐ་དད་ན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཅན་ཤིང་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྣམས་དང་དུས་ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་འཕྲོད་འདུས་
འབྲེལ་བའི་ཕྱིར། མ་ཁྱབ་པའི་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པ་ལ། ཕྱི་རོལ་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག ཤེས་པ་
གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པའོ། དང་པོ་ཕྱི་རོལ་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་ལ། རགས་པ་དང་། དུལ་ཕྲན་
གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པ་དང་། དེ་དག་གིས་གྲུབ་པའི་དོན་ནོ། དང་པོ་ནི། སྒྲིབ་སོགས་གཉིས་ལ།
བུམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། གཅིག་ཏུ་མི་བདེན་པར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། གཅིག་ཏུ་མི་བདེན་པར་
ཐལ། བསྒྲིབས་མ་བསྒྲིབས་སོགས་ཇས་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་འགལ་འདུ། ལ་སོགས་པ་གཡོ་མི་གཡོ་
སོགས་བྱ་བ་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་འགལ་འདུ། མཆོད་གྱིས་བསྒྲུངས་མ་བསྒྲུངས་སོགས་ཡོན་ཏན་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་
འགལ་འདུ་སོགས་གསུམ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དུལ་ཕྲན་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པ་ནི། དབྱར་སོགས་
བཅུ་གཉིས་ལ། ཕྱོགས་བཅུའི་དབུས་ན་གནས་པའི་དུལ་ཕྲན་ཆོས་ཅན། ཤར་དུལ་དང་ཕྱོགས་
གཞན་དགུའི་དུལ་གོ་ས་ཐ་དད་མེད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཤར་ལ་བལྟ་བའི་ངོས་དེ་དང་ཁྱོད་ཕྱོགས་གཞན་
དགུའི་དུལ་ལ་བལྟ་བའི་ངོས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། སྐའི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ལ་སོགས་པའི་
རགས་པ་རྣམས་པ་མི་སྲིད་པར་ཐལ། འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར། བལྟ་བའི་ངོས་སོ་སོ་སོར་འདོད་ན།
དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཆ་མེད་ཀྱི་གཅིག་མིན་པར་ཐལ། ཕྱོགས་བཅུའི་དུལ་ལ་བལྟ་བའི་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ངོས་མི་
འདྲ་བ་བཅུ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་དེས་གྲུབ་པའི་དོན་ལ། རྟགས་དགོད་པ་དང་། ཁྱབ་པ་
སྒྲུབ་པ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པ་ཤད་པ་བཞེས་སྟེན་ཏོ། ཤེས་བྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། རང་སྟེས་སྐྱས་པའི་ཕུང་

ཁམས་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་དང་། གཞན་སྡེས་སྨས་པའི་ཡན་ལག་ཅན་གྱི་ཇས་ལ་སོགས་པ་བདེན་པའི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་མངོན་ཞེང་གྱུབ་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྟུལ་ཕྲན་བདེན་པའི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་པ་ཡོད་དེ། རང་སྡེས་གཟུགས་ཅན་བཅུ་རྟུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་བསགས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་ཁས་ལྡངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཞན་གྱི་སྡེ་པས་ཡན་ལག་གིས་ཇས་རྟུལ་གྱིས་བརྟགས་ཤིང་། གཟུགས་དྲི་ལ་སོགས་པ་དེའི་ཡོན་ཏན་དང་། འདོགས་འཇོག་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ལས་དང་། ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ལ་སོགས་པའི་སྤྱི་ཚེན་པོ་དང་། ཉི་ཚེ་བ་དང་། སྟོན་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དེ་ལ་འདུ་བའི་ཁྱད་པར་རྣམས་རགས་པ་ཡན་ལག་གི་ཇས་ལ་འདུ་འབྲེལ་གྱུབ་པར་ཁས་ལྡངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཤེས་པ་གཅིག་བདེན་དགག་པ་ལ། རང་སྡེ་དོན་སྨ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ལུགས་དགག ཕྱི་རོལ་པའི་ལུགས་དགག རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ལུགས་དགག་པའོ། དང་པོ་ལ། རྣམ་མེད་བྱེ་བྲག་སྨ་བའི་ལུགས་དགག མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་དགག་པའོ། དང་པོ་ལ་དོན་རིག་དང་། རང་རིག་མི་མཚུངས་པར་བསྒྲུབ། དོན་སྨ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ལུགས་མི་མཚུངས་པར་བསྒྲུབ་པའོ། དང་པོ་ལ། རང་རིག་འཐད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པ་དང་། དོན་རིག་མི་འཐད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའོ། དང་པོ་ལ། ཐལ་བ་འགོད། ཁྱབ་པ་སྒྲུབ། དོན་བསྟུ་བའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། རྣམ་ཤེས་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། རྣམ་ཤེས་ཆོས་ཅན། རང་རིག་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་མེམ་པའོ་རང་བཞིན་ལས་ལོག་པར་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་པར་ཐལ། བེམ་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རང་བཞིན་གང་ཡིན་པའི་འཇིན་རྣམ་དེ་ཤེས་པ་དེའི་རང་རིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་པ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ནི། གཅིག་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་རང་རིག་དེ་རིག་བྱ་རིག་བྱེད་རིག་པ་གསུམ་པོ་ཇས་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཚུལ་དུ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཇས་ཆ་ཤས་མེད་པའི་གཅིག་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་པར་ཐལ། ཇས་ཆ་

ཤས་མེད་པའི་གཅིག་ལ་བྱ་བྱེད་ཇས་ཐ་དད་པ་གསུམ་མི་འཐད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དོན་བསྡུ་བ། དེ་ཕྱིར་སོགས་གཉིས་ལ། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། རང་རིག་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་འཇིན་རྣམ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དོན་རིག་མི་འཐད་པ་ནི། དོན་སོགས་དྲུག་ལ། དོན་དངོས་སུ་མྱོང་བ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། དོན་ཤེས་ཇས་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེར་ཐལ། དོན་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་ཤེས་པ་ལ་མེད་ཤེས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་དོན་ལ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རང་རིག་འཐད་པ་བཞིན་དོན་རིག་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། དོན་ཤེས་འབྲེལ་མེད་ཇས་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དོན་སྣ་གཉིས་ལུགས་མི་མཚུངས་པ་ལ། མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་དོན་བརྟགས་ནས་མྱོང་བ་འཐད། བྱེ་བྲག་སྣ་བའི་ལུགས་ལ་བརྟགས་ནས་མྱོང་བར་ཡང་མི་འཐད་པར་བསྟན་པའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། ཤེས་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་དོན་ཤེས་ཇས་ཐ་དད་ཀྱང་དོན་བརྟགས་ནས་མྱོང་བ་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། དོན་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི་དོན་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། བྱེ་བྲག་སྣ་བའི་ལུགས་ལ་ཕྱི་རོལ་དོན་བརྟགས་ནས་མྱོང་བའི་རྣམ་པས་ཏེ་ཚུལ་འདིའང་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། དོན་གྱིས་རྣམ་པ་མི་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་དགག་པ་ལ། སྣ་ཚོགས་གཉིས་མེད་པ། སྒྲ་ཙམ་ཡང་ཚལ་བ། རྣམ་ཤེས་གྲངས་མཉམ་པའི་ལུགས་དགག་པའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། ཤེས་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ཤེས་པ་གཅིག་ལ་སྔོ་སེར་དམར་སོགས་རྣམ་པ་དུ་མ་ཤར་བའི་ཚེ་རྣམ་པ་དེ་རྣམས་ཇས་ཐ་དད་མིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་རྣམས་ཤེས་པ་ཆ་མེད་གཅིག་དང་ཐ་དད་མིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། དོན་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བའི་སྒོ་ནས་དོན་ཇས་ཐ་དད་དུ་གྱུར་པར་གཞག་ཏུ་མི་རུང་བར་ཐལ། རྣམ་པ་དེ་རྣམས་ཇས་ཐ་དད་མིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྣམ་པ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ཁྱ་འཇིན་དབང་ཤེས་ཚོས་ཅན།

གཅིག་ཏུ་མི་བདེན་པར་ཐལ། རྣམ་པ་དུ་མ་དང་ཇས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མ་ཁྱབ་ན། ཆོས་ཅན། རྣམ་པ་དེ་རྣམས་དང་ཇས་གཅིག་ཏུ་མི་བདེན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཇས་གཅིག་ཡིན། རྣམ་པ་དེ་རྣམས་ཇས་དུ་མར་བདེན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་སྐྱོང་ཕྱིད་ཚལ་བའི་ལུགས་དགག་པ་ལ། འདོད་པ་བཙོད་པ་དང་། དེ་དགག་པའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། དཀར་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ཁོ་ན་རེ། ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་ལ་སྐྱོན་དེ་དག་མེད་དེ། ཤེས་པ་གཅིག་ལ་སྔོ་སེར་སོགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་དུ་མ་ཤར་བའི་ཚེ་དཀར་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རྣམ་པ་རྣམས་ཤེས་པ་ལ་རིམ་གྱིས་སྣང་ཡང་འཇུག་པ་མགྱོགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་སྣང་ངོ་སྟམ་དུ་འཁྲུལ་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་མགལ་མེ་རིམ་གྱིས་འབྱུང་ཡང་ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་འཁྲུལ་བ་བཞིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ། གཉིས་པ་ལ་དོན་དགག དཔེ་དགག་པའོ། དང་པོ་ལ། ཡི་གེ་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་བློས་མ་ངེས། ཡིད་རྟོག་འབའ་ཞིག་ཡུལ་ལ་འཇུག་པས་མ་ངེས། བློ་ཀུན་གྱིས་མ་ངེས་པའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། ལྷག་མོགས་བཞི་ལ། སྤྲ་ར་རྟ་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་ཚེ། འབྲས་བུ་རོ་དང་མཚོ་གཉིས་གཅིག་ཅར་དུ་ཐོས་པར་འཁྲུལ་པ་སྐྱེ་བར་ཐལ། དེ་གཉིས་ཐོས་པ་ཆེས་ཚུར་བའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་བསལ། གཉིས་པ་ནི། ཡིད་སོགས་གཉིས་ལ། ཡིད་རྟོགས་འགའ་ཞིག་ཡུལ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚེ། ཡུལ་ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་འཇིན་པའི་འཁྲུལ་པ་སྐྱེ་བར་ཐལ། ཡུལ་འཇིན་པ་ཆེས་ཚུར་བའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་བློ་ཀུན་གྱིས་མ་ངེས་པ་ནི། རིགས་སོགས་དྲུག་ལ། བློ་ཀུན་ཆོས་ཅན། ཡུལ་རིམ་གྱིས་འཇིན་པ་མ་ངེས་པར་ཅིག་ཅར་འཇིན་པ་འཁྲུལ་བར་ཐལ། ཡུལ་འཇིན་པ་ཆེས་ཚུར་བའི་ཕྱིར། དེར་ཐལ། སྐད་ཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རིང་དུ་མི་གནས་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་ཁྱོད་རང་འདོད་པའི་རྣམ་པ་རྣམས་བཞིན། གཉིས་པ་ལ། ཐལ་བ་དགོད། ཁྱབ་པ་

སྒྲུབ་པའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། མཁལ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། མཁལ་མེ་ལ་འཁོར་ལོར་འཁྲུལ་པའི་བློ་འདི་ཚོས་ཅན། མཐོང་བ་རྟོག་མེད་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་ཐུ་ཐྱི་མཚམས་སྦྱོར་བའི་བློ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཡུལ་གསལ་བར་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི། འདི་སོགས་བརྒྱད་ལ། མ་ཁྲབ་བོ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ལ་ཁྲབ་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཐུ་ཐྱི་མཚམས་སྦྱོར་བའི་བློ་ཡིན་ན་དྲན་པ་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟོག་མེད་ཤེས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཐུ་ཐྱི་མཚམས་སྦྱོར་བ་མེན་པར་ཐལ། ཡུལ་འདས་པ་མི་འཛིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཐུ་ཐྱི་མཚམས་སྦྱོར་བའི་བློ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཡུལ་གསལ་བར་སྣང་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཡུལ་འདས་པ་འཛིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཁལ་མེ་ལ་འཁོར་ལོར་འཁྲུལ་པའི་བློ་འདི་ཚོས་ཅན། ཐུ་ཐྱི་མཚམས་སྦྱོར་བའི་བློ་མེན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་ཡིན་ན་ཡུལ་གསལ་བར་སྣང་མི་རིགས་པ་ལས། དེ་ཡིན་ན་ཡུལ་གསལ་བར་སྣང་མི་རིགས་པ་ལས་ཡུལ་གསལ་བར་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར། རྣམ་ཤེས་གྲངས་མཉམ་པ་དགག་པ་ལ། འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་དང་། དེ་དགག་པའོ། དང་པོ་འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་ནི། རི་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ཁོ་ན་རེ། རས་གཞི་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རི་མོ་རྒྱང་པ་མཐོང་བ་བཞིན། ཐུ་སེར་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་དུ་མ་སྣང་བའི་ཚེ། རྣམ་ཤེས་ཀྱང་དུ་མ་ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་འབྱུང་བས་ཁོ་བོ་ལ་སྐྱོན་དེ་དག་མེད་དོ་ཞེ་ན། གཉིས་པ་ལ། བློ་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་མའི་རྣམ་པ་དུ་བསྒྲུབ། ཆ་མེད་གཅིག་མི་སྲིད་པར་བསྟན་པའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། དེ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། དཀར་པོའི་རྣམ་པ་གཅིག་པུ་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཚོས། དུ་མའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་དུ་ཐལ། དཀར་པོ་དེ་ལ་ལྷོ་ཤར་སོགས་ཐ་དད་དུ་མ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། རྣམ་པ་གཅིག་ཁོ་ན་འཛིན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་མི་སྲིད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། གཉིས་པ་ནི། དུལ་སོགས་བརྒྱད་ལ། ཆ་མེད་གཅིག་ཏུ་བདེན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པར་ཐལ། དེར་དམིགས་རྟང་མ་

དམིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེར་ཐལ། མེག་གི་རྣམ་ཤེས་སོགས་རྣམ་ཤེས་ལྟ་ནི་ དུལ་ཕྱ་རབ་བསགས་པ་ལ་དམིགས་ཤིང་། དེའི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྱང་བའི་ཡིད་ཤེས་ནི་དེ་དང་འདྲ་བ་མི་ འབྱང་བའི་ཡིད་རྣམས་སེམས་སེམས་བྱུང་ཚོགས་པ་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཕྱི་རོལ་པའི་ལུགས་ དགག་པ་ལ། སྒྲིར་དགག སོ་སོར་དགག་པའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། ཕྱི་སོགས་གཉིས་ལ། ཕྱི་ རོལ་པའི་ལུགས་ལའང་ཡུལ་གཅིག་ཁོ་ན་འཛིན་པའི་བློ་མི་སྲིད་པར་ཐལ། བློ་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་མའི་ རྣམ་པ་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ལ། ཕྱོགས་སྔ་དགག་པ་ལྟ་པའི་དང་པོ་ནི། ཡོན་ཏན་ སོགས་གཉིས་ལ། ཁྱེ་བྱག་པ་དང་རིག་པ་ཅན་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་ཡུལ་གཅིག་ཁོ་ན་འཛིན་པའི་བློ་མི་སྲིད་ པར་ཐལ། ཡན་ལག་ཅན་གྱི་ཇ་ས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཡོན་ཏན་དང་། ལས་དང་། འདུ་བས་ཁྱད་ པར་དུ་བྱས་ནས་འཛིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི། རྣོར་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། རྒྱལ་བ་བའམ་ ཟད་ཁྱིད་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་དེ་མི་སྲིད་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་རྣོར་བྱའི་གཟེ་ལྟར་དུ་མར་བདེན་ པའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་ནི། ས་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། རྒྱང་ཕན་གྱི་ལུགས་ལའང་བསལ་བ་སྔ་མ། གཟུགས་སོགས་ཡུལ་དང་མེག་སོགས་དབང་པོ་ཀུན་འབྱུང་བཞི་འདུས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་ཁས་ལྡངས་པའི་ ཕྱིར་དང་། བཞི་པ་ནི། སྟེང་སོགས་བརྒྱད་ལ། གང་ཅན་གྱི་ལུགས་ལའང་དེ་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། གཟུགས་སྒྲ་སོགས་དེ་ཙམ་ལྟ་པོ་དུལ་ཤུན་སྟེང་སྟོབས་གསུམ་གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཡུལ་ལྔ་ལས་ བར་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། མ་ཁྱབ་ཅེ་ན། དེ་ཙམ་ལྟ་འཛིན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཡུལ་གྱི་གནས་ ལུགས་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་འཛིན་པ་མིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་ཙམ་ལྟ་པོ་བདེ་སྐྱ་བཏང་སྟོམས་གསུམ་གྱི་རང་ བཞིན་དུ་བདེན། ཁྱོད་ལ་ཡུལ་གཅིག་ཁོ་ནའི་རྣམ་པ་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར། ལྟ་པ་ནི། ཕྱི་སོགས་བཞི་

ལ། རིག་བྱེད་གསང་བའི་མཐར་སྣ་བའི་ལུགས་ལའང་དེར་ཐལ། ཡུལ་སྣ་ཚོགས་སྣང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་རགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་དགག་པ་ནི། རྣམ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། འདུས་མ་བྱས་འཇིན་པའི་ཐོ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཡུལ་སྣ་སོགས་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་དུ་ཐལ། ཡི་གེའི་སྤྱི་སྣེ་སྐུ་སྤྱི་དུ་མ་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར། རྣམ་སོགས་བརྒྱད་ལ། རྣམ་པ་སྣ་ཚོགས་མི་སྣང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་འགའ་ཞིག་ཡོད་ན་འདི་པར་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ཐལ། བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་རིགས་པས་གནོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྣམ་ཤེས་ཆོས་ཅན། གཅིག་པུའི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་མི་བདེན་པར་ཐལ། རྣམ་པ་སྣ་ཚོགས་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་རྣམ་པ་དུ་མ་བཞིན། རྣམ་རིག་པ་དགག་པ་ལ། འདོད་པ་བརྗོད། བདེན་ཚྲུན་བརྟགས། དེ་དག་ཀྱང་ཐལ། དང་པོ་འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་ནི། ཅི་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ཇི་སྙེ་ཐོག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་བརྒྱུད་ཀྱི་འོངས་པའི་དོན་སྣང་གི་བག་ཆགས་སྨིན་པས་སྤྲུལ་པས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱེད་པའི་དོན་དུ་སྣང་བའང་དོན་མེད་བཞིན་དུ་དོན་དུ་སྣང་བ་སྐྱུ་མའི་རང་བཞིན་དང་འདྲའོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ། གཉིས་པ་བདེན་ཚྲུན་བརྟགས་པ་ནི། དེ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ལྟ་བ་དེ་མདོ་སྡེ་པ་མན་ཆད་ཀྱི་མངོན་ཞེན་ངན་པ་མང་པོའི་གཉེན་པོ་བྱེད་པས་དེ་དག་བས་དེ་བཟང་པོ་ཡིན་ཡང་། གཉིས་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པ་བདེན་ནམ་བརྫུན་པ་མ་བརྟགས་གཅིག་པུ་ཉམས་དགའ་བ་ཡིན། དང་པོ་ལྟར་ན། གསུམ་པ་དེ་དགག་པ་ལ་གཉིས། རྣམ་བདེན་པ་དང་། རྣམ་ཚྲུན་པའི་ལུགས་དགག་པའོ། དང་པོ་རྣམ་བདེན་པ་ལ་གསུམ། སྒོ་ངོ་ཕྱིར་ཚལ་བ། རྣམ་ཤེས་གྲངས་མཉམ་པ། སྣ་ཚོགས་གཉིས་མེད་པའི་ལུགས་དགག་པའོ། དང་པོ་ལ་ཐལ་བ་དགོད། འདོད་པ་ལ་གནོད་པ་བསྟན་པ། དོན་ཁས་བླངས་པ་ལའང་སྐྱོན་མཚུངས་པ་བསྟན་པའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། གལ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། རྣམ་ཤེས་དུ་མར་ཐལ། རྣམ་པ་དུ་མ་དང་གཅིག

ཏུ་བདེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། རྣམ་པ་རྣམས་གཅིག་ཏུ་ཐལ། རྣམ་ཤེས་དང་ཇ་སྐ་གཅིག་ཏུ་བདེན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་པ་མེད་ན། དེ་གཉིས་ཇ་སྐ་སོར་ཐལ། རྣམ་ཤེས་གཅིག་དང་རྣམས་དུ་མར་བདེན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཐལ་བར་འདོད་ན། གཉིས་པ་ནི། རྣམ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ་རྣམ་པ་གཅིག་གཡོ་བར་མཐོང་བའི་ཚེ་ཐམས་ཅད་གཡོ་བ་དང་། གཅིག་སེར་བའི་ཚེ་ཐམས་ཅད་སེར་པོར་ཐལ། རྣམ་པ་རྣམས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་ནི། ཕྱི་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། དོན་ཁས་ལྷངས་པའི་ལུགས་ལའང་རྣམ་པ་རྣམས་གཅིག་ཏུ་མི་བདེན་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱོན་དེ་དག་བཟློག་ཏུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི། ཅི་སྟེ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། མིག་གི་རྣམ་ཤེས་རིགས་མཐུན་དུ་མ་ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་ཐལ། དུལ་ཆ་མེད་དུ་མ་ཅིག་ཅར་ཆོགས་པ་ལ་བཀོད་པའི་སྐྱོན་དེ་མཚུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་ནི། གལ་སོགས་བརྒྱད་ལ། རྣམ་པ་སྣ་ཚོགས་པ་དེ་ཤེས་པ་གཅིག་གི་ཤར་བཞིན་དུ་བདེན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན། གཅིར་ཡུ་བ་རིག་བྱེད་གསང་བའི་མཐར་སྐྱ་བའི་ལུགས་ལྟར་ཡུལ་སྣ་ཚོགས་སྣང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་གཅིག་ཏདེན་འདོད་ན་རྣམ་པ་སྣ་ཚོགས་སྣང་ན་གཅིག་ཏུ་མི་བདེན་པས་ཁྱབ། རིན་པོ་ཆེ་སྣ་ཚོགས་པའི་ཕུང་པོ་བཞིན། ཤེས་པའང་རྣམ་པ་སྣ་ཚོགས་པ་སྣང་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། རྣམ་པ་རྣམས་གཅིག་ཏུ་འདོད་ན། སྔོ་སེར་སོགས་རྣམ་པ་སྣ་ཚོགས་པའི་རྣམ་པ་སྣང་བ་དང་། སྐྱེགས་མ་སྐྱེགས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཐ་དད་པ་དུ་མ་སྣང་བ་འདི་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། རྣམ་པ་སྣ་ཚོགས་པ་རྣམས་གཅིག་ཏུ་བདེན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྣམ་རྟུན་པ་དགག་པ་ལ། འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་དང་། དེ་དགག་པའོ། ཅི་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ཁོ་ན་ཟེ། རྣམ་པ་ཇ་སྐ་གཅིག་དང་ཐ་དད་ལ་བཀོད་པའི་སྐྱོན་དེ་ཁོ་བོ་ལ་མེད། རྣམ་པ་འདི་རྣམ་པོར་མེད་བཞིན་དུ་སྣང་བ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ། གཉིས་པ་ལ། རྣམ་པ་ཚྭང་བ་མི་འཐད་

པར་ཐལ་བ། སྤྲིན་ཤེས་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ་བ་སོགས་བརྒྱད་ཡོད་པའི་དང་པོ་ནི། གལ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། རྣམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། གསལ་བར་ཚོར་ཞིང་རྒྱུ་བ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོར་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་པར་ཐལ། རྣམ་པའི་དངོས་པོལས་ཐ་དད་པས་ཏེ་རྣམ་པས་དབེན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི། འདི་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ཤེས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། རྣམ་པ་ཤེས་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ལ་རྣམ་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན། སྒྲག་བསྒེག་ལ་བདེ་བ་དང་། དཀར་པོ་ལ་སྔོན་པོ་མེད་པས་མི་ཤེས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། དངོས་སུ་རྒྱུ་བ་མི་འཐད་པ་ནི། རྣམ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། རྣམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་སུ་རྒྱུ་བ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། ཤེས་པའི་ཇོས་མིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ནམ་མཁའི་མེ་དོག་བཞིན། བརྟགས་རྒྱུ་མི་འཐད་པ་ནི། མེད་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ཤེས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། རྣམ་པ་བརྟགས་ནས་རྒྱུ་བ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། རྣམ་པ་ལ་ཁྱོད་རྣམ་ལྡན་དུ་བསྒྲུབ་པའི་ནུས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན། རྟ་རྭ་བཞིན། ཁྱབ་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོར་མེད་ན་རང་སྣང་མཁན་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་བསྒྲུབ་པའི་ནུས་པ་མེད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཤར་དུལ་ཉེ་བར་སྣང་། ནུབ་དུལ་རིང་བར་གནས་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཤར་དུལ་ཉེ་བར་སྣང་བའི་ཆ་དེ་ནུབ་དུལ་རིང་བར་སྣང་བའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཤར་དུལ་ཉེ་བར་སྣང་བ་གང་ཞིག ཁྱོད་ཆ་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། ཤར་དུལ་རིང་བར་སྣང་བར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་བསལ་ལོ། རྣམ་ཤེས་འབྲལ་མེད་དུ་ཐལ་བ་ནི། གང་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ཤེས་པ་ཚུལ་བའི་ཚེ་རྣམ་པ་སྣ་ཚོགས་ཚུལ་བར་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། རྣམ་པ་དང་ཤེས་པ་འབྲལ་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེར་ཐལ། བདག་གཅིག་དེ་བྱུང་གི་འབྲལ་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རེས་འགའ་འབྱུང་

བར་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ་བ་ནི། རྒྱུ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། རྣམ་པ་རྣམས་ལ་རྒྱུ་ཡོད་དམ་མེད། མེད་ན། རྣམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། རེས་འགའ་འབྱུང་བ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། རྒྱུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ་ན། གཞན་དབང་དུ་ཐལ། འགྲུལ་པའི་རྒྱུ་ལས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཕྱིར། འཇིན་རྣམ་འབའ་ཞིག་པར་ཐལ་བ་ནི། དེ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། གཟུང་རྣམ་གྱིས་བདེན་པའོ་ཞེ་ན། ཤེས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། གཟུང་རྣམ་མེད་པར་འཇིན་རྣམ་འབའ་ཞིག་པར་ཐལ། གཟུང་རྣམ་གྱིས་དབེན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། གཟུང་རྣམ་གྱིས་དབེན་པའི་ཤེལ་སྒོང་ལྟ་བུའི་འཇིན་རྣམ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། དམིགས་རྟང་མ་དམིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཞན་དབང་དུ་ཐལ་བ་ནི་འདི་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ཁོ་ན་ཟེ། དོན་ལ་མེད་ཀྱང་འགྲུལ་པའི་དབང་གིས་རྣམ་པ་སྣང་བ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། རྣམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། གཞན་དབང་དུ་ཐལ། འགྲུལ་པ་ལ་རག་ལས་པ་སྟེ་འགྲུལ་པའི་མཐུ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། བདེན་པའི་དུ་བྲལ་སྐྱབ་པ་ནི། དངོས་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། བདེན་པའི་དུ་མར་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ཐལ། བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་པ་སྐྱབ་པ་ནི། གཅིག་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མར་མ་གྲུབ་ན་བདེན་པར་མེད་དགོས་པར་ཐལ། གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་ལས་མ་གཏོགས་པའི་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེར་ཐལ། གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་གཉིས་ཕན་ཚུན་སྤངས་འགལ་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་དངོས་འགལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་བསྟན་པ་ལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་། ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་ངོས་བཟུང་། འགྲུལ་རྒྱུ་བདེན་པ་བཀག་པའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། དེ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། དངོས་པོ་འདི་དག་ཆོས་ཅན། ཇུན་པར་ཐལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པ་བཀག་ཟིན་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར། ཕྱི་མ་གཉིས་ལ། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པ་བདག་གིས་དགག་

མི་རིགས་པར་ཐལ། བདེན་པར་ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཡང་ན་ཚད་མས་དགག་མི་རིགས་པར་ཐལ། འདོད་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས་བཞག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་བདག་རྐྱེ་མ་ལས་འབྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི། མ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། མཐར་ཐུག་དཔྱོད་པའི་རིགས་པས་དཔྱད་མི་བཟོད་པ་དང་། སྐྱེ་འཇིག་ཏེད་པ་དང་། དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པ་གསུམ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཀུན་ཇོབ་བདེན་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཐ་སྙད་པའི་ཚད་མས་རྟེན་དོན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་ནི། བརྟགས་སོགས་བརྗུད་ལ། བྱམ་པ་སོགས་ལ་རྐྱེ་བདེན་པ་མེད་ན་མི་རུང་། ཞེས་པ་དེས་ལེགས་པ་སྨས་པ་མེན་པར་ཐལ། རྐྱེ་བདེན་པ་མེད་ཀྱང་རིགས་འདྲ་སྔ་མ་ལས་འབྲས་བུ་ཕྱི་མ་འབྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། རྐྱེ་བདེན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པར་ཐལ་བ་དང་། བདེན་པ་བཀག་ཟིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ལ་ཀུན་ཀ་སྨང་བ་ལ། མངོན་སུམ་དང་འགལ་བ་སྨང་བ་དང་། ལུང་འགལ་སྨང་བ། དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་བསྟན། དེ་ལ་རྩོད་པ་སྨང་བ། ཀུན་ཇོབ་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་ངོས་བཟུང་བ། ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་ངོ་བོ་དེ་དང་གཞན་ལས་ཁྱད་འཕགས་ཚུལ། ལུགས་འདི་རྟོགས་ན་སྟོང་ཉི་དང་དད་པ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ནོ། དང་པོ་ནི། དངོས་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་པའི་དངོས་པོ་མེད་ན། མངོན་སུམ་དང་འགའ་ལོ་ཞེ་ན། བདེན་པ་བཀག་པས་མངོན་སུམ་དང་འགལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་མེད་པར་ཐལ། མཐར་ཐུག་དཔྱོད་པའི་རིགས་པས་དཔྱད་བཟོད་ཀྱི་དངོས་པོ་བཀག་གི་ཐ་སྙད་པའི་ཚད་མས་རྟེན་དོན་མ་བཀག་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཇི་སྐད་བཤད་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་དང་འགལ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་སྐྱོན་མེད་པར་ཐལ། ཡོད་པ་དང་མེད་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་གཉིས་མེན་སོགས་མཐའ་བཞི་པོ་བདེན་པར་ཁས་མ་བླངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི། དེ་ཕྱིར་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ལུང་ལས་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་མ་འགགས་པར་གསུངས་པ་ལ་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡོད་དེ། ཡང་དག་

པར་གྱུབ་པའི་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་ནི། དམ་སོགས་བཟུ་གཉིས་ལ། མྱ་ཀུ་བདེན་མེད་ཚོས་ཅན། རྣམ་གྲངས་པའི་དོན་དམ་བདེན་པར་ཐལ། རིགས་ཤེས་རྗེས་དཔག་གིས་རྟེན་དོན་གང་ཞེག ཁྱོད་གོམས་པ་ལས་མཉམ་གཞག་མི་རྟོག་ཡེ་ཤེས་གསར་དུ་འབྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། དོན་དམ་པར་སྤྲོས་པ་ཀུན་ལས་གྲོལ་བར་ཐལ། དགག་བྱ་བདེན་སྐྱེ་མེད་པ་བཞིན་བདེན་པའི་སྐྱེ་མེད་ཀྱང་དོན་དམ་པར་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ་ན། སྐྱེ་མེད་དོན་དམ་པར་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ཐལ། དགག་བྱ་བདེན་སྐྱེ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་པར་ཐལ། བདེན་སྐྱེ་གཞི་མེད་ན་མཉམ་གཞག་གི་གཟིགས་ངོར་དེ་བཀག་པའི་ཚིག་གི་སྒྲ་མི་སྲོར་བའི་ཕྱིར། དེར་ཐལ་དགག་གཞི་མེད་པ་ལ་དགག་སྒྲ་སྲོར་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟོག་བཏགས་ལ་དགག་སྒྲ་སྲོར་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཀུན་རྫོབ་པར་འགྱུར་གྱི་བདེན་པར་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ཐལ། དགག་བྱ་རྟོག་བཏགས་བཀག་པའི་བཀག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྩོད་ཟློག་ལ། ཟློག་པ་ཉམས་སུ་ལེན་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པར་ཐལ་བ་སྟོང་ཉིད་རྟོགས་པའི་གང་ཟག་མེད་པར་ཐལ་བ། སྒྲུབ་ངག་མེད་པར་ཐལ་བ། ལས་འབྲས་སོགས་མེད་པར་ཐལ་བའོ། དང་པོ་ལ་རྩོད་པ་དང་། ལན་ནོ། དང་པོ་ནི། འོན་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། མི་མཁས་པ་གནག་རྫི་སོགས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་སྟོང་ཉིད་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པ་གང་ཞེག དངོས་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་བདེན་མེད་ཀྱི་ངོར་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། གཉིས་པ་ནི། མ་ཡིན་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། དངོས་པོ་བདེན་མེད་ཡིན་ཀྱང་གནག་རྫི་ལ་སོགས་པས་སྟོང་ཉིད་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མི་རྟོགས་པའི་ཚུལ་མཚན་ཡོད་དེ། ཐོག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་དངོས་པོ་བདེན་པར་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་པའི་འཁྲུལ་པས་ཆུད་བསྣད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི། འོ་ན། སྟོང་ཉིད་རྟོགས་པའི་གང་ཟག་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་སོགས་བཞི་

ལ། ཏྲིན་པོས་མི་རྟོགས་ཀྱང་སྣོང་ཉིད་རྟོགས་པའི་གང་ཟག་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཆོོགས་སྤྲོར་ལ་གནས་པའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་གཏན་ཆིགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་རྟོགས། ས་ལ་གནས་པའི་སེམས་དཔའ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་ཀྱིས་གཟིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་ནི། གཞུང་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། དངོས་པོ་བདེན་པར་མེད་ཀྱང་རྟགས་སྤྲོར་སྣང་ངོ་སོགས་མེད་པའི་སྐྱོན་མེད་པར་ཐལ། ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ལ་གཞགས་པའི་ཆོས་ཅན་སོགས་སྐང་ས་ནས་མཁས་པ་ནས་བྱིས་པའི་བར་ལ་གཞགས་པའི་དངོས་པོར་སྣང་ཙམ་འདི་ཆོས་ཅན་སོགས་སུ་འཛོག་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་མིན་ན་ཆོས་ཅན་གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་པས་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་སོགས་ལ་ལན་གདབ་མི་ནུས་པར་ཐལ། ཐུན་མོང་མིན་པའི་གྲུབ་མཐས་བརྟགས་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལ་བརྟགས་སྤྲོར་དོན་གསུམ་འཛོག་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁོ་བོ་ལ་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་བཞག་ཏུ་མི་རུང་བའི་སྐྱོན་མེད་པར་ཐལ། མཁས་པ་ནས་བྱིས་པའི་བར་གྱི་རྟོག་མེད་ཤེས་པ་ལ་སྣང་བའི་དངོས་པོ་སྣང་ཙམ་འདི་མི་འགོག་པའི་ཕྱིར། ལས་འབྲས་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ་བ་ལ། རྐ་བ་ཐུ་ཕྱི་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ་བ། ཀུན་ཉོན་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ་བ། ཆོོགས་རྫོགས་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ་བའོ། དང་པོ་ལ། རྟགས་དགོད། དེ་སྒྲུབ་པ། རྟག་ཆད་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་མེད་པ། སྲིད་པ་ལས་ཐར་པ་སྲིད་པར་བསྟན་པའོ། དང་པོ་ནི། དེ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། སྐྱེས་མ་ཐག་གི་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པའི་རྟོག་པ་འདི་ཆོས་ཅན། རིགས་འདྲ་ཐུ་མ་ཐོན་དུ་སོང་སྟེ། རིག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ཆགས་གོམས་པ་བཞིན། གཉིས་པ་ནི། འདི་སོགས་དགུ་ལ། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན་དོན་ཆ་མེད་ཀྱི་སྟོབས་ལས་མ་བྱུང་བར་ཐལ། དེ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། དངོས་པོ་བདེན་པ་བཀག་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། རྒྱུ་མེད་མིན་པར་ཐལ། རིམ་གྱིས་འབྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། ངོ་བོ་རྟག་པ་མིན་

པར་ཐལ། རྟག་ཏུ་འབྱུང་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་ན་རིག་པ་ཇོན་དུ་སོང་སྟེ། རིག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་ནི། དེ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། དབུ་མའི་ལུགས་ལ་རྟག་ཆད་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་མེད་པར་ཐལ། རྒྱུ་ལོག་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲས་བུ་ལྡོག་པས་རྟག་པ་དང་། རྒྱུ་ལས་འབྲས་བུ་མི་འབྱུང་པས་ཆད་པའི་སྐྱོན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ས་བོན་ལས་མྱུ་གུ་འབྱུང་བ་བཞིན། བཞི་པ་ནི། ཆོས་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། བྱང་སེམས་འཕགས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། བདེན་འཛིན་གྱི་རྒྱུ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཉོན་མོངས་སྒྲིབ་མི་དགོས་པར་སྟོང་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། སྟོང་ཉིད་མཐོང་ཟིན་གོམས་པར་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི། རྒྱུ་སོགས་བཞི་ལ། ཀུན་ཉོན་བདེན་པ་བཀག་པས་འཁོར་འདས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་འགྲུགས་ཤིང་ཉམས་པའི་སྐྱོན་མེད་པར་ཐལ། རྒྱུ་འབྲས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་ནི། འདི་སོགས་རྣམས་ལ། ཆོགས་དྲི་མེད་སོགས་པའང་ལུགས་འདི་ལ་མི་རུང་བར་ཐལ། རྒྱུ་འབྲས་བདེན་པ་བཀག་ནས་ཇུན་པ་འཇོག་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྟོང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བས་ཀུན་ནས་བསླངས་པའི་བསོད་ནམས་ཆོས་ཅན། འབྲས་བུ་རྣམ་དག་ཏུ་འབྱུང་སྟེ། རྒྱུ་རྣམ་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འཇིག་རྟེན་པའི་ཡང་དག་པའི་ལྟ་བས་ཀུན་ནས་བསླངས་པའི་སྦྱིན་གཅོད་སྟོང་པའི་ཚུལ་ཁྲིམས་སོགས་བཞིན། བདེན་འཛིན་གྱི་ཀུན་ནས་བསླངས་པའི་བསོད་ནམས་ཆོས་ཅན། ཆོས་རྟག་གོ་སྟོག ལོག་ལྟའི་སྟོབས་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་འདོད་ལོག་བཞིན། སྟོང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བས་ཀུན་ནས་མ་བསླངས་པའི་སྦྱིན་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་སྟོབས་ཆུང་སྟེ། ཁྱོད་རྒྱུ་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བས་ཀུན་ནས་མ་བསླངས་པའི་སྦྱིན་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་སྟོབས་ཆུང་སྟེ། ཁྱོད་རྒྱུ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། བདག་དང་བདག་གིར་འཛིན་པ་ལས་འབྱུང་བའི་འབྲས་བུ་བཞིན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོར་བདེན་པར་གྱུར་པ་ལ་ཚད་མས་གནོད་

པའི་ཕྱིར། སྐྱེས་རྒྱུ་ལ་ཆུར་འཛིན་པ་བཞིན། སྣོང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཀུན་ནས་བསངས་པའི་སྒྲིབ་པ་ཆོས་
ཅན། འབྲས་བུ་རྣམ་དག་འབྱུང་སྟེ། རྒྱས་པའི་རྒྱུ་རྣམ་དག་ལས་འབྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། ས་བོན་གྱུང་
པོའི་མྱ་ཀུ་འབྱུང་བ་བཞིན། ཀུན་རྫོབ་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ངོས་བཟུང་བ་ནི། རྒྱུ་སོགས་བརྒྱད་ལ། རྒྱུ་
འབྲས་ཀྱིས་བསྡུས་པའི་ཆོས་འདི་རྣམས་ཆོས་ཅན། ཤེས་པའི་ཕྱས་ལས་གཞན་མིན་པར་ཐལ།
མངོན་སུམ་ཚད་མས་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་པར་ཐལ། རྟགས་དེ་
ཡིན་ན་ཤེས་པའི་ཕྱས་སུ་གནས་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཐ་སྙད་དུ་སེམས་ཙམ་གྱིས་བདག་
ཉིད་དུ་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་སྟེ། ཕྱི་དོན་གྱིས་དབེན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དོན་དམ་པར་སེམས་ཙམ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་སྟེ།
དོན་དམ་པར་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་དང་བྲལ་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཐེག་ཆེན་གྱི་སའི་ངོ་བོ་དང་གཞན་ལས་འཕགས་
ཚུལ་ནི། ཚུལ་སོགས་བཅུ་གཉིས་ལས། ཆོགས་སྒྲུབ་བའི་སེམས་དཔའ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེ་ཁོ་ན་
ཉིད་ཀྱི་དོན་ཅན་གྱི་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ཐོབ་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ཐ་སྙད་ཙམ་དུ་སེམས་ཙམ་གྱི་ཚུལ་དང་།
དོན་དམ་པར་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པའི་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཤེང་རྟ་ལ་ཞོན། ཐུར་བཤད་པའི་རིགས་པའི་སྲབ་
བསྒོགས་འཇུག་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དུས་དཔག་མེད་འགོར་བ་ཇི་སྲིད་དུ་འཆི་བ་མེད་པའི་གོ་
འཕང་ལ་གནས་པའི་རྒྱུ་ཡང་དག་པའི་བདུད་རྩི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་ཤེས་རབ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱབ་
འཇུག་དང་དབང་ཕྱུག་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་རོལ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དང་། འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་སྒྲིལ་པོ་ཉན་རང་དགྲ་བཅོམ་
པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་ཉམས་སུ་མི་མྱོང་བར་ཐལ། ཐུགས་རྗེ་དག་པའི་རྒྱུ་ཅན་གྱི་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་
ཉག་གཅིག་གིས་རང་དབང་དུ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མྱོང་བའི་ཕྱིར། ལུགས་འདི་རྟོགས་ན་སྟིང་རྗེ་དང་དད་པ་
སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ནི། དེ་སོགས་བརྒྱད་ལ། ཆོགས་སྒྲུབ་བའི་སེམས་དཔའ་དག་ཆོས་ཅན། ཕྱི་

རོལ་པ་རྣམས་ལ་སྙིང་རྗེ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡོད་དེ། དེ་དག་ཐར་ལམ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཏུ་སྐྱོན་པའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ལ་འཆེལ་ཞིང་གཞོལ་བར་མཐོང་བའི་ཕྱིར། བོ་གྲོས་ཀྱི་རོར་དང་ལྡན་པའི་ཚོགས་སྡུར་ལ་གནས་པའི་བྱང་སེམས་ཆོས་ཅན། ཐུབ་པ་ལ་གུས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ཐུབ་པའི་ལུགས་ལས་ལུགས་གཞན་ཐམས་ཅད་ཐར་ལམ་ལས་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཏུ་གྱུར་པས་སྙིང་པོ་མེད་པར་གཟིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། བཤད་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་རྫོགས་པའི་བྱ་བ་ནི། བསྟན་བཅོས་འདི་སྨོན་དཔོན་ཞི་བ་འཚོས་མཛད་ལ། དེའི་ཡོན་ཏན་ནི་བདག་དང་སོགས་སོ། ངག་གི་དབང་ཕྱུག་ནི་རྗེས་བཟུན་འཇམ་པའི་དབྱངས་སོ། ཟེ་འབྲུ་སྤྱི་བོས་ལེན་པ་ནི་དེ་ལ་དངོས་སུ་ཆོས་ཉན་པའོ། མཁས་པའི་དབང་པོ་དཔལ་ལྡན་ཞི་བ་འཚོས། ལེགས་པར་བཤད་པའི་དབྱ་མ་རྣམས་འདི་ལ། ཏླ་མའི་གསུང་བཞིན་བཟློད་བྱང་འདི་བྱས་པས། འགྲོ་ཀུན་ཐེག་མཆོག་ལུགས་ལ་མཁས་པར་ཤོག བདག་ཀྱང་དལ་བའི་རྐེན་བཟང་ཐོབ་གྱུར་ནས། བཤེས་གཉེན་མཆོག་རྣམས་གུས་པས་བསྟེན་ཏྲིད་ཅིང་། ལྷ་ངན་ལོག་པའི་གཡང་ས་ངན་སྤང་ས། མཁས་པའི་དབང་པོ་ཞི་འཚོ་འདྲ་བར་ཤོག ཁམས་གསུམ་གྱི་ཏླ་མ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པ་ཏློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པའི་གསུང་རྒྱལ་ཚབ་ཆོས་རྗེས་བརྗེད་བྱང་དུ་བྱས་པ་དག་བར་གྱུར་ཅིག

※ རྣམ་གྲོལ་ཞི་བའི་རྒྱ་མཚོར་རོ་གཅིག་ཀྱི། གཞོལ་བའི་མཐའ་ཡས་ཆོས་ཚུལ་དལ་འབབ་ཀྱང་། ཆིག་གི་གཟིགས་མ་རེས་ཀྱང་དུག་གསུམ་གྱི། དྲི་མ་ཡོངས་འཁྲུད་ལེགས་བཤད་བདུད་རྩི་འདི། དཔར་དུ་བསྐྲུན་པའི་རྣམ་དཀར་ཕུང་པོའི་མཐུས། ཡང་དག་ཆོས་ཀྱི་སྐོ་མོ་སྙོང་ཕྱག་བརྒྱ། གདངས་ཀྱ་རྒྱུད་ལྡའི་འགྲོ་བ་མ་ལུས་པ། ངེས་ལེགས་ནོར་བུའི་མཛོད་ལ་དབང་འབྱོར་ཤོག ཅེས་པ་འདི་ཉིད་ནང་བསྟན་གྱུབ་མཐའ་རིས་མེད་ཀྱི་གསུང་རབ་དག་དཔར་དུ་བསྐྲུན་དང་བསྐྲུན་འགྱུར་གང་ལའང་སྦྱར་

ཆོག་པའི་དགེ་བསྟོའི་སྨོན་ཚིག་ཀྱི། ཀུན་དགེ་སྤྱོང་ཆོས་སྐྱ་བ་ངག་དབང་བློ་བཟང་བསྟན་འཛིན་རྒྱ་
མཚོས་སྦྱར་བའོ།།

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